


FOOD SYSTEMS IN CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING SETTINGS

Ways Forward

KRISTINA TSCHUNKERT AND CAROLINE DELGADO



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD

Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden)
Ambassador Chan Heng Chee (Singapore)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Dr Radha Kumar (India)
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom)
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)
Dr Feodor Voitlovsky (Russia)

DIRECTOR

Dan Smith (United Kingdom)



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

FOOD SYSTEMS IN CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING SETTINGS

Ways Forward

KRISTINA TSCHUNKERT AND CAROLINE DELGADO



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

January 2022

Contents

<i>Abbreviations</i>	iv
<i>Summary</i>	v
1. Introduction	1
Figure 1.1. Countries experiencing the worst food insecurity crises in 2020 and the level of conflict deaths in these countries 2011–20	2
2. Knowledge gaps in global responses and policy debates	4
Pathways between food systems, conflict and peace	4
Failure to recognize the pathways	5
Transforming food systems through a humanitarian–development–peace nexus approach	6
Box 2.1. Social and contextual considerations in technology-based peacebuilding	5
3. Food systems transformation needs concerted implementation and funding	9
Concerted implementation and collaboration	9
Flexible and multi-year funding, addressing the donor paradox	12
Figure 3.1. Donors that provided at least 30 per cent of humanitarian funding as unearmarked and flexible funding, 2020	10
Figure 3.2. Share of funding that is multi-year among donors that provide multi-year funding, 2020	11
Figure 3.3. Share of global humanitarian funding provided to national and local organizations	12
4. Transforming food systems: Local food systems in focus	14
Box 4.1. Global food systems and multinational corporations: The example of Sierra Leone	15
Box 4.2. The Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath: Exacerbated inequalities, shrinking civic space and few meaningful efforts towards localization	16
5. Operationalizing a nexus approach in support of food security	18
6. Conclusions and recommendations	21
Recommendations	22

Abbreviations

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HDP	Humanitarian–development–peace
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MSP	Multi-stakeholder platform
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RBA	UN Rome-based agency
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UN	United Nations
UNFSS	United Nations Food Systems Summit

Summary

This policy paper is the third and final paper of a three-part series on food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings. The objectives of the series are to emphasize the urgency of addressing the relationship between conflict and food insecurity and to point out existing opportunities to do so. The first paper outlined the pathways and interconnections between violent conflict and food insecurity, which have a two-way relationship. On the one hand, violent conflict is a main driver of food insecurity because it disrupts food systems, affecting people's ability to produce, trade and access food. On the other hand, food insecurity can be a contributing factor to the emergence and duration of conflict, depending on the context. The most common factors that exacerbate the risk of food insecurity contributing to violent conflict include environmental stress and climate-induced food shortages, production resource competition, and grievances related to social issues and food price. The second paper contextualized these pathways and interconnections with case studies of Venezuela and Yemen. The case studies showed that the conflict environment has had detrimental consequences for food security in both countries; it caused the food systems of these oil-producing and food import-dependent countries to contract. The paper identified four key themes that demonstrate the complex relationships and linkages between conflict and food insecurity: a shift from agriculture to oil, detrimental government policies, migration and displacement, and the politicization and weaponization of food, including food aid.

Conversely, equitable and sustainable food systems have the power to foster peace. This paper explores the opportunities for breaking the vicious cycle between food insecurity and violent conflict. For food system transformation and food security activities in conflict and peacebuilding settings to create conditions conducive to peace, it is important to apply a peacebuilding lens to food security interventions and a food security lens to peacebuilding efforts. The lenses can be integrated by taking a humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus approach that enhances the integration of humanitarian, development and peace interventions.

Knowledge gaps in global responses and policy debates

People's sustainable development depends on their food security, which in turn depends on food systems. Food systems, however, are in crisis. Food systems need to transform to be more equitable and sustainable. Such transformation in conflict-affected countries demands a coherent response that combines immediate humanitarian assistance with investment in local capacities to prevent, cope with and recover from crises, and to sustain peace.

The United Nations Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) 2021 set the stage for a global food systems transformation to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. However, the summit failed to unpack and discuss the pathways between food insecurity and conflict or to integrate a peacebuilding lens into its food systems approach to achieving the SDGs, despite that conflict continues to be the main driver of food insecurity.

Food systems transformation needs concerted implementation and funding

The gaps in global responses and policy debates are manifested in a persistent fragmented approach to funding and to implementing food security and food system transformation activities. Intervening organizations and their response plans often

fall firmly into either the humanitarian, development or peacebuilding sectors, which means they do not address the full spectrum of food security issues. Barriers to addressing the full spectrum include the tendency of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to neglect the peace element and to instead focus on the dual nexus between humanitarian and development work. Furthermore, diverse understandings of peace and its interconnection with food systems make it difficult for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to adopt joint positions and learn from each other. Ways of working need to be more integrative while at the same time ensuring that humanitarian principles are not undermined. One example is to work through consortia comprised of international, national and community-based organizations with a balance of expertise across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors, which can help better integrate the peace element.

Furthermore, conflict and peacebuilding settings tend to be very dynamic and therefore require flexible and, particularly, multi-year donor funding. This type of funding enhances the ability of agencies to respond quickly to changes in the context and to work towards peacebuilding objectives and outcomes that have a long time span. However, donors need to do more towards their commitments to make funding flexible, longer term and more localized.

Transforming food systems: Local food systems in focus

Context-specific and locally led and owned humanitarian and development interventions that build on existing local capacities are essential for the long-term success of food system transformation. However, there is a status quo that works in favour of multinational corporations and produces unsustainable and inequitable outcomes that fuel grievances among local food system actors, which can lead to conflict, and therefore it needs to be reconsidered.

Furthermore, such a local approach is necessary, particularly in conflict and peacebuilding settings, to strengthen sustainable and just elements of food systems and transform unjust elements that can contribute to conflict. However, flexible and multi-year funding is not sufficiently dispersed to local actors. The result is that decision-making power remains centralized within the UN and some large international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Operationalizing a nexus approach in support of food security in conflict and peacebuilding settings

Food and peace facilities have been proposed as an innovative approach to breaking the pathways between food insecurity and conflict while strengthening and transforming food systems to generate conditions conducive to peace. A food and peace facility would be a multidisciplinary hub constituting humanitarian, development and peacebuilding analysts, actors and funders in conflict-affected countries. The overarching objective of the facilities would be to generate the evidence and analysis needed to better understand the pathways in local contexts. Furthermore, the facilities would support and incentivize actors to implement a nexus approach for addressing the double burden of food insecurity and conflict. They would institutionalize cooperation by bringing together actors engaged in different elements of food systems across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors from the local to the international. This kind of collaboration would ensure that the analysis that informs operations and funding streams incorporates highly contextual dynamics.

Recommendations

The paper ends with four recommendations for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors. The recommendations seek to provide guidance for measures that can be taken to advance an integrated approach to food security and food system transformation activities. An integrated approach is needed to break the pathways between food insecurity and conflict while strengthening and transforming food systems to generate conditions conducive to peace.

1. The state holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union should work to include peace and conflict as critical items on the agendas of upcoming summits and multilateral events on food security and food systems.
2. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors should integrate a peacebuilding lens into food security interventions and a food security lens into peacebuilding efforts.
3. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors should work in consortia and through multi-stakeholder processes to draw on each other's expertise and to include local actors in a meaningful way. This demands: (a) simultaneous, rather than sequential, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programming; and (b) that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors act on their Grand Bargain intention to make interventions 'as local as possible, as international as necessary'.
4. Donor governments and international humanitarian and development organizations should ensure funding supports the HDP nexus approach to food systems transformations. Donor governments should do so by (a) delivering on their Grand Bargain commitments to make at least 30 per cent of their funding flexible and longer term; and (b) making at least 25 per cent of funding available to local and national organizations. International humanitarian and development organizations should do so by committing to passing on flexible and multi-year funding to national and local cooperating partners.

1. Introduction

World hunger is among the most pressing issues of our time. Around 45 million people are on the verge of famine, meaning that without immediate emergency food assistance they face starvation.¹ The Global Network Against Food Crises estimates that 161 million people were acutely food insecure as of September 2021—a 19 per cent increase from the year before. The actual figure is likely to be even higher as the figures for 13 countries and territories are missing from the 2021 estimate. Most of these people live in countries where violent conflict is the main driver of food insecurity, notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Yemen.²

This paper is part of a three-part policy paper series that aims to emphasize the urgency of addressing the relationship between conflict and food insecurity. It is the third and final paper in the series and explores the opportunities for breaking the pathways between food insecurity and violent conflict. The first paper demonstrated a two-way relationship between violent conflict and food insecurity.³ On the one hand, conflict has a direct impact on food systems, affecting people's ability to produce, trade and access food. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the stark overlap of food insecurity and violent conflict; in 2020 the ten countries with the worst food crises globally accounted for over 72 per cent of all conflict deaths globally over the preceding decade.⁴ On the other hand, food insecurity can be a contributing factor to the emergence and duration of conflict. The pathways leading from conflict to increased food insecurity or from increased food insecurity to conflict are complex and unique to each case. The most common factors that exacerbate the risk of food insecurity contributing to violent conflict include environmental stress and climate-induced food shortages, production resource competition, and grievances related to social issues and food price. Conversely, when food systems are equitable and sustainable, they have the power to foster peace.⁵ The second paper contextualized those pathways and interconnections, using Venezuela and Yemen as case studies. It demonstrated that the conflict environment has had detrimental consequences for food security in both countries. The paper identified four factors that create conditions that feed the vicious cycle between food insecurity and conflict: a shift from agriculture to oil; detrimental government policies; migration and displacement; and the politicization and weaponization of food.⁶

¹ Khorsandi, P. and Anthem, P., '45 million people at risk of famine require urgent intervention', World Food Programme (WFP), 8 Nov. 2021; and United Nations, 'WFP warns 3 million more now "teetering on the edge of famine"', 7 Nov. 2021.

² Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and Global Network Against Food Crises, *Global Report on Food Crisis 2021: September 2021 Update* (FSIN/Global Network Against Food Crises: Rome, 2021).

³ The goal of this paper is not to explain in detail the linkages between food security, food systems, conflict and peace. Thorough reviews of this can be found here: Delgado, C., Murugani, V. and Tschunkert, K., *Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Pathways and Interconnections* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2021); Martin-Shields, C. and Stojetz, W., 'Food security and conflict: Empirical challenges and future opportunities for research and policy making on food security and conflict', Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 18-04, 2018, pp. 150–164; Brück, T. et al., 'The relationship between food security and violent conflict', Report to FAO, International Security and Development Center (ISDC), 22 Dec. 2016; Brinkman H.-J. and Hendrix, C. S., 'Food insecurity and violent conflict: Causes, consequences, and addressing the challenges', World Food Programme (WFP), Occasional paper 24, 2011; Rudolfson, I., 'Food insecurity and domestic instability: A review of the literature', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 32, no. 5 (2020); and Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 'Peace through food: Ending the hunger–instability nexus', 2021.

⁴ However, the scale of the food crisis and conflict dimension does not always neatly overlap or correlate; Syria and Afghanistan made up the majority of conflict deaths but did not experience the largest food crises while the DRC experienced the reverse.

⁵ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3); Martin-Shields and Stojetz (note 3); and Helland, J. and Sørbo, G. M., 'Food securities and social conflict', Chr. Michelsen Institute Report, 2014.1.

⁶ Murugani, V. et al., *Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Case Studies of Venezuela and Yemen* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2021).




Figure 1.1. Countries experiencing the worst food insecurity crises in 2020 and the level of conflict deaths in these countries 2011–20

DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Note: People in crisis refers to people in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) phase 3, or above.

Sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, University of Uppsala, retrieved: 1 Oct. 2021, <<https://ucdp.uu.se/>>; Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and Global Network Against Food Crises, *Global Report on Food Crisis 2021* (FSIN/Global Network Against Food Crises: Rome, 2021); and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), ‘Integrated phase classification’, [n.d.].

Humanitarian aid is one way of addressing food insecurity and other humanitarian needs. As food insecurity is tightly linked to conflict, and 80 per cent of humanitarian aid goes to conflict-affected countries, it is imperative to recognize and address issues of peace and conflict prevention to tackle the causes of food insecurity.⁷ Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation need to work in a more integrated, efficient and sustainable way to achieve better impacts in conflict and peacebuilding settings. The humanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDP nexus) continues long-running efforts to foster a more coherent strategy across humanitarian and development work to promote more sustainable solutions. In 2016, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called for ‘sustaining peace’ to be considered the ‘third leg of the triangle’.⁸ The HDP nexus, thus, links these three pillars to ensure a more sustainable approach to poverty, violent conflict and the underlying multisectoral causes of crises.⁹

However, so far, efforts to address food insecurity and transform food systems have not put the peace element on equal footing with the humanitarian and development elements, which this paper discusses in the second chapter. This manifests as a persistent siloed and segregated approach to the funding and implementation of interventions that aim to address food insecurity, discussed in chapter 3. In turn, donors and international actors have failed to make multi-year and flexible funding available to local actors. In chapter 4, the paper argues that systems thinking and better integration of bottom-up perspectives and local solutions to inequalities are necessary to address the power asymmetries in the current food system. This would enable local and global food systems to complement each other in such a way that food and income distribution more equally benefit previously marginalized actors. One proposal made during the UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) in 2021, and discussed in chapter 5, was to establish food and peace facilities in conflict and peacebuilding

⁷ Südhoff, R. and Milasiute, G., ‘Time for a reset? The World Humanitarian Summit and the Grand Bargain, 5 years on’, Centre for Humanitarian Action (CHA), 2021.

⁸ International Council of Voluntary Agencies, ‘Learning stream: Navigating the nexus—Topic 1: The “nexus” explained’, Briefing paper, 2018.

⁹ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), ‘The humanitarian–development–peace nexus in practice: A literature review’, 2021.

settings. This is one way of operationalizing the pathways linking food systems, conflict and peace in global responses and policy debates. The food and peace facilities would be able to institutionalize cooperation across the HDP nexus and pay sufficient attention to the social processes that drive food insecurity—including conflict—and the contexts in which these processes are embedded. The paper ends by providing four recommendations for policymakers, donor governments, and humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, considering the opportunities and practical steps that can help to break the vicious cycle of food insecurity and conflict.

2. Knowledge gaps in global responses and policy debates

This section discusses the persistent knowledge gaps about the pathways and interconnections between food systems, food security, conflict and peace in global responses and policy debates.

Pathways between food systems, conflict and peace

Violent conflict affects most of the elements and processes in food systems, notably production, distribution and marketing (in this paper, marketing means activities relating to the buying and selling of food at markets). The pathways connecting violent conflict and food production include the destruction of assets, resources and human capital, heightened risks in the wider operating environment, and national budgets that prioritize military spending instead of agriculture and development. Violent conflict affects food systems' distribution and marketing elements by disrupting infrastructure, reducing the availability of goods, shifting market dynamics and changing the institutional market environment. Food insecurity can also be a contributing factor to the emergence and duration of violent conflict. The most common factors that exacerbate the risk of food insecurity contributing to violent conflict include environmental stress and climate-induced food shortages, production resource competition, and grievances related to social issues and food prices.¹⁰

The interrelations between food security and conflict are also strikingly clear on the empirical level; the worst food crises in the world are found in conflict-affected countries. Afghanistan, the DRC, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and Zimbabwe accounted for the 10 worst food security crises in 2020 (see figure 1.1).¹¹ In the preceding decade, these same countries accounted for over 72 per cent of all conflict deaths globally.¹² This is no coincidence. Conflict actors frequently use food as a weapon of war and deliberately destroy food systems, and lasting food insecurity is a principal legacy of war, as recognized in UN Security Council Resolution 2417.¹³ The case studies on Venezuela and Yemen in the second paper in this series demonstrated how conflict actors in both countries politicized and weaponized food, including food aid. In Yemen, parties to the conflict have systematically attacked food system infrastructure, and critical humanitarian aid deliveries have been susceptible to coalition-led restrictions on imports. In Venezuela, the government uses the state subsidized food distribution system, committees of local supply and production (CLAP), as a political tool to manipulate and control the Venezuelan population. Furthermore, the government has repeatedly denied that there is an ongoing complex humanitarian crisis and has only recently allowed international humanitarian aid into the country. The strategic politicization of food and food aid in the case of Venezuela and the weaponization of food in Yemen have led to major disruptions to the food systems in both countries.¹⁴

Breaking the links between food insecurity and conflict is critical for ending global food insecurity and achieving sustainable peace. Furthermore, addressing

¹⁰ These pathways are thoroughly unpacked in the first paper of this series, see Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3).

¹¹ Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and Global Network Against Food Crises (note 2).

¹² Uppsala Conflict Data Program, University of Uppsala, retrieved: 1 Oct. 2021, <<https://ucdp.uu.se/>>.

¹³ United Nations, 'Adopting Resolution 2417 (2018), Security Council strongly condemns starving of civilians, unlawfully denying humanitarian access as a warfare tactics', Press release, 24 May 2018.

¹⁴ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3); and Murugani et al. (note 6).

Box 2.1. Social and contextual considerations in technology-based peacebuilding

Social and contextual considerations are crucial in discussions around and in the implementation of technological innovations to address food insecurity. Technological innovations include the use of artificial intelligence linked to big data, sensors and food systems knowledge to increase productivity and optimize resource use; the use of robots and drones throughout the food supply chain; the use of tailored genes for specific nutritional and environmental outcomes; and novel food and feed from farmed single-cell organisms; vertical farming with controlled-environment production, to name but a few.^a However, technology and technological innovations are not implemented in a social vacuum but in dynamic and complex contexts. The outcome of innovations will depend on consumer preferences (whether they are considered ethical, socially acceptable and equitable), economic factors and policy regulations. New technologies and innovations risk perpetuating societal divides within and between countries. This risk is amplified in countries and societies affected by violent conflict as these countries have less capacity to engage with technological advances and limited ability to realise technology's potential benefits.^b

Two examples of this are urban agriculture in Venezuela and the installation of solar panels in Yemen. Urban agriculture is in many ways a grassroots innovation for tackling major societal challenges. However, in Venezuela, urban farms have become co-opted by the local armed militia groups that drive insecurity and violence in Venezuela. Moreover, they have been critiqued for constituting a micro-solution to national-level structural production problems. In Yemen there are signs that solar panels for the extraction of groundwater needed for irrigation have been installed in conflict-affected areas. However, there is a risk that the panels were installed by the rebels to facilitate qat cultivation rather than installed to extract groundwater to enhance agricultural production.^c

^a Asseng, S. et al., 'Implications of new technologies for future food supply systems', *Journal of Agricultural Science*, vol. 159, no. 5–6 (July 2021).

^b For a detailed discussion on the impact of violent conflict on human and productive capital, resource diversion and the regulatory environment, see Delgado, C., Murugani, V. and Tschunkert, K., *Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Pathways and Interconnections* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2021).

^c Murugani, V. et al., *Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Case Studies of Venezuela and Yemen* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2021).

food insecurity in conflict-affected countries is also crucial for achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 on zero hunger, not least because more than half of the people facing undernourishment live in countries affected by conflict, violence or fragility.¹⁵ Progress towards achieving SDG2 however is dangerously off track and 657 million people—or nearly 8 per cent of the world's population—are projected to be undernourished in 2030.¹⁶ The failure to achieve SDG2 risks having serious repercussions on the achievement of the other SDGs. Ultimately, people's sustainable development depends on their food security, and nutritional and health status, which in turn depend on food systems.¹⁷ Food systems, however, are in crisis.¹⁸

Failure to recognize the pathways

Food systems need to transform into more equitable and sustainable systems if the world is to achieve SDG2. Such transformation in conflict-affected countries demands a coherent response, which combines immediate humanitarian assistance to those most in need with investment in local capacities to prevent, cope with and recover from crises, and to sustain peace over the medium to long term.¹⁹

The UNFSS 2021 set the stage for a global food systems transformation to achieve the SDGs by 2030.²⁰ It sought to leverage the interconnectedness of food systems to address global challenges such as food insecurity, climate change, poverty and inequal-

¹⁵ von Grebmer, K. et al., *Global Hunger Index: Hunger and Food Systems in Conflict Settings* (Welthungerhilfe/Concern Worldwide: Bonn/Dublin, 2021).

¹⁶ von Grebmer et al. (note 15).

¹⁷ Mustafa, M. A. et al., 'Transition toward sustainable food systems: A holistic pathway towards sustainable development', ed. C. M. Galanakis, *Security and Nutrition* (Academic Press: London, 2021), pp. 33–56.

¹⁸ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3).

¹⁹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Development Initiatives and Norwegian Refugee Council, 'Development actors at the nexus: Lessons from crises in Bangladesh, Cameroon and Somalia, synthesis report', 2021.

²⁰ United Nations, Food Systems Summit, 23 Sep. 2021, New York.

ity. However, the summit failed to unpack and discuss the pathways or to integrate a peacebuilding lens into its food systems approach to achieving the SDGs, despite that conflict continues to be the main driver of food insecurity. The UNFSS thereby missed a unique opportunity to highlight the importance of these linkages, as it was the first time since 2009 that food and food systems were discussed at an event that brought together all UN member states.

The UNFSS missed several opportunities to incorporate the linkages. First, conflict and peace were not among the main items on the summit's agenda, and only a few peace and conflict experts participated in the working groups. In addition, insufficient space was created for segments of the populations most affected by conflict, food insecurity and marginalization to participate in the preparatory work for the summit. They include landless farmers, agricultural workers, indigenous peoples, fisherfolk, rural women, youth, rural people living in occupied areas, who are important agents of food systems. Moreover, the UNFSS prioritized technological innovations over social innovations, even though social innovations—such as those labelled pro-poor, base-of-the-pyramid, below-the-radar and grassroots innovations—help tackle major societal challenges and hold considerable promise for meaningful technology-based peacebuilding (see box 2.1).²¹ Furthermore, only one of the 25 working groups constituting the five action tracks discussed the interconnections between food insecurity and violent conflict.²² Finally, the high-level speeches on the day of the summit, including that of the secretary-general, did not give these pathways and interconnections due attention, making only passing remarks on the role of conflict in food insecurity.

This notwithstanding, there was one working group at the UNFSS that convened peace and conflict actors with food systems experts and brought forward innovative solutions, including the establishment of food and peace facilities in conflict-affected countries, which this paper addresses in chapter 5. The solutions that emerged further underline the importance of connecting all relevant actors in food systems transformations.

Transforming food systems through a humanitarian–development–peace nexus approach

Transforming food systems into more equitable and sustainable systems in conflict-affected countries demands a nexus approach between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors and interventions. In conflict-affected settings, food aid, together with broader humanitarian assistance, constitutes the principal emergency measures to protect and ensure the survival of affected populations. Nevertheless, in these same settings, humanitarian funding and response are often overstretched. As conflicts are increasingly protracted, humanitarian actors often carry out activities that go beyond what was intended as short-term emergency relief. At the same time, development and peace efforts struggle to take hold. Development programmes are not usually designed to engage in conflict and peacebuilding environments in which levels of violence and stability constantly fluctuate.²³ Development actors often decrease engagement or pull out when risks escalate, and they can be slow or late to engage in

²¹ De Schutter, O. et al., 'Open letter to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres regarding the UN Food System Summit', 10 Sep. 2021; and Miklian, J. and Hoelscher, K., 'A new research approach for peace innovation', *Innovation and Development*, vol. 8, no. 2 (2018).

²² The pre-summit discussions were organized along five action tracks (AT), aligned with the summit's five objectives. The action tracks were: AT1 Ensure access to safe and nutritious food for all, AT2 Shift to sustainable consumption patterns; AT3 Boost nature-positive production; AT4 Advance equitable livelihoods; AT5 Build resilience to vulnerabilities, shocks and stress.

²³ 'Q&A: The ICRC and the "humanitarian–development–peace nexus" discussion—In conversation with Filipa Schmitz Guinote, ICRC Policy Adviser', *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 101, no. 912, pp. 1051–66.

‘sudden-onset’ situations.²⁴ The traditional static and linear model of intervention that governs many development programmes is ill-suited for the complex and interrelated challenges the programmes face operating in protracted crisis contexts.

The HDP nexus approach continues long-running efforts in the humanitarian and development fields to foster a more coherent strategy across humanitarian and development work to promote more sustainable solutions. Previous efforts include disaster risk reduction (DRR), linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), and the resilience agenda, embedding conflict sensitivity across responses.²⁵ Conflict sensitivity refers to an organization’s ability to understand the interactions between its interventions and the context, and to act upon this understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts. The nexus approach received renewed momentum at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). At this summit, UN agencies and the World Bank agreed on a ‘New Ways of Working’ agenda to deliver the nexus approach, which pushes for more robust collaboration and coordination among humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors. Moreover, the nexus approach has strong relevance to the Grand Bargain, an agreement from 2016 ‘between some of the largest donors and humanitarian organisations who have committed to get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action’. Several donors, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) agreed in the Grand Bargain to work across the HDP nexus to reach the 2030 SDGs.²⁶ Yet, despite the clear need for an HDP nexus approach, it is still often missing in conflict and peacebuilding settings.

Challenges also arise because humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors do not share a common understanding of purpose, inclusion and principles even although they share objectives such as protection, health, education, prosperity and peacefulness. Peacebuilding and development activities have a political purpose—shaping state and society in the long term—while the purpose of humanitarian activities is ‘one of person not polity’.²⁷ Humanitarian opposition to nexus thinking, particularly in conflict-affected contexts, includes fear that humanitarian principles—specifically neutrality and independence—will vanish and that the humanitarian sector will be used as an instrument in state-building or global security agendas.²⁸ A fully integrated HDP nexus approach is appropriate and crucial in some local settings. However there is a possibility it could be counterproductive in other settings if there is a threat of humanitarian aid being politicized or if local understandings and perceptions of the three nexus elements consider them to be politicized.

For example, historically in South Sudan, church-based organizations have been productively entangled in humanitarian aid, development and peace, from Sudan’s first civil war (1955–72) through secession of South Sudan from Sudan (2011) to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led peace process for the most recent civil war (2013–20). UN agencies supported and intersected grassroots peacebuilding initiatives led by local and international Christian groups and NGOs that supported the IGAD peace process by conducting public messaging and

²⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Development Initiatives and Norwegian Refugee Council (note 19).

²⁵ Hövelmann, S., ‘Triple nexus to go’, Center for Humanitarian Action, Mar. 2020; and Fanning, E. and Fullwood-Thomas, J., ‘The humanitarian–development–peace nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?’, Oxfam Discussion Paper, 2019.

²⁶ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘The Grand Bargain (official website)’, [n.d.]; and Südhoff, R., Hövelmann, S. and Steinke, A., ‘The triple nexus in practice: Challenges and options for multi-mandated organisations’, Center for Humanitarian Action, Oct. 2020.

²⁷ Slim, H., ‘Joining what belongs together? The triple nexus and the struggle for policy synthesis’, *Rural 21: The International Journal for Rural Development*, vol. 53, no. 1 (2019).

²⁸ DuBois, M., ‘The triple nexus: Threat or opportunity for the humanitarian principles?’, Centre for Humanitarian Action, May 2020.

awareness campaigns and community-level peacebuilding, pioneering a ‘people-to-people’ approach to peace in South Sudan.²⁹ Local actors appreciated that the three elements were reintegrated because they regarded the previous segregation of them as artificial. In Mali, local actors, instead, perceived external parties to be influenced by their own political agendas instead of being impartial and neutral, which jeopardized humanitarian staff’s safety and risked exacerbating the conflict (see chapter 3).³⁰ Thus, it is important that actors understand the impact of the HDP nexus in context.

²⁹ Südhoff, Hövelmann and Steinke (note 26); and Agency, J. C., ‘Religion, governance, and the “peace–humanitarian–development nexus” in South Sudan’, eds C. de Coning and M. Peter, *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order* (Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, 2019).

³⁰ Südhoff, Hövelmann and Steinke (note 26).

3. Food systems transformation needs concerted implementation and funding

The gaps in global responses and policy debates discussed in the previous section are manifested in a persistent fragmented approach to funding and to implementing food security and food system transformation activities. Sectoral siloes separate humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors and interventions, objectives and budget models. A transformation towards sustainable and just food systems calls for a nexus approach that breaks those siloes. The Grand Bargain in 2016 (see chapter 2) promised shifts in funding towards unearmarked, flexible and multi-year funding.³¹ While this is a welcome development, it has also led to a donor paradox that must be addressed before food systems can be transformed.³²

Concerted implementation and collaboration

The structure of food systems, the level of food security, and peace and conflict are deeply intertwined, and one cannot be solved without addressing the others. However, intervening organizations and their response plans often fall firmly into either the humanitarian, development or peacebuilding sectors, which means they do not address the full spectrum of food security issues. Therefore, there is an urgent need to resolve the persistent siloed approach to food system transformation and food security interventions. This calls for renewed efforts to operationalize the HDP nexus, fostering de-siloed and integrative ways of working where appropriate. Essentially, actors need to pay as much attention to the peace component of the nexus and consider it as important as the humanitarian and the development components.

Barriers to incorporating the peace component of the HDP nexus include the tendency of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to neglect the peace element and to instead focus on the dual nexus between humanitarian and development work.³³ For example, the UN Rome-based agencies (RBAs), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP), have collaborated since 2016 in a resilience initiative to promote food security and strengthen resilience against shocks and stressors in the DRC, Niger and Somalia. Recognizing that action needs to be accelerated to reach the 2030 SDGs, the RBAs aim to cooperate to implement transformative initiatives that focus on addressing the root causes of food insecurity and that span across the HDP nexus. However, the 2015 conceptual framework that the initiative is built upon confidently makes the humanitarian–development bridge but does not mention peace. In a later document, in 2019, the framework is extended to include—in brackets—the aim to work towards improved prospects for peace.³⁴ This illustrates that a significant amount of work remains to be done, conceptually and practically, to be able to leverage the potential of food systems to generate the conditions conducive to peace.

³¹ DuBois (note 28); and Saez, P. and Worden, R., ‘Beyond the grand bargain: The humanitarian financing model needs more radical change’, Center for Global Development, July 2021.

³² Südhoff and Milasiute (note 7).

³³ Südhoff, Hövelmann and Steinke (note 26).

³⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development and World Food Programme, ‘Strengthening resilience for food security and nutrition: A conceptual framework for collaboration and partnership among the Rome-based agencies’, Apr. 2015; and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development and World Food Programme, ‘Rome-based agencies plan of action for Sahel: Strengthening the resilience of the livelihoods of most vulnerable populations for food security, nutrition and sustained peace in Sahel’, 2019.




Figure 3.1. Donors that provided at least 30 per cent of humanitarian funding as unmarked and flexible funding, 2020

Notes: Some of these figures were still provisional at the time of writing. All numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: Metcalfe-Hough, V. et al., ‘The grand bargain at five years: An independent review’, Humanitarian Policy Group-commissioned report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2021, p. 105.

Furthermore, there is no common understanding of peace among actors. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors work with broad definitions of peace, which include concepts such as social cohesion, conflict sensitivity, education or economic opportunity programmes, as well as formal peace processes, early warning, mediation, and security and stabilization.³⁵ Such diverse understandings make it difficult for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to adopt joint positions and learn from each other.³⁶ For instance, in Mali the mandate of the UN Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is stabilization and peace. However non-state armed groups perceive MINUSMA and its activities to be conflated with operations aimed at counter-insurgency and therefore consider MINUSMA a partial actor to the conflict. Understanding peace activities as tending towards stabilization and security has repercussions when implementing humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities. When UN missions are considered partial conflict actors, humanitarian access and UN and NGO staff associated with the UN can be put at risk.³⁷

Food security and food system transformation activities in conflict-affected contexts face similar obstacles. The political economy nature of food systems must be acknowledged to enable a shift towards a more integrated and de-siloed approach to food security. This requires disentangling the power structures governing food supply chains and means of production, and considering the implications of these, to transform food systems to be equitable and sustainable.³⁸ However, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors have little common understanding of food security and

³⁵ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (note 9); Südhoff, Hövelmann and Steinke (note 26); and Steinke, A., ‘The triple nexus in Mali: Coordination, securitisation and blurred lines’, Centre for Humanitarian Action, 2021.

³⁶ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (note 9).

³⁷ Steinke (note 35).

³⁸ Havnevik, K., ‘The World Food Programme and the Nobel Peace Prize 2020’, *Forum for Development Studies*, vol. 48, no. 3 (2021); and Swedish Government, ‘Sammanställning av Sveriges andra globala livsmedelssystem dialog om livsmedelsförsörjning konflikt och motståndskraft inför toppmötet om livsmedelssystem 2021’, [Summary of Sweden’s second global food systems dialogue about food security, conflict, and resilience ahead of the Food Systems Summit 2021], 29 Apr. 2021.




Figure 3.2. Share of funding that is multi-year among donors that provide multi-year funding, 2020

PRM = United States Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; MFA = Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs; SIDA = Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency; BHA = US Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance.

Notes: The table summarizes data provided in self-reports. However, this data is generated on different interpretations of the guidance from the workstream and different timeframes. Data reported is therefore not entirely comparable and cannot be consolidated. Italy's figure appears as a range due to different interpretations of the guidance from the workstream and different timeframes. Japan provides multi-year funding but was not included in this graphic because no data was available. All numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: Metcalfe-Hough, V. et al., 'The grand bargain at five years: An independent review', Humanitarian Policy Group-commissioned report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2021, p. 102.

food systems, which is one of the main reasons for the predominantly siloed approach. The humanitarian sphere's opposition to nexus thinking is partly due to fear that humanitarian principles—specifically neutrality and independence—will vanish and instead be replaced by the political approach of development and peace actors.³⁹ However, neglecting the political economy nature of food systems, and acting with a purely apolitical approach to food systems and food insecurity, risks further marginalizing smallholder farmers and others who are significant to food security but who are among those most affected by conflict.

To ensure that humanitarian principles are not undermined and in light of these barriers, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors need to work in a more integrated manner when taking a conflict sensitivity approach to food security interventions. This will ensure that they are addressing people's urgent needs independently from political interests. If actors work through consortia comprised of international, national and community-based organizations with balanced expertise across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors, they can better integrate the peace element. For example, the Durable Peace Programme in Myanmar was implemented through such a consortium. Individually, the participating organizations did not work across the HDP nexus, but collectively they were able to draw on each other's diverse areas of thematic expertise and this contributed to HDP nexus programming. This way of working helped strengthen conflict sensitivity across all programming and support conflict-affected communities' needs. At the same time the programme could address the conflict dynamics, which are the root causes of humani-

³⁹ DuBois (note 28); and Slim (note 27).




Figure 3.3. Share of global humanitarian funding provided to national and local organizations

Source: Metcalfe-Hough, V. et al., ‘The grand bargain at five years: An independent review’, Humanitarian Policy Group-commissioned report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2021, p. 53.

tarian needs, and build capacities of local actors that have the influence to engage in the peace processes.⁴⁰

Flexible and multi-year funding, addressing the donor paradox

While concerted collaboration and implementation by humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors can help resolve the fragmented approach to food system transformation activities, flexible and, particularly, multi-year donor funding is required in conflict and peacebuilding settings, which tend to be very dynamic. Donors need to commit to long-term and flexible funding so that food system transformation and food security activities in conflict and peacebuilding settings become integrated and de-siloed. The advantages of flexible, multi-year funding include gains in cost-efficiency and effectiveness as well as the ability to address cross-cutting issues such as gender equality. Furthermore, it enhances the ability of agencies to respond quickly to changes in the context, and work towards peacebuilding objectives and outcomes that have a long time span.⁴¹

However, the unearmarked funding targets set out in the Grand Bargain have not been fully reached. In 2020, 17 of the 25 institutional donors that signed the Grand Bargain were reported to have reached the goal of making 30 per cent of global humanitarian funding flexible and unearmarked (see figure 3.1).⁴² This demonstrates a donor paradox—donors advocate for nexus thinking and working and demand it from their implementing partners but change little about their own budget mechanisms and practice to facilitate the nexus.⁴³

There has been some positive development towards reaching the goal for flexible and multi-year funding. In 2020, 19 of the 25 institutional donors that signed the

⁴⁰ Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas (note 25).

⁴¹ Bena, F. et al., ‘A win-win: Multi-year flexible funding is better for people and better value for donors’, International Rescue Committee, 2020.

⁴² Metcalfe-Hough, V. et al., ‘The grand bargain at five years: An independent review’, Humanitarian Policy Group-commissioned report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2021.

⁴³ Südhoff and Milasiute (note 7).

Grand Bargain were reported to have provided multi-year funding (see figure 3.2).⁴⁴ However, the dispersal of funds along these lines does not alone incentivize or encourage organizations to coordinate and collaborate across the HDP nexus. Donors can play a positive facilitating role by creating an enabling environment and building the structures and frameworks for cooperation.⁴⁵

Furthermore, multi-year and flexible funding is in most cases not passed on to national and local organizations, which is an obstacle to transforming food systems. A third commitment of the Grand Bargain was to make 25 per cent of humanitarian funding available to national and local organizations. However, only 4.7 per cent of humanitarian funding reached national and local responders in 2020, which is even lower than the proportion in 2016 when the Grand Bargain was signed (see figure 3.3).⁴⁶ A localized, bottom-up approach is essential for making food systems equitable and sustainable, as it ensures equal attention is paid to local food systems and how they are linked to the global food system. This approach builds local capacities and considers local perspectives (see below).

⁴⁴ Metcalfe-Hough (note 42).

⁴⁵ Brown, S. and Mena, R., 'A review of the triple nexus approach in discourse and practice: With a focus on Islamic Relief's triple nexus programme', Islamic Relief Worldwide, Aug. 2021.

⁴⁶ Metcalfe-Hough (note 42).

4. Transforming food systems: Local food systems in focus

There is currently a status quo that neglects local actors in the food system. This can be seen in the failure of donors and international actors across the HDP nexus to make multi-year and flexible funding available to local actors in conflict and peacebuilding settings, which is a barrier to transforming food systems to become more equitable and sustainable. This status quo also works in favour of multinational corporations and produces unsustainable and unequitable outcomes that fuel grievances that can lead to conflict.⁴⁷ Smallholder farmers play a considerable role in global food security as they produce roughly 35 per cent of the world's food.⁴⁸ However smallholder farmers made up more than half of the total number of people that experienced food insecurity in 2017. While large-scale, industrialized food production has helped many farmers out of poverty, the benefits are unequally distributed and the expansion of multinational companies pushes small-scale farmers out of business.⁴⁹ Furthermore, multinational agribusiness foreign direct investment (FDI) often displaces smallholder farmers from the land, illustrating how local actors are neglected in favour of multinational corporations (see box 4.1).

If actors are to transform food systems, there needs to be a shift towards reinforcing rather than replacing local systems and solutions.⁵⁰ An important aspect of systems thinking is that systems 'create the outcomes that they are designed to produce', meaning that the design of food systems needs to be analysed and altered if the outcomes are negative.⁵¹ Food supply relies heavily on global food supply chains whose vulnerabilities have been laid bare by the Covid-19 pandemic (see box 4.2). Moreover, an estimated one third of food produced globally is lost or wasted.⁵² A key question, therefore, is how to distribute food and income generated in the food system more equitably and sustainably to reach SDG2 (zero hunger), rather than increase food production.

Humanitarian and development interventions need to be context specific, locally led and owned, and built on existing local capacities to ensure the long-term success of any attempts to transform the food system in such a way that it will yield positive contributions to peace. These interventions need to address the root causes and drivers of food insecurity, including conflict and climate change.⁵³ Therefore they need to have a conflict-sensitive approach and a thorough understanding of the context and work across the HDP nexus. Moreover, interventions need to have a systems approach that unpacks the connections between food systems from the local to the international level, not only in countries experiencing conflict and food insecurity. External part-

⁴⁷ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3); and Murugani et al. (note 6); and Kemmerling, B., Schetter, C. and Wirkus, L., 'Addressing food crises in violent conflicts: Food Systems Summit brief prepared by research partners of the scientific group for the Food Systems Summit', Center for Development Research in cooperation with the Scientific Group for the UN Food System Summit 2021, Apr. 2021.

⁴⁸ Lowder, S. K., Sánchez, M. V. and Bertini, R., 'Which farms feed the world and has farmland become more concentrated?', *World Development*, vol. 142 (2021).

⁴⁹ Swedish Government (note 38); and *Konzernatlas 2017: Daten und Fakten über die Agrar- und Lebensmittelindustrie [Agrifood Atlas: Facts and Figures about the Corporations that Control What we Eat]* (Heinrich Böll Foundation/Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung/Friends of the Earth Germany/Oxfam Germany/Germanwatch/Le Monde Diplomatieque: Berlin/Brussels, 2017).

⁵⁰ Center on International Cooperation, 'The triple nexus in practice: Toward a new way of working in protracted and repeated crises—A synopsis', Dec. 2019.

⁵¹ Swinburn, B., 'Power dynamics in 21st-century food systems', *Nutrients*, vol. 10, no. 11 (2019).

⁵² Gustavsson, J. et al., 'Global food losses and food waste: Extent, causes and prevention', Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2011.

⁵³ The drivers of food insecurity are discussed in more detail in the first paper of this series. Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3).

Box 4.1. Global food systems and multinational corporations: The example of Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, tension over land and unequal distribution of other natural resources was a key driver of the 1991–2002 Sierra Leone Civil War. Customary and formal land and property institutions were debilitated, leading to discontent among the rural population over marginalization, disenfranchisement and poverty.

Systemic land issues remain an underlying source of social conflict and political instability even 20 years after the civil war ended.^a Agribusiness investments are seen to emphasize commodities for export rather than local consumption. There are concerns that the surge in large-scale foreign direct investment (FDI) for agribusinesses negatively impacts food security and disrupts customary land tenure norms to the detriment of local people and communities, as small-scale farmers tend not to have formal control over the land they cultivate.^b In the aftermath of these large-scale commercial land deals, communities, especially land-using families, women, youth and other community members who are not well-connected, face precarious economic situations. For example, in 2012, an international bioenergy company planned to plant 10 000 hectares of sugar cane to be processed into ethanol and exported to Europe, claiming it would provide 2000 jobs to community members in rural Sierra Leone. However, the salary covered less than the value of food and resources local farmers previously produced themselves on the land that was leased to the company.^c

Furthermore, the influx of money has increased inequality, and reinforced nepotism and the role of the paramount chiefs, exposing communities to corruption, coercion and violence. Land-lease payments are not given to the individuals who used to work a particular plot of land, but to a few male heads of households of the land-owning families in each village, increasing resentment between youth and elder males and sparks local communities' frustration towards the company.^d Such emerging grievances 'and growing inequality resulting from commercial land investments resemble the dynamics that spurred the war in Sierra Leone'.^e

This is not limited to Sierra Leone. In 2011, 34 of 37 active conflicts were in developing agrarian countries, and in all but three intrastate conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2009 land issues were a key driver. Agribusiness investments can contribute to tensions as access to and control over land is an important dimension of conflict due to its economic relevance and its social, political and cultural value.^f

There are some attempts in Sierra Leone and elsewhere, for example by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), to improve land tenure governance and to mitigate the potential for conflict by engaging a variety of local stakeholders in the process through multi-stakeholder platforms. The FAO proposed and established multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), which provide one example of how the local and the global can be combined. MSPs could ensure local actors engage by creating an inclusive forum for actors to discuss problems and propose solutions to improve land tenure governance and provide better and more equal access to natural resources. In Sierra Leone, the MSP brings together 300 stakeholders including government officials, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, academia, the private sector, traditional authorities, religious leaders, landholding families, the media and development partners. Members of the MSP took an active role in the preparation of the land policy document using guidelines on responsible land tenure governance in the context of food security. The collective ensured that the document recognizes and respects tenure rights, safeguards and protects against threats, promotes the employment of legitimate tenure rights while providing access to justice and preventing disputes, conflicts and corruption. Actors perceived this process to be beneficial for addressing land tenure governance across sectors, increasing collaboration and improving information sharing and project coordination.^g

Nevertheless, this example of FDI in Sierra Leone illustrates that unabated business-as-usual that favours multinational actors at the cost of local actors and smallholder farmers could increase and accelerate the very drivers that lead to conflict. Therefore, longer-term transformation of food systems needs to consider bottom-up perspectives and seek local solutions through active participation, integration and collaboration of international and local actors in the transformation process.

^a Sturgess, P. and Flower, C., 'Land and conflict in Sierra Leone: A rapid desk-based study', Evidence on Demand, UK Department for International Development (DFID), Dec. 2013; and Moyo, S. and Foray, K. M., 'Scoping mission report: Key land tenure issues and reform processes for Sierra Leone', Report commissioned for the Ministry of Land, Country Planning and the Environment by the United Nations Development Programme, 2009.

^b Sturgess and Flower (note a); Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Sierra Leone* (Freedom House: Washington, DC, 2012); Baxter, J., 'Who is benefitting? The social and economic impact of three large-scale land investments in Sierra Leone: A cost-benefit analysis', Christian Aid, July 2013; and Millar G., 'Local experiences of liberal peace: Marketization and emergent conflict dynamics in Sierra Leone', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 53, no. 4 (2016), pp. 569–81.

^c Millar, G., 'Investing in peace: Foreign direct investment as economic restoration in Sierra Leone?', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 9 (2015), pp. 1700–1716.

^d Hennings, A., 'From bullets to banners and back again? The ambivalent role of ex-combatants in contested land deals in Sierra Leone', *Africa Spectrum*, vol. 54, no. 1 (2019), pp. 22–43; Millar (note b); and Millar (note c).

^e Hennings (note d).

^f Iff, A. et al., 'Agribusiness: Risks and impacts in conflict-affected areas', Background Paper, Swiss Peace and International Alert, Feb. 2015.

^g Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), *FAO Support of Multi-stakeholder Platforms on Land Tenure Governance: Innovative Practices from the Field and Building on Experience*, Second version (FAO: Rome, 2021).

Box 4.2. The Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath: Exacerbated inequalities, shrinking civic space and few meaningful efforts towards localization

The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed weaknesses, inequalities and inequities in the food system, which particularly affect vulnerable people who already experience poverty and food insecurity.^a National and international restrictions on movement in response to the Covid-19 pandemic have led to loss of income. These economic impacts have led to rising levels of food insecurity.^b Port closures and export bans have affected trade, which, together with decreasing purchasing power due to loss of income, impacts traders and producers and most severely affects smallholder farmers, youth and women who have limited capacity to mitigate the shock.^c The executive director of a women's development organization in Somalia, expressed the consequences of this for local conflict dynamics: 'Amidst Covid-19, we have terrorism. We have an ongoing war. And we have a climate crisis. Additionally, the pandemic has precipitated social problems such as land grabbing, sexual abuse, and the misuse of authority. And the situation in the camps of internally displaced people and other informal settlements is also only becoming more dire. With people losing their income, the risk of children being recruited to al-Shabaab [insurgent group] in return for a small remuneration is rising.'^d

Furthermore, there are rising concerns that the Covid-19 pandemic has contributed to shrinking civic and humanitarian space. Measures taken by governments, or other groups that control territories, can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for civil action and humanitarian response.^e Since March 2020, governments across the globe have taken measures in response to the Covid-19 pandemic that restrict freedoms and close civic space. Governments often use crises, such as a pandemic, to infringe fundamental rights and freedoms.^f For example, the president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, used the pandemic as an opportunity to oppress opposition by announcing lockdowns that limited ongoing protests opposing his regime.^g Such measures also impacted the humanitarian response in conflict-affected countries. In Bangladesh, for instance, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were placed under lockdown, impeding their ability to provide humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees in camps.^h

Finally, as international humanitarian workers were not able to travel due to Covid-19 restrictions, the pandemic was seen as an opportunity to drive forwards the localization agenda. Local organizations took on more responsibility and risk—for example exposure to the virus. However, leadership roles remained in the hands of international organizations, leaving minimal scope for local organizations to provide input to key decision making. Furthermore, while the level of humanitarian funding generally increased in response to the pandemic, it was mainly funnelled to the United Nations and other international organizations. In Afghanistan, for instance, only 2.3 per cent of funding went directly to local organizations.ⁱ

^a Shenggen, F. et al., 'Food system resilience and COVID-19: Lessons from the Asian experience', *Global Food Security*, no. 28 (Mar. 2021); iPES Food, 'COVID-19 and the crisis in food systems: Symptoms, causes, and potential solutions', 2020; and International Food Policy Research Institute, *2021 Global Food Policy Report: Transforming Food Systems after COVID-19* (International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, DC, 2021).

^b International Food Policy Research Institute (note a).

^c Shenggen et al. (note a).

^d de Harder, C., 'Conflict climate change and Covid-19: The complexities of Somalia', Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), [n.d.].

^e Roepstorff, K., 'Localisation and shrinking civic space: Tying up the loose ends', Centre for Humanitarian Action, 15 May 2020.

^f Anderson, C. et al., 'Navigating civic space in a time of Covid: Synthesis report', Institute of Development Studies, May 2021.

^g Kishi, R., 'A year of Covid-19: The pandemic's impact on global conflict and demonstration trends', Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2021.

^h Roepstorff (note e).

ⁱ Ullah, Z., Ullah Khan, S. and Wijewickrama, E., 'Covid-19: Implications for localisation: A case study of Afghanistan and Pakistan', Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, 2021.

ners can actively support the creation and strengthening of a virtuous cycle between food systems and peace in a collaborative way that ensures accountability towards local stakeholders.⁵⁴

However, equitable and sustainable food systems that equally benefit all will not be possible unless decision-making power is dispersed to the local level. Currently, as discussed above, the flexible and multi-year funding necessary to bridge the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding divide is not dispersed to local and

⁵⁴ The second paper of this series provides an example of this, where programmes to save livelihoods of conflict-affected populations invest in local food systems and rebuild national value chains. Activities include training and grants especially for women and youth, temporary employment opportunities to rebuild local infrastructure and offering technical and support services to farmers. Murugani et al. (note 6).

national organizations. The result is that decision-making power remains centralized within the UN and some large international NGOs.⁵⁵ The UNFSS in 2021 is an example. It was labelled the people's summit, but critics argue that it did not have much reach beyond the high member-state level. Critics of the summit point out that it lacked transparent decision making, excluded representatives of people affected by food crises, such as indigenous-led organizations and civil society actors, facilitated corporate capture of the food system, and legitimized high-tech solutions geared towards large-scale agriculture that undermine local actors within the food system.⁵⁶ The perception of exclusion prompted an alternative event, the Global People's Summit on Food Systems, organized by 22 regional and international organizations, which called for an end to 'the global corporate food empire' and aimed to present 'an actionable, pro-people and pro-planet alternative to radically transform the food systems'.⁵⁷

The UNFSS was a unique but missed opportunity to highlight, with the world watching, the importance of an approach to food system transformation that is rooted in a thorough understanding of local response strategies and capacities to food crises. Particularly in conflict and peacebuilding settings, such a local approach is necessary to support and strengthen sustainable and just elements of existing food systems and transform inequitable elements that can contribute to conflict.⁵⁸ Interventions that are not rooted in a sound understanding of local dynamics and that do not mainstream conflict sensitivity mechanisms throughout activities as a baseline for more active engagements in the peacebuilding arena can have adverse effects on local conflict dynamics. Such interventions can undermine local capacities in the food production and marketing sectors and can even fuel grievances that drive conflict in a particular context.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Center on International Cooperation (note 50).

⁵⁶ Canfield, M., Anderson, M. D. and McMichael, P., 'UN Food Systems Summit 2021: Dismantling democracy and resetting corporate control of food systems', *Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems*, vol. 5 (2021); Anderson, M., 'UN Food Systems Summit: It's time to listen to civil society's concerns', International Institute for Environment and Development, Guest blog, 22 June 2021; Quijano, I.-I., 'Farmers, not corporations, will transform the food system', Progressive International, 2021; and Growing Culture, 'We should all be worried about the about the United Nations Food Systems Summit', 2 May 2021.

⁵⁷ Chakamba, R., 'UN Food Systems Summit faces criticism at kickoff of counter-event', Devex, 21 Sep. 2021; and Welsh, T., 'Devex dish: The view from the alternative food systems summit', Devex, 22 Sep. 2021.

⁵⁸ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3); and Murugani et al. (note 6).

⁵⁹ Kemmerling, Schetter and Wirkus (note 47).

5. Operationalizing a nexus approach in support of food security

Breaking the pathways between food insecurity and violent conflict requires equitable and sustainable food systems. As discussed in the first paper in this series, the complexities of food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings present many difficulties.⁶⁰ To transform food systems, a food security lens needs to be applied to peacebuilding and a peacebuilding lens to food security interventions, which can be facilitated by taking an HDP nexus approach. However, it is nearly impossible for individual organizations and institutions working with food security and peacebuilding to take full account of the diversity of actors and the multiplicity of levels and processes in the food system.⁶¹ Furthermore, as discussed in this paper, there are knowledge gaps in current HDP nexus debates and the interventions do not fully integrate non-earmarked funding or local perspectives. But there are still ways of breaking the pathways between food insecurity and conflict while strengthening and transforming food systems to generate conditions conducive to peace. This section discusses one innovative approach to this end that emerged from the UNFSS: the establishment of food and peace facilities.⁶²

A food and peace facility would be a multidisciplinary hub made up of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding analysts, actors and funders in a country that faces—throughout the country or in a part of it—the identifiable risk, current reality or aftermath of violent conflict and its humanitarian impact.⁶³ The overarching objective of the facilities would be to generate the evidence and analysis needed to understand the links between food, conflict and peace in local contexts better. Furthermore, the facilities would aim to support and incentivize actors to implement an HDP nexus approach for addressing the double burden of food insecurity and conflict. The choice of location is an essential feature of the facilities; they would be situated in countries that face the risk, current reality or aftermath of violent conflict. They would institutionalize cooperation by bringing together actors engaged in different elements of food systems across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors. This includes community-based actors and affected populations, national and international NGOs, provincial and national governments, multilateral agencies, and researchers.

There are several advantages to this kind of collaboration. Convening this diversity of actors and stakeholders allows humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to share resources and exchange knowledge. It would mitigate the risk of interventions fuelling conflict and avoid duplicating efforts while identifying any potential emergency and development blind spots. Conflict-affected environments are often characterized by incomplete information systems. This kind of collaboration would ensure that the analysis that informs operations and funding streams incorporates highly contextual dynamics. At the same time, actors would be able to consider contextual dynamics against the workings of broader national, regional and global food systems and geopolitical developments. The facility would thereby be well placed to influence strategy and action that breaks the linkages between food insecurity and conflict, while generating the conditions conducive to food security and peace

⁶⁰ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3).

⁶¹ von Grebmer (note 15).

⁶² The food and peace facilities were proposed by the peace and resilience working group of Action Track 5 of the United Nations Food Systems Summit, chaired by SIPRI.

⁶³ United Nations Food Systems Summit 2021, Action Track 5—Building resilience to vulnerabilities, shocks & stress: Synthesis Report, 'Potential game changing and systemic solutions: An initial compilation', 19 Feb. 2021.

The establishment of food and peace facilities would be a significant development, given that in protracted conflicts, few non-government actors have the resources, information or capacity required to plan over the medium to long term. The inability of longer-term planning makes partnerships more difficult. On the one hand, funding uncertainty makes it difficult to strategize effectively with others and complement each other's programming.⁶⁴ On the other hand, the lack of a common understanding of the contextual meaning of the three components of the HDP nexus and how they link up and interact with broader humanitarian, development and peacebuilding dynamics hamper the formation of dedicated partnerships (see section 3).

Furthermore, food and peace facilities would be well placed to fully unpack the increasingly blurred dichotomy between the humanitarian and development sectors. The facilities would be able to identify the objectives and principles humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors share and those that are separate. They would also be able to identify the development gains attained through humanitarian action, and support development actors to build on these gains by becoming more risk tolerant. At the same time, since the facilities would bring together actors working at the local, national, regional and global levels, they would be able to help ensure that the impact of local operations are considered against broader conflict and security dynamics. They would also help understand how local operations connect to food systems at different scales. For example, as discussed in the first paper in this series, actors promoting livelihood interventions that target conflict-affected farmers in Colombia must consider broader economic and development transitions to avoid aid dependency and potentially reinforcing drivers of violence. The Colombian government has made efforts to develop the agriculture sector, such as promoting the export of avocados to capitalize on the rapidly increasing global demands for this product. The government's efforts to turn the agriculture sector into a motor of economic growth, however, favour agribusiness, and farmers who are unable to produce to export standards are shut out of this rapidly growing market. Agribusiness producers that supply, or strive to supply, the export market are increasingly also supplying the domestic markets, further marginalizing small-scale traditional farmers.⁶⁵ Another example of FDI into export-oriented agribusiness that marginalizes local small-scale farmers is laid out in box 4.1.

The facilities would also be a way of building consensus on what the context-specific relationship between food insecurity and violent conflict is, by involving local, national, regional and international actors. These actors, which range from marginalized subsistence farmers and small-scale producers to government institutions and UN organizations, often have different priorities, interests and ways of conceptualizing key notions—as became strikingly clear in the UNFSS process.⁶⁶ If the facilities work towards a consensus, they can ensure a nuanced, coherent, comprehensive, and systematic approach to strengthening equitable and sustainable food systems so that, to the greatest extent possible, efforts to enhance food systems are conflict sensitive and peace positive.

There are many challenges in establishing food and peace facilities, particularly in countries where such facilities are most needed. Take, for example, the case of Venezuela, as outlined in the second paper in this series. Venezuela is facing a devastating and complex humanitarian emergency where 32 per cent of the population are food insecure and in need of assistance.⁶⁷ At the same time, the country has one of the high-

⁶⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences* (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Geneva, 2016).

⁶⁵ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 3).

⁶⁶ Canfield, Anderson and McMichael (note 56).

⁶⁷ World Food Programme, 'Venezuela food security assessment: Main findings', 2019.

est homicide rates globally, with many armed groups driving violence, some of which have close ties to the state. The hunger crisis is worsened by and worsens violent conflict in Venezuela. For the past century, oil has been the primary source of revenue for the country, and it played a vital role in ensuring food security in a country with limited national food production. This is an important consideration given that the humanitarian crisis is unfolding against broader global decarbonization efforts, which will probably lower demand for petroleum and gas in the coming decades. The second policy paper concluded that the way current and future governments manage the crisis will have significant implications for food systems and their interconnectedness with violent conflict. Therefore, better understanding of the intricate links between food insecurity and conflict is vital for managing the crisis and breaking the links. The food and conflict facilities discussed above would play a crucial role to this end.

However, the political and operating environment in Venezuela is extremely challenging. Venezuelan authorities are accused of restricting, harassing and criminally prosecuting organizations that are responding to the humanitarian emergency.⁶⁸ International organizations fear using information the government does not approve of as they risk losing their permits to operate in the country.⁶⁹ Although President Nicolás Maduro's position is weakening, he and his governing coalition have strong incentives to remain in power at any cost, given the risk of incarceration or death for him and his closest supporters should he lose power.⁷⁰ Therefore, the food and peace facilities must be able to deal with challenges like these where the state is the principal conflict actor driving violence and governments pressurize the works of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors towards political interests.

Yet, even in some of the most challenging operating environments, progress is possible. Humanitarian agencies and other international organizations do operate, and they could facilitate establishing the initial processes and structures for food and peace facilities. The facilities need to ensure political buy-in and ownership at national and regional levels to counter potential political resistance at state level. Regional bodies, such as the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), could promote the facilities among their respective member states. In doing so, they should provide evidence that the functions of the facilities are not driven by the political interest of any state, donor institution or organization.

⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch, 'Venezuela: Humanitarian groups under attack—Detention, harassment, prosecution of workers, activists', 21 Dec. 2020.

⁶⁹ Febres, V. C., Ganteaume, F. R. and Ramsey, G., 'Venezuela emergencia humanitaria compleja: Respuesta humanitaria, desafíos para la sociedad civil' [Venezuela's complex humanitarian crisis, responses, and challenges for civil society], WOLA, 24 Nov 2020.

⁷⁰ Pauselli, G., 'The Venezuelan crisis: What role for intergovernmental actors?', Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), Policy brief, Sep. 2019.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

The first two papers in this series have shown—in theory and in context—that there is a two-way relationship between violent conflict and food insecurity. The first paper of this series sets out a framework that demonstrates that conflict has a direct impact on food systems and food insecurity can be a contributing factor to the emergence and duration of conflict. Food systems are complex and the way in which violent conflict affects them differs across contexts. However, the outcome is the same: failing food systems and increasing levels of food insecurity. Conversely, equitable and sustainable food systems can generate conditions conducive to peace. There is, however, an urgent need to better understand and act upon the links between food systems and violent conflict to leverage this potential. The case studies of Venezuela and Yemen in the second paper of this series show that compounding factors, including a shift from agriculture to oil, detrimental government policies, migration and displacement, and the politicization and weaponization of food and aid, have driven these complex relationships and linkages between conflict and food insecurity. The solution to food insecurity—and SDG2 (zero hunger)—is not to grow more food. Instead, there is a need to address the inequalities and inequities in the system that can drive conflict to create equitable and sustainable food systems that have the power to foster peace.

This third and final paper explores the opportunities for breaking the pathways between food insecurity and violent conflict. For food system transformation and food security activities in conflict and peacebuilding settings to create conditions conducive to peace, it is important to apply a peacebuilding lens to food security interventions and a food security lens to peacebuilding efforts. The lenses can be integrated by taking an HDP nexus approach that enhances the integration of the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding elements. Current challenges to this include knowledge gaps about the pathways between food and conflict, which manifest in siloed, sector-specific funding and disintegrated approaches to implementing food security and food system transformation activities. In turn this leads to local actors in the food system being neglected in favour of multinational corporations.

The paper has argued that these challenges emphasize how important it is for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to collaborate to leverage the potential of equitable and sustainable food systems to help to break the vicious cycle of food insecurity and conflict. Policymakers, national governments, donor governments, the UN, local and international NGOs, research institutions and civil society actors need to make firm commitments to collaboration. Collaboration also requires concerted implementation and multi-year and flexible funding as well as the creation of an enabling environment for collaboration and cooperation.

Actors implementing food system transformation activities need to recognize the pathways and take an integrated HDP nexus approach where contextually appropriate and useful. Food security interventions need to adhere to humanitarian principles to respond to people's immediate needs in a neutral and impartial manner. Humanitarian food insecurity and developmental food system transformation activities need to be preceded by a thorough context analysis and conflict sensitivity measures need to be mainstreamed throughout. Peacebuilding objectives can be drawn up from this baseline. Simultaneous rather than sequential humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programming is needed to ensure that humanitarian (food) needs are met while also addressing the structural root causes of food insecurity in the food systems with longer-term programming.⁷¹ Moreover, there needs to be a shift in thinking and

⁷¹ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (note 9).

working from project-related output to outcome-based planning. Working in an outcome-oriented way means that building partnerships and local capacity can be goals, which are key to building equitable and sustainable food systems. Outcome-oriented working requires consensus-building brokering and building new partnerships; navigating and communicating complex ideas; using systems thinking; facilitating open dialogues; and co-creating ideas.⁷² In Myanmar, for instance, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors within the Durable Peace Programme have worked in a consortium. The actors have strengthened conflict sensitivity across all programming and responded to conflict-affected communities' needs by drawing on each other's expertise. They worked simultaneously on addressing the conflict dynamics at the root of humanitarian needs and building the capacity of local actors to engage in the peace processes.⁷³

Furthermore, the power imbalances and inequalities in the food system must be addressed. Local and global food systems need to complement each other rather than compete, to be able to operate effectively. Persisting power asymmetries in the current food system tend to favour multinational corporations and compromise small-holder farmers, who are fundamental to global food security but are among those most affected by conflict and food insecurity. Therefore, it is imperative that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors place equal importance on local food systems and bottom-up approaches, recognizing their important contributions to global food security and peacebuilding.

The FAO proposed and established multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), which provide one example of how the local and the global can be combined. Due to the inclusiveness of the MSPs, which incorporate a range of local, national, regional and international actors bringing a broad range of expertise to the forum, actors perceived this process to be beneficial for addressing issues across sectors, increasing collaboration and improving information sharing and project coordination (see box 4.1).

It is critical that actors pay sufficient attention to social processes that drive food insecurity—including conflict—and the contexts in which these processes are embedded. The proposal emerging from one working group of the UNFSS, and recommended in the first paper of this series, to establish food and peace facilities in conflict and peacebuilding settings demonstrates one way to integrate food systems and peacebuilding. The facilities aim to institutionalize cooperation by bringing together actors engaged in different elements of food systems across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors.

Recommendations

This paper makes the following four recommendations to humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, including policymakers, national governments, donor governments, the UN and local and international NGOs. The recommendations seek to provide guidance for measures that can be taken to advance an integrated approach to the food security and food system transformation activities needed to break the pathways between food insecurity and conflict while strengthening and transforming food systems to generate conditions conducive to peace.

1. The state holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) should work to include peace and conflict as critical items on the agendas of upcoming summits and multilateral events on food security and food systems. These states represent major donor governments. The

⁷² German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (note 9).

⁷³ Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas (note 25).

Swedish Government, in particular, has an opportunity to bring the discussion of the pathways and interconnections between food systems, food insecurity and peace and conflict to the centre. It holds the presidency of the Council of the EU from January until June 2023 and the Swedish Government has previously expressed commitment towards these issues. As the proposal for food and peace facilities by one working group at the UNFSS 2021 has shown, important outcomes can be achieved when actors come together. These outcomes can and should be enhanced by adequate support from EU member states.

2. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, including policymakers, national governments, donor governments, the UN, local and international NGOs, and research institutions, should integrate a peacebuilding lens into food security interventions and a food security lens into peacebuilding efforts. Only if these pathways and interconnections between food systems, food security and conflict and peace are recognized and acted upon by all relevant actors can food systems be transformed in an equitable and sustainable manner to reach SDG2 (zero hunger).
3. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors should work in consortia and through multi-stakeholder processes to draw on each other's expertise and to include local actors in a meaningful way. As part of this, the following actions are needed to leverage the opportunities that these processes provide: (a) simultaneous, rather than sequential humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programming is needed to ensure that the immediate needs of conflict-affected people are met in a principled way while the structural root causes of food insecurity in the food systems with longer-term programming can be addressed; and (b) humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors should act on their Grand Bargain intention to make interventions 'as local as possible, as international as necessary'. Working through multi-stakeholder processes that invite meaningful participation of local actors and communities and that allow a locally led and internationally enabled response can contribute to better mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity throughout interventions. At the same time, these bottom-up processes are in a better position than top-down interventions to address structural drivers that inhibit building the conditions in food systems conducive to peace, such as power asymmetries in food systems that prevent local small-holder farmers and other marginalized actors to equitably benefit from economic gain in the food system.
4. Donor governments and international humanitarian and development organizations should provide integrated funding that supports the HDP nexus approach to food systems transformations that is needed to achieve the SDGs and to break the linkages between food insecurity and conflict. Donor governments should do so by (a) delivering on their Grand Bargain commitments to make at least 30 per cent of their funding flexible and longer term; and (b) making at least 25 per cent of funding available to local and national organizations. Without creating an enabling environment and building the structures and frameworks for humanitarian-development-peace cooperation, successfully transforming food systems and reaching SDG2 (zero hunger) will be difficult. International humanitarian and development organizations should do so by committing to passing on flexible and multi-year funding to national and local cooperating partners.

About the authors

Dr Kristina Tschunkert (Germany), is a Researcher with the Food, Security and Peace Programme at SIPRI. Research interests include host-refugee relations, socio-economic dimensions of peace and interventions, local agency and micro-dynamics of conflicts, the Triple Nexus.

Dr Caroline Delgado (Sweden) is a Senior Researcher and Director of the Food, Security and Peace Programme at SIPRI, working on the interrelations between food security, violent conflict, stability and peace. She is also one of the focal points for the Global Registry of Violent Deaths (GReVD), engaged in efforts to monitor and code violent event data. Other research interests include making use of geographic information systems (GIS) technologies as a way of inquiring into complex conflict dynamics and peace measurement.



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org