

# AFRICAN DIRECTIONS

Towards an Equitable Partnership  
in Peace Operations

XENIA AVEZOV, JAÏR VAN DER LIJN  
AND TIMO SMIT

FINAL REPORT OF THE  
NEW GEOPOLITICS OF PEACE  
OPERATIONS II INITIATIVE



# African Directions

## Towards an Equitable Partnership in Peace Operations

XENIA AVEZOV, JAÏR VAN DER LIJN  
AND TIMO SMIT

FINAL REPORT OF THE  
NEW GEOPOLITICS OF PEACE  
OPERATIONS II INITIATIVE



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

**GOVERNING BOARD**

Sven-Olof Petersson, Chairman (Sweden)  
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)  
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia)  
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)  
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)  
Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)  
Dr Radha Kumar (India)  
The Director

**DIRECTOR**

Dan Smith (United Kingdom)



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9  
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden  
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00  
Email: [sipri@sipri.org](mailto:sipri@sipri.org)  
Internet: [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)

## Acknowledgments

The SIPRI New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II Initiative is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, and is conducted in partnership with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this report lies entirely with the authors.

The authors are indebted to the participants of the dialogue meetings for their rich and valuable input. They would also like to acknowledge the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure Programme's data contribution to this report, in particular to the figures in chapter three, and Kajsa Tidblad-Lundholm's invaluable contribution to the literature review. Lastly, the authors are grateful to the reviewers for their very constructive feedback.



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
Netherlands



MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

**FRIEDRICH  
EBERT**   
**STIFTUNG**





# Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	iii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	vi
<i>Executive summary</i>	vii
<b>1. Introduction</b>	1
Recent trends	1
Contemporary discussions	2
The aims of NGP II	4
An outline of the report	5
<b>2. Onwards and upwards: the future African security environment and peace operations</b>	7
Perceptions of the current and future security environment	7
Tackling African security challenges: the requirements and scope of peace operations	9
An African perspective on future peace operations	13
<b>3. From global dependency to global partnership: future peace operation requirements in Africa</b>	17
African capabilities and capacities in perspective	17
Balancing external assistance and African interests: from African ownership to global–regional partnerships	25
<b>4. Coordination and inclusivity in a long-term approach: pathways for future cooperation</b>	33
Constituting the global–regional partnership	33
The challenges of cooperation	39
Elements of a balanced and equitable future cooperation	42
<b>5. Conclusions</b>	47
<b>6. Policy implications</b>	49
Mandates	49
Cooperation	49
Coordination	50
A balanced and equitable partnership	51
<b>List of figures</b>	
Figure 1. Number of personnel in multilateral peace operations, by region, 2006–15	2
Figure 2. Number of multilateral peace operations, by region, 2006–15	3
Figure 3. African armed forces: active personnel, 2015	18
Figure 4. Top 10 African contributors of military personnel to peace operations in Africa, 2015	18
Figure 5. African armed forces: fixed-wing transport aircraft, 2015	19
Figure 6. African armed forces: helicopters, 2015	20
Figure 7. African armed forces: surface ships, 2015	20
Figure 8. African armed forces: armoured vehicles, 2015	21
Figure 9. Military expenditure in Africa, 2015	22
Figure 10. Military expenditure by African countries and France, compared to the United Nations peacekeeping budget, 2015	23
Figure 11. African personnel contributions to peace operations in Africa, 2006–15	26

## Abbreviations

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and integration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EASF	East African Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FOMAC	Central African Multinational Force
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MICEMA	ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force (against Boko Haram)
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
NARC	North African Regional Capacity
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGP	New Geopolitics of Peace Operations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
REC	Regional economic community
RM	Regional mechanism
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
SSF	SADC Standby Force
SSR	Security sector reform
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur



## Executive summary

Africa has increasingly become the focus of peace operations and, by extension, the main arena for new developments and approaches in them. The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II initiative aims to stimulate dialogue on international cooperation in peace operations in Africa. Largely based on six dialogue meetings with participants from different regions in Africa, this report examines perceptions of the future of peace operations on the continent. The report's findings seek to outline pathways to improve future collaboration between African and external actors, and to strengthen their mutual understanding.

Participants in the dialogue meetings stressed the importance of supporting and strengthening conflict prevention, economic development, state capacity and good governance, in order to prevent the escalation of security challenges in the future—challenges which are likely to become increasingly transnational and non-traditional. For peace operations, this will require an increased focus on acute and non-traditional security challenges (e.g. organized crime and terrorism), strengthening their multi-dimensional and civilian character, and deploying more often with transnational or regional mandates.

A limited number of African countries currently contribute the bulk of troops in peace operations in Africa, while external actors provide funding and other forms of assistance, including niche capabilities. Given this mutual dependency and division of labour, neither African actors nor the international community have sufficient leverage to improve operations and make the global–regional partnership more balanced and equitable. In order to overcome this, participants suggested that: (a) African actors increase their financial contributions to operations; (b) African capabilities and capacities for peace operations are strengthened with the help of external actors; and (c) the pool of troop-contributing countries is diversified.

Coordination between the various actors involved in peace operations in Africa is also key and will only increase in importance in the future security environment. Participants pointed out that this requires further agreement on a mechanism to achieve and operationalize the concept of subsidiarity between the United Nations, the African Union and the African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms. They also noted the importance of a common integrated strategy that includes local (civil society) actors in strategic multi-stakeholder decision-making processes.

Last but not least, participants stressed that a truly balanced and equitable global–regional partnership will require: (a) prioritizing local populations, as they are the 'end users of peace'; (b) increasing the African lead role and cooperating on the basis of mutual respect; and (c) strengthening accountability for both the assistance received by African actors and the actions taken by peace operations and the international community.



# 1. Introduction

SIPRI launched the final report on the first phase of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations (NGP I) initiative in January 2015. NGP I aimed to foster a better understanding of the impact of the shifting international power balance and the increasing activism of emerging powers and major troop-contributing countries on the future of peace operations. One of its key findings was that despite the overwhelming consensus on the concepts and principles applied in peace operations, and the perceived crucial importance of peace operations for resolving global conflicts, the number and scope of operations are likely to stagnate in the regions that major powers view as their backyards or where they have conflicting interests. Africa, however, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, will be a clear exception.<sup>1</sup>

NGP I found that emerging and major powers perceive Africa as the region where they have fewer conflicting security interests and the most common security concerns, while African stakeholders are comparably open to hosting and contributing to a wide variety of peace operations in a range of constellations. Consequently, there is a relatively constructive spirit on the continent regarding new peace operations and new developments within them. In many ways, therefore, the future of peace operations is likely to unfold in Africa.

## Recent trends


Recent trends and developments clearly reflect this African dynamic. Currently, about 75 per cent of all peace operation personnel are deployed in Africa (see figure 1), where the vast majority of peace operations are also hosted (see figure 2).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, new operational and normative developments in peace operations, such as increasingly robust and intrusive mandates and the use of modern technologies (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs), tend to take place in Africa.

The development and experiences of peace operations in Africa also contributed to the establishment of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which examined the current state of United Nations peace operations and emerging needs. The HIPPO report and the subsequent report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of its recommendations emphasize ‘global–regional partnerships’ between the UN and regional organizations. The African Union (AU) and the African subregional entities received particular attention, indicating the leading role the continent is expected to continue to play in shaping the future of peace operations.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, despite the improvements in African capabilities and capacities for peace operations, and strong calls for greater African ownership, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has still not reached full operational capability, while the continent will not be able to take on all the military, development-related and civilian requirements of multidimensional peace operations, at least not in the short to medium term. It is thus both relevant and timely to look at how to improve international cooperation in peace operations in Africa.

<sup>1</sup> Van der Lijn, J. and Avezov, X., *The Future Peace Operations Landscape: Voices from Stakeholders Around the Globe*, Final Report of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations Initiative (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> Van der Lijn, J., Smit, T. and Höghammar, T., ‘Peace operations and conflict management’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016), pp. 269–319.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June 2015; and United Nations, General Assembly, The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/357–S/2015/682, 2 Sep. 2015.



**Figure 1.** Number of personnel in multilateral peace operations, by region, 2006–15

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

## Contemporary discussions

The future of peace operations in Africa has already been the subject of much debate in literature and there are four recurring issues that stand out.

1. *The development of APSA.*<sup>4</sup> APSA was founded in the early 2000s to better enable African peace and security structures to protect civilians and respond to human rights abuses and armed conflicts.<sup>5</sup> Since then, however, the security environment has changed quite significantly in many parts of Africa, which has implications for the further development of APSA, including the much delayed African Standby Force (ASF) and African-led peace support operations.<sup>6</sup> In particular, both scholars and practitioners have emphasized that APSA needs to be enhanced and that it has the means required to meet the challenges associated with terrorism, disaster management, piracy and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as transnational organized crime, climate change and food insecurity.<sup>7</sup>


2. *Strategic partnerships.* Strategic partnerships and cooperation between the AU and its external partners are a key issue. The AU and individual African states have already established or explored partnerships with multilateral organizations such as

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Badmus, I. A., *The African Union's Role in Peacekeeping: Building on Lessons Learned from Security Operations* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2015); Gebrehiwot, B. M. and de Waal, A., 'Peace missions in Africa: constraints, challenges and opportunities', Preliminary Report to the African Union, World Peace Foundation, Mar. 2015; Lotze, W., 'Strengthening African peace support operations: nine lessons for the future of the African Standby Force', Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) Policy Briefing, Dec. 2013; Okeke, J. M., 'United in challenges? The African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises', eds C. de Coning, L. Gelot and J. Karlsrud, *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram* (Zed Books: London, 2016); and Williams, P. D. and Boutellis, A., 'Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union relationship', *African Affairs*, vol. 113, no. 451 (2014), pp. 254–78.

<sup>5</sup> Engel, U. and Porto, G. D., *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance* (Ashgate: Burlington, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> Aning, K. and Abdallah, M., 'Confronting hybrid threats in Africa: improving multidimensional responses', eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4); de Coning, C., 'Adapting the African Standby Force to a just-in-time readiness model: improved alignment with the emerging African model of peace operations', eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4); Dersso S. A., 'Confronting hybrid threats in Africa: improving multidimensional responses', eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4); and Leijenaar, A., 'Africa can solve its own problems with proper planning and full implementation of the African Standby Force', Blog post, Institute for Security Studies, 21 Jan. 2014, <<https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-can-solve-its-own-problems-with-proper-planning-and-full-implementation-of-the-african-standby-force>>.

<sup>7</sup> Fisher L. M. et al., 'African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 assessment study', Commissioned by the African Union's Peace and Security Department, 2010; and Aning, K. and Abdallah, M., 'Confronting hybrid threats in Africa: improving multidimensional responses', eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4).



**Figure 2.** Number of multilateral peace operations, by region, 2006–15

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as on a bilateral level with states such as China, India, Japan, Russia and Turkey.<sup>8</sup> There is broad consensus that sound strategic partnerships remain crucial to sustaining and improving African peace operations in the foreseeable future.<sup>9</sup> For example, de Coning et al. argue that both the continuous development of existing partnerships as well as the establishment of new ones will be important.<sup>10</sup>

3. *Subsidiarity and AU–REC/RM relations.* The development of relations between the AU and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the interpretation of the subsidiarity principle—meaning issues should be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level consistent with their resolution—is a key issue that affects future peace operations in Africa.<sup>11</sup> For example, Ndiaye argues that although the subsidiarity principle is fundamental to the relationship between the UN, the AU and the RECs/RMs, it has often become an obstacle in terms of providing strategic and rapid responses to crises. In particular, it is not clear what the principle means for the relationship and disagreements on how it should be interpreted tend to slow down action when rapid response is required.<sup>12</sup> Gebrehiwot and de Waal, for example, stress the importance of clarifying the role of the subsidiarity principle and call for a stronger agreement between the AU and the RECs/RMs to define their relationship.<sup>13</sup>

4. *Donor dependency and financial self-reliance.* The question of how peace operations in Africa should be financed and by whom is a topic that keeps resurfacing.<sup>14</sup> The majority of the costs for peace operations in Africa are borne by external

<sup>8</sup> De Coning, C., Gelot, L. and Karlsrud, J., ‘African peace operations: trends and future scenarios, conclusions and recommendations’, eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4), p. 136.

<sup>9</sup> See e.g. Boutellis, A. and Williams, P. D., *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships* (International Peace Institute: New York, Apr. 2013); Darkwa, L., ‘The strategic relationship between the African Union and its partners’, eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4); Gebrehiwot and de Waal (note 4); Lotze (note 4); and Williams, P. D., ‘Enhancing US support for peace operations in Africa’, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report no. 73, May 2015.

<sup>10</sup> De Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 8), pp. 135–36.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Fisher et al. (note 7); and de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 8).

<sup>12</sup> Ndiaye, M., ‘The relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs in relation to peace and security in Africa: subsidiarity and inevitable common destiny’, eds de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (note 4), p. 52.

<sup>13</sup> Gebrehiwot and de Waal (note 4), pp. 19–22.

<sup>14</sup> See e.g. Jentzsh, C., ‘Opportunities and challenges to financing African Union Peace Operations’, *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 86–107; and Williams (note 9).

partners—notably China, the EU (including its member states), the UN and the United States—which has major implications in terms of sustainability and African ownership, as well as for the partnerships with these actors.<sup>15</sup> For example, Gebrehiwot and de Waal argue that the main reason why the AU turns to the UN Security Council is financial. They also point to the gap that exists between the political will in Africa to take ambitious political decisions on the one hand, and the financial resources necessary to implement them on the other.<sup>16</sup> Looking forward, de Coning claims that the AU will not be able to make its own independent decisions regarding the mandate, scope, size and duration of peace operations as long as it is dependent on funding from external partners.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, Darkwa highlights that while the AU has not been able to independently finance its peace operations, AU member states have been the ones providing the vital boots on the ground for new types of peace operation in Africa.<sup>18</sup>

### The aims of NGP II

It is clear from the above that it was both relevant and timely for the second phase of the NGP initiative (NGP II) to focus on how to improve international cooperation in peace operations in Africa. Within its overarching goal of identifying pathways for improving international cooperation in peace operations in Africa, NGP II aimed to (a) create additional forums in which to discuss the future of peace operations in Africa, at the subregional, regional and global levels—as informal space for fresh views to be heard, facilitating frank debate and dialogue is rare; (b) inform relevant policy stakeholders about diverse African perspectives on peace operations in Africa; and (c) gather data on the various perceptions, positions and interests of the different stakeholders.

This NGP II final report seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on how the international community can best address current and emerging security challenges in Africa, and to a broader discussion on the future direction of peace operations and their scope.

### Research questions

The report provides insights into the following five research questions.

1. What types of conflict and what security challenges are foreseen in the next 5–10 years in the different African subregions and in Africa as a whole?
2. What types of peace operation will be needed to tackle such conflicts and security challenges, and in what way do the current international and regional responses need to change?
3. What kind of contribution can African states and organizations make to these future peace operations?
4. What contributions to peace operations are likely to be required from countries and organizations outside the region in the future?
5. How can coordination and cooperation be improved between the AU, the African subregional entities, the UN, other international organizations and bilateral partners?

<sup>15</sup> Desmidt, S., 'Peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict monitoring in the African Peace and Security Architecture', European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Background note, Aug. 2016, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Gebrehiwot and de Waal (note 4).

<sup>17</sup> De Coning, 'Adapting the African Standby Force to a just-in-time readiness model: improved alignment with the emerging African model of peace operations' (note 6), pp. 123–24.

<sup>18</sup> Darkwa (note 9), p. 71.

## Methodology

In order to collect the data and to discuss the above questions, regional dialogue meetings were organized during the autumn of 2015 in five African subregions: West Africa, the Greater Horn of Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa and Sahel-Saharan Africa. The meetings, which were co-organized and funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), brought together a range of leading African experts, military and government officials, representatives of civil society and representatives of international organizations.

For the research purpose of the initiative, the dialogue meetings served as focus group meetings.<sup>19</sup> In order to facilitate the free exchange of information, participants were informed in advance that any input or discussion during the meetings would remain anonymous. References in the text are therefore made only to a specific dialogue meeting, region, country or professional affiliation. The meetings consisted of sessions in which each research question was discussed for the subregion and for Africa as a whole. Each session began with a number of ‘kick-off’ presentations to set the stage for the rest of the discussion. In order to ensure ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking—not limited by current or cultural assumptions—the definition of a peace operation was left open to the interpretation of the participants.<sup>20</sup> Restricting the discussion to current definitions of a peace operation would risk missing the point of how peace operations may (need to) change in the future. The thematic highlights from each regional dialogue meeting were published in workshop reports.<sup>21</sup>

Following the regional dialogue meetings, a global dialogue meeting was organized in Brussels to bring together selected participants from the African dialogue meetings, representatives from the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the EU and the UN, as well as experts and military and government officials from African and European countries, the USA and Russia. The global meeting was designed as a forum to discuss the way forward for international cooperation in Africa, using the findings from the regional dialogue meetings and thematic presentations from African participants as a baseline for discussion.

The analysis and research findings outlined in this final report are based on data gathered from the dialogue meetings and the inputs of its almost 150 participants, supplemented with interviews with African and external stakeholders, and a literature review.

## An outline of the report

Chapter two discusses African perceptions of the security challenges in Africa and its subregions in the coming 5–10 years, as well as the perceived need for responses

<sup>19</sup> Focus group meetings are ‘a form of group interview that capitalises on communication between research participants in order to generate data. Although group interviews are often used simply as a quick and convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously, focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the method. This means that instead of the researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other’s experiences and points of view. The method is particularly useful for exploring people’s knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way’. See Kitzinger, J., ‘Qualitative research: introducing focus groups’, *British Medical Journal*, vol. 311, no. 7000 (July 1995), pp. 299–302.

<sup>20</sup> In order to explain the broad scope of the research, reference was made to the broad range of activities that fall within the HIPPO definition of peace operations and that AU peace support operations are part of this. See United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3), pp. 12–13.

<sup>21</sup> Avezov, X., ‘The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: A dialogue with West Africa’, SIPRI Workshop Report, Abuja, 16–18 Sep. 2015; Avezov, X., ‘The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: A dialogue with the Greater Horn of Africa’, SIPRI Workshop Report, Addis Ababa, 20–22 Sep. 2015; Avezov, X., ‘The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: A dialogue with Central Africa’, SIPRI Workshop Report, Douala, 24–25 Sep. 2015; Avezov, X., ‘The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: A dialogue with Southern Africa’, SIPRI Workshop Report, Maputo, 28–30 Oct. 2015; and Avezov, X., ‘The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: A dialogue with Sahel-Saharan Africa’, SIPRI Workshop Report, Bamako, 16–18 Nov. 2015.

to them. The chapter examines views on which responses should take place in the context of peace operations and which should not, as well as the likely types of international and regional peace operation response required and their scope.

Chapter three takes stock of the capabilities and capacities that African countries and organizations have at their disposal to deploy in the future peace operations identified in chapter two, and the types of capability that are most likely to be required from external actors. The chapter outlines the challenges of, and potential pathways to, balancing the need for external assistance with African calls for an increased role in agenda-setting and decision-making processes regarding peace operations on the continent. Finally, it investigates a number of challenges linked to the current mutual dependence of African actors and the international community, and how to move to a more balanced and equitable global–regional partnership.

Chapter four examines how international cooperation in peace operations in Africa could be improved in the near future to ensure a more balanced and equitable global–regional partnership. It looks at the main actors in peace operations and their different modes of cooperation, focusing on the main challenges for cooperation between them. The chapter then suggests a number of elements for a balanced and equitable future cooperation.

Chapter five draws overall conclusions on the future of peace operations in Africa and the implications for international cooperation.

Chapter six concludes the report by considering what implications its findings could have for policy, looking to find a middle ground where African and external actors are able to meet in order to build on and improve current peace operations.



## 2. Onwards and upwards: the future African security environment and peace operations

In order to discuss the required responses from peace operations in the future, it is important to first grasp what the future security environment might look like and what kinds of peace operation might be needed to address the related security challenges. This chapter describes the perceptions of the participants at the regional dialogue meetings as regards the current and future security environment, their views on whether these challenges should be addressed inside or outside peace operations, as well as what this would mean for peace operations.

### Perceptions of the current and future security environment

The discussions in the dialogue meetings on the future security environment in Africa showed that the challenges are complex, intertwined and interrelated, and their effects are increasingly having transnational and global repercussions. The security challenges and priorities in the different subregions were first identified in a brainstorm and subsequently clustered. They vary within and between each subregion. Nonetheless, in broad strokes, participants in the dialogue meetings painted a picture in which the underlying causes of armed conflict and instability in Africa will continue to be a combination of poverty, inequality and resource scarcity, as well as weak state institutions and weak or poor governance.

State institutions frequently fail to provide adequate services, employment opportunities and protection for much of their population, especially in the peripheries away from larger cities where governments and institutional headquarters are based. There was a strong sense in the dialogue meetings that insufficient investment in public welfare fuels poverty and increases vulnerability to pandemics and migration, which in turn exacerbate the degradation of social cohesion and solidarity in a number of African countries. Governments often lack accountability and are becoming increasingly hybrid, as they are sometimes ‘held hostage’ by corrupt ruling elites, criminals and other non-state actors. This dynamic contributes to economic inequality and a sense of relative deprivation among already frustrated and marginalized populations throughout Africa, which are increasingly losing faith in governments, public institutions and abusive formal security sectors.

Consequently, criminal networks, gangs, vigilante groups, pirates, terrorists and insurgents operating in the weakly governed spaces around and across a number of porous borders, and within marginalized areas of cities in particular, find a fertile recruiting ground among vulnerable segments of the population. Especially susceptible are the unemployed and youth, who lack access to legitimate income-generating opportunities and education, and who are socially and politically excluded, giving them little hope for a better future. Given that populations throughout Africa are growing rapidly and are overwhelmingly young, the susceptibility of youth to radicalization and criminality was seen as a priority issue in all the regional dialogue meetings.

While some optimism for the future was expressed in the Greater Horn of Africa and West Africa meetings, there was a general consensus that the security situation in Africa is likely to deteriorate in the future if underlying causes of conflict are not sufficiently addressed. Four factors that could exacerbate the security situation in Africa were highlighted throughout the meetings.

1. *Environmental degradation and resource scarcity.* These were highlighted in all the regions as factors exacerbating instability and conflict. In the Greater Horn of, Southern and West Africa meetings, participants noted that droughts and water shortages caused by global warming are affecting the availability of grazing land, drinking water and food, thereby fuelling conflict among impoverished populations in particular. Environmental degradation caused by excessive and under-regulated mining, as well as poaching and deforestation driven by unsustainable trade practices and an increased demand for basic commodities, were noted in the Central, Southern and West Africa meetings.

2. *The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW).* Participants in all the meetings stressed that throughout Africa, and particularly in so-called ungoverned or weakly governed spaces, this proliferation is exacerbating the lethality of conflicts, crime, terrorism and insurgency, and is putting the communities most affected by instability and war in greater danger.

3. *The degradation of democratic institutions and a closing down of political space.* These were seen as further drivers of communal tensions and conflict as frustrated, poor and marginalized groups have little opportunity to express their discontent through participation in democratic processes. The perceived increasing numbers of coups d'état and attempts by leaders to change constitutions in order to cling to power—especially in regions such as Central and West Africa—and the lack of inclusion, representation and responsiveness for marginalized groups and civil society throughout the continent, with the resulting uprisings among non-state actors and frustrated populations, were seen as indicative of these trends.

4. *Migration flows.* These flows within different regions and from rural to urban areas throughout Africa—often caused by changing environmental conditions, conflict and the hope for a better future elsewhere—add to tensions as migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons compete with local populations for resources, employment, space and land.

### **Acute security challenges**

Taking into account the above underlying causes and exacerbating factors, participants in the regional dialogue meetings noted six acute security challenges that Africa is either currently facing or likely to face in the short to medium term (in random order).

1. *Communal, identity-based and religious conflict.* These types of conflict were noted in all the meetings. In the Central and Greater Horn of Africa meetings, in particular, the distribution of ethnic populations across borders and the marginalization of minority populations in the different countries of the subregions were expected to cause further tensions and, in the opinion of some, proxy wars. In the Greater Horn of, Southern and West Africa meetings it was predicted that clashes between different ethnic and religious communities would be exacerbated by droughts and water shortages. In the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting, participants noted that religious conflict among Christians and different branches of Islam is increasing. Participants from Central and West Africa suggested that competition over resources as well as election-related tensions create fertile conditions for identity-based conflicts.

2. *Insurgencies.* Violent challenges to governments by insurgent organizations were seen as a priority security problem in most subregions, the exception being Southern Africa. Participants recognized that the dynamics on which insurgencies feed are complex and can be particularly strong in the periphery of countries or in 'ungoverned

spaces'. These provide havens for insurgent groups, which can easily cross borders and benefit from external support.

3. *Terrorism*. The violence and instability caused by jihadist terrorism was seen as a priority security issue in all the subregions. The Greater Horn of Africa, Sahel-Saharan Africa and West Africa were seen as particular hotbeds for terrorism, but similar concerns were expressed in Central and Southern Africa. Although terrorism and insurgencies are often driven by similar factors, and both flourish in ungoverned spaces, they present different security challenges. Insurgencies are often driven by political or territorial aims, while terrorist groups often seek to delegitimize the government but not necessarily to challenge it.<sup>22</sup> Each requires a different response. Nonetheless, they were commonly conflated in the dialogue meetings, as rebel organizations were often labelled as terrorists.

4. *Organized crime*. The proliferation of organized crime, and in particular transnational organized crime, was highlighted in most subregions. In the Central, Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings, participants held extensive discussions on the governance vacuum in border areas in their subregions, where criminal activity such as the trafficking of people, drugs and SALW is commonplace. Transnational organized crime not only threatens the security of local communities, but also destabilizes entire regions, as criminal networks combine with the above-mentioned challenges of terrorism and insurgency to create new hybrid security challenges. Moreover, in Southern Africa and West Africa, crime also affects major cities and state institutions. Cybercrime, for instance, was specifically noted in Southern and West Africa as a new security challenge for which states within the subregions are ill-prepared, and one that would therefore continue to proliferate and potentially cause substantial instability.

5. *Piracy*. While the international community has made progress with managing piracy off the coast of Somalia, participants in Central, the Greater Horn of, Southern and West Africa noted that piracy was likely to remain an acute security challenge in the Gulf of Guinea and on the East African coast, from the Horn down to the Mozambique Channel. Participants from Somalia suggested that piracy is likely to persist as a result of current socio-economic conditions, particularly in impoverished countries where there is little access to legitimate opportunities for income generation.

6. *Social conflict*. The potential for social conflict and revolts was noted in all the meetings but primarily highlighted in Central, Southern and West Africa. Participants in the Central and West Africa meetings, in particular, predicted that the unwillingness of populations across the continent to continue to accept what they perceive as weak and corrupt governance, growing authoritarianism and rigged elections has the potential to create instability. Even in Southern Africa, a relatively economically well-off subregion, some believed that growing inequality, marginalization and dissatisfaction with state institutions might lead to a mass uprising in an 'African Spring'.<sup>23</sup>

### Tackling African security challenges: the requirements and scope of peace operations

Participants in the dialogue meetings called for the application of a broad and expanding range of policies and instruments to meet the complex security challenges described above. However, four areas of focus were identified as key to dealing with future conflict in Africa (in random order).

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. Hoffman, B., *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press: New York, 2006), pp. 35–36.

<sup>23</sup> See also Kigwangalla, H., 'Why was there no "African Spring"?', Aljazeera, 24 July 2014.

1. *Strengthening strategies for conflict prevention.* Participants in all the meetings and from all backgrounds called for a greater international focus on conflict prevention. The need to reinforce regional and subregional early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms in order to meet the complex security challenges in Africa in a sustainable manner was especially highlighted. Efforts by the AU and subregional organizations should also move beyond short-term action to prevent a specific conflict, to long-term structural prevention that addresses underlying causes. A variety of forms of such structural prevention were mentioned, ranging from demarcating borders and strengthening regional integration, freedom of movement and trade, to enhancing national and local conflict resolution and peacebuilding infrastructures.

2. *Strengthening state institutions and good governance.* There was a broad consensus that further strengthening state institutions and consolidating nation states should be key priorities, alongside creating more opportunities for marginalized populations, reducing inequality and stimulating good and accountable governance. Governance issues are crucial since many of the acute security challenges mentioned in the meetings, particularly the non-traditional ones, will require strong and coordinated responses from states and state institutions.

3. *Improving economic development.* In a similar vein, participants from across the continent and from all different backgrounds noted with concern that the current international agenda is too focused on security and military solutions, and insufficiently concerned about the underlying causes of conflict linked to economic development issues. While efforts to build up national armed forces, secure borders and combat terrorism are important instruments for maintaining security, long-term improvements in areas such as infrastructure, public health, education, poverty reduction and employment are paramount in order to move away from responding to the symptoms of conflict and towards creating lasting peace.

4. *Addressing acute, often non-traditional security challenges.* Despite the emphasis on long-term, holistic and preventative approaches to conflict management in Africa, the need to address acute security challenges such as terrorism, criminality and insurgency—particularly in ungoverned or weakly governed spaces—was seen as vital in the short term. Many participants emphasized that any increased focus on economic development and governance should not be at the expense of dealing with insurgency and terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, the March 23 Movement (M23) and al-Shabab. Robust challenges would ultimately require robust responses. They argued that while underlying causes should receive much more attention, managing the symptoms should not be forgotten, as populations will have to be protected against them.<sup>24</sup>

### **Expanding the scope of peace operations**

While not new, the focus areas outlined above suggest that peace operations may have to adapt further in order to rise to the complex security challenges that Africa will continue to face in the future. Since the deployment of the first UN peacekeeping operation in 1947–48, the organizations involved have multiplied and the character and tasks of peace operations have evolved.<sup>25</sup> Yet, while there was consensus among participants in the regional dialogue meetings on the need to expand and enhance efforts to deal with security challenges in Africa, there was less agreement on whether

<sup>24</sup> See also the Windhoek Declaration, ‘Silencing the guns—terrorism, mediation and armed groups’, 6th annual retreat of special envoys and mediators on the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, Windhoek, Namibia, 21–22 Oct. 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P. D., ‘Trends in peace operations 1947–2013’, eds J. A. Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015), pp. 13–42.

and how such tasks should be implemented within peace operations. Nonetheless, a majority was in favour of expansion. In general, participants from civil society backgrounds stressed the need to address the underlying causes of conflict within operations, whereas participants from military backgrounds often emphasized the need for missions to tackle acute security challenges. Almost no one in the meetings advocated limited and targeted operations, and even those from military backgrounds agreed that more needs to be done to address the underlying causes of conflict, including a greater focus on economic development. Four overarching rationales for expanding the scope of peace operations were discernible in the regional dialogue meetings.

1. *Expanding the scope of operations to tackle non-traditional and acute challenges is necessary in order to remain relevant.* This argument was very strong in the Greater Horn of, Sahel-Saharan and West Africa subregions, and reinforced in the global dialogue—particularly when it comes to insurgencies, terrorism and organized crime. In Sahel-Saharan and West Africa, it was noted that without addressing these acute challenges, peace operations would not be able to build peace and help to provide services to vulnerable populations, let alone rebuild institutions. These acute challenges would also ultimately require the adaptation of UN peacekeeping mandates and principles.

2. *Including additional tasks in peace operations also has a practical financial effect.* Many participants accepted a continued dependence of African states and organizations on external funding and assistance for addressing security challenges on the continent in the short to medium term. Military and government representatives therefore seemed to favour including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism aspects in the context of peace operations, as that would better guarantee capacity and sustainable funding.

3. *The legitimacy and accountability of responses to non-traditional challenges, such as terrorism, are more likely to be guaranteed by including them in peace operations.* In the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting, participants from Mali, for example, argued that including counterterrorism in UN peacekeeping operations was preferable because such operations are guided by collective global security interests and standards. Rather than outsourcing elements or allowing countries to intervene on their own, expanding mandates might make it easier for the international community to regulate the quality and effectiveness of responses. A participant in the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting used the example of MINUSMA to argue that by outsourcing counterterrorism tasks to French-led operations or ECOWAS, the international community was losing its ability to regulate the response to terrorism while at the same time opening the door to less legitimate interventions motivated by geostrategic interests rather than maintaining stability and peace.

4. *Expanding the scope of peace operations enhances the prospects for developing a more comprehensive approach.* Several participants in the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting suggested that peace operations provide a common framework in which the international community, including states and subregional organizations, can work jointly to achieve their common security interests. It could be argued that a common approach is more likely to be formulated in the context of a peace operation, which brings together different national approaches and different instruments, rather than outside of it.

### **Growing pains: the challenges of expansion**

Despite majority support in the meetings for the expansion of peace operations, many recognized the challenges that operations will face if they continue to expand. Participants identified seven major challenges.

1. *Peace operations are already stretched to capacity.* According to some participants in the Greater Horn of, Sahel-Saharan and West Africa dialogue meetings, expanding existing or adding new tasks, such as those linked to development cooperation or counterterrorism, might further undermine the ability of missions to meet expectations and sustainably manage conflict. An AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) official in the Greater Horn of Africa meeting reinforced this point by suggesting that operations such as AMISOM already have limited capacity and would therefore be simply unable to take on economic development tasks. In the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting, an official from MINUSMA asserted that the mission would not have the military capacity to take on counterterrorism tasks in addition to its already taxing stabilization mandate.

2. *Expanding the scope of peace operations would increase reliance on regional and external troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as on financial contributors driven by geostrategic interests or less noble motives.* In all the meetings, but especially in the Sahel-Saharan, Southern and West Africa meetings, participants suggested that unless or until African actors were willing or able to fund their own operations, external interests and geopolitical dynamics would continue to have a significant influence on the peace operation agenda in Africa. Participants were also concerned about the national and geostrategic interests that might be driving the contributions of the largest African troop- and police-contributing countries (see chapter three). An increased reliance on these troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors would reduce the leverage over them, with potentially counterproductive results for stability in Africa in the long term.

3. *Expanding the tasks of peace operations is likely to result in even more attention on the military component within them.* Participants in the Central, Greater Horn of, Southern and West Africa dialogue meetings suggested that missions in Africa are already too focused on their military aspects and that more tasks would, given the dominant military mindset in African peace operations, automatically mean more military tasks. Participants from Southern Africa, in particular, also expressed concern that including more development cooperation, humanitarian aid or peacebuilding tasks in peace operations that traditionally focus on military solutions would risk securitizing them.

4. *Although peace operations taking on more development-related tasks would increase their legitimacy, it might also challenge the legitimacy of host states and governments.* In this context, for example, a former government representative from Mali argued that even the civil–military coordination (CIMIC) projects implemented by MINUSMA in essence weakened the Malian state, as the legitimacy of the government depends on service delivery and the CIMIC projects would replace this government role.

5. *Adding increasingly robust, broad and intrusive tasks to mission mandates might further challenge working relationships between missions, host governments and other parties to a conflict.* While operations are often deployed with the consent of all parties, host governments or other parties do not always agree with certain aspects of a mandate. It is particularly difficult for multidimensional stabilization missions such as MINUSMA—which have a robust mandate, on the one hand, and are tasked with initiating and facilitating a delicate peace process, on the other—to maintain perceptions of their impartiality while effectively carrying out their mandate.

6. *In the case of UN peacekeeping operations, upholding the peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent of the parties and the non-use of force will become much more difficult if UN operations take on non-traditional security challenges.* Participants in the Sahel-Saharan Africa and global meetings debated the importance of preserving these principles. Some suggested that the principles should adapt to the new security environment, which would require greater flexibility, while a smaller group stressed the importance of keeping enforcement tasks separate from peace operations in order to preserve the legitimacy and safety of ‘blue helmets’ (UN peacekeepers). Some participants were concerned that UN peacekeeping operations would lose their perceived impartiality if they incorporated counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tasks, and would come to be seen as a party to the conflict.

7. *Peace operations may not always be the most suitable tool for resolving every security problem.* This was a minority view throughout the dialogue meetings, but was also raised by an interviewed South African official, who stressed that given the long-term capacities and commitments required to address non-traditional security challenges—such as organized crime and terrorism—including these in operations would make deployments unnecessarily protracted and expensive. A participant from Egypt suggested that when it comes to counterterrorism, for example, only states would have the capacity to invest in a long-term security strategy reinforced by the rule of law.

## An African perspective on future peace operations

Given the fact that peace operations have been developing over time to accommodate and adapt to changing security environments, and taking into account the advantages and disadvantages entailed in any further expansion noted above, participants in the African dialogue meetings generally believed that peace operations in Africa should continue to broaden their horizons. From their input, it is possible to distil a number of likely types of international and regional peace operation.

### **A continued need for multidimensional operations**

In most meetings, but particularly in the West Africa meeting, many participants argued that the multidimensionality and integrated nature of many existing peace operations should be maintained, if not deepened and expanded. From this perspective, a broader range of tasks that includes everything from reconstruction to peace-building, facilitating a peace process and combating terrorism would allow operations to engage more effectively in addressing the underlying causes of conflict and building a sustainable peace. Moreover, there is a predominance of poverty, inequality, weak state institutions and poor governance in various parts of the continent. These are all important underlying causes of conflict and instability, and illustrated for many participants the continued need for multidimensional peace operations that support African states in building their capacity, strengthening accountability, and fostering reconciliation and inclusiveness.

For many participants, particularly those with a civil society background, multidimensional peace operations, and particularly the non-military or civilian aspects of such operations, would help to balance their current military and security focus in Africa. Multidimensionality and the corresponding improvements in infrastructure and welfare would also ensure that peace operations have lasting and sustainable effects. However, different regions emphasized different additional aspects. Participants in the West Africa dialogue meeting specifically noted the importance of incorporating long-term programmes into mandates concerning reconciliation at

the communal and national levels, and strengthening them where they already exist; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and deradicalization programmes; and rebuilding and strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms. In Central Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa, a large group of participants stressed the importance of integrating development and humanitarian tasks into mandates. Some in the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting noted the importance of taking religion into account and the need for staff specialized in religion.

Some participants argued that peace operations, particularly those not deployed by the UN, rarely have sufficient capacity to take on such broad, multidimensional mandates. This view was expressed most strongly in the Greater Horn of, Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings. However, the majority of participants argued that a lack of capacity is not an argument against multidimensionality in itself, and suggested instead that international and regional actors and organizations should invest more in multidimensional peace operations to ensure their effectiveness and contribution to a durable peace.

### **An increasing emphasis on civilian missions and components in missions: long- and short-term prevention**

Interestingly, participants did not generally refer to ‘civilian missions’ and only rarely to civilian capabilities in the discussions about the types of peace operation that are required. In fact, they used the term peace operations primarily to describe military missions such as peacekeeping, peace support and peace enforcement missions. When discussing the instruments that might be required in future peace operations, however, participants referred to a variety of approaches and tools that are commonly used in civilian missions or civilian components of peace operations.

#### *Civilian missions with a focus on democratization, good governance and the rule of law*

In the Southern Africa meeting large military peace operations were seen as incompatible with a security environment characterized by low-intensity conflict, organized and petty crime, and human security challenges. Instead, participants focused on the need for a set of non-military tasks related to building a positive peace and human security environment, such as supporting the rule of law and good governance, democratization and policing, which are also often performed within the context of civilian missions. In fact, field missions that have been deployed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) since the end of the cold war encompass very similar tasks and goals.

Similarly, many participants in other meetings also emphasized the need to strengthen state institutions, promote good governance and foster the rule of law in order to enhance structural conflict prevention in the long term. In West Africa, participants described the need for the consolidation of state institutions, and more specifically to build more accountable and legitimate state institutions and security sectors. Anti-corruption efforts were also mentioned as a priority in the Central and West Africa meetings, as these would enable a fairer distribution of the resource wealth of both subregions and by extension help to prepare for future challenges such as resource scarcity and environmental degradation.

Participants in the Central Africa meeting, in particular, stressed that in addition to educating the population about electoral processes, there is a need to improve education more generally and to provide better services and information to marginalized communities with low levels of literacy and little access to information. This type of civilian democratization, good governance and rule of law mission—longer-term



structural prevention along the lines of OSCE field missions, although never explicitly labelled as such—would have the added advantage of being less controversial than short-term prevention in the form of monitoring missions.

#### *Civilian missions for short-term prevention and elections observation*

In addition to the long-term structural prevention missions described above, the participants in the Central, Greater Horn of, Southern and West Africa meetings, in particular, regarded a greater focus on short-term conflict prevention in operations as crucial. Short-term electoral violence prevention tasks were seen as particularly relevant in the Central and West Africa meetings. Participants in the Central Africa meeting noted the ongoing post-election violence in Burundi, and feared the possible consequences of elections scheduled in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Many feared that the series of elections in the subregion might lead to mass instability and the degradation of democratic institutions if the outcome or legitimacy of the ballots were contested, or if ruling elites attempted to preserve their power by modifying constitutions or oppressing opposition parties. Some criticized the international community for its inability or unwillingness to prevent election-related conflict, especially in cases where there are clear signs of impending conflict in advance of the poll.

Participants suggested that in addition to regular election observation, which is usually focused on polling days, more substantial electoral observer missions should be deployed well ahead of elections to support the entire electoral process: by enabling dialogue with key political players on mutually acceptable election protocols, monitoring the political parties competing in the election and educating the population about the electoral process. Uniformed personnel could step in where such civilian observer missions fail to prevent armed conflict. Participants acknowledged that many African countries would object to such missions, as they would be regarded as outside interference in their domestic affairs.

#### **More crisis management operations to address acute and non-traditional security challenges**

Acute and non-traditional security challenges (see above) were highlighted as priorities in all the regional dialogue meetings. While the importance of addressing the underlying causes of insurgencies, terrorism and organized crime was clear, short-term security was still seen by many participants as crucial to effective peace operations.

#### *Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions*

Counterinsurgency in the context of peace operations was mostly discussed in the Greater Horn of Africa and West Africa meetings. Counterterrorism was particularly high on the peace operations agenda in the Greater Horn of Africa, Sahel-Saharan Africa, West Africa and global dialogue meetings. In contrast to the recommendations contained in the HIPPO report—that ‘United Nations troops should not undertake military counterterrorism operations’ and ‘Extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy’—many participants felt that in order to remain relevant, the UN would have to possess the capability to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.<sup>26</sup> In the Sahel-Saharan Africa dialogue meeting, in particular, participants—especially from Mali but also some from North Africa—called for the inclusion of counterterrorism mandates in UN peace operations such as MINUSMA. In addition to the frequently perceived

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3), p. 12.

self-evident logic of including counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in peace operations, the widespread conflation of the two concepts was striking. Generally, all military action against Islamist groups such as AQIM, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine and al-Shabab, regardless of the strategies involved, was called counterterrorism.

*Missions to counter transnational organized crime, piracy and illegal migration*

Organized crime, including cybercrime, was raised as a significant security challenge, particularly in the Southern and West Africa meetings. Participants in both meetings noted that given the limited resources and the transnational nature of organized crime, states in Africa are not in a position to address the issue on their own. Participants generally agreed that although combating organized crime in a sustainable manner would require a wider set of instruments and more attention paid to the economic development, immediate responses to mitigate the acute aspects of international organized crime would still be required in the short term. In the West Africa meeting, some suggested that peace operations in general should be given the specialized capabilities and capacities required to police and stamp out organized crime. Alternatively, specialized crisis management operations were perceived to be pertinent given the interconnected and transnational nature of the challenge.

Despite the frequent references in the regional dialogue meetings to the need for future peace operations to respond to other non-traditional challenges, including piracy and illegal migration, participants did not describe in detail the tasks and responsibilities that such missions would need to take on. Many of the questions about the roles and practicalities of peace operations in responding to non-traditional challenges therefore remained unanswered.

### **Regional operations**

Given the regional and transboundary nature of many of the security challenges in Africa, participants frequently suggested that in order to operate effectively, future peace operations will require regional thinking, approaches, strategies and solutions, and will therefore more often need to have a regional character. In all the meetings it was pointed out that many of the underlying causes—such as the distribution of ethnic populations across borders, the marginalization of minority populations and the geopolitical tensions that these sometimes lead to—are regional rather than national in character. In addition, many of the acute challenges also manifest themselves transnationally and even when they are predominantly national, they often make use of porous borders or external backers. Insurgent, transnational organized criminal, terrorist and pirate groups, in particular, frequently operate in the weakly governed spaces around and across porous borders. These groups do not respect borders and therefore many participants argued that neither should peace operations.

Solutions can be partly found in further strengthening inter-mission cooperation, while peace operations with national mandates can also emphasize and support regional approaches. According to a UN official in the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting, MINUSMA, for example, is aware of and supports regional approaches to fighting terrorism and organized crime. However, regional operations were seen as preferable.

### 3. From global dependency to global partnership: future peace operation requirements in Africa

This chapter looks at the capabilities and capacities considered to be required for future peace in Africa. It observes a mutual dependency between African actors and the international community, which comes with both advantages and disadvantages to all involved, and makes the achievement of objectives all the more challenging. It concludes that a balanced and equitable partnership is required—in which this mutual dependency is decreased, and the leverage of both African actors and the international community is increased—to ensure the best possible peace operations in Africa.

#### African capabilities and capacities in perspective

##### **Data on troops, equipment and funding in Africa**


Data from the International Institute for Security Studies and SIPRI on African armed forces, military expenditure and multilateral peace operations, combined with some reflections from the dialogue meetings, are a helpful reference point for the current African capabilities and capacities to implement the international and regional peace operations necessary to deal with future security challenges in Africa (see chapter two).

The assumption in the dialogue meetings (and frequently elsewhere) is that African countries have sufficient human resources in terms of available infantry units—and several countries in Africa do indeed maintain relatively large armed forces. Figure 3 shows the number of active personnel in the armed forces of major military powers in Africa, as well as the largest troop contributors to peace operations.<sup>27</sup> Army personnel make up the lion's share of all African armed forces. However, while this gives an indication of the pool of troops that African countries can potentially draw on for contributions to peace operations, the actual number of soldiers available for such purposes is often much smaller. In addition to the fact that most African armed forces have challenging national defence and internal security tasks and responsibilities, deployment in peace operations requires sufficient and specific training and equipment. Therefore, the number of African countries that have available the substantial forces required to deploy and sustain the almost 80 000 African military personnel active in peace operations in Africa in 2015, for example, is actually relatively limited.<sup>28</sup>

Nonetheless, despite the relatively small size of the armed forces of many of the potential troop contributors, and the fact that much of their capacity is often required for national defence or internal tasks, many African countries do contribute substantial numbers of military personnel to peace operations. Comparing the numbers of active personnel in African armed forces with the number of military personnel deployed in peace operations by the ten largest African troop contributors shows that some countries deploy a considerable proportion of their active troops in peace operations (see figure 4). Burundi, for example, deploys about 33 per cent of its active troops in peace operations, Burkina Faso around 25 per cent and Kenya about 20 per cent. These ratios of deployed personnel to total number of active troops are virtually unheard of outside of Africa. Sustaining them means that these countries have very

<sup>27</sup> The armed forces of countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan—which are involved in protracted civil wars, and therefore are either unavailable or unsuitable for peace operations—have been excluded from this overview.


<sup>28</sup> 'Sub-Saharan Africa', in International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance, 2016* (Routledge: London, 2016), pp. 421–80.



**Figure 3.** African armed forces: active personnel, 2015

*Note:* Paramilitary forces may be included.

*Source:* International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance*, 2016 (Routledge: London, 2016).



**Figure 4.** Top 10 African contributors of military personnel to peace operations in Africa, 2015


*Note:* Figures are as of 31 Dec. 2015 and exclude the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) in Egypt (Sinai).

*Source:* SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

limited opportunities for training and recuperation, which is likely to compromise the sustainability of their forces in the long run. Moreover, having such a large number of troops abroad may also pose risks for internal security.<sup>29</sup> These figures clearly illustrate that African troop contributors share a significant proportion of the burden of peace operations in Africa.

While African countries contribute a major share of the personnel deployed in peace operations in Africa, African armed forces lack sufficient modern equipment to support these forces. The available data shows that military equipment, especially in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, is very limited. Most lack basic military enablers and have insufficiently modernized or maintained their equipment. Much of the military

<sup>29</sup> Gebicke, S. and Magid, S., 'Lessons from around the world: benchmarking performance in defense', *McKinsey on Government* (Spring 2010), <[http://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiques/BenchmarkingPerformance\\_VF.pdf](http://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiques/BenchmarkingPerformance_VF.pdf)>.



**Figure 5.** African armed forces: fixed-wing transport aircraft, 2015

Note: Figures do not include light transport aircraft.

Source: International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance, 2016* (Routledge: London, 2016).

equipment that they do have, including what is listed in figures 5 to 8, would probably not be available for use in peace operations, due to serviceability and maintenance issues or the fact that it is being used for pressing internal security needs. Consequently, even countries with relatively well-equipped armed forces, such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, have limited spare capacity.<sup>30</sup>


Airlift capability is extremely limited in Africa. African countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, generally have few if any aircraft in service that are capable of transporting troops and equipment to, or within, areas of deployment. None of the major African troop contributors has strategic airlift capability. (Of the countries listed in figure 5, only Algeria and Angola have a number of heavy transport aircraft in service.) Tactical airlift capability is also very limited and consists primarily of medium transport aircraft and helicopters. Figure 5 shows that the major African armed forces and biggest African troop-contributing countries either completely lack, or have only a minimal number of, fixed-wing transport aircraft.

Similarly, most African countries—with the exception of Algeria and Egypt, and to a lesser extent Angola and South Africa—have only a very limited number of helicopters in service that are capable of troop transport (see figure 6). The number of attack helicopters and multi-role platforms that can perform ground attacks is even smaller. This means that most African air forces have only limited assets available for tactical troop transport, close air support, casualty or medical evacuation, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa have some UAV capabilities that are primarily intended for ISR purposes. The number of such systems, however, is not known.<sup>31</sup>

The availability of naval assets among the most capable African armed forces and top African troop-contributing countries is also sparse. The majority of surface ships shown in figure 7 are located in North Africa and are small coastal or inshore patrol craft. Moreover, countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa need their limited maritime capacities to police their vast coastlines. Many African coastal

<sup>30</sup> See 'Sub-Saharan Africa' (note 28), pp. 421–80.


<sup>31</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>>.



**Figure 6.** African armed forces: helicopters, 2015

*Note:* Multi-role helicopters can carry out different tasks, including light transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.

*Source:* International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance, 2016* (Routledge: London, 2016).



**Figure 7.** African armed forces: surface ships, 2015


*Notes:* The figures include all surface ships in service by country, most of which are patrol and coastal surveillance vessels. Other types of ships include frigates and corvettes, amphibious and landing craft, logistics and support vessels, and minesweepers. Submarines are excluded.

*Source:* International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance, 2016* (Routledge: London, 2016).

countries face enormous challenges managing their own piracy and smuggling problems, and have little to offer to international operations elsewhere.<sup>32</sup>

African contingents in UN peacekeeping operations and African or African-led peace operations suffer relatively high fatality rates. In the meetings, a common explanation for this trend was that many African countries have insufficient means and equipment to protect their troops in the field. Several peace operations in Africa operate in hostile environments in which they are regularly targeted by armed groups and

<sup>32</sup> 'Sub-Saharan Africa' (note 28), pp. 421–80.



**Figure 8.** African armed forces: armoured vehicles, 2015

*Notes:* The figures do not include battle tanks. The figure for Algeria's land vehicles is an underestimate: the country's *Guarde républicaine* and *Gendarmerie nationale* have an indeterminate number of land vehicles, so only the known number of vehicles is included.

*Source:* International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance, 2016* (Routledge: London, 2016).


exposed to asymmetric threats. For example, the use of road bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against UN peacekeepers in Mali has resulted in numerous casualties that might have been avoided if vehicles had been better protected against such devices.<sup>33</sup>

Figure 8 shows the number of armoured vehicles (excluding battle tanks) in service with the armies of the above-mentioned African countries. Although most of the countries have a relatively substantial number of armoured vehicles in service, and a number of countries have recently received new vehicles for the specific purpose of deploying them in peace operations, many of their armies rely on vehicles that are old and only lightly protected or often not operational. As troop-carrying capacity per vehicle is small, the equipment available is clearly insufficient to support larger military units.<sup>34</sup>

The inability of most African countries to strengthen their military capabilities and capacities can be partly explained by their modest levels of defence expenditure. Many African countries are economically developing countries with small economies. Angola, Nigeria and South Africa are the only countries in sub-Saharan Africa with substantial levels of military expenditure (see figure 9). By way of comparison, in 2015 the military expenditure of all the African countries combined was US\$ 57.5 billion, compared to US\$ 60.7 billion by France alone and a total UN peacekeeping budget of US\$ 8.27 billion (see figure 10). The fact that France's military expenditure is larger than that of all of Africa illustrates why external actors are in an excellent position to assist African countries with their peace operations. For this and other reasons, many African countries also receive substantial amounts of military assistance from external actors.

<sup>33</sup> See also Van der Lijn, J. and Dundon, J., 'Peacekeepers at risk: the lethality of peace operations', SIPRI Policy Brief, Feb. 2014; and Van der Lijn, J. and Smit, T., 'Peacekeepers under threat? Fatality trends in UN peace operations', SIPRI Policy Brief, Sep. 2015.

<sup>34</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>>.



**Figure 9.** Military expenditure in Africa, 2015

*Notes:* Figures are in millions of US dollars at constant 2014 prices. The figure for Burkina Faso's military expenditure is for 2014 as no information was available for 2015.

*Source:* SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>>.

### **The capabilities required for future peace operations in Africa**

With the above capabilities and capacities of African actors in mind, participants in the regional and global dialogue meetings identified a number of gaps in civilian, military and financial capability and capacity. African actors and organizations would currently need to seek assistance from external actors to fill these gaps, in order to carry out the international and regional peace operations required to address future security challenges in Africa (see chapter two).


#### *Civilian capabilities*

Civilian capabilities were generally considered to be very weak in both African organizations and their member states. Although the AU and some of the RECs/RMs are either in the process of developing these capabilities or at the planning stage, these efforts are still in their infancy.<sup>35</sup> The strong military mindset in Africa regarding peace operations (see chapter two) may have contributed to the relative neglect of their civilian aspects. In West Africa, participants noted the need to strengthen civilian capabilities in the areas of deradicalization; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), including SALW disarmament; the rehabilitation of youth combatants; security sector reform (SSR); and service delivery to marginalized populations. In the Greater Horn of Africa there was a much larger focus on capabilities for economic development projects and border control. In the Central, Sahel-Saharan and Southern Africa meetings, participants primarily emphasized the need for peace operations to have the means to promote the rule of law, good governance and democratization, as well as to monitor civil and human rights violations, and build additional expertise on the protection of civilians, gender and religion.

Despite these differences of emphasis across the regions, many participants agreed that in addition to, and sometimes instead of, the UN and the EU, African organizations and countries need appropriate civilian capabilities for peace operations in Africa, and they require external assistance to develop and strengthen those capabilities. Without such assistance, participants argued that African responses to armed conflict in particular were likely to remain highly military focused.

<sup>35</sup> African Union, 'Report of the Independent Panel of Experts' Assessment of the African Standby Force and Plan of Action for Achieving Full Operational Capability by 2015', Addis Ababa, 10 Dec. 2013.





**Figure 10.** Military expenditure by African countries and France, compared to the United Nations peacekeeping budget, 2015

*Notes:* Figures on military expenditure by African countries and France are in millions of US dollars at constant 2014 prices. The UN peacekeeping budget figure is calculated for the 2015 calendar year on the basis of the 2014–15 and 2015–16 budgets, assuming an even rate of spending throughout the financial years.

*Sources:* SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>>; and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

#### *Strengthening military capabilities and key enablers*

In all the meetings, participants from military and government backgrounds stressed the crucial importance of strengthening African land-, air- and sea-based military capabilities in order to ensure the safety and effectiveness of peace operations in Africa—especially those with robust mandates tasked with taking on asymmetrical threats in hostile environments. In the Greater Horn of Africa, Sahel-Saharan Africa, West Africa and global meetings, in particular, participants noted that the lack of even basic military equipment often puts African troops at unnecessary risk in the field and may undermine their ability to successfully perform mission tasks.

Among the different types of military capability, logistics (especially troop transport), close air support and ISR were seen as the areas needing particular enhancement. Most peace operations in Africa generally depend on external actors to provide such key enablers, but many of the participants would have preferred them to help African armed forces obtain such capabilities for themselves. Their ‘wish list’ included fixed-wing transport aircraft, combat and transport helicopters, and armoured vehicles. Some participants also mentioned naval capabilities as an important requirement that would enable African navies to better protect Africa’s coastline and combat piracy. Finally, UAVs were frequently highlighted as an example of the need to introduce modern technologies to African armed forces.

In some regions the preference for strengthening African capabilities (over increased cooperation with external actors that already have such capabilities, particularly when it comes to specialized military capacities and equipment) seemed to be based on recent experience. Several participants in the Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings argued, for example, that the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) could have deployed to Mali faster if external actors had provided more and quicker logistical support when rapid deployment was needed. The importance of improving African intelligence gathering capabilities rather than relying primarily on intelligence gathered by external actors was also highlighted in both

meetings. One participant from Nigeria, for example, criticized bilateral partners such as the United Kingdom, the USA and France for not sharing enough of their own intelligence in the subregion.

*Strengthening rapid deployment capabilities and special forces*

There was a general call from participants for continued external support to APSA institutions, and the ASF in particular. In the Greater Horn of, Sahel-Saharan, Southern and West Africa meetings many also argued that there is a continued need to support and build the capacity of African rapid response forces. The planning and logistical challenges that AFISMA faced were raised to suggest that rapid deployment capabilities in Africa are not yet operational and need continued support. The AU response to these challenges, through the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), a temporary rapid response mechanism, was widely perceived as a valuable addition, but its relationship to the ASF was seen as unclear.<sup>36</sup>

In the global meeting, participants noted that the absence of well-trained and well-equipped special forces throughout Africa is preventing African troop contributors from intervening in the rapid, agile and highly mobile fashion necessary to better take on the protection of civilians in unstable conflict situations, among other tasks. Instead, they were seen as often being forced to wait for French or US special forces to arrive. Continuing and increasing the current level of external support and training provided to African special forces is therefore crucial to enabling African troop contributors to respond quickly to crises and attacks against civilians.

*Training for civilian, police and military personnel*

Participants in all the meetings reinforced the continuing need to train African civilian, police and military personnel for the specialized and multidimensional tasks that they are expected to carry out in peace operations. Such training efforts are particularly important because the roles played by personnel in peace operations are often different from the domestic tasks for which they have been trained.

*Continued external funding for African peace operations and contributions*

In the short to medium term, APSA, African-led peace operations and African contributions to UN operations will remain heavily dependent on external funding from bilateral partners and international organizations such as the EU and the UN. Participants in the global meeting noted that while AU member states have committed—through the new AU Peace Fund—to increase their contributions to the AU peace and security budget to 25 per cent of the budget by 2020, complete independence from external financing remains a longer-term aspiration.<sup>37</sup>

Regarding the above-mentioned requirements and capabilities, most participants in the different dialogue meetings supported the idea that Africa will eventually have to provide for its own security independently. In the interim, however, since Africa has not yet built these capacities, external provision of advanced capabilities, key enablers, rapid response and special forces, which many European countries see as their niche capabilities, remain welcome.

<sup>36</sup> See African Union Commission (AUC), 'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capacity of the ASF and the Establishment of an "African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises"', RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/ (i-a) 2013, 26 Apr. 2013.

<sup>37</sup> See African Union (AU) Peace Fund, 'Securing predictable and sustainable financing for peace in Africa', Aug. 2016; and African Union, 'The African Union adopts the AU Peace Fund', Press release, Kigali, 18 Jul. 2016, <<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-adopts-the-au-peace-fund>>.

## Balancing external assistance and African interests: from African ownership to global–regional partnerships

### **The many faces of African ownership**

Regardless of their backgrounds, participants in all the regional dialogue meetings overwhelmingly emphasized the importance of ‘African ownership’ of peace operations in Africa. In the global dialogue meeting, participants from Europe and North America, as well as representatives from the UN, the AU and the EU also affirmed that their countries or organizations wish to contribute to increasing African ownership, which to many seemed to be an end in itself.


The term African ownership, however, was used to express a variety of things. Broadly speaking, to most African participants, African ownership meant African control over decision-making processes regarding the deployment and conduct of peace operations in Africa. Most participants representing external actors, however, used African ownership to emphasize the perceived need for African countries and organizations to carry out operations in Africa by continuing to contribute military personnel, but increasingly also by funding the peace operations. While the latter interpretation does not necessarily exclude the former, and many African participants indeed supported the aim of operational independence, this distinction matters, as most African participants viewed ownership as decision-making primacy for African actors, while participants representing external actors seemed reluctant to concede decision-making power to African actors.

The support of external actors for increasing African contributions, at least at the operational level, is understandable, given the continued need of the international community for generous troop contributions. Although some European countries have returned to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, especially in Mali, their contributions to peace operations on the continent have been fairly limited over the past two decades. In spite of the number of EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions on the continent, the number of European and North American personnel deployed in Africa has been much lower than the number from Africa and other non-European regions. This is partly due to the persistent perception that deploying troops in UN peace operations, and particularly in UN operations in Africa, is more dangerous than deploying troops with other organizations and in other regions.<sup>38</sup> Many large troop- and police-contributing countries from Asia and the Middle East also prefer to leave the more robust peace operations in Africa to African troop contributors, and to contribute to more traditional peacekeeping operations instead.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, increasing African troop contributions to, and funding for, peace operations in Africa would alleviate the burden on external actors that are heavily involved in African peace and security, such as France.

Among African participants it was not always clear which African constituencies should be represented in order to create true African ownership of peace operations—or who owns African ownership. Government and military representatives generally argued that host governments should be in charge of decision-making processes. However, civil society representatives in particular, but also a number of academics, were much more in favour of ‘local ownership’ by the ‘end users of peace’, such as local communities, and women and children in particular. Some participants even feared that African control over decision-making processes regarding peace operations would simply mean that African governments would be placed in charge, which could

<sup>38</sup> Van der Lijn and Dundon (note 33).

<sup>39</sup> Van der Lijn and Avezov (note 1), p. 29.



**Figure 11.** African personnel contributions to peace operations in Africa, 2006–15.

*Note:* The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Egypt (Sinai) is not included as a peace operation in Africa.

*Source:* SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>>.

in itself be problematic given that the meetings frequently gave vent to a frustration with and mistrust of governments, formal security sectors and ruling elites. The different views within Africa about the meaning of African ownership illustrate that the principle is not necessarily a democratic one and that although it is commonly used by African and external actors, its meaning is contested.

### **Global–regional mutual dependency**

Notwithstanding the relevance of the objective of African ownership, however it is interpreted, it is most likely that African actors will continue to depend on external actors in the short to medium term. Meanwhile, the international community will continue to depend on a limited number of African actors if external or other African actors are unwilling or unable to make significant personnel contributions to peace operations in Africa. Thus, various forms of global–regional partnership are likely to continue to exist.

The dependency on African contributions to peace operations in Africa has increased dramatically in the past decade. The continent has seen a surge in peace operation

activity, particularly in terms of the number of uniformed personnel deployed, which increased from around 70 000 in 2006 to more than 115 000 in 2015. At the same time, the number of non-African uniformed personnel deployed in Africa has remained largely stable at around 40 000. As a consequence, while in the mid-2000s Africa contributed a little over one-third of all uniformed personnel deployed in Africa, this has now increased to two-thirds (see figure 11).

Concurrently, African actors are almost completely dependent on external funding for their contributions to peace operations. In the period 2013–15, the 54 African countries provided only 2.5 per cent of the total effective rates of assessment for UN peacekeeping operations, most of which are in Africa. In the period 2016–18 this percentage will increase marginally to 2.7 per cent. Voluntary contributions are not included in these percentages, which means that African countries' contribution to the total cost of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa is even lower.<sup>40</sup>

The AU and the RECs/RMs are also dependent on significant levels of external funding to deploy their own peace operations. Although the share of the total AU budget that is covered through assessed contributions by its member states has increased in recent years and is expected to increase further with the new AU Peace Fund, it will, for example, still only cover 27 per cent of the total AU budget proposed for the 2017 financial year.<sup>41</sup> To cover the operational costs of AMISOM, the AU is completely dependent on direct and indirect financial support from the EU, the UN and a range of individual countries. The EU covers the costs of the allowances for all its military personnel, while the UN supports AMISOM through an extensive logistical support package funded directly from the UN peacekeeping budget.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, other recent African-led peace operations such as AFISMA, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) and the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) have only been able to deploy and operate with external financial assistance.

This global–regional mutual dependency, while likely to remain a reality in the coming years, presents a number of challenges that should be considered and ideally overcome in order to make the global–regional partnership in Africa envisaged in the HIPPO report more balanced and equitable.<sup>43</sup> These challenges are discussed below.

## **The challenges of depending on external funders and decision makers**

### *Financial dependency is a barrier to African influence*

Participants in all the dialogue meetings, and in particular those with military or governmental backgrounds, believed that African governments should have greater control over the peace operation agenda for their own continent. Many also argued that African organizations and their member states currently have little influence or leverage over the direction and operationalization of peace operations in Africa, even in the context of the AU. Participants gave three main arguments for increasing African influence over the peace operation agenda for the continent.

<sup>40</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations, Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/331/Add.1, 28 Dec. 2015, pp. 28–29.

<sup>41</sup> The proposed budget for the 2017 financial year includes the budget of AMISOM. African Union Commission, '2017 Budget Overview Paper', 5 Mar. 2016, <<http://www.panafricanparliament.org/thematic-information/documents-from-may-2016-pap-session/auc/43-au-2017-budget-overview-paper-po>>.

<sup>42</sup> Through the European Commission's African Peace Facility (APF), the EU alone contributed over €1 billion to the AU between 2007 and 2015 to support AMISOM. European Commission, 'African Peace Facility: Annual Report 2015', June 2016. The UN provides AMISOM with a logistical package through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which has an annual budget of more than US\$ 600 million. See United Nations, General Assembly, Financing of the activities arising from Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009), A/C.5/70/L.52, 13 June 2016.

<sup>43</sup> United Nations, A/70/95–S/2015/446 (note 3), p. 12.

1. *African stakeholders are in the best position to understand their own security environment.* This was seen as a particularly important issue in the dialogue meetings in the Greater Horn of Africa, Sahel-Saharan Africa and West Africa, where many participants from military and governmental backgrounds argued, in contrast to the HIPPO report and the predominant view in the UN Security Council, that the security environment in Africa requires peace operations that combat crime and apply counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies.

2. *African states are the most affected by conflicts on the continent, and stability is in their direct national security interests.* For example, in the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, two major troop contributors to AMISOM, stability in Somalia is a matter of national security.

3. *Those states willing to deploy to missions in dangerous areas should have proportionate influence, regardless of whether external actors are financing them.* In peace operations in Africa these are often African states and they should therefore have sufficient influence to manage and adapt operations. A number of participants in the Greater Horn of Africa and global dialogue meetings argued that this increased influence would help African troop contributors ensure the security of their troops.

#### *Dependency gives space to external geopolitical interests*

It was generally agreed in the meetings that assistance from external actors, whether financial, military or civilian, tends to come with strings attached. This was seen as inherently problematic as the interests of such actors are not always aligned with the interests of African actors and states. Participants often suggested that the interests that guide bilateral and multilateral partnerships and activism in Africa should be more closely scrutinized. Participants in the Southern Africa meeting were particularly concerned about the proliferation of donor and military partnerships on the continent—for example with China, various EU member states and the USA—and the potentially disruptive effects that their distinctive and at times conflicting geopolitical interests might have on Africa. Additional African sources of funding, and by extension the increased decision-making power of African stakeholders, would diminish the importance of external players and their interests, including those that might be counterproductive to a sustainable peace and African interests.

### **The challenges posed by the predominance of a limited number of troop contributors in Africa**

#### *Dependency on troop contributors with national geopolitical agendas*

While countries contributing troops to peace operations often have altruistic motives, these are always accompanied by geopolitical and others agendas, and are sometimes merely used to legitimize contributions.<sup>44</sup> During the regional meetings some participants argued that a number of countries participate in peace operations primarily to pursue their own geopolitical interests, rather than to improve regional security. They were said to do this directly through their troops deployed in a particular mission, but also indirectly by threatening to withdraw troops if they are criticized for pursuing their own geopolitical interests elsewhere. In the Central, Greater Horn of and West Africa meetings, Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda were mentioned as examples of African countries pursuing their own geopolitical interests. France was often named as an example of an external actor that pursues its own rather than regional security interests. Participants with civil society or academic backgrounds,

<sup>44</sup> Van der Lijn and Avezov (note 1).

in particular, were concerned that by encouraging potential regional hegemony to take on a greater share of operational responsibility, the international community would be indirectly supporting the misuse of peace operations for geostrategic ends, which might fuel rather than quell conflict.

*Dependency on countries that could use contributions to peace operations to 'blackmail' the international community and fend off international criticism*

A number of countries were also accused of using their troop contributions to peace operations, or threats to withdraw them, to fend off international criticism for violations of international and national/domestic law at home. This might arguably foster internal instability within troop-contributing countries. Several participants in Central Africa cited Burundi as an example, suggesting that the international community had failed to adopt a clear position on President Pierre Nkurunziza running for another term, which the Burundian political opposition claims violated constitutional law, for fear that Burundi would withdraw its troops from AMISOM in retaliation. Some claimed that this lack of action in turn contributed to the escalation in violence in Burundi. In cases where troop contributions are used as bargaining chips, the international community is confronted with a difficult moral and political dilemma: generating the required number of troops to maintain international peace and stability or putting pressure on the troop contributor to uphold human rights, good governance and the rule of law at home.

*Dependency on frontline states*

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping operations did not involve neighbouring states on the grounds that such states might not be perceived as impartial. Today, however, the international community seems more willing to rely on neighbouring states playing key roles in African-led peace operations, as they are some of the few willing to take on the risks involved.<sup>45</sup>

In the Greater Horn of Africa meeting a number of participants were concerned about the extent to which Kenya and Ethiopia—which provide close to half of all AMISOM troops and are neighbouring countries of Somalia—are able to maintain the principle of impartiality and to balance their own national interests with the goals of AMISOM's mandate. Participants from Somalia, in particular, questioned whether both countries sufficiently prioritize the operational goals and the long-term aim that Somalia should be able to maintain its own security. One Somali official noted that while AMISOM is generally viewed as a successful mission in the eyes of the population, the lack of trust in and discomfort at the presence of large contingents of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops, due to the territorial and security interests of both countries in Somalia, is a challenge to the success of the mission. Kenyan and Ethiopian participants by contrast suggested that their interests are not necessarily counterproductive to the mission goals because they are willing to invest so heavily precisely because of their vested interests in Somalia, and that they try to align their presence with the mandate and operational goals of AMISOM.

### **From 'African ownership' to global-regional partnership**

Participants in the regional dialogue meetings generally argued that African states and organizations should have a greater say in the decision-making process regarding peace operations in Africa. However, this does not mean that all the participants

<sup>45</sup> Roberts, A., 'The crisis in UN peacekeeping', *Survival*, 36(3), 1994, pp. 93–120; and Van der Lijn, Smit and Höghammar (note 2).

suggested that African governments alone should decide on, deploy and finance peace operations on the continent. Two arguments were used to illustrate why a balanced and equitable global–regional partnership, rather than simply ‘African ownership’, is required for a healthy international conflict management architecture.

*African problems are global problems*

Peace operations should be an international instrument or collection of tools for which not just regional and subregional organizations, but the international community as a whole are responsible. A sizeable minority of participants argued that globalization and the interconnectivity of current security challenges mean that peace operations require shared responses. While this would not exclude greater influence for African actors in the decision-making process, it would mean that African actors cannot be expected and should not aim to deploy and finance peace operations on their own. Some argued that in relative terms Africa is already sharing a significant amount of responsibility in terms of troop deployments, and that there is therefore an obligation on external actors to play their part financially and militarily.

*Guaranteeing international norms and standards in peace operations*

Involving external actors in the decision-making process regarding peace operations in Africa helps to better anchor international norms and standards. A significant minority of participants, particularly those from civil society backgrounds, were concerned that if African governments were solely responsible for peace operations in Africa, normative and operational standards might suffer. Participants from military and government backgrounds in Sahel-Saharan and West Africa, for example, were strongly in favour of the use of force against terrorist organizations, while most civil society participants in the Central and West Africa dialogue meetings emphasized developmental and peacebuilding approaches. The latter saw current responses, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, as overly military focused and in some cases even counterproductive in terms of reconciliation and de-escalation, creating more grievances among local populations as a result of human rights violations and deaths, injuries or other damage inflicted on unintended targets within local communities.

**The benefits of a balanced equitable global partnership**

Despite the ambition of many African actors to have greater influence over the peace operation agenda for Africa, their persistent dependence on external assistance will probably mean that external actors will continue to play a critical role in the decision making. At the same time, the dependence of the international community on a limited number of predominantly African troop contributors in Africa also limits its ability to influence the conduct of troop contributors and the operationalization of mandates on the ground. In order to make the global–regional partnership in Africa more balanced and equitable, the challenges of this mutual dependency will have to be overcome.

The implications of this mutual dependence appear to reaffirm the commonly held belief that the division of labour and responsibilities in the international conflict management architecture is not balanced and equitable. Nonetheless, given the comparative advantages and preferences of African and external actors, the current division of labour will probably persist to some extent in the short to medium term. However, a more balanced and equitable global–regional partnership is more likely to exist when external actors are willing to relinquish decision-making power, when the pool of troop contributors in Africa is further diversified, ideally including financial



contributors, and when African stakeholders are better able to fund and provide niche capabilities for operations. In other words, a situation in which both the international community and African actors are able to leverage their contributions in order to achieve what they believe to be the highest standards for peace operations.



## 4. Coordination and inclusivity in a long-term approach: pathways for future cooperation

The balanced and equitable global–regional partnership required for peace operations in Africa involves a variety of actors. Depending on the context, these actors contribute to peace operations in various different constellations. Both African and non-African participants in the dialogue meetings perceived the quality of this cooperation as uneven, and often in need of improvement. This chapter examines the roles and contributions of all the partners and the challenges to their cooperation. It also distils some elements from the dialogue meetings that it suggests would contribute to a balanced and equitable future cooperation in peace operations in Africa.

### Constituting the global–regional partnership

#### **The constituent parts of the partnership**

The African regional organizations and mechanisms, the UN and bilateral partners and donors each have an important contribution to make to a balanced and equitable global–regional partnership. Each has a history in the global conflict management architecture, as well as its own strengths and weaknesses, and comparative advantages and disadvantages.

#### *The Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms*

ECOWAS is perhaps the strongest REC in Africa. It has substantial peace operation experience through its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and its ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is a constituent part of the ASF. Although ECOWAS is heavily dependent on its strongest member state, Nigeria, all the participants in the West Africa dialogue meeting strongly identified with the organization and generally felt that it should be involved in all future peace operations in the region. Despite the fact that the ESF is largely operational, it did not receive the international logistical and financial support needed to deploy the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA). AFISMA was later given such support.<sup>46</sup> This partly explains the main objection raised in the Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings: that ECOWAS does not receive the respect and recognition it deserves with regard to the role it can play in the region. On the other hand, Nigerian participants, in particular, complained that other member states often fail to pay their dues.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is another strong REC. Its SADC Standby Force (SSF) is operational but like the ESF, it has not yet been deployed—even though the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is provided by SADC member states.<sup>47</sup> Participants in the Southern Africa meeting argued that in spite of the fact that SADC protocols, agreements and frameworks are in place, the political will for implementation needs to be strengthened. Another challenge mentioned in the Southern Africa

<sup>46</sup> Adebajo, A., ‘Liberia: a warlord’s peace’, eds S. J. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E. M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder/London, 2002), pp. 599–630; African Union (note 35); and Théroux-Bénoni, L., ‘The long path to MINUSMA: assessing the international response to the crisis in Mali’, eds T. Tardy and M. Wyss, *Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture* (Routledge: London/New York, 2014), pp. 171–189.

<sup>47</sup> Southern African Development Community, ‘Memorandum of understanding amongst the Southern African Development Community member states on the establishment of a Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade’, Lusaka, 16 Aug. 2007; African Union (note 35); and Roux, A., ‘South Africa and the UN Intervention Brigade in the DRC’, Blog post, Institute for Security Studies, 23 Apr. 2013, <<https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-and-the-un-intervention-brigade-in-the-drc>>.

meeting is that, in the absence of a financial compensation mechanism for contributions to SADC missions, member states prefer to participate in UN missions.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has played an important role in peace operations in the region. Most notably its Central African Multinational Force (Force Multinationale des Etats d'Afrique Centrale, FOMAC) was responsible for the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) in 2008–13. FOMAC also operates as the ECCAS Standby Force.<sup>48</sup> Participants in the Central Africa meeting suggested that in addition to the instability and lack of capacity in the region, ECCAS lacks a common strategic vision. Its membership is drawn from two different subregions: the member states of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and a number of countries from the Great Lakes region. As a consequence, some of its member states are thought to be less committed due to their membership in multiple RECs, and it is seen as competing with CEMAC for a role in security affairs.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the primary and most active regional organization in the Greater Horn of Africa. It was authorized to deploy a mission to Somalia and has deployed an operation to South Sudan.<sup>49</sup> Participants emphasized the challenge of creating a unifying platform in the region given that IGAD member states are frequently members of multiple organizations. The East African Standby Force (EASF), for example, is an RM and is not tied to IGAD as non-IGAD members have also joined.<sup>50</sup> Some questioned the future development of the EASF, as they identified a trend towards more IGAD involvement in peace operations in the region. Others criticized the lack of cohesion within IGAD, as well as the tensions among its member states, and even argued that certain member states have been using the IGAD name to legitimize unilateral interventions in conflicts in other countries.

In North Africa, the Arab Maghreb Union has been a dormant organization more or less from the start. The North African Regional Capacity (NARC) was established because the ASF required a regional mechanism, but this is by far the least developed Standby Force.<sup>51</sup> It was largely ignored in the dialogue meetings, including the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting. There, NARC was said to have been a Libyan project that, in spite of potential Egyptian interest, has now been placed on the back-burner.

In general, there were frequent calls to increase the capacity of the RECs/RMs and their role in peace and security in their own regions. Many participants in the different dialogue meetings argued that the RECs/RMs would be best suited to, and have the biggest interest in, deploying missions in their own subregions. Participants often also argued that the involvement of RECs/RMs is instrumental to a mission's success. At the same time, however, the biggest perceived obstacle to REC/RM involvement is their lack of financial and military capacity. In addition, RECs/RMs were encouraged in all the meetings to develop their peacebuilding and civilian capabilities, as they were often criticized for being too military focused.

<sup>48</sup> 'Standing Orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)', Malabo, 17 June 2002, <[http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3845-v-Organisation\\_et\\_structure\\_de\\_la\\_FOMAC.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3845-v-Organisation_et_structure_de_la_FOMAC.pdf)>; African Union (note 35); and United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country, S/2008/733, 26 Nov. 2008.

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725, 6 Dec. 2006; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 'Agreement on cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (in opposition) (SPLM/A in opposition)', Addis Ababa, 23 Jan. 2014; and African Union, Peace and Security Council, 62nd Meeting, 'Communique', PSC/PR/ COMM.(LXII), 13 Sep. 2006.

<sup>50</sup> Eastern Africa Region, 'Agreement on the establishment of the East African Standby Force (EASF)', 26 June 2014; and East African Standby Force (EASF), 'EASF set to operationalize', Press release, Adama, 13 Nov. 2014, <<http://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/media-watch/press-releases/75-easf-operationalise>>.

<sup>51</sup> African Union (note 35); and Cilliers, J., *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 160 (Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, Mar. 2008).

### *The African Union*

The AU has a long history in the field of peace operations that can be traced back to the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The AU's peace support operations are generally more robust than UN peacekeeping operations. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the most notable current example. The AU has agreed to set up the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in which the ESF, the SSF, FOMAC, the EASF and NARC together constitute the African Standby Force (ASF). Once it has reached its full operational capability, the ASF will form the continent's rapid deployment capability. The ASF consists of military and civilian components to be deployed in peace support operations and interventions. Thus far, however, the ASF has only conducted exercises. The AU has therefore set up the ACIRC as an interim rapid deployment solution. With the aim of increasing African funding for AU operations from 2 to 25 percent by 2020, at its summit in Kigali in July 2016 the AU heads of state approved a funding model for a new AU Peace Fund on the basis of an import levy.<sup>52</sup>

The AU has many advantages when it comes to conflict management in Africa. Participants in the global meeting pointed out that the AU has the political will and is in the rare position of being able to act as a first responder. Unencumbered by a colonial history, it is perceived as providing a space for African influence and African solutions. In addition, the AU seems to be able to absorb fatalities in its missions more easily than organizations that rely on troop-contributing countries from outside the region. It is therefore arguably well-suited to implementing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tasks.

AU peace support operations also face many challenges. An AU representative in the Central Africa meeting noted that the AU's ambitions currently still exceed its capabilities. Participants generally saw its limited military assets and financial dependency on external actors as obstacles to its legitimacy and effectiveness. According to participants in the Horn of Africa meeting, another more operational challenge is that in the absence of a centralized AU command and control structure, it is the troop-contributing countries and not the AU that determine the future of the missions. Lastly, tensions between the AU and the RECs/RMs were apparent in all the dialogue meetings.

### *Multinational task forces*

A growing trend for deployments outside of AU and REC/RM structures in the form of multinational task forces was also noted in the Central, Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings. Some saw such task forces as a model for the future, as they allow countries to work together against common threats and enable cross-border operations by the participating armed forces. Participants also claimed that they could increase common understanding and cooperation regarding logistics among neighbours and benefit from international funding. The EU and other bilateral partners, for example, support the MNJTF against Boko Haram politically, financially, logistically and by providing training.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup> African Union, 'Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union', Durban, 9 July 2002; African Union, 'Policy framework for the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee: Part I', Exp/ASF-MS/2 (I), Document adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff, Addis Ababa, 15–16 May 2003; African Union Commission, 'Decision on the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC): DOC. EX.CL/110 (V)', EX.CL/Dec. 156 (V), 5th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, Addis Ababa, 30 June to 3 July 2004; African Union, Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the regional economic communities and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, 2008; African Union (AUC) Commission, *African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016–2020* (AUC: Addis Ababa, Dec. 2015); African Union, 'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalization of the rapid deployment capacity of the ASF and the establishment of an "African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises"', RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013, 29–30 Apr. 2013; AU Peace Fund (note 37); African Union (note 37); Connolly, L., 'AU Peace Fund could be catalyst for true UN partnership', IPI Global Observatory, 28 July 2016; and Desmidt (note 15).

<sup>53</sup> US Department of State, 'United States support to counter Boko Haram', Office of the Spokesperson, Fact

### *The United Nations*

The UN is the primary organization deploying peace operations worldwide, including in Africa where it also has a long history.<sup>54</sup> Although participants in the different dialogue meetings saw the UN's strengths as primarily in the fields of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in none of the meetings did the majority of participants see it as the organization of first preference. Participants often perceived the UN as biased towards the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council and those who finance peace operations, limiting the influence of African actors in its planning and decision-making processes. The inability of the UN to deploy rapidly and the improbability of it playing a significant role in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, which many African stakeholders consider to be crucial for addressing acute security challenges, were also seen as serious drawbacks.

A number of participants, specifically from Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa, were not in favour of changing the UN's restraint, as according to them it does not have the required capabilities and capacities, and it might endanger its troops and humanitarian personnel by discarding the principles of UN peacekeeping. At the same time, UN personnel in the different meetings stressed the need for flexibility in dealing with non-traditional security challenges, including terrorism.

### *The European Union*

Most of the EU's CSDP missions are deployed in Africa and the EU provides extensive financial support to AU and African-led operations and multinational task forces. CSDP missions are different from AU, REC or UN operations, as they tend to be focused not only in time and place, but also in terms of their tasks—in particular niche tasks such as SSR, military training, capacity building and border monitoring.<sup>55</sup>

The EU was not often referred to in the different dialogue meetings, which suggests that despite its efforts, it is not seen as an important player in the field of peace operations. Although it was acknowledged in most of the meetings as an important funding partner, the EU was more often seen as a geopolitical actor seeking to assert its influence and leverage to protect European interests. Moreover, participants in the Greater Horn of Africa, Sahel-Saharan Africa and global meetings criticized its perceived insufficient respect for or openness to African approaches. This could sometimes reduce the effectiveness of operations, as EU solutions were thought to not always fit the reality on the ground in Africa.

### *Bilateral partners*

A number of external actors support Africa on a bilateral basis. Participants referred most frequently to France, with its recent military operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya and Mali, and its current operation Barkhane in the Sahel region. Other European and Middle Eastern countries and the USA were also mentioned in the various meetings. Like the EU, in addition to military operations, these bilateral partners were recognized for their involvement in a range of other activities,

sheet, Washington, DC, 11 Feb. 2016, <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252399.htm>>; and European Commission, 'Joint Communiqué by Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission; Neven Mimica, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development; and Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security', Statement 16/2702, Brussels, 1 Aug. 2016, <[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_STATEMENT-16-2702\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2702_en.htm)>.

<sup>54</sup> Van der Lijn, Smit and Höghammar (note 2); United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3); and African Union, 'Common African position on the UN review of peace operations', 502nd meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(DII), 29 Apr. 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Van der Lijn, Smit and Höghammar (note 2); Council of the European Union, 'The Africa-EU strategic partnership: a joint Africa-EU strategy', 16344/07 (Presse 291), Lisbon, 9 Dec. 2007, <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf)>; and European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, June 2016.

such as financing operations and counterterrorism by African organizations, providing training and equipment, and building capacity in support of African efforts, including special forces cooperation.

Participants in the different meetings raised several disadvantages of bilateral cooperation. China and France in particular, but sometimes ‘the West’ in general, were singled out as great power actors that while providing crucial assistance in the short term, are ultimately pursuing their own interests, which may eventually be incompatible with the interests of African actors and populations. The military intervention in Libya was frequently given as an example. Although the majority of participants did not favour bilateral military interventions, government and military representatives, in particular, were less critical of bilateral military cooperation in support of the host government, such as the French in Mali. Moreover, they regarded bilateral assistance as sometimes less bureaucratic and more effective than multilateral aid.

### **The different modes of cooperation**

The need for a variety of arrangements for cooperation was stressed in all the meetings. Modes of cooperation should depend on the nature of the conflict, the interests of the different African and external actors, and the comparative advantages that each mode brings to the table. Furthermore, the different types of cooperation discussed and outlined below are not and should not be seen as mutually exclusive.

#### *Parallel missions*

Since the 1990s there has been a significant increase in the number of missions that have been deployed in parallel. A number of African nations currently host two or more separate peace operations. In Mali, for example, the French Operation Barkhane is currently involved in military counterterrorism operations, MINUSMA has a multi-dimensional stabilization mandate, the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) has a political mandate, and EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali build capacity and train the Malian national and internal security forces.<sup>56</sup> According to representatives of ECOWAS and the UN in the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting, among others, there is significant potential for successful cooperation and outsourcing among partners in such constellations, where parallel missions can provide rapid reaction forces or exit strategies. Participants frequently stressed, however, that parallel deployments require much better cooperation, better coordination of a common strategy and a clear definition of the respective roles of all actors in order to prevent duplication of effort, confusion and in the worst case chaos. Moreover, the increasing trend for the UN to outsource different tasks to non-UN operations will require reflection on what UN peacekeeping operations should and should not do.

#### *Supportive missions*

In a slightly different model, a mission deployed in parallel with others may only have a specific support function. In the global meeting, a representative from AMISOM gave as examples the provision of logistical support to AMISOM by the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and previously by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which helped AMISOM enormously. The AMISOM representative also argued that these were capabilities that should have been established sustainably within the AU in the meantime.

<sup>56</sup> Jones, B. and Cherif, F., ‘Evolving models of peacekeeping: policy implications and responses’, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, External study requested by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Nov. 2003; and Van der Lijn, Smit and Höghammar (note 2).

*Sequenced missions*

It has also become increasingly common in Africa for peace operations to deploy in sequence. Initial ‘bridging’ operations are often deployed during crises by regional organizations such as the AU, one of the RECs or the EU, as these organizations are either willing to take greater risks or have the ability to deploy more rapidly than the UN. These bridging operations are succeeded by other, often larger, UN missions that require a longer preparation and build-up period. These can direct their attention to further stabilization, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Such larger operations are sometimes followed in turn by smaller peacebuilding, specialized or civilian follow-on missions, which in Africa are usually deployed by the UN or the EU.<sup>57</sup> Such sequenced operations were primarily mentioned in the Greater Horn of Africa, Central Africa, Sahel-Saharan Africa and global meetings as useful rapid response mechanisms and as exit strategies. An ECOWAS representative in the global meeting believed that sequenced operations are particularly appropriate in West Africa, as that region already has experience and follows the logic of subsidiarity. According to this logic, a subregional organization assumes primary responsibility for a regional crisis, and actors at the regional or global level (the AU or the UN) take over only if more financial and logistical means are required.

*Hybrid missions*

In hybrid missions, two or more organizations deploy a single operation together.<sup>58</sup> An integrated hybrid mission such as the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was perceived in the meetings as particularly challenging. This is because it compels two very different organizations to work together to overcome their differences in terms of standards and approaches, and to integrate their command and control structures. At the same time, some participants argued that the cooperation between the UN and the AU in the framework of UNAMID was particularly beneficial for the transfer of knowledge and experience to the AU, and as such for capacity building.

A newer form of hybridity combines a particular element of an operation provided by one organization with a broader operation deployed by another. The best known example of this is the FIB in the DRC, which is composed of troops from SADC member states but operates within the framework of MONUSCO. Participants in the Central Africa meeting saw this model of combined hybridity as a potential template for future interventions in similar crisis situations.

*Assistance: financing, training and equipping*

The last form of partnership discussed is one in which the AU or an REC/RM deploys a peace operation but receives support to do so from external, bilateral partners. This support can come in many different forms: the provision of logistical support and other enablers, the training and equipping of personnel, and financial support to cover the expenses of the operation. A notable example of such a partnership is AFISMA, which benefited from supplies provided by the USA, and air transport and medical care from France, amongst others.<sup>59</sup>

While most participants in the different meetings welcomed such forms of assistance in principle, some complained that this external support is not always sufficiently coordinated. They also considered predictable funding for African-led peace operations to be key to this form of partnership. A number of participants criticized, for example, the recent decision by the EU to reduce its funding to AMISOM by 20 per

<sup>57</sup> Jones and Cherif (note 56).

<sup>58</sup> Jones and Cherif (note 56).

<sup>59</sup> See also Thérroux-Bénoni (note 46).



cent.<sup>60</sup> In the global meeting, representatives of external actors such as the EU, the UN and the USA agreed that predictable funding for African-led peace operations is crucial.

### The challenges of cooperation

The above modes of cooperation in peace operations and their related challenges underline the importance of more and better cooperation. However, past and present experience has proved that such cooperation can be extremely challenging in practice. A number of these challenges were discussed in the various meetings.

### **Subsidiarity and the relationship between the UN, the AU and RECs/RMs**

Although the importance of the principle of subsidiarity was generally agreed on, there was some debate in the dialogue meetings about what the term means in practice. Like the discussions on ownership, some participants stressed the importance of subsidiarity in terms of implementation, and others in terms of decision-making processes and outcomes.

Some participants suggested that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does not provide sufficient clarity as to which organization should define the mandates of regional peace operations. This can lead to unnecessary coordination problems, misunderstandings and tensions, particularly between the RECs/RMs and the AU, but also between African organizations in general and the UN. The tensions between ECOWAS, the AU and the UN during the transitions from MICEMA to AFISMA and AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali were given as examples in the Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings. The structural character of the issue is apparent as tensions, particularly between the RECs/RMs and the AU, were also discussed at length in the Central Africa, Greater Horn of Africa and Southern Africa meetings. According to an AU representative in the Central Africa meeting, the AU and RECs/RMs often do not have a shared vision of their relationship in these matters, and lack standard operating procedures and mechanisms for governing and monitoring the cooperation between them.

Many of the participants in the different dialogue meetings supported the notion of the decentralization of peace operations and felt that the RECs/RMs should be strengthened and empowered. They argued that when conflict breaks out, the sub-region should take the initiative to resolve the crisis. The AU and the UN should hold back and support the REC/RM, and only step in if the REC/RM becomes overstretched in terms of its capacity. However, for some participants this idea was at odds with the notion of the primacy of the UN Security Council as the supreme global body overseeing international issues of peace and security.

### **Inter-mission cooperation**

Cooperation between missions—whether deployed in parallel, in support of each other or in sequence—was seen as essential in all the meetings. Two preconditions for successful cooperation were seen as key: (a) convergence of interests among the main actors involved, and (b) unity of purpose.

Participants recalled various examples of where cooperation between missions had been clearly insufficient, and both preconditions were not met. Two of these examples received the most attention. In the case of Libya in 2011, African participants were

<sup>60</sup> See also Muvunyi, F., 'Somalia: AMISOM plays down EU budget cut concerns', *Deutsche Welle*, 30 May 2016.

particularly frustrated with the way the UN Security Council and external powers, presumably to further their own geopolitical or other interests, sidelined the AU high-level panel's mediation efforts in Libya by imposing the military no-fly zone, followed eventually by regime change. According to many participants, the situation in Mali and the Sahel since 2012 is another example that shows how various organizations ignored cooperation and formulated their own individual strategies for the Sahel without any coordination.

Some participants, including an ECOWAS representative, were pessimistic about the prospects for improvement, noting that cooperation will always be difficult as long as different organizations have different decision-making processes and objectives. Moreover, because operations are increasingly being implemented by ad hoc coalitions or task forces, instead of organizations, there are fewer opportunities to develop structural cooperation and nowhere to hold institutional memory to enable learning and improvement.

Others think that there is still hope. An AMISOM representative present at the global meeting mentioned, among others, joint assessment missions in the field and the UN's logistical support for AMISOM as examples of reasonably successful inter-mission cooperation in Somalia. Moreover, a number of AU and UN representatives noted that cooperation between the AU and the UN, in particular, is improving. In all meetings it was argued that the tensions between the UN, the AU and the RECs/RMs were at their height during the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA in 2013, but that the situation has since improved.

### **Donor/partner coordination**

The coordination between peace operations and other bilateral donors and partners in host nations was also noted in all the meetings as an area that requires improvement. Again, it was often argued that in instances where coordination is weak, there is duplication and opportunities for recipients to play various donors off against each other, which in turn results in the loss of funding and suboptimal outcomes. Nonetheless, despite coordination efforts, partners were seen to often have different interests and regard each other as competitors, at the expense of the needs of the host nation. For example, in the Greater Horn of Africa meeting, participants described how in the cooperation between AMISOM, the EU, the UN and a variety of other bilateral donors and partners, training efforts for the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) have been insufficiently coordinated. Consequently, as the SNSF has received different uniforms, been trained using different doctrines and been paid different salaries, its cohesion and collective effectiveness have suffered, and defection rates have been substantial. Although most participants in the different meetings seemed to accept that coordination between missions, host governments and their donors and partners is likely to remain difficult, they did suggest that establishing or strengthening common coordination platforms is important.

### **Mission–host nation relations**

The relationship between missions and host nations was seen as perhaps the most important one for the success of peace operations, not least because many missions aim to support and strengthen their national counterparts. This means that effective mandate implementation requires close partnership with the host government. At the same time, as underlined in the meetings, in a variety of cases, such as the DRC, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan, the relationship has not always been obstacle free.

*The key elements of good relations*

Many participants in the global meeting discussed how consent is the first key element in maintaining good cooperation between mission and host government operations. It does not just entail the host government's agreement to deploy to a country, but is a constant process of managing the relationship with and the expectations of the host government, as well as those of other parties to the conflict. Participants in the Greater Horn of Africa meeting described it as a continuous bargaining process with the host government, especially when it has only accepted the presence of a peace operation, or certain aspects of its mandate, because of international pressure.

According to many participants in the global meeting, impartiality is the second main ingredient for success. In practice, achieving this seems to be the most difficult task. In the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting the case of MINUSMA was used to illustrate that there can sometimes be a trade-off between maintaining a mission's impartiality and the perceived sovereignty of the host government. In such cases, the peace operation is always seen as biased by at least one of the parties to the conflict. If it sides with the sovereign government, the armed opposition obviously regards this as being an indication of lack of impartiality. If it positions itself between the parties, however, the government is likely to perceive this as bias towards the armed opposition as its sovereignty is not respected.

The need for top-class mission leadership was the third key element discussed by participants in the global meeting. According to a UN official, a good relationship between mission and government leadership is often personal, requires trust and needs to be built over time. Moreover, it needs to evolve in accordance with the strength of the host government. In the Central Africa meeting, a civil society representative added that being able to explain the mission's mandate to all stakeholders in a sensitive manner is part of this personal relationship, as national leaders do not always appear to understand mission mandates completely. These personal requirements stress the importance of the recruitment and training of high quality senior leadership.

Public diplomacy and strategic communication together make up the fourth key aspect of ensuring a healthy relationship between missions and their host governments. A number of participants in the global dialogue meeting gave the example of Mali to illustrate the uphill battle faced by an operation that has been handicapped in explaining its mandate and managing the expectations of the population. The decision by the UN Security Council not to authorize MINUSMA to fight the armed opposition, together with the decision to reduce its communication budget, meant that the mission could not do what the population expected and was unable to communicate this sufficiently well. As the population of Mali is largely illiterate, it was relatively easy for misinformation to spread. In both the Sahel-Saharan Africa meeting and the global meeting, however, participants pointed out that the host government also has a responsibility to inform the public, and should not make the mission a scapegoat for insufficient progress of its own.

*The tension between occupation and blind support*

Hosting foreign forces on any government's territory can be a sensitive matter even when consent is in place. Participants in the different meetings warned that permanent members of the UN Security Council may be keen to keep peace operations deployed in order to protect their interests, while major troop contributors may attempt to prolong their stay to retain the financial gains they receive from salary reimbursements. According to one UN representative in the global dialogue meeting, only a shared vision between the peace operation and the host government can reduce the fear of occupation. Participants, particularly from Mali and Somalia, reinforced

the importance of minimizing the symbols of occupation (e.g. large numbers of vehicles) and having a clear exposition of the exit strategy for the operation.

At the same time, particularly civil society and academic participants argued that because host governments are the natural partners of peace operations, missions often end up supporting them at the expense of, for example, human rights and in particular women's rights. These participants noted that this dynamic is especially likely to occur when government support is essential to the success of the mission, or when operations do not want to substitute for the tasks of governments. Peace operations therefore frequently need to accomplish a balancing act in their relationship with host governments. Participants in the global meeting stressed the need to develop a strong partnership with the local population as a safeguard.

### Elements of a balanced and equitable future cooperation

The need for better and stronger coordination was reinforced in all the meetings. While participants often did not have concrete suggestions for how to improve cohesion between efforts and prevent duplications, the following six elements of a balanced and equitable future cooperation can be distilled from the discussions.

#### **Increase the African lead role and cooperate on the basis of mutual respect**

Many African participants in all the dialogue meetings felt that African actors are not sufficiently capacitated or taken seriously by external actors. They argued that African solutions have been given insufficient time and support, and have therefore often failed. Subsequently, external actors tend to take over, pushing African attempts to the side when introducing their own solutions. The transformation of AFISMA into MINUSMA was mentioned in this context in the Sahel-Saharan Africa and West meetings, and is an example of a relatively robust African approach being replaced by a more limited UN peacekeeping approach. In the Southern Africa and global meetings, the military intervention in Libya was seen in the same light, only this time it was the AU's attempts to find a mediated solution that were sidelined. Even though African actors may not have the capability and capacity to resolve all of the problems on the continent, and sometimes the accountability or political will to act is missing, disqualifying African solutions was generally perceived as a degrading signal. In addition, the experience in Libya illustrates that Western solutions are often also far from perfect.

At the same time, although many of the participants in the different meetings favoured African operations, this in itself raises challenges. For example, the fact that African countries are paying such a high price in Somalia for fighting in the framework of AMISOM, coupled with the UN's unwillingness to take over until the situation has been stabilized and the limited amount of African decision-making power, left some of the participants in the Greater Horn of Africa and global meetings with the impression that African lives matter less than those from other continents.

The overall message was therefore very clear: external actors should listen more to their African counterparts and interact on the basis of mutual respect. External assistance was seen as currently guided by the interests and preferences of external donors and bilateral partners, which do not always have enough understanding of the local context or do not consult with African states and organizations sufficiently on the type of assistance needed most. African stakeholders should set the agenda, identify the areas of need on the continent, gain decision-making power over the solutions, draw up mandates, coordinate and take the lead. This should result in a more contextualized approach to peace operations adapted to the dynamics of conflicts in Africa.

### **Increase the sustainability of external assistance to African peace operations**

It was widely felt in the dialogue meetings that external assistance should contribute to increasing the sustainability of African capabilities. Such assistance should move away from one-off contributions to each mission and move towards capacity building that structurally allows Africa to take care of its business and contribute to peace and security on the continent. African actors, on the other hand, need to investigate how to generate African funding and to design and develop innovative measures to sustain their peace operations. Some participants in the regional meetings argued that most African states do not have the resources, while others pointed out that if countries are able to intervene unilaterally, the issue might also be a matter of prioritization. Moreover, some critical participants in the Horn of Africa meeting noted that a number of troop contributors are currently profiting from their participation in peace operations and that personnel deployment can be highly lucrative. There was, however, broad agreement between the African participants in the different meetings and the external actors from the EU, the UN and the USA in the global meeting that the proposal for a 75:25 split of the budget for AU peace operations between the UN and the AU (see above) is a positive one. This division would help to further enhance the capacity of regional organizations, such as the AU, to be at the forefront of and take action on specific conflicts.

### **Put the ‘end users of peace’ first**

While it was agreed that the African lead role should be strengthened, the question of who represents Africa was not answered—arising from the awareness that Africa is not a bloc, but a diverse continent. Moreover, while many participants, particularly those from governmental or military backgrounds, suggested that African host states, troop- and police-contributing countries and RECs/RMs are best positioned to understand and coordinate responses to the needs on the ground, participants with civil society backgrounds, particularly in the West and Central Africa meetings, suggested that first and foremost the vulnerable populations affected by instability and war should define the efforts of peace operations.

Most participants agreed that peace operations in Africa are, at the very least, currently too elite-driven or top-down and should be more inclusive of local communities, traditional leaders, religious institutions, civil society actors, the private sector, and women and youth—in short, they should use more bottom-up approaches. Local communities, and particularly women and youth, were generally seen as the real ‘end users of peace operations’—the recipients of peace. Current operations do not adequately engage with local communities and too often assume that a state-centric mandate creates adequate local ownership. According to most participants, however, grassroots support is required to make any peace sustainable. There were strong calls in all the meetings for what the HIPPO report calls a ‘people-centred’ approach.<sup>61</sup>

Participants with civil society or academic backgrounds suggested involving the end users of peace both ‘upstream’, during negotiations on peace agreements, and ‘downstream’, during implementation, which would involve strategic engagement with communities and increasing the role played by civil society and local stakeholders. A civil society participant in the West Africa meeting gave examples from Côte d’Ivoire, where he argued that the potential for civil society to contribute to the disarmament process and the provision of humanitarian assistance was not sufficiently harnessed. He believed that civil society and other local informal structures could have helped to

<sup>61</sup> See United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3).

coordinate assistance because they were better aware of local needs. During even the worst crisis, there are almost always well-informed local stakeholders, religious leaders and traditional actors or civil society organizations on the ground. Participants stated that this grassroots input and expertise needs to be used more for issue mapping and conflict analysis, or monitoring and evaluation, and that this would positively affect both the efficiency and the effectiveness of peace operations.

Most participants therefore considered mainstreaming communication with the end users to be of the utmost importance in order to increase popular support, manage expectations, coordinate tasks and provide an exit strategy. Communication entails both explaining the work of the operation and being open to signals from outside. The suggested tools of communication ranged from radio to social media, but also open days to make it possible for the public to visit the mission. There was a general criticism that peace operations are too disconnected from the local reality. Consequently, the end users of a peace operation were said to often consider it to be of no concern to them, have no ownership of it and are therefore not empowered by it.

In addition, participants argued that the end products of missions and the services they deliver require greater civilian oversight. The mission should be directly accountable to the end users with regard to the humanitarian aid provided, but also indirectly by ensuring that the institutions built or strengthened are placed under proper civilian oversight. Participants in the West Africa meeting stressed that in the area of SSR, for example, building a stronger security apparatus without civilian oversight would perpetuate the local population's lack of trust of in the security forces.

Amid all the support for a more people-centred approach, participants in the global meeting from a variety of backgrounds warned that this is not an easy task.<sup>62</sup> There is not always a functioning civil society, the local population is not monolithic and will have different interests and some local actors can be highly irresponsible. Particularly in times of crisis, the general population may be just as divided as the elites. Participants therefore stressed the importance of missions having a clear understanding of the dynamics on the ground, in order to manage tensions. In this context, perceptions of the mission's impartiality would again be very important.

### **Increase comprehensiveness**

A more comprehensive approach is needed to make peace operations more inclusive of local communities, civil society actors and women, and to put their human security needs first. Most participants viewed peace operations as only part of a much wider political strategy for conflict resolution—a tool in a larger toolbox. It was often argued, as in the HIPPO report, that peace operations should be seen as part of a political strategy for conflict resolution, rather than a substitute for it.<sup>63</sup> Many of the participants in the various meetings argued that peace operations are currently still insufficiently embedded in such broader, comprehensive strategies for preventing conflict and building peace. Peace operations were generally perceived as often too reactive, usually to existing or imminent armed conflict. A comprehensive approach should, according to participants, be more proactive and focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Many stressed the need for structural prevention, or dealing with the root causes of conflicts during the pre- and post-conflict phases. They argued that this would reduce the need for operational prevention to prevent armed conflict from breaking out. This argument was frequently supported with what were almost

<sup>62</sup> See United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3).

<sup>63</sup> See United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3).

slogans, such as: ‘prevention is better than cure’ and ‘we need to remedy the causes, not just address the symptoms’.

Structural prevention and peacebuilding are not always part of peace operations, but are achieved through development cooperation, and strengthening regional integration and cooperation in the context of regional frameworks and organizations. However, participants in the different meetings argued that peace operations cannot be discussed while ignoring reconciliation, institution building—including a strong and incorruptible security sector—wealth distribution and sustainable economic development. Security and development are interconnected and one cannot be achieved without the other. Participants, particularly those with civil society and academic backgrounds, frequently stressed that the toolbox is currently imbalanced in favour of military solutions. Moreover, participants argued that peace processes are generally not linear. Therefore, all the different tools from the toolbox need to be applied at the same time. In the Greater Horn of Africa meeting this was illustrated with the argument that even in recently captured areas in Somalia, development must follow directly after the troops, in order to ensure support for the new authorities.

### **Increase the long-term focus by using better exit strategies**

The need for a comprehensive approach implies a long-term approach that goes beyond the presence of a peace operation. Participants in all the meetings argued that peace operations, particularly stabilization, should be seen not as the end of a process, but as the beginning—of a long process of consolidation. In general, peacebuilding requires structural attention to make the results of peace operations more sustainable. Hence, participants frequently aired their concern that peace operations are insufficiently embedded and anchored in such long-term visions and strategies.

As peace operations are only deployed for a limited time span, participants frequently stressed that such operations must anticipate the need for the transfer of knowledge and capacity to local actors and state institutions. Collaborating with government structures and civil society to strengthen and prepare them for the period after transition was seen as highly important for this purpose.

Transitioning security provision is one of the main aspects of an exit strategy. In the Greater Horn of Africa and global meetings, creating a professional SNSF was seen as an important ingredient for the successful withdrawal of AMISOM. In the Central and West Africa meetings, participants suggested that flexible intervention mechanisms would also be helpful in a number of countries. Liberian and Congolese participants in the dialogue meetings argued that an ‘over-the-horizon force’—an out-of-theatre military element that can quickly deploy in case of contingencies—can be useful after ending the continuous deployment of large numbers of troops on the ground. It can serve as both a security guarantee and an emergency intervention force.

In addition, participants generally stressed that peace operations should be strategically linked to economic development and other forms of cooperation on the ground. Many therefore argued the need for comprehensive exit strategies to maintain and build on the gains achieved. Participants from countries currently hosting peace operations that are drawing down, in particular, feared that with the departure of the military presence, other forms of international attention and support would also diminish. They stressed that the transition to other economic development and peacebuilding organizations is essential in order to consolidate the results of peace operations.

There appears to be no model for the type of conditions-based exit strategy required. Government representatives from host nations, in particular, stressed the need for a handover to the government, while civil society representatives emphasized that a

transfer of some tasks to civil society is also required. Generally, however, participants in all the meetings agreed that peace operations have to move away from what the HIPPO report calls ‘Christmas tree mandates’—in which operations have many laudable goals in template language but no sense of priority and do either all or nothing—and move towards more sequenced mandates.<sup>64</sup> Within such mandates, tasks would be slowly transferred from the peace operation to national actors on the basis of concrete objectives and benchmarks, and supported by international partners and donors.

Participants stressed that an exit strategy must entail more than a couple of paragraphs in the concept of operations. It has to be a joint process, working with local actors towards clearly defined objectives. In many ways, the general description of exit strategies showed that the term appears to be a misnomer. An exit strategy should not plan the departure of a mission, but determine and form the strategy of the whole mission from the beginning.

### **Increase accountability**

Participants in all the meetings highlighted the need for accountability, for both the assistance received by African actors and the actions taken by peace operations.

There was a general awareness among many participants that African countries and organizations must account for the assistance they receive, so that donors and international organizations are able to explain and justify their policies and their impact to their taxpayers or their own funders. Obviously, accountability measures for donors’ funds and military equipment are in place to prevent misuse, corruption and human rights abuses. Some civil society participants in the Sahel-Saharan and West Africa meetings stressed the accountability of recipient governments to their own populations, as embezzling donor funding affects the local population as well. There was, however, some criticism of the accountability mechanisms currently in place. In the West Africa meeting, a participant from Liberia claimed that many civil society organizations do not have enough capacity to fulfil all the accountability measures. In addition, according to participants with a military background in various meetings, measures can sometimes be too elaborate and time-consuming, and as a consequence counterproductive for capacity building. A Dutch participant in the global meeting agreed that there is still a lot to do to facilitate improved reporting. Systems should be further streamlined and not changed too often, and coordination among donors should be increased. Nonetheless, external actors in the global meeting stressed the need for more user-friendly systems, not less accountability.

Peace operations should also be held accountable for the actions they take, not least with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse, but also more broadly. In the Sahel-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa and global meetings, African participants gave Libya as a case in point. The NATO-led intervention in 2011 was suggested to have destabilized not only Libya, but also the Sahel region as a whole and Mali in particular. They argued that those responsible should therefore be held accountable for their disruptive interference. In the same vein, it was also noted in different meetings that an increased African lead role in decision making regarding peace operations on the continent would also come with increased responsibility and it should not be interpreted as a go-ahead to ignore current international standards.

<sup>64</sup> See United Nations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 3).



## 5. Conclusions

The NGP II initiative has shown that many of the debates regarding the future of peace operations in Africa and global–regional cooperation are not new. Within them, however, the discussion is clearly moving forward and there is potential for more convergence. Based primarily on the inputs of the participants in the dialogue meetings, the overall conclusions of NGP II are as follows.

### **Non-traditional security challenges are driving the continuing move away from traditional peace operations**

The future security environment in Africa is likely to continue to be characterized by a familiar mix of traditional and non-traditional challenges. Non-traditional security challenges, however, such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, piracy and illegal migration, are likely to become even more pronounced. Their current manifestation throughout the different subregions of Africa and their present and potential effects on global security underline the urgent need to address them and prevent further escalation. Yet, the complex, interrelated and trans-boundary nature of the security challenges in Africa complicates efforts to combat their root causes and symptoms. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in spite of the challenges, many African stakeholders support an expansion of the normative and operational agenda for peace operations to make them even more multidimensional, civilian and transnational, but also to better enable them to use force against insurgencies and terrorism. Such expectations of the use of force, in particular, are not in line with the recommendations made in the HIPPO report, which indicates that the traditional principles of UN peacekeeping increasingly do not address all the priorities in Africa. This strengthens the call of many African actors for more African-led missions.

### **Mutual dependency and a division of labour between African and external actors are likely to persist**

African states and (sub)regional organizations and mechanisms do not yet have the sufficient funds and the specialized capabilities and capacities to cope with the security challenges on the continent alone. Despite the commonly expressed wish among African stakeholders to achieve greater self-reliance in the long term, African dependence on external assistance to fund and build the capacity of peace operations is likely to persist in the short to medium term. The international community, in turn, is likely to continue to rely on a limited number of primarily African troop-contributing countries to ensure security in Africa—and by extension, in an increasingly globalized world, also global security. African troops remain key, given that the demand for peace operation troops in Africa has increased tremendously in the past two decades and some African governments are far more willing to deploy their troops in dangerous and increasingly robust missions than their external partners.

### **Reducing the mutual reliance of African actors and the international community will provide leverage for a more balanced and equitable global–regional partnership**

This mutual dependency between African actors and the international community does not allow the global–regional partnership envisaged by the HIPPO report to be truly balanced and equitable. The current division of labour has negative implications.

On the one hand, the dependency of African actors on external funding and assistance limits their political leverage in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes regarding peace operations on the continent, while creating space for external actors to exploit circumstances for their own geopolitical ends. On the other hand, the reliance of the international community on a limited number of African troop contributors curtails international, including African, leverage to hold troop contributors accountable when they pursue their own geopolitical and partial agendas in a particular conflict zone, or even for domestic policies or human rights abuses at home.

**A balanced and equitable global–regional partnership will continue to require many forms of often challenging cooperation**

A balanced and equitable global–regional partnership will require a variety of forms of cooperation between the many actors involved in peace operations, from the AU and the RECs/RMs to the UN, the EU and bilateral partners, as well as host governments and civil society. These actors cooperate in various forms, ranging from financing, training and equipping to deployments in sequenced, parallel, supportive or hybrid missions. There are perceived challenges and obstacles with all these forms of cooperation, ranging from coordination issues that can be dealt with using technical measures to conflicts of interest that might be more difficult to resolve. Subsidiarity issues are mostly strategic and political, and are likely to be particularly difficult to overcome. Inter-mission cooperation challenges appear to be more responsive to technical coordination solutions in the field. Donor/partner coordination issues are often caused by a combination of strategic differences and a lack of coordination. Last but not least, one of the biggest challenges is forging fruitful relations between mission and host government. This is a delicate process that requires excellent mission leadership, walking the tightrope of building a relationship with the host government (with space for both assistance and constructive criticism) while maintaining the mission's impartiality. In increasingly complex forms of cooperation, coordination among multiple peace operations is bound to be a challenge, particularly when there still are, as the meetings have also shown, many grievances between the actors involved.

## 6. Policy implications

The following policy implications are given in the order of the conclusions and are directed at building on and improving current peace operation efforts and cooperation in Africa, within a balanced and equitable global–regional partnership. They result from the inputs of the African and global dialogues, and are neither a product of consensus nor a representation of what particular actors prefer. They are the authors' understanding of the middle ground where African and external actors should be able to meet. As a result, most stakeholders will likely have a stronger affinity with some implications than others.

### Mandates

1. *Multidimensional mandates.* Provide peace operations with multidimensional mandates that bolster conflict prevention, stimulate economic development and strengthen state structures, but which also focus more on supporting good governance, responsiveness and accountability in host governments, while addressing the challenges of ever-expanding missions.

2. *Civilian missions and components.* Have a greater focus on civilian aspects. Such missions are particularly relevant in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and could perform a set of non-military tasks linked to promoting the rule of law, good governance, democratization and policing reform, along the lines of the field missions deployed by the OSCE since the end of the cold war.

3. *Acute and non-traditional security challenges.* Continue to address acute security challenges and explore new ways to tackle non-traditional security challenges. The latter will require more flexible mandates and new capabilities, which makes the discussion on what peace operations should and should not do all the more urgent.

4. *Transnational or regional mandates.* Develop creative solutions that allow peace operations to be given transnational or regional mandates.

### Cooperation

1. *A global–regional partnership.* Build a truly global–regional partnership for peace operations in Africa in which African and external actors work together in a balanced and equitable manner, and African actors gain influence over the decision-making processes. This would increase mutual understanding and strengthen the knowledge transfer between financial and troop contributors.

2. *African capabilities.* Increase African capabilities of relevance to peace operations in order to reduce African dependency on external actors. This would enable more balanced and equitable decision-making processes and minimize the adverse effects of potentially disruptive external geopolitical interests. This will require a benchmarked process in which the civilian and military capabilities of African countries and organizations are enhanced only for peace operation purposes, most notably in the areas of: (a) civilian capabilities, including for DDR, SSR, deradicalization, border control, promotion of the rule of law and good governance, civil and human rights monitoring, democratization, protection of civilians, gender, religion, service delivery, and economic development; (b) military capabilities and key enablers, including logistics (especially troop transport), close air support, ISR, force protection, and equipment (especially armoured vehicles, fixed-wing transport aircraft, combat and transport helicopters, UAVs, and naval platforms); and (c) rapid deployment capabilities and special forces. Training for civilian, police and military personnel, and external

funding for African-led peace operations will continue to be required in the short to medium term, as it will take time for African countries and organizations to achieve greater self-reliance.

2. *African financial contributions.* Continue to increase African financial contributions to peace operations in Africa in order to increase African political leverage in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes. This requires effort from African actors to find new ways to generate their own funding (e.g. beyond the currently anticipated 25 per cent through the new AU Peace Fund) and to develop innovative policies to sustain African-led peace operations. At the same time, external actors should provide technical support to reach these financial goals and make their assistance to African countries and organizations more sustainable by moving away from one-off support to individual missions and moving towards capacitating sustainable African capabilities.

4. *A pool of troop-contributing countries.* Establish a larger pool of troop-contributing countries for peace operations in Africa, thereby increasing the recruitment base and allowing more effective force generation. This pool should principally include African countries, but also external contributors as required—particularly financial contributors to strengthen mutual understanding. This would reduce the regional and global dependency on a limited number of troop contributors and increase leverage over them, making it easier to guarantee their impartiality and compliance with international standards, both on mission and at home, and to prevent and penalize misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse.

## Coordination

1. *Subsidiarity.* Agree on a mechanism to achieve and operationalize subsidiarity between the UN, the AU and the RECs/RMs that is satisfactory to all the stakeholders involved. In addition, technical measures such as standard operating procedures and mechanisms to instruct and monitor cooperation between the partners need to be strengthened further. Increasing the frequency of meetings between the members of the different decision-making bodies would also strengthen their shared vision and improve their relationship. Harmonize and synchronize the decision-making and reporting processes.

2. *A common integrated strategy.* Further integrate the consultation on, and analysis, planning, financing and evaluation of, missions between the RECs/RMs, the AU and the UN. This is needed in order to strengthen inter-mission cooperation in complex constellations of peace operations where multiple missions can operate in parallel, in sequence or in hybrid formats. This would strengthen the joint nature of the common strategy.

3. *Local inclusion.* Improve and increase information sharing and joint analysis at the field level with local actors. Better mechanisms are required to include inputs from local civil society organizations in processes such as planning and they should be included in implementation.

4. *A comprehensive political strategy.* In line with the findings of the HIPPO report, peace operations should be seen as part of a political strategy for conflict resolution rather than a substitute for it. They need to be better integrated into broader comprehensive political strategies and approaches for conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding.

5. *A long-term focus and exit strategies.* A comprehensive approach almost automatically implies a long-term approach that goes beyond the presence of a peace operation. This requires peace operations to make better use of efforts already under way before

their deployment, and on departure their knowledge and capacity need to be transferred to local actors, state institutions and other international actors in well-planned and transparent exit strategies.

6. *Multi-stakeholder strategic decision making.* Establishing or enhancing common platforms for coordination and communication would further strengthen cooperation between missions, their troop and financial contributors, donors and partner countries, host governments, civil society and other key stakeholders in mission areas. Such platforms for broader and more transparent strategic discussion would help to clarify their respective tasks and objectives. This would also be the arena in which to discuss and formulate exit strategies, as all stakeholders should discuss and define together the conditions, strategies and measureable actions required for exit. As far as possible, the host nation should play a leading role in these coordination efforts from an early stage.

7. *Mission leadership and strategic communication.* Further professionalize mission leadership. Significant investment in public diplomacy and strategic communication will be required to cope with the sensitive and dynamic relationships with host governments, other parties to the conflict and civil society.

### A balanced and equitable partnership

1. *Put the 'end users of peace' first.* Peace operations in Africa are still too top-down, and the various decision-making and implementation processes should become more inclusive of local communities, particularly women and youth, traditional leaders, religious institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector. This will require, among other things, a substantial strengthening of public diplomacy and strategic communications in peace operations.

2. *Increase the African lead role and cooperate on the basis of mutual respect.* External actors must listen more to their African counterparts and interact with them on a basis of mutual respect. African stakeholders should be in the lead when setting agendas and identifying needs, and given more decision-making power over solutions, drawing-up mandates and coordination.

3. *Increase accountability.* There is a need for more accountability, for both the assistance received by African actors and the actions taken by peace operations and the international community. This will also mean that the increased African lead role comes with increased responsibility and should not be interpreted as a green light to relax international standards. Misconduct or disruptive interference should be treated equally, regardless of whether responsibility lies with African or external actors.



© SIPRI 2017



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9  
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden  
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00  
Email: [sipri@sipri.org](mailto:sipri@sipri.org)  
Internet: [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)

