


TRANSPARENCY IN TRANSFERS OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Reports to the United Nations Register
of Conventional Arms, 2003–2006

PAUL HOLTOM



Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

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of Conventional Arms, 2003–2006

SIPRI Policy Paper No. 22

PAUL HOLTOM



Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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Preface

The contrast could hardly be sharper: while we know that small arms and light weapons (SALW) are the number one killers of combatants and innocents alike in conflicts around the world, we know far less about the international trade in these weapons. This Policy Paper makes an important contribution to closing that gap.

In recent years, intergovernmental organizations, export control regimes and states have worked to provide more information to other states and the public on SALW transfers. One of the most notable efforts has been the UN General Assembly's decision of December 2003 to invite member states to provide information on SALW transfers to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

This Policy Paper is the first study to document and analyse information on SALW transfers reported to UNROCA for 2003–2006. The author, Dr Paul Holtom, presents and analyses the level of reporting to UNROCA on SALW transfers and the information reported. He finds that while, in recent years, far more intergovernmental and public information has been made available on international SALW transfers, this information falls far short of providing a full picture. While the level of reporting on light weapons to UNROCA has been fairly steady for the years 2003–2006, a significant increase in submissions of background information on SALW transfers followed the introduction of a standardized reporting form for 2006. However, despite this noteworthy increase, UNROCA still only captures a fraction of the information on international SALW transfers that states otherwise make available, and the UNROCA reporting system faces both technical and political hurdles for its improvement and possible expansion.

This Policy Paper helps inform the debate over how these improvements can be put in place. In that light, it is intended as a contribution to the 2008 Biennial Meeting of States on implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. It is also hoped that the study will inform the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation and further development of UNROCA, which is due to convene in 2009. More broadly, the study highlights the challenges and opportunities of making the international trade in weapons more transparent. Dr Holtom is to be congratulated for this original and thorough study, which adds to the growing body of SIPRI research on small arms and light weapons.

Thanks are due to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for its generous financial support for this study, and to all those who completed and returned the

SIPRI questionnaire on SALW submissions to UNROCA. The author is grateful for the comments received from Dr Owen Greene and from SIPRI colleagues Ian Anthony, Mark Bromley and Pieter D. Wezeman. Special mention should also be given for the invaluable advice and support provided by SIPRI editors David Cruickshank and Joey Fox; the SIPRI Library, under Nenne Bodell; and Noel Kelly, the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project Assistant.

Dr Bates Gill
Director, SIPRI
June 2008

Summary

Intergovernmental and public transparency in international transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) lags behind transparency levels for other conventional weapons. In recent years, intergovernmental organizations, export control regimes and states have worked to provide more information to other states and the public on SALW transfers. In December 2003 the United Nations General Assembly invited member states to provide information on SALW transfers to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

Since UNROCA's establishment, groups of governmental experts (GGEs) tasked with considering its continuing operation and development have debated the merits of reporting SALW transfers to the Register. Their discussions reveal three options for reporting SALW transfers to UNROCA: (a) expand the seven existing categories; (b) invite states to submit background information on SALW transfers; or (c) establish an eighth category for reporting SALW.

In 2003 the General Assembly adopted the GGE's recommendations to request reports on transfers of some light weapons to categories III and VII of UNROCA and to invite the submission of background information on transfers of SALW. In December 2006 the General Assembly invited states to submit background information on SALW transfers on a standardized reporting form. This created a 'virtual eighth category' for reporting SALW to UNROCA.

For the years 2003–2006, 50 UN member states reported information on international transfers of light weapons to UNROCA categories III and VII or on SALW transfers as background information. Of these 50 states, 28 are from Europe (including 18 members of the European Union), 9 from the Americas, 5 from Africa, 4 from Asia, 2 from the Middle East and 2 from Oceania. Overall, the international transfer of almost 1 million SALW units was reported to UNROCA for 2003–2006, citing 40 exporters and 128 importers. Other sources show that this represents only a fraction of the volume of international transfers of SALW for this period. Major exporters such as China, Russia and the USA did not participate, while several states (e.g. Norway, Spain and Ukraine) that have made information on their SALW transfers publicly available also failed to report to UNROCA.

The level of response to the invitation to report on light weapons transfers to UNROCA remained steady over 2003–2006. Following the introduction of the standardized reporting form, there was a significant increase in the response to the invitation to submit background information on SALW transfers for 2006. Four states submitted nil reports for both exports and imports as background information—a sign of support for the creating of the 'virtual eighth category'. In addition, several states also took the opportunity to provide comments on the

type of transfer, quality of the items, end-user or -use, the actual delivery date and the method of delivery. This information improves understanding of the data, avoids misinterpretation of reports and is crucial for enhancing UNROCA's confidence-building role.

One of the key obstacles for the further development of reporting SALW transfers to UNROCA is that the collection of data on units actually transferred, as subcategorized by UNROCA, challenges existing data collection and reporting processes for several states. Germany was the only state to comment on its UNROCA submission that information derived solely from licences issued data was used for the compilation of its report. However, responses to a SIPRI questionnaire, which sought information on the data collection methods used by states for compiling background information submissions, reveal that at least five other states relied solely on export licences issued for reporting exports of SALW as background information. Responses to the SIPRI questionnaire also reveal that states used data from customs, arms companies and other government agencies (e.g. the defence ministry or police) for the compilation of data on SALW transfers. This report proposes two means for addressing this issue:

1. A GGE should express its opinion on the use of data derived from export licences.

2. Regional workshops could be undertaken as a means of helping to enable the reporting of SALW transfers to UNROCA, with exponents of 'best practice' explaining how their systems have evolved to move beyond using data derived from export licences.

The main political challenge for the creation of an eighth category is achieving a consensus in a GGE that such a change is both feasible and would contribute to the goals of UNROCA. A considerable minority of UN member states have demonstrated their willingness to provide background information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA. Before an eighth category for reporting SALW to UNROCA can be created, more states from two groups of UN members would need to demonstrate a willingness to submit information on SALW transfers to UNROCA: (a) major SALW exporters, in particular China, Russia and the USA, and (b) UN member states from regions where SALW transfers are considered to be a threat to regional stability and to foster the misunderstandings and misperceptions that spark, fuel and prolong conflict.

It is, of course, possible that the invitation to submit background information on SALW transfers (the 'virtual eighth category') could become a substitute for an eighth UNROCA category. It remains to be seen what states will do with the information submitted, and whether there will be attempts to push for the inclusion of SALW in background information reports on procurement from national production and military holdings.

Abbreviations

EU	European Union
GGE	Group of governmental experts
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
POA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
UN	United Nations
UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement

1. Introduction

In his April 2008 report on small arms, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, recommends that ‘States should enhance their efforts to collect, maintain and share data on small arms’.¹ This Policy Paper responds to this recommendation for enhanced transparency by assessing how much data on transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) states are collecting, maintaining and sharing via the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).² One of the main arguments for greater transparency in international transfers of SALW is that the availability of more detailed and comprehensive information could better inform policy on an issue in which there is a scarcity of basic facts.³ Researchers examining SALW transfers and their impact on international peace and security have called for transparency levels in the SALW trade to be brought ‘to the same level as trade in major conventional weapon systems’.⁴

The main global instrument for enabling UN member states to report to other states and the public on their imports and exports of major conventional weapons is UNROCA, which was established in 1991.⁵ At the time, states were neither ‘requested’ nor ‘invited’ to submit information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA.⁶ In 2003 states were requested to submit information on some types of light weapon to UNROCA categories III (large-calibre artillery systems) and VII (missiles and missile launchers) and invited to submit background information on international transfers of SALW.⁷ In 2006 states were invited to continue submitting background information on international transfers of SALW but to do so using a standardized reporting form.⁸ The information to be entered in the reporting form was the same as for submissions on major conventional weapons in UNROCA’s seven categories.

¹ United Nations, Security Council, ‘Small arms’, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2008/258, 17 Apr. 2008, para. 62.

² See appendix A for a variety of international definitions of SALW, including the UN’s.

³ United Nations (note 1).

⁴ Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), p. 115.

⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36L, 6 Dec. 1991.

⁶ Although reporting to UNROCA is voluntary, the ‘request’ for information is considered to be more politically binding on UN member states than an ‘invitation’ to submit information. Wagenmakers, H., ‘The UN Register of Conventional Arms: the debate on the future issues’, *Arms Control Today*, Oct. 1994, pp. 11–12.

⁷ UN General Assembly Resolution 58/54, 8 Dec. 2003. See appendix A for the definitions of the 7 categories.

⁸ UN General Assembly Resolution 61/77, 6 Dec. 2006; and United Nations, Office of Disarmament Affairs, ‘Standardized form for reporting international transfers of conventional arms’, <<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html>>.

This is the first study to document and analyse information on SALW transfers reported to UNROCA for 2003–2006.⁹ It also seeks to inform the debate on the inclusion of SALW transfer data in UNROCA by considering the response to the request and invitations for information of 2003 and 2006 and the prospects for proposals to establish a SALW-specific UNROCA category (or categories).¹⁰

Chapter 2 of this Policy Paper gives a brief overview of the existing inter-governmental and national transparency reporting mechanisms on SALW transfers (see also appendix B). It also considers the various sources of data that are used for reporting information on SALW transfers.

Chapter 3 outlines the origin and rationale for UNROCA and the discussions surrounding the original decision not to request information on SALW transfers. It also documents the expansion of UNROCA to include some SALW following the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2003 and 2006.

Chapter 4 provides a breakdown of states that responded to the UN's request and invitations to submit information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA for 2003–2006. It gives an overview of the type of information provided; in particular, it considers the impact of the introduction of the standardized reporting form on submissions of background information. This chapter also presents information obtained from a SIPRI questionnaire on SALW submissions to UNROCA, which gathered information on the data sources used by states in the compilation of their background information reports on SALW transfers to UNROCA.

Chapter 5 analyses the data submitted to UNROCA in response to the request for information on transfers of light weapons classified under categories III and VII and to the invitations to submit background information on transfers of SALW.

The conclusions in chapter 6 bring together the results of chapters 4 and 5 and highlight the challenges that face those states interested in establishing an eighth UNROCA category for reporting SALW transfers.

Appendix A gives the various international definitions of SALW, including the UN definition used here, the definitions of the current seven UNROCA categories. Appendix B describes briefly the intergovernmental transparency mechanisms for international transfers of SALW.

⁹ Transfers are recorded in UNROCA according to the year in which they took place, not the year in which they were reported. Thus, this Policy Paper covers transfers that took place in 2003–2006 and that have been reported to UNROCA.

¹⁰ Goldring, N., 'Developing transparency and associated control measures for light weapons', eds Chalmers, M., Donowaki, M. and Greene, O., *Developing Arms Transparency: The Future of the UN Register* Bradford Arms Register Studies no. 7 (University of Bradford: Bradford, 1997), p. 218.

2. Transparency in international transfers

Intergovernmental and public transparency

In their releases of information on international transfers of small arms and light weapons, governments practice two distinct, but related, forms of transparency: intergovernmental and public.¹¹

Intergovernmental transparency refers to the confidential exchange of information between governments as a means of building confidence among states and preventing the misinterpretations and miscalculations of state intentions that can lead to interstate conflict.¹² Intergovernmental transparency applied to arms transfers (of both major conventional weapons and SALW) helps to inform states' decision making on exports and imports by revealing transfers that could lead to destabilizing accumulations and tensions or diversion to undesirable end-users.

Public transparency refers to the practice of making information on a state's preferences, intentions and capabilities available to its citizens. It is often seen as implicitly related to a government's democratic accountability and willingness to subject decisions to parliamentary and public oversight. Public transparency applied to arms transfers relates to 'situations in which information on laws, decision-making procedures and proposed and actual transfers are disseminated to parliaments and citizens'.¹³ It has been argued that making such information publicly available 'might motivate the authorities to give even more careful consideration to all aspects of contemplated arms transfers before they are carried out'.¹⁴ By providing official information on international transfers of SALW, the parliament and the general public are given the opportunity to monitor a government's compliance with its national and international legal obligations regarding the prevention of conflict, human rights violations and, to a degree, illicit arms transfers.¹⁵

¹¹ Finel, B. I. and Lord, K. M. (eds), *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency* (Palgrave: New York, 2000), pp. 1–12; Florini, A., 'Globalization at work: the end of secrecy', *Foreign Policy*, no. 111 (summer 1998), pp. 50–64; Grigorescu, A., 'International organizations and government transparency: linking the international and domestic realms', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47 (2003), pp. 643–67; and United Nations, General Assembly, 'Study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms', Report of the Secretary-General, A/46/301, 9 Sep. 1991, para. 14.

¹² United Nations (note 11), para. 14.

¹³ Holtom, P. and Bromley, M., 'From scandals to scrutiny? The role of public transparency in improving Ukraine's image as a responsible arms exporter', *Security and Nonproliferation*, no. 3(21) (2007), p. 28.

¹⁴ United Nations (note 11), para. 101.

¹⁵ Greene, O. with Batchelor, P., *Information Exchange and Transparency: Key Elements of an International Action Programme on Small Arms*, Biting the Bullet Briefing 9 (BASIC, International Alert and Saferworld: London, 2001); and Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007), pp. 73, 81.

Some states are more willing to make information available to other governments than to their own citizens. However, the information that states make available to other states via intergovernmental organizations is increasingly being made publicly available by those organizations, thereby contributing to public transparency.¹⁶ UNROCA is a good example of a mechanism that was created to increase intergovernmental transparency, but which has also contributed to greater public transparency on arms transfers.

It has been suggested that the optimal information required to enhance intergovernmental and public transparency on international arms transfers should include information on: (a) the supplier and recipient; (b) the type of arms (e.g. aircraft, artillery, warships etc.); (c) the number of units; (d) a description of the item (e.g. model), components, knowledge or services transferred; (e) the final end-user or -use; (f) the dates of agreement and delivery or deliveries; (g) the condition of the weapons (e.g. new, second-hand, deactivated, etc.); (h) the financial value of the transfer; (i) how the transfer is being carried out (e.g. transfer of title, purchase, donation or gift, licensed production or technology transfer); and (j) any technical support and training provided.¹⁷

Defining the type of arms to be included in reports to intergovernmental or public transparency mechanisms is not a straightforward task. States, international organizations and export control regimes have defined and categorized different types of arms, components and technologies in lists of military equipment that are subject to export controls and must be reported on. However, military lists are not internationally uniform in their coverage, definitions and categorization of items to be controlled. In addition, exhaustive lists of the actual models of conventional weapons to be included in each particular category are not given. Therefore, there can be misunderstandings and misinterpretations regarding which items are to be controlled and reported on and into which category they should be included. The same problem applies to UN-defined SALW. Although there now appears to be a general consensus on the types of weapon that are classified as SALW (see appendix A), different states categorize the same SALW models differently (see chapter 5 for examples). Another significant issue that has not been clearly confronted is the distinction between 'military-style SALW' and 'civilian firearms'. It has been suggested that only 'military-style SALW' need be reported on because of their role in inter- and intrastate conflicts and their potential impact on international and regional security.¹⁸ However, states do not appear to have agreed on this internationally

¹⁶ Grigorescu (note 11), p. 649.

¹⁷ United Nations (note 11), para. 116.

¹⁸ Brown, A., *An International Register of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Issues and a Model* (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Ottawa, Oct. 1998), p. 10.

and the distinction is not reflected in the data collection methods of many states, as shown in this study.

Two approaches to reporting SALW transfers

Whether opting for intergovernmental or public transparency, there are two approaches that states currently take in reporting information on international transfers of SALW. The first approach is SALW-specific, whereby a reporting mechanism is established that requires the submission of information on SALW transfers only. The second approach treats SALW as a category of conventional weapon, which involves the expansion of an existing reporting mechanism on international transfers of conventional arms to include SALW. Since the turn of the millennium, both approaches have been implemented (see below). In addition, several governments have begun to include separate sections in their arms transfers reports that specifically focus on SALW (see table B.2).

In November 2000 the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to an annual intergovernmental exchange of information on SALW transferred between OSCE states. The 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons outlines the rationale, purpose and procedures of the reporting mechanism and the types of information to be exchanged. It states that ‘the participating states recognize that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms . . . poses a threat and a challenge to peace’.¹⁹ The two main aims of the OSCE mechanism are (a) to act as an early-warning device by helping to identify destabilizing accumulations of SALW; and (b) to enhance transparency and confidence building among OSCE participating states.²⁰ Using a standardized reporting form, states are requested to provide information on deliveries of five subcategories of small arms and eight subcategories of light weapon for the preceding calendar year, including the exporting or importing state, the number of items, the state of origin (if not the exporter), any intermediate location and additional information. For 2003–2007 not all OSCE participating states have taken part in the exchange.²¹ The OSCE exchange of information on SALW transfers has inspired

¹⁹ OSCE, Forum for Security Co-operation, Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 24 Nov. 2000, <<http://www.osce.org/fsc/13281.html>>, para. 1, section I.

²⁰ OSCE, ‘Further implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons’, FSC Chairperson’s Progress Report to the 15th Ministerial Council, Madrid, document MC.GAL/7/07, 14 Nov. 2007, <<http://www.osce.org/item/28669.html?html=1>>, p. 12.

²¹ In 2002, 45 OSCE states participated in the exchange, 47 in 2003, 50 in 2004, 48 in 2005, 46 in 2006 and 42 in 2007. OSCE, ‘FSC Chairperson’s progress report to the Ministerial Council on implementation of the OSCE Document on small arms and light weapons’, Document MC.GAL/5/05, 30 Nov. 2005, p. 3; and OSCE (note 20), p. 5.

other intergovernmental organizations to consider inviting member states to report on international SALW transfers.

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is an intergovernmental reporting mechanism intended (a) to promote greater transparency, cooperation and responsibility in transfers of major conventional arms and dual-use items and technologies, and (b) to prevent destabilizing accumulations and diversions.²² WA participants meet formally twice a year to exchange information in confidence on exports and export licence denials. In December 2002 the WA announced that it would study the OSCE exchange of information on SALW transfers with a view to adopting the OSCE's SALW subcategories as a basis for exchanging information on SALW in the WA.²³ Although Russia reportedly opposed exchanging information on SALW exports in the WA at the December 2002 meeting, WA participants agreed in 2003 to expand the scope of the WA to include reporting on an eighth category of conventional arms—SALW.²⁴ The rationale for the inclusion of SALW by the WA 'reflected concerns that these items can exacerbate regional conflicts and are among the weapons of choice for terrorists'.²⁵

Publicly available national reports on arms exports are examples of public transparency on international arms transfers. As of January 2008, 31 states had published at least one national report on arms exports, compared with 6 states as of January 1998.²⁶ In 2007, 24 states published a report on arms exports for the preceding year or years, with 21 reporting some information on SALW. The quality of the information contained in these reports varies, but at a minimum they tend to include information on the number of licences issued, broken down by destination and value. The most useful national reports in terms of the type of information included on SALW are those of the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, which provide the destinations and numbers of SALW units transferred. The Czech Republic also separates information on international transfers of SALW to civilians. Overall, SALW

²² On recent developments in the WA see Anthony, I., Bauer, S. and Wetter, A., 'Controls on security-related international transfers', *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008), pp. 498–99.

²³ Wassenaar Arrangement, Public statement, 12 Dec. 2002, <http://www.wassenaar.org/public_documents/public121202.html>.

²⁴ Boese, W., 'Wassenaar members adopt small arms initiative', *Arms Control Today*, Jan./Feb. 2003.

²⁵ Wassenaar Arrangement, Public statement, 12 Dec. 2003, <http://www.wassenaar.org/public_documents/public121203.html>.

²⁶ The 31 states include 19 EU member states, 8 non-EU European countries, 2 North American countries, 1 Oceanic country and 1 African country. In 2007 national reports on arms exports were published for the first time by Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. All available official reports on arms exports are available on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project website at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/atlinks_gov.html>.

researchers have been disappointed by the quality of the data made available on SALW transfers in national arms export reports, lamenting unfulfilled potential.²⁷

Approximately one-third (61) of UN member states are members of inter-governmental organizations that report on international transfers of SALW, although it is unknown if all have demonstrated a willingness and ability to collect and share information on SALW transfers with other governments.²⁸ Of these states, only 22—that is, around 10 per cent of UN member states—have also published national reports with some information on their exports, and in some cases imports, of SALW for recent years (see table B.2).

Data collection sources used for reporting SALW transfers

In the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA), UN member states agreed to undertake measures at the national level to ensure that they had adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to control transfers of SALW.²⁹ Before permitting an international SALW transfer, most states require the parties involved to apply for an import or export licence, and in some cases an end-user or -use certificate.³⁰ The task of assessing import or export licence applications is given to different government agencies in different states, with many requiring inter-agency consultations. The UN member states also agreed in the 2001 POA that national licensing authorities should record their decisions and should therefore be able to provide information on licence applications to other government bodies, intergovernmental information exchanges, their national parliament or the public at large.³¹

²⁷ Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 102. This continues to be a common complaint in the annual Small Arms Survey.

²⁸ In addition, non-UN member the Holy See is an OSCE participating state. See appendix B.

²⁹ United Nations, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/15, 20 July 2001, section II, para. 2. The POA was agreed during the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which took place in New York on 9–20 July 2001.

³⁰ It has also been suggested that all UN member states have indirectly obliged themselves to establish mechanisms for regulating arms exports in order to be able to enforce mandatory UN arms embargoes. Anthony, I. (ed.), SIPRI, *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991), p. 1. A 2006 assessment found that 111 states or entities had laws and administrative procedures in place for controlling SALW exports, while 135 states or entities had laws and procedures in place for controlling SALW imports. Thus, 25–30% of UN member states lacked laws or administrative procedures for controlling exports or imports of SALW. It was also noted that the capacity of many states to implement laws and procedures is limited. Biting the Bullet, *Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action* (International Alert, Saferworld, University of Bradford and IANSA: London, 2006), pp. 32, 144–85.

³¹ United Nations (note 29), section II, para. 9.

Box 2.1. The UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade)

The customs data of the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) on 'Arms and ammunition: parts and accessories thereof' (chapter 93) are regarded by many SALW researchers as one of 'the most important sources of information on small arms exports'.^a The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) collects and collates customs data from Comtrade and compiles an annual register of international SALW transfers. NISAT uses each submitting country's export and import data and 'mirrors' this data with the export and import data of suppliers or recipients in order to internally verify data submitted by importing and exporting states.

The overall strengths and weaknesses of relying on Comtrade data are discussed at length elsewhere.^b Comtrade data are not referred to at length here for two reasons. First, Comtrade is not intended to be, nor has it in any way been designed to serve as, an inter-governmental or public transparency reporting mechanism on transfers of SALW. Second, although it contains information on SALW transfers, it contains little information on either units transferred or on military-style SALW. Comtrade will continue to be used as a proxy source of information on transfers of SALW, but it does not meet the demands for an international register of transfers of SALW.

^a Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), p. 101.

^b The Small Arms Survey does so each year. For a clear explanation see *Small Arms Survey 2004* (note a), pp. 98–100. See also Haug, M. et al., *Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 4 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Jan. 2002), pp. 22–23; and Marsh, N., 'Accounting guns: the methodology used in developing data tables for the Small Arms Survey', Memorandum by Nicholas Marsh, Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) project at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 14 Nov. 2005.

Although there is no internationally recognized minimum standard for the information required to be reported to national licensing authorities, it has been recommended that at the minimum the following information is collected: (a) the supplier and recipient, (b) the date of delivery, (c) the type of arms transferred and (d) the financial value or number of units being transferred.³²

Even if these minimum standards are met, licences issued are not the most reliable source of information on actual transfers of SALW. This is because the number of units transferred may change or the licensed transfer might not take place. In addition, many states issue 'open licences' which may not specify the exact quantity or goods to be exported, their destination, or when the transfer is to take place.³³ Therefore, although states often report on licences issued, it is

³² Council of the European Union, 'User's Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports', document 7486/08, Brussels, 29 Feb. 2008, <http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=408>, pp. 18–19. For a suggested optimal standard see United Nations (note 11), para. 116.

³³ Bauer, S. and Bromley, M., *The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: Improving the Annual Report*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 8 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 2004), p. 21.

information on actual transfers that is most useful.³⁴ States use different data sources for information on actual transfers of SALW, such as data reported by industry, customs and other government agencies.

On the use of the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) as a source of information on SALW transfers see box 2.1.

Reports from industry

In a number of states, SALW-producing companies are asked to provide national licensing authorities with information on actual transfers of SALW, either as soon as a transfer takes place, each quarter or annually.³⁵ As the information on an actual transfer relates back to the information on the issued export licence, actual transfer information should include details on the supplier and recipient, the date of delivery, the type of arms transferred, and the financial value or number of units being transferred.³⁶

This approach relies on companies collecting data on their completed arms transfers and reporting to the licensing authority. This reliance on companies means that, without checks, the information collected and submitted could be intentionally or unintentionally inaccurate. It is also possible that companies will not report unless legally obliged to do so.³⁷ This source of data can only produce information for export reports.

Reports from customs

National customs agencies are tasked with collecting information on goods that cross national boundaries. Although the consignor is required to enter data on the shipment (in the case of arms transfers, the consignor is the exporting company), the customs agency is in an ideal position to collect and report information on actual international transfers of SALW.³⁸

However, among those states that collect and report customs statistics on SALW transfers, there are differences in the types of transfer included and the level of detail collected. For example, some states collect information on transits of SALW across their territory, some do not include transfers related to foreign aid, others include SALW destined for their own armed forces overseas and some include arms being temporarily returned for maintenance or repairs. Further, not

³⁴ Fei, E. T., 'Understanding arms transfers and military expenditures: data sources', eds S. G. Neuman, and R. E. Harkavy, *Arms Transfers in the Modern World* (Praeger: New York, 1979), p. 38.

³⁵ Bauer and Bromley (note 33), p. 25.

³⁶ Bauer and Bromley (note 33), p. 28.

³⁷ Bauer and Bromley (note 33), p. 29.

³⁸ Haug, M. et al., *Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 4 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Jan. 2002), p. 22.

all states explicitly identify the importer or exporter (simply identifying them as ‘unspecified countries’), few report on the number of units transferred, and the financial values reported might have been under-reported for fraudulent reasons or using inconsistent exchange rates.

Reports from government agencies

The POA places considerable emphasis on government agencies to keep up-to-date records of their inventories of SALW, including imports and exports.³⁹ Government agencies (such as the armed forces, police etc.) should therefore represent one of the most reliable sources of information on SALW. However, a 2006 assessment found that only 102 states have procedures in place for controlling stocks of SALW, and only an estimated 69 states conducting regular reviews.⁴⁰ In many of these cases, inter-agency communication had not developed to levels that enable the smooth processing of information by different government agencies.

³⁹ United Nations (note 29), section II, para. 9.

⁴⁰ *Biting the Bullet* (note 30), pp. 32, 187–90.

3. UNROCA and international transfers of SALW

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

UNROCA was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L, on ‘Transparency in armaments’, in December 1991 ‘to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms ... in order to promote stability and strengthen regional or international peace and security [and to] enhance confidence, promote stability, help states to exercise restraint, ease tensions and strengthen regional and international peace and security’.⁴¹ UN member states were requested to report on imports and exports from the preceding calendar year for each of the seven categories of major conventional arms listed in an annex to the resolution.⁴² States were requested to give information on the final importer or exporter state, the number of items, the state of origin (if not the exporter), any intermediate location, a description of the item and comments on the transfer.

UNROCA is the only intergovernmental transparency mechanism to which all UN member states are *requested* to submit information on international transfers of major conventional weapons.⁴³ UNROCA is also significant in that it is not only an intergovernmental transparency mechanism but also serves as a public transparency mechanism following the decision to reproduce submissions on the website of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.⁴⁴

While 150 UN member states voted in favour of Resolution 46/36 L, two abstained and 12 did not participate in the vote.⁴⁵ Of the 192 current members of

⁴¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36L (note 5). Several studies have analysed the rationale for and developments surrounding the establishment of UNROCA. See e.g. eds Chalmers, Donowaki and Greene (note 10); Laurance, E. J., Wezeman, S. T. and Wulf, H., *Arms Watch: SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, SIPRI Research Report no. 6 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993); and Wulf, H., ‘The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms’, *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 533–44. Records of the documents and discussions on UNROCA in the UN General Assembly’s First Committee can be found in Miller, C. D., *The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Origins and Evolution 1988–1994* (Monterey Institute of International Studies: Monterey, Calif., [1995]).

⁴² For a description of the categories see appendix A.

⁴³ Other registers of international transfers of major conventional weapons transfers—e.g. the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <<http://armstrade.sipri.org/>>—exist, but they are not intergovernmental transparency mechanisms.

⁴⁴ The UN Register of Conventional Arms is available at <<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html>>.

⁴⁵ Cuba and Iraq abstained from the vote. Antigua and Barbuda, China, Djibouti, El Salvador, Grenada, Laos, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sudan, Syria, Viet Nam and Zaire did not participate in the vote.

the UN, 170 have submitted at least one report to UNROCA for the years 1992–2006; however, 50 have reported for each year.⁴⁶ The highest level of participation in UNROCA was for 2001, with 126 UN member states submitting a report. States are not only requested to submit reports on imports and exports but also to provide ‘nil reports’ if they have not imported or exported conventional weapons in the UNROCA categories. A nil report is regarded as an expression of support for UNROCA and as demonstrating the state’s commitment to transparency. Nil reports can therefore also contribute to confidence building.

Many states in regions of tension that could benefit from participation in inter-governmental exchanges of information on armaments, to prevent misperceptions and build confidence, have not participated on a regular basis in UNROCA. At the same time, it has been noted that not only does UNROCA lack a specific consultation mechanism for UN member states to discuss concerns with potentially destabilizing accumulations, but that little guidance has been proffered on identifying destabilizing accumulations.⁴⁷ In contrast, the Wassenaar Arrangement has provided member states with an explanatory note presenting a range of factors to assist with identifying destabilizing accumulations.⁴⁸

UNROCA was a creation of its time. It was established against the backdrop of Iraq’s accumulation of weapons before its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the signing of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), which contains elements on transparency in armaments.⁴⁹ These events also help to explain the comparatively rapid way in which UNROCA moved from conception to inception—a concrete demonstration of action by the international community in response to destabilizing accumulations and increasing transparency in armaments. Hendrik Wagenmakers, one of the architects of UNROCA, has explained that he regarded the establishment of UNROCA as a first step in promoting transparency in armaments, expecting that its scope, coverage and participation would be gradually increased over time.⁵⁰ Thus, while states were requested to submit information on transfers of major conventional weapons, they were initially only invited to submit background information to UNROCA on

⁴⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development’, Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/261, 15 Aug. 2006, para. 20.

⁴⁷ Laurance, E. J., *The United Nations Conventional Arms Register: Present Challenges, New Directions*. (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Feb. 2001), pp. 17–19.

⁴⁸ Wassenaar Arrangement, ‘Elements for objective analysis and advice concerning potentially destabilising accumulations of conventional weapons: explanatory note’, Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary, 3 Dec. 1998, <<http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/>>.

⁴⁹ Wagenmakers (note 7), p. 8. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed on 19 Nov. 1990 and entered into force on 9 Nov. 1992. Its text is available at <<http://www.osce.org/item/13752.html?html=1>>.

⁵⁰ United Nations (note 11), para. 106. See also Wagenmakers, H., ‘The UN Register of Conventional Arms: a new instrument for cooperative security’, *Arms Control Today*, Apr. 1993, p. 17.

their military holdings and procurement through domestic production. The issue of including weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological and chemical weapons—in UNROCA was also sidestepped when UNROCA was established, although Middle Eastern states and others continue to raise the issue and relate their participation in UNROCA to its expansion to cover WMD.

Groups of governmental experts (GGEs) have been appointed by the UN Secretary-General to review the continuing operation and development of UNROCA every three years since 1994.⁵¹ One of their tasks has been to consider expanding the coverage of UNROCA, for example to request states to submit information on holdings and production of conventional arms rather than inviting them to submit background information. The GGEs have also considered expanding the scope of UNROCA to include weapons not covered by UNROCA's original seven categories, such as small arms and light weapons. New weapons are only included in UNROCA if the GGE deems that they meet the principle of 'military relevance in terms of the significance of their impact on regional and global stability'.⁵² There has been little progress with regard to the expansion of UNROCA's coverage as the GGEs have struggled to achieve a consensus.⁵³ In other words, UN member states have been unable to achieve consensus on taking the next steps in transparency in armaments.

The omission of SALW from UNROCA

The design and conception of UNROCA coincided with increased attention on the proliferation of SALW. Although there were calls for SALW to be included in UNROCA from the start, they were not deemed to have the same political or strategic significance as major conventional weapons.⁵⁴ Several reasons have been given for not requesting or inviting states to report on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA: (a) SALW are more difficult to trace, count and register than major conventional weapons; (b) the volume of SALW would overwhelm UNROCA and risk undermining efforts to meet the purpose of UNROCA and its progress in other areas; (c) there was no definition of SALW when UNROCA was established; (d) SALW were not the most decisive weapons used in large-scale

⁵¹ The first report of a GGE on UNROCA's continuing operation and further development was published in 1994. Subsequent reports have been published in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006.

⁵² United Nations, General Assembly, 'Report on the Register of Conventional Arms', Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/342, 14 Aug. 1992, para. 39.

⁵³ Laurance (note 47); Wezeman, S. T., *The Future of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 4 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Aug. 2003); and United Nations, General Assembly, 'Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development', Note by the Secretary-General, A/55/281, 9 Aug. 2000, para. 52.

⁵⁴ Haug et al. (note 38), p. 13.

cross-border aggressions; and (e) there was a disagreement on their threat to regional or international peace and security.⁵⁵

Despite states being neither requested nor invited to submit information to UNROCA on international transfers of SALW, Jamaica submitted information on imports of small arms—not necessarily for use by the military—for 1992, 1993 and 1994. It explained that ‘The Permanent Mission of Jamaica wishes to advise that categories listed for inclusion in the Register are not relevant to Jamaica. However, in an effort to make available all related information, the data on arms and ammunitions imported into Jamaica for the period January to December 1994 have been submitted.’⁵⁶

In 2001 Togo submitted background information for 2000 on its military holdings, including SALW. Its submission gave the number of items, a brief description and in some cases the origin of arms, broken down into subcategories of sub-machine guns, semi-automatic pistols and rifles for small arms, and rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, light machine guns and mortars for light weapons. These were the only two states to submit information on SALW to UNROCA for the years 1992–2002.

The GGEs convened in the 1990s considered a range of options to increase the relevance of UNROCA for states in Africa and Latin America in particular.⁵⁷ However, these groups generally concluded that the issue of SALW transfer transparency should be dealt with at the regional or subregional level.⁵⁸ Some commentators have raised concerns with such a proposal, suggesting that the exclusion of SALW from UNROCA signals that the international community does not take the security concerns of certain regions and states as seriously as others.⁵⁹

At the same time, the practice of treating SALW as distinct from other conventional weapons became an established norm. A 1997 report notes that ‘trans-

⁵⁵ Donowaki, M., ‘Developing associated transparency measures for light weapons and small arms and a regional arms register for West Africa’, *Disarmament*, vol. 20, nos 2–3 (1997), p. 109; Latham, A., ‘Light weapons and human security—a conceptual overview’, eds J. Dhanapala et al., *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues* (UNIDIR and Ashgate: Geneva and Brookfield, Vt.), p. 23; Laurance (note 47), pp. 31–32; and Singh, J., ‘The UN Register: transparency and the promotion of conflict prevention and restraint’, eds Chalmers, Donowaki and Greene (note 10), p. 135.

⁵⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘United Nations Register of Conventional Arms’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/50/547, 13 Oct. 1995, p. 39. In 1994 Jamaica also submitted background information for 1992 and 1993 on imports of pistols, shotguns, rifles, revolvers and ammunition.

⁵⁷ E.g. the 1997 GGE discussed the issue of lowering the calibre for large artillery systems (category III) from 100 mm to 75 mm with the aim of increasing UNROCA’s relevance to African states. Donowaki, M., ‘Addressing light weapons and small arms proliferation’, eds Chalmers, Donowaki and Greene (note 10), p. 207.

⁵⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/49/316, 22 Sep. 1994, para. 39. The chair of the UN GGE on small arms also proposed establishing regional or subregional registers that could include information on SALW. Donowaki (note 57), p. 207.

⁵⁹ Goldring (note 10), pp. 220–21.

parency and restraint in transfers of small arms requires a significantly different approach than for major categories of weapons covered by the UN Register'.⁶⁰ A 1998 Canadian Foreign Ministry study proposes an international SALW-specific register, in which interested states would be invited to submit information on military-style SALW transfers, associated ammunition and munitions, destruction, production, current holdings and illicit trade seizures.⁶¹

These issues were also among those discussed during the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. During the pre-conference meetings and at the conference itself, several states proposed calling on UN member states to introduce measures to 'enhance transparency with respect to small arms and light weapons transfers as a confidence-building measure and with a view to combating their illicit trade'.⁶² These states were unable to gain enough support for the inclusion of a reference to enhancing transparency on SALW transfers in the conference's final document, the Programme of Action. However, as noted in chapter 2, members of the OSCE and WA agreed to exchange information on international transfers of SALW to prevent destabilizing accumulations and diversions and to contribute to confidence building.

Expanding UNROCA to include SALW

Two years after the 2001 conference, a consensus was achieved by the 2003 GGE to request the submission of information on several types of light weapon to UNROCA and to invite background information on SALW.⁶³ Specifically, the GGE recommended lowering the threshold for the calibre of large-calibre artillery systems reported under UNROCA category III from 100 millimetre and above to 75 mm and above and reporting on man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) to a subcategory of category VII. The GGE also recommended that

interested Member States in a position to do so, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, provide additional information on transfers of small arms and light weapons made or modified to military specification and intended for military use; and, where national, subregional and regional mechanisms exist, recommends that they make use of these reporting methods, including definitions of small arms and light weapons, as they deem appropriate.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Singh (note 55), p. 135.

⁶¹ Brown (note 18), pp. 10–17.

⁶² United Nations, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Draft Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/PC/L.4/Rev.1, 12 Feb. 2001, para. 30, section II.

⁶³ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development', Note by the Secretary-General, A/58/274, 13 Aug. 2003, para. 112.

⁶⁴ United Nations (note 63), para. 113(e).

These recommendations were supported by the UN General Assembly in a December 2003 resolution which formally requested and invited states to submit information on UN-defined SALW to UNROCA for the first time.⁶⁵

The 2006 GGE continued to consider expanding the scope of UNROCA. Proposals were put forward to lower the calibre of category III large-calibre artillery systems to 50 mm and introduce an eighth UNROCA category for reporting SALW transfers.⁶⁶ Neither option was recommended by the GGE. However, a December 2006 UN General Assembly resolution invited UN member states to submit information on SALW transfers on a standardized reporting form—the same reporting form used for requesting information on major conventional weapon transfers.⁶⁷

The standardized reporting form requests that information be broken down into subcategories. The six subcategories of small arms are (a) revolvers and self-loading pistols; (b) rifles and carbines; (c) sub-machine guns; (d) assault rifles; (e) light machine guns; and (f) others. The seven subcategories of light weapons are (a) heavy machine guns; (b) hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; (c) portable anti-tank guns; (d) recoilless rifles; (e) portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems; (f) mortars of calibre less than 75 mm; and (g) others. In a sense, the invitation to use a standardized reporting form creates a ‘virtual eighth category’. Although states are only invited to report on SALW transfers, they are invited to do so on a form that requests the same level of information as requested for the seven UNROCA categories.

⁶⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution 58/54 (note 7).

⁶⁶ United Nations (note 46), para. 95 and 103.

⁶⁷ UN General Assembly Resolution 61/77 (note 8); and United Nations (note 8).

4. Reporting SALW transfers to UNROCA: assessing participation

This chapter considers the response by UN member states to UN General Assembly resolutions 58/54 of December 2003 and 61/77 of December 2006. The following two sections examine, respectively, the states that have submitted reports of light weapon transfers to the expanded UNROCA categories III and VII and those that have submitted background information on transfers of small arms and light weapons. In both cases, the type of information they have provided is assessed.

The final section examines the sources of data used for reporting background information on transfers of SALW to UNROCA. The section on data sources is informed by a questionnaire that SIPRI distributed to the 37 UN member states that responded to the invitation to submit background information on SALW transfers. The questionnaire sought information on the data collection methods used by the state for compiling background information submissions. The questionnaire also requested information on the scope and coverage of the data collected and how this data compared to information made available to other inter-governmental or public transparency reporting mechanisms. As of 20 June 2008, 13 states had returned completed questionnaires.⁶⁸

Reporting light weapon transfers to UNROCA: participation for 2003–2006

It has been possible to identify 25 states as having reported transfers of light weapons to UNROCA categories III and VII for 2003–2006. More states may have reported, but only those submissions that identified an artillery system with a calibre of 75–99 mm or MANPADS when describing the item transferred could be counted.⁶⁹ Using this approach, about 10 per cent of states reporting to UNROCA on transfers of major conventional weapons for 2003, 2005 and 2006 reported information on light weapons to UNROCA, with less than 5 per cent doing so for 2004 (see table 4.1). If nil reports are omitted, then 20–27 per cent of states reporting to UNROCA reported transfers of light weapons for 2003, 2005

⁶⁸ These 13 countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK. The completed questionnaires are available at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=362>.

⁶⁹ UNROCA guidelines recommend that only complete units and launcher/gripstocks should be reported on, although separate reporting of gripstocks and missiles is regarded as useful. United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Guidelines for Reporting International Transfers: Questions and Answers Booklet* (United Nations: New York, 2007), <<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html>>, pp. 5–6.

Table 4.1. Reports on light weapon to UNROCA categories III and VII, 2003–2006

Year of transfer	2003	2004	2005	2006
Reports to UNROCA	115	117	118	117
Nil reports	66	64	70	61
Reports on light weapon to UNROCA	11 ^a	5	13	12

^a This figure includes India's nil report for MANPADS imports.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

and 2006, with less than 10 per cent doing so for 2004. Overall, the level of participation has been steady for 2003–2006.

All states reporting on light weapons transfers to UNROCA identified an importing or exporting state (see table 4.2). While two states (Australia and Sweden) omitted basic information on the number of units transferred, several provided extra comments on the transfer. For example, Belarus reported on a 2003 export from Russia to Côte d'Ivoire that passed through Belarus; Bulgaria and Hungary reported that a 2006 transfer of mortars was for industrial purposes; Poland reported that light weapon transfers to Afghanistan in 2003 were donations; and Norway reported that a transfer of mortars to the Netherlands left Norway in 2005 but arrived in the Netherlands in 2006. Belarus's report on a transfer from Russia to Côte d'Ivoire is significant because Russia did not report this transfer in its submission for 2003.

Reporting background information on SALW transfers to UNROCA: participation for 2003–2006

Thirty-nine states responded to the invitation to submit background information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA for 2003–2006, representing 19 per cent of UN member states. However, for 2003–2005, only seven states—all of them European member states of the OSCE—responded.⁷⁰ There thus appears to be a strong causal relationship between the upgrading of SALW to a 'virtual eighth category' and the increase in responses from UN member states. This increase in reporting helped to make the total number of submissions of back-

⁷⁰ These 7 states are Finland, France, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK. Latvia and Sweden only reported in 2003 and 2006. In addition, Japan submitted information on the estimated number of units and types for some of the SALW it procured in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

Table 4.2. Type of information reported on light weapons transfers to UNROCA categories III and VII, 2003–2006

State	Year	Category	Importer/ Exporter	No. of units	Description of items	Comments on transfer
Argentina	2003	III	x	x	x	
Australia	2003	VII	x		x	
Azerbaijan	2005	III	x	x	x	
Belarus ^a	2003	III	x	x	x	x
Bulgaria	2003	III	x	x	x	
	2005	III	x	x	x	
	2006	III	x	x	x	
Czech Republic	2006	VII	x	x	x	
Finland	2006	VII	x	x	x	
Germany	2006	VII	x	x	x	
Hungary	2006	III	x	x	x	x
Israel	2003	III	x	x	x	
	2005	III	x	x	x	
Jordan	2003	VII	x	x	x	
	2004	VII	x	x	x	
Latvia	2006	VII	x	x	x	
Mexico	2004	III, VII	x	x	x	
Netherlands	2004	III	x	x	x	
	2005	III	x	x	x	x
	2006	III	x	x	x	
Norway	2005	III, VII	x	x	x	x
	2006	III	x	x	x	x
Poland	2003	III	x	x	x	x
	2006	III	x	x	x	
Portugal	2005	III	x	x	x	
Russia	2005	VII	x	x	x	
South Africa	2005	VII	x	x	x	
Slovenia	2003	VII	x	x	x	
	2005	III	x	x	x	
Sweden ^b	2003	VII	x		x	
	2006	VII	x		x	
Turkey	2004	VII	x	x	x	
UK	2005	VII	x	x	x	
Ukraine	2003	III, VII	x	x	x	
	2005	VII	x	x	x	
	2006	III, VII	x	x	x	
USA	2004	VII	x	x	x	
	2005	VII	x	x	x	x
	2006	VII	x	x	x	

^a Belarus reported on a transfer from Russia to Côte d'Ivoire.

^b Sweden submitted data on category, type of weapon and recipient, but labelled the number of units transferred as 'classified'.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

Table 4.3. Background information submissions on small arms and light weapons to UNROCA, 2003–2006

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006
Submissions of background information to UNROCA	34	32	30	53
Submissions of background information on SALW to UNROCA	5	5 ^a	5 ^a	36 ^{a b}

^a These figures exclude Japan's submission on estimated procurement of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

^b This figure excludes Panama's submission on seizures of illicit SALW and Switzerland's *note verbale*.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

ground information for 2006—53 (see table 4.3)—the highest since UNROCA was established.⁷¹

However, three of the 39 states that submitted background information on SALW did not include information on transfers of SALW: Japan reported on its procurement of some SALW units (for 2004–2006), Panama on seizures of illicit SALW (for 2006) and Switzerland submitted a *note verbale* in support of an eighth category for SALW. These submissions are not included in the following analysis as they do not deal with SALW transfers, leaving 36 submissions of background information on SALW transfers. Of these, 21 came from Europe (including 15 European Union member states), 7 from the Americas, 4 from Africa, 3 from Asia and 1 from Oceania.

It is not only the significant increase in submissions that makes 2006 noteworthy. Of the 36 states that submitted background information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA for 2006, four submitted nil reports for both imports and exports of SALW and two submitted nil reports for exports and no report on imports (see table 4.4). The submission of nil reports has generally been regarded as a sign of support for UNROCA. The submission of nil reports in response to an invitation to submit background information is therefore a strong signal in support of the inclusion of SALW transfers in UNROCA. For 2006, 18 states submitted export reports, 17 submitted nil reports on exports and 1 state did not report on exports; 26 states submitted import reports, 4 submitted nil reports and 6 states did not report on imports. Overall, 30 states reported actual transfers of SALW in their background information submissions to UNROCA for 2006.

⁷¹ The second highest number of submissions was for 1992—the first year of reporting—when 44 states submitted background information.

Before the introduction of a standardized reporting form in 2006, states were invited to submit background information on SALW using the reporting methods of other reporting mechanisms. In their reports for 2003–2005, Finland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland used the reporting template of the OSCE's information exchange on SALW.⁷² Finland, Germany, Latvia and Poland also included descriptions of the items transferred and in some cases end-user certificate numbers or references in their background information reports for these years. France and the UK did not use the OSCE reporting template; instead they submitted information on the number of units per subcategory of SALW and the importing state.

The introduction of the standardized reporting form is undoubtedly the key factor in the increased reporting of background information on SALW transfers for 2006. Of the 30 states that submitted background information detailing SALW transfers for 2006, only France did not use the subcategories of the standardized reporting form (see table 4.5). As submissions to UNROCA on transfers of major conventional weapons have shown, providing a description of the items transferred and other relevant data in the 'remarks' field is crucial in helping to understand and use the data for confidence-building purposes and for making assessments about particular transfers.⁷³ It is therefore encouraging that 24 of the 30 states reporting actual transfers of SALW in 2006 provided a description of at least some of the items reported, although the quality of the description varies.

For 2006, 12 states entered information in the 'comment on the transfer' section. Several states commented on the type of transfer (i.e. re-export, donation, transit or temporary export), the quality of the items (i.e. whether second-hand, inactivated or surplus), the end-user or -use (i.e. whether civilians, UN missions, return to manufacturer or for industrial use), the actual delivery date and the method of delivery. Turkey's submission gave information on the type of transfer, end-user, delivery date and method of delivery for many of the transfers it reported.

Canada was the only state to mention in its 'comments on transfer' field that civilians were among the recipients of transfers reported to UNROCA. However, responses to the SIPRI questionnaire reveal that at least nine states included transfers to civilians in their UNROCA submissions.⁷⁴ Albania and Hungary were the only states to identify transfers of second-hand or surplus SALW units in the background information submitted to UNROCA, yet seven of the states that completed the SIPRI questionnaire revealed that they also reported imported or

⁷² OSCE (note 19).

⁷³ United Nations (note 69), p. 12.

⁷⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Turkey and the UK reported in the SIPRI questionnaire that imports or exports to civilians were included in their report on background information on SALW transfers to UNROCA.

Table 4.4. Export, import and nil reports submitted as background information on transfers of small arms and light weapons to UNROCA, 2003–2006

State	Year	Exports			Imports		
		Yes	Nil	No	Yes	Nil	No
Albania	2006	x			x		
Antigua and Barbuda	2006			x	x		
Bangladesh	2006		x		x		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2006	x			x		
Canada	2006	x			x		
Cyprus	2006	x			x		
Czech Republic	2006	x			x		
Denmark	2006	x			x		
Finland	2004	x					x
France	2004	x					x
	2005	x					x
	2006	x					x
Georgia	2006		x		x		
Germany ^a	2005	x			x		
	2006	x			x		
Greece	2006	x			x		
Haiti	2006		x		x		
Hungary	2006	x			x		
Jamaica	2006		x		x		
South Korea	2006	x					x
Latvia	2003		x		x		
	2006		x		x		
Liechtenstein	2006		x		x		
Lithuania	2006		x		x		
Mali	2006		x				x
Mexico	2006		x		x		
Moldova	2006		x			x	
Netherlands	2003		x		x		
	2004		x		x		
	2005		x		x		
	2006		x		x		
New Zealand ^b	2006	x			x		
Philippines	2006		x			x	
Poland	2003	x			x		
	2004	x			x		
	2005	x			x		
	2006	x			x		
Portugal	2006	x			x		
Saint Lucia	2006		x			x	
Senegal	2006		x		x		

State	Year	Exports			Imports		
		Yes	Nil	No	Yes	Nil	No
Slovakia	2006	x			x		
Swaziland	2006		x			x	
Sweden	2003	x					x
	2006	x					x
Togo	2006		x				x
Trinidad and Tobago	2006		x		x		
Turkey	2006	x			x		
UK	2003	x					x
	2004	x					x
	2005	x					x
	2006	x					x

^a Germany submitted 'remarks' on the methods for data collection for its 2006 submission.

^b New Zealand provided its national criteria on transfers

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

exported surplus military equipment to UNROCA.⁷⁵ Germany, the Netherlands and the UK also revealed in their responses to the SIPRI questionnaire that their submissions included transfers conducted via brokers.

Several states omitted basic information from their reporting forms (see table 4.5), including: the Czech Republic, which aggregated units per category, giving no importing or exporting state in its submission; Poland, which aggregated the types of small arms exported from Poland to the USA; and Sweden, which 'classified' the number of units transferred.

Data sources used for reporting background information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA

In a note attached to its background information on international transfers of SALW to UNROCA for 2006, Germany explains that the number of units reported as being exported refers to 'the number of weapons for which export licences were issued'.⁷⁶ The note states that the SALW categories provided in the UNROCA standardized reporting form correspond neither with 'the foreign trade statistic nomenclature nor to the terminology of the Wassenaar Munitions List',

⁷⁵ Canada, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey and the UK reported in the SIPRI questionnaire that their SALW transfers reported as background information to UNROCA included surplus equipment.

⁷⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, 'United Nations Register of Conventional Arms', Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/170, 27 July 2007, p. 104.

Table 4.5. Type of information submitted as background information on international transfers of small arms and light weapons to UNROCA, 2003–2006

State	Year	Importer/ Exporter	No. of units	State of origin	Description of items	Comments on transfer
Albania	2006	x	x	x	x	
Antigua and Barbuda	2006	x	x		x	
Bangladesh	2006	x	x		x	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2006	x	x			
Canada	2006	x	x			x
Cyprus	2006	x	x	x	x	
Czech Republic	2006		x			
Denmark	2006	x	x		x	x
Finland	2004	x	x		x	
France	2004	x	x			
	2005	x	x			
	2006	x	x		x	
Georgia	2006 ^a	x	x		x	x
Germany	2005	x	x			x
	2006 ^b	x	x		x	x
Greece	2006 ^b	x	x		x	
Haiti	2006	x	x		x	
Hungary	2006	x	x	x	x	x
Jamaica	2006 ^a	x	x		x	
South Korea	2006	x	x		x	
Latvia	2003	x	x		x	
	2006 ^a	x	x		x	
Liechtenstein	2006		x			x
Lithuania	2006 ^a	x	x			x
Mexico	2006	x	x		x	
Netherlands	2003	x	x			
	2004	x	x			
	2005	x	x		x	
	2006	x	x		x	
New Zealand	2006	x	x			x
Poland	2003	x	x		x	x
	2004	x	x		x	
	2005	x	x		x	x
	2006	x	x		x	x
Portugal	2006	x	x		x	x
Senegal	2006	x	x		x	x
Slovakia	2006	x	x	x	x	
Sweden	2003	x			x	
	2006	x			x	

State	Year	Importer/ Exporter	No. of units	State of origin	Description of items	Comments on transfer
Trinidad and Tobago	2006	x	x		x	
Turkey	2006	x	x		x	x
UK	2003	x	x			
	2004	x	x			
	2005	x	x			
	2006	x	x		x	

^a In these reports the final exporting or importing state was also given as ‘State of origin (if not exporter/importer)’ by the reporting state.

^b These states did not give a description of every item reported in their submissions but did give a description for the type of heavy machine gun imported from Belgium.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

which are used by Germany for generating data on actual exports. Germany was the only state to attach a note to its background information giving the data source used for its submission on international transfers of SALW. However, responses to the SIPRI questionnaire show that Germany was not the only state to use issued export and import licences as the sole source of data for reporting background information on SALW transfers to UNROCA (see table 4.6).

One of the first key decisions taken with regard to UNROCA was that states would be requested to provide data on actual exports or imports of conventional weapons in the seven UNROCA categories.⁷⁷ States were not to be requested to report on orders or licences issued. The fact that several states submitted background information on SALW transfers using data derived from export licences issued suggests that not all states have established data collection practices that would enable reporting on actual transfers of SALW to UNROCA. For example, Switzerland’s *note verbale* on international SALW transfers in 2006 states that its current licensing and customs practices do not ‘allow for an accurate notification of SALW transfers’.⁷⁸ It therefore refrained ‘from notifying inaccurate numbers at a potentially high cost for the credibility of both the Register and the notifying state’. However, Switzerland also expressed its support for SALW to be made an eighth category of UNROCA.

Of the 13 states that returned SIPRI questionnaires, seven revealed that the information made available to other intergovernmental or public reporting mechanisms was the same as the information submitted to UNROCA and six reported

⁷⁷ Laurance, Wezeman and Wulf (note 41), p. 10.

⁷⁸ United Nations (note 76), p. 125.

Table 4.6. Data sources used for reporting background information on international transfers of small arms and light weapons to UNROCA, 2003–2006

State	Export data sources			Import data sources		
	Licence	Customs	Arms company	Licence	Customs	Defence ministry
Bosnia and Herzegovina ^a	x			x		
Canada	x					x
Cyprus ^b		x			x	x
Denmark	x			x		x
Germany	x			x		
Latvia ^c						x
Liechtenstein	x			x		
Mexico ^c						x
Netherlands ^c				x	x	x
New Zealand ^d	x					x
Sweden			x			
Turkey	x		x	x		x
UK	x		x			x
Total	8	1	3	6	2	9

^a The returned questionnaire of Bosnia and Herzegovina listed its national arms export and import report as the source of information for its UNROCA submission. The export and import report of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2005 and 2006 only gives information on licences issued.

^b Cyprus reported using statistical data collected for intra-European Union trade (Eurostat).

^c Latvia, Mexico and the Netherlands reported nil exports.

^d New Zealand also used data collected by the police as a source for information.

Source: Completed and returned SIPRI questionnaires on submissions to UNROCA on international transfers of small arms and light weapons. The completed questionnaires are available at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=362>.

that UNROCA submissions differed from the information made available elsewhere.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico and the Netherlands submitted the same information to UNROCA and other reporting mechanisms. Cyprus, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey and the UK submitted different information to UNROCA and to other reporting mechanisms.

5. Reporting SALW transfers to UNROCA: analysing the reports

This chapter analyses the information on SALW transfers submitted to UNROCA for 2003–2006. As in chapter 4, the submissions on transfers of light weapons to categories III and VII are considered separately from the submissions of background information on SALW transfers. In both cases the following questions are addressed.

1. How many transfers and units were reported to UNROCA for 2003–2006?
2. Who were the largest suppliers and recipients according to submissions to UNROCA for 2003–2006?
3. How many of the transfers can be verified by cross-checking with submissions by other reporting states to UNROCA?
4. How many of the transfers can be verified by cross-checking with data contained in national arms export and import reports?

One of the architects of UNROCA has stated that it was ‘designed for verification through cross-checking’.⁸⁰ This study therefore seeks to verify each entry in a state’s reporting form. An ‘entry’ is defined here to mean each provision by a reporting state of information for a particular SALW subcategory and a particular importing or exporting state. In several cases, there is more than one entry for a single exporting or importing state within a particular SALW subcategory. An example of this is given in figure 5.1, in which Latvia has filed two entries for the import of two different types of assault rifles from Germany.

This study uses two methods to verify data submitted on international SALW transfers to UNROCA: (a) internal, where importer and exporter submissions to UNROCA are cross-checked against UNROCA data for matches on type of weapons, description of items and number of units; and (b) external, where UNROCA data are cross-checked against data in official national arms export and import reports. Submissions on light weapons to categories III and VII are only subject to internal verification here because the available national reports do not provide information that enables cross-checking.

Different types of result are achieved when seeking to verify the entries filed by reporting states against entries filed by other states or cross-checked against national reports. The following terms are used to distinguish the different results derived from the internal verification exercise.

⁸⁰ Wagenmakers (note 50), p. 17.

A	B	C	D	E	REMARKS	
	Exporter State(s)	Number of items	State of origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate location (if any)	Description of item	Comments on the transfer
SMALL ARMS						
4. Assault rifles	Germany Germany	1400 1	Germany Germany		Gun G-36 assault rifle Sniper weapon DSR No. 1	

Figure 5.1. Example of entries on Latvia's import reporting form, 2006

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/170, 27 July 2007, p. 112.

1. *Exact match*: the exporting and importing states both file entries that identify the transfer of the same number of units for the same subcategory of SALW.

2. *Partial match (no units reported)*: the exporting and importing states both file entries that identify the transfer of the same subcategory of SALW, but neither party reports on the number of units transferred.

3. *Partial match (difference in units reported)*: the exporting and importing states both file entries that identify the transfer of the same subcategory of SALW, but each party reports a different number of units transferred.

4. *No match*: the exporting and importing states both report to UNROCA for the same year, but only one of the parties files an entry for a particular subcategory of SALW.

5. *Match not possible*: only one of the parties to a transfer reports to UNROCA.

Other complicating factors when attempting to verify entries include differences with regards to subcategorization of SALW as well as the coverage and scope of SALW included in reports.

It is important to bear in mind that the information presented below on SALW transfers reported to UNROCA represents only a fraction of international transfers of SALW. In particular, the tables presenting the significant exporters and importers of SALW based on submissions to UNROCA are skewed by an overrepresentation of submissions by European states. The final section of this chapter gives a number of examples of transfers of SALW in 2003–2006 that have not been submitted to UNROCA.

Reporting light weapon transfers to UNROCA: an analysis for 2003–2006

Based on submissions for 2003–2006, 25 UN member states filed 77 entries to UNROCA categories III and VII detailing light weapon transfers. The 77 entries

Table 5.1. Submissions on light weapons to categories III and VII of UNROCA, 2003–2006

Figures do not include double counting of units.

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Exporters reported	11	5	10	10	19
Importers reported	10	8	16	13	30
LW entries	14	16	22	25	77
in category III	6	8	8	8	30
in category VII	8	8	14	17	47
LW units reported	2 123 ^{ab}	4 811 ^b	4 120 ^a	780	11 834
in category III	132	84	2 946	482	3 644
in category VII	1 991	4 727	1 174	398	8 290
launchers/gripstocks	12	180	870	92	1 154
missiles	39 ^a	451 ^b	304 ^c	306	1 100
other (i.e. RPG launchers)	1 940 ^{b c}	4 096 ^d	0	0	6 036

LW = light weapon; RPG = rocket propeller grenade.

^a Sweden submitted data on category, description of item, and recipient, but labelled the number of units of missiles transferred as ‘classified’.

^b These figures includes Jordan’s submission on imports of RPG-25/26/27s from Russia.

^c This figure includes Slovenia’s submission of data on exports of RPG-7s to Afghanistan.

^d This figure includes the USA’s submission of data on imports of 549 de-militarized or destroyed MANPADS gripstocks from Bulgaria.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

reported on transfers involving 19 different exporters and 30 different importers (see tables 5.1 and B.2).

It is possible that more light weapon units were reported to the expanded categories III and VII than have been recorded here. First, underreporting is possible due to submissions not clearly identifying the model or calibre of units reported to categories III and VII. Second, Sweden reported transfers of MANPADS for 2003, 2005 and 2006 but did not report the number of units transferred. Third, when both an importing and exporting state have reported a transfer of items for the same category but differ with regard to the number of units transferred, the importer’s reported number of units delivered is used. This choice limits the possibility of double counting—although a transfer may be reported as ‘delivered’ by an exporter in one calendar year, the goods may be in transit and not ‘received’ by the importer until the following calendar year.⁸¹ This

⁸¹ The issue of delivery dates is raised with regard to submissions on transfers of major conventional weapons to UNROCA in Anthony, I., ‘Assessing the UN Register of Conventional Arms’, *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Dec. 1993), p. 124.

Table 5.2. Significant exporters of light weapons based on UNROCA submissions to categories III and VII, 2003–2006

Figures are numbers of units.

Category	Russia	Israel	Bulgaria ^a	Hungary	USA	Others
Category III	0	2 422	0	446	0	780
Category VII	6 254	0	549	0	443	1 046
Total units	6 254	2 422	549	446	443	1 826

^a These figures include the USA's submission of data on imports of 549 de-militarized or destroyed MANPADS gripstocks from Bulgaria.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

Table 5.3. Significant importers of light weapons based on UNROCA submissions to categories III and VII, 2003–2006

Figures are numbers of units.

Category	Jordan	Brazil	USA ^a	Bulgaria	Turkey	Other
Category III	0	2 422	0	594	0	632
Category VII						
excl. missiles	6 030	0	657	0	0	503
missiles	0	0	261	0	334	507
Total units	6 030	2 422	918	594	334	1 642

^a These figures include the USA's submission of data on imports of 549 de-militarized or destroyed MANPADS gripstocks from Bulgaria.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

approach carries the risk of undercounting because there is no guarantee that the same units are reported by the importer and exporter.

One of the most notable findings relating to the light weapon submissions to UNROCA categories III and VII is that 6203 of the 11 834 light weapon units reported either fell below the 75-mm reporting threshold for category III or were anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, which states have not been requested to report to category VII. It is unclear if these units were reported to demonstrate a willingness and ability to report international transfers of light weapons to UNROCA or due to a misunderstanding of the types of light weapon to be submitted to categories III and VII.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 list the most significant exporters and importers of light weapons based solely on entries for categories III and VII of UNROCA. Although Russia only reported the export of 108 MANPADS units (including missiles) for

Table 5.4. Internal verification of reported transfers of light weapons to categories III and VII of UNROCA, 2003–2006

Figures in parentheses after matching transfers are the number of matching pairs.

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006
Exact match	0(-)	0(-)	4(2)	6(3)
Partial match (no units)	2(1)	0(-)	0(-)	2(1)
Partial match (differences in units)	0(-)	0(-)	2(1)	2(1)
No match	7	16	12	13
Match not possible	5	0	4	2
Total	14	16	22	25

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

2006, it is ranked as the leading exporter of light weapons based on importer submissions for 2003–2006. This is mainly because Jordan reported the import of 6000 RPG-25/26/27 launchers from Russia in 2003 and 2004. Israel is in second place due to the report of a transfer in 2005 of 2422 81-mm mortars to Brazil. These transfers also explain the rankings of Jordan as the leading importer of light weapons and of Brazil in second place. In general, the results are skewed by single entries in which the transfer of several hundred or more light weapon units are reported. This suggests that UN member states are still not submitting full and clear information on light weapon transfers to categories III and VII. This should be borne in mind with regard to the rankings presented in tables 5.2 and 5.3—these tables are based only on data derived from UNROCA.

Internal verification of light weapon transfers reported to UNROCA categories III and VII

The results of the internal verification of submissions of light weapons to UNROCA for 2003–2006 revealed only 5 exact matches, representing 10 of the 77 entries (see table 5.4). There were two partial matches with no units reported in which both Australia and Sweden filed entries on a transfer of RBS-70 MANPADS missiles but did not give the number transferred. There were also two partial matches with differences in units reported. In the first of these, for 2005 the Netherlands reported the import of 102 Brandt 81-mm mortars from Norway, while Norway appeared to report the export of 100 mortars. In the second, for 2006 Bulgaria reported the import of 236 mortars from Hungary, while Hungary reported the export of 237 mortars to Bulgaria. The partial matches therefore account for 8 of the 77 entries. Forty-eight entries had no matching entry from

Table 5.5. Submissions of background information on international transfers of small arms and light weapons to UNROCA, 2003–2006

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006
Exporters reported	10	12	14	38
Importers reported	67	78	93	105
Reported transfers of SALW	220	799 ^a	1 140 ^a	838
Small arms	203	779	1 083	726
Light weapons	17	20 ^a	57 ^a	112

Note: The figures for 2006 exclude submissions by the Czech Republic (which only gave aggregated exports for SALW and reported no importers or exporters), Japan and Panama. The table also excludes entries filed by the UK on SALW transfers to Alderney, Aruba, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, St Helena and Sark. The table also excludes entries filed by Germany on SALW transfers to Aruba.

^a These figures include the transfer of Brand 81-mm mortars from Norway to the Netherlands, which the Netherlands also reported to category III of UNROCA.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

another UNROCA reporting state and for 11 entries no match was possible because only one state had reported to UNROCA for that year.

Reporting background information on SALW transfers to UNROCA: an analysis for 2003–2006

Based on submissions for 2003–2006, 37 UN member states reported 2997 transfers of SALW to UNROCA, involving 40 exporters and 128 importers (see table 5.5).⁸² The total number of exporters reported on increased significantly in 2006 compared with the years 2003–2005, although the number of importers for 2005 and 2006 remained fairly stable. The drop in the overall number of entries between 2005 and 2006 is mainly due to the reporting format used by the UK. For 2005 the UK was filed as an SALW exporter in 935 entries, accounting for 82 per cent of entries. For example, the UK filed 29 entries for the export of 34 pistols to Ireland, with 28 entries for a single unit and one entry for 6 pistols. For 2006, when the UK aggregated its SALW export figures by type of SALW for each

⁸² The importers include 7 UN peace operations: Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia and Sudan. Several states reported overseas territories of UN member states as recipients of SALW, including: Aruba (Netherlands), Bermuda (UK), the Channel Islands (UK), the Cayman Islands (UK), the Dutch Antilles (Netherlands), the Falkland Islands (UK), the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Gibraltar (UK), Hong Kong (China) and St Helena (UK). Taiwan was also reported as a recipient.

subcategory and destination, the number of entries citing the UK as an exporter dropped to 249.

Based on background information submissions to UNROCA for 2003–2006, information has been revealed on the transfer of at least 934 373 SALW units—of which 905 538 are small arms and 29 199 light weapons (see table 5.6). As with units reported to categories III and VII, in cases where there is a partial match but differences on units reported, the number of units reported by the importer is used in order to avoid double counting (see above for further explanation). Using this approach, table 5.6 provides a breakdown of numbers of units reported as transferred in 2003–2006, using the UN reporting form’s subcategories for SALW. Revolvers and self-loading pistols account for 37 per cent of SALW units reported in background information to UNROCA, followed by rifles and carbines with 29 per cent (excluding the assorted small arms reported as exported to Iraq and the USA by Poland and French exports to Algeria, Norway, Switzerland and the USA). It has not been possible to distinguish transfers to military and civilian end-users based on the background information submitted to UNROCA.

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 give the most significant exporters and importers of SALW based solely on background information submitted to UNROCA. The five exporters presented in table 5.7 account for 87 per cent of SALW exports reported in background information submissions to UNROCA for 2003–2006. The UK accounted for 56 per cent of reported SALW exports, followed by Poland (12 per cent), Germany (9 per cent), Hungary (5 per cent) and the Czech Republic (4 per cent). The UK and Poland reported background information on international SALW transfers to UNROCA for 2003–2006, Germany for 2005 and 2006 and the Czech Republic and Hungary only for 2006. Other sources suggest that these five states were not the largest exporters of SALW in 2003–2006. For example, despite Comtrade’s limitations (see box 2.1), its data suggest that the USA, Italy, Belgium and Austria are among the largest SALW exporters.⁸³ In addition, China, Russia and Ukraine would be expected to appear among the leading exporters of SALW units for this period (on exports by Russia and Ukraine see below).

The five importers presented in table 5.8 account for 72 per cent of SALW imports reported in background information submissions to UNROCA for 2003–2006. The USA was the single largest recipient, accounting for 55 per cent of SALW units reported, followed by Iraq (8 per cent), Afghanistan (5 per cent), Georgia (2 per cent) and Latvia (2 per cent). Of these states, only Georgia and Latvia reported imports to UNROCA for any of the years 2003–2006.⁸⁴ As for the leading exporters identified above, other sources suggest that the five states in

⁸³ United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, *UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database: Export and Import of Small Arms and Light Weapons* (United Nations: New York, [n.d.]), tables I and V.

⁸⁴ Latvia is the only state in table 5.8 to have reported on imports for years other than 2006.

Table 5.6. Types and totals of small arms and light weapons reported in background information submissions to UNROCA, 2003–2006

Figures are numbers of units. Figures do not include double counting of units.

Type of weapon	2003	2004	2005	2006
Total	54 322	93 402	167 246	619 767
Small arms	53 749	92 456	161 065	598 268
Revolvers and self-loading pistols	18 644	47 040	31 725	245 020
Rifles and carbines	3 838	11 614	5 134	247 740
Sub-machine guns	8 254	1 776	19 230	36 830
Assault rifles	21 137	2 101	4 684	48 063
Light machine guns	1 158	724	5 039	3 858
Other	718	29 201	41 069	1 770
Various small arms exported to Iraq from Poland	0	0	47 000	0
Various small arms exported to the USA from Poland	0	0	7 000	14 987
Various small arms exported to Algeria, Norway, Switzerland and the USA from France	0	0	184	0
Light weapons	573	946	6 181	21 499
Heavy machine gun	119	378	206	2 992
Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers	334	247	3 007	11 960
Portable anti-tank guns	0	0	0	222
Recoilless rifles ^d	70	0	1 597	2 340
Portable anti-tank launchers	12	304	1 086	3 840
Mortars of calibre less than 100 mm	36	17	250	50
Others	2	0	35	95

Notes: The figures do not include Japan's submissions for 2004–2006, which give some information on the SALW procured by the Japanese Government. Japan's submission for 2004 reported on the procurement of an estimated 3254 Type-89 rifles, 252 5.56-mm machine guns MINIMI, 141 12.7-mm heavy machine guns and 26 81-mm L16 mortars. Japan's submission for 2005 reported on the procurement of an estimated 7084 Type-89 rifles, 343 5.56-mm machine guns MINIMI, 80 12.7-mm heavy machine guns and 12 81-mm L16 mortars. Japan's submission for 2006 reported on the procurement of an estimated 6064 Type-89 rifles, 381 5.56-mm machine guns MINIMI, 151 12.7-mm heavy machine guns and 9 81-mm L16 mortars.

The figures do not include the submission by Panama for 2006. The figures also exclude SALW reported by the UK as transferred to Alderney, Aruba, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, St Helena and Sark. The table also excludes SALW reported by Germany as transferred to Aruba.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

table 5.8 are not the leading importers of SALW for 2003–2006. Although Comtrade data for 2004 and 2005 also give the USA as the single largest importer of SALW, Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia and Latvia are not among the top 20 importing states.⁸⁵ However, the lack of Comtrade data for Afghanistan and Iraq for these years also highlights the problem of using this data source for identifying major importers and exporters of SALW. Examples given below show that more SALW units were transferred to Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq and the USA in 2003–2006 than were reported to UNROCA.

Internal verification of SALW transfers reported as background information to UNROCA

For 2003–2006, UN member states filed 2997 entries on SALW transfers as background information to UNROCA. As noted above, the verification of these entries, by comparing importing and exporting state reports to UNROCA, is complicated by several factors. The most problematic factors include: uncertainty as to whether entries that appear to present an exact or partial match actually relate to the same transfer; the fact that in many cases importer and exporter both report to UNROCA but only one party reports the transfer; and the high number of entries that cannot be matched because one of the parties to the transfer did not report background information to UNROCA.

Issues to bear in mind with regard to the partial matches and where there appear to be no matches include: different delivery dates for importer and exporter; the several states' use of data derived from issued export licences for submissions to UNROCA; some states' reporting of transfers to civilians; several states' practice of aggregating data without clearly identifying the exporting or importing states; and some states' classifying SALW differently from the UN's subcategories. Several of these problems are also common to attempts to verify data on major conventional weapons transfers in UNROCA.⁸⁶ The lack of guidance on the models of SALW to be reported to particular subcategories on the standardized reporting form could have contributed to the high number of entries for which there was no match (see table 5.9). For example, the distinctions between rifles and assault rifles and light and heavy machine guns may not be clear. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate cases in which the exporter and importer reported on the same transfer but classified the SALW differently in their entries. In the first case, Jamaica reported the import from Poland of 1146 MP5 sub-machine guns, and Poland reported the export to Jamaica of 1146 MP9 self-loading pistols. In the second case, Poland reported the import from Hungary of 20 23-mm ZSU anti-aircraft guns as portable anti-tank missile launchers, and

⁸⁵ United Nations (note 83), tables II and VI.

⁸⁶ Laurance, Wezeman and Wulf (note 41); and Wezeman (note 53).

Table 5.7. Significant exporters of small arms and light weapons based on UNROCA submissions, 2003–2006

Figures are numbers of units.

Type of weapon	UK	Poland	Germany	Hungary	Czech Republic ^a	Other
Total	523 541	111 829	81 946	50 126	40 130	127 165
Small arms	522 344	110 799	62 524	46 685	39 500	123 686
Revolvers and self-loading pistols	193 460	21 522	18 775	18 684	35 363	54 625
Rifles and carbines	231 973	50	9 421	0	3 855	23 027
Sub-machine guns	5 849	1 323	24 188	26 454	196	8 080
Assault rifles	18 676	14 462	9 571	0	30	33 246
Light machine guns	1 416	4 455	562	1 547	56	2 743
Other	70 970	0	7	0	0	1 781
Assorted	0	68 987 ^b	0	0	0	184
Light weapons	1 197	1 030	19 422	3 441	630	3 479
Heavy machine gun	1 197	507	1	156	159	1 675
Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers	0	274	14 395	200	0	679
Portable anti-tank guns	0	119	0	0	0	103
Recoilless rifles	0	80	3 897	0	0	30
Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	0	12	1 095	3 085	460	590
Mortars of calibres less than 75 mm	0	36	34	0	0	283
Others	0	2	0	0	11	119

Notes: The figures exclude SALW reported by the UK as transferred to Alderney, Aruba, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, St Helena and Sark. The figures also exclude SALW reported by Germany as transferred to Aruba.

^a These figures are taken from the Czech Republic's submission.

^b This figure includes 14 987 various small arms transferred from Poland to the USA that were not disaggregated in the submission to UNROCA.

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

Hungary reported the export to Poland of 20 ZU-23-2 23-mm AAMG heavy machine guns.

Table 5.9 gives the results of the internal verification of background information submissions on international transfers of SALW. Less than 1 per cent of entries produced exact matches between the importing and exporting state

Table 5.8. Significant importers of small arms and light weapons based on UNROCA submissions, 2003–2006

Figures are numbers of units.

Type of weapon	USA	Iraq	Afghani- stan	Georgia	Latvia	Other
Total	513 353	79 091	45 634	22 132	20 661	253 866
Small arms	502 497	78 929	45 329	21 958	20 137	236 688
Revolvers and self-loading pistols	195 240	23 788	10 938	160	591	111 712
Rifles and carbines	225 339	0	0	0	49	42 938
Sub-machine guns	2 662	575	21 600	98	6 263	34 892
Assault rifles	3 223	6 988	11 330	21 700	12 491	20 253
Light machine guns	2 025	368	1 461	0	704	6 221
Other	51 920	210	0	0	39	20 589
Assorted	22 088	47 000	0	0	0	83
Light weapons	10 856	162	305	174	524	17 178
Heavy machine gun	295	162	94	35	0	3 109
Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers	10 550	0	0	64	524	4 410
Portable anti-tank guns	0	0	103	0	0	119
Recoilless rifles	0	0	70	0	0	3 937
Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	0	0	0	0	0	5 242
Mortars of calibres less than 75 mm	0	0	36	50	0	267
Others	11	0	2	25	0	94

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

reports. Less than 2 per cent of entries had partial matches, with 7 per cent giving no match. It was impossible to match 90 per cent of importer and exporter entries.⁸⁷

Even when only considering the 271 entries for which both an importing and exporting state had submitted background information to UNROCA for the same year, the results of the internal verification only produce exact matches for

⁸⁷ Two of the states that submitted nil reports for imports for 2006 were cited by exporters as destinations for SALW exported or licensed for export in 2006: the UK reported the export of 3 heavy machine guns to Swaziland, while Swaziland reported nil imports; and Hungary reported the export of 25 pistols and Germany issued export licences for 64 sub-machine guns to the Philippines, but the Philippines reported nil imports. Of course, these transfers may not have been recorded as arriving in the importing states in 2006 and could be reported for 2007.




Figure 5.2. Reporting on the same transfer for different subcategories: Jamaica and Poland

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/170, 27 July 2007, pp. 110, 119.

around 9 per cent of entries. An additional 20 per cent of entries give partial matches and 72 per cent give no match.

The number of exact and partial matches is low. In addition to the comparatively low participation rate, it could also be argued that this should be expected for the first years of reporting on SALW transfers, as knowledge and understanding of the types of information to be submitted have not been accumulated.

External verification of SALW transfers reported as background information to UNROCA

In the absence of satisfactory internal verification of the SALW transfers reported to UNROCA, external verification is necessary. This can be done by comparing transfers reported to UNROCA with national arms export and, where available, import reports for 2003–2006. The arms export and import reports used can be divided into three different sets: (a) reports by states that did not report to UNROCA in which the type and number of SALW units actually exported are disaggregated for each destination; (b) reports by states that did not report to UNROCA in which the type and number of SALW units are disaggregated for each destination according to export licence data, but units actually exported are not given; and (c) reports by states that did submit background

From Poland's report on imports for 2006

A	B <i>Final importer State(s)</i>	C <i>Number of items</i>	D <i>State of origin (if not exporter)</i>	E <i>Intermediate location (if any)</i>	REMARKS <i>Description of item</i> <i>Comments on the transfer</i>	
LIGHT WEAPONS						
1.	Heavy machine guns	Poland	20	Poland	ZU-23-2 23mm AAMG	Return to manufacturer

From Hungary's report on exports for 2006

A	B <i>Exporter State(s)</i>	C <i>Number of items</i>	D <i>State of origin (if not exporter)</i>	E <i>Intermediate location (if any)</i>	REMARKS <i>Description of item</i> <i>Comments on the transfer</i>	
LIGHT WEAPONS						
5.	Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	Hungary	20		23 mm ZSU	To use parts in other goods
		Israel	200 32		PPK SPIKE (rockets) PPK SPIKE (launchers)	

Figure 5.3. Reporting on the same transfer for different subcategories: Poland and Hungary

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/170, 27 July 2007, pp. 108, 120.

information to UNROCA but where the arms export and import reports provide information to verify UNROCA entries that is not included in submissions to UNROCA.⁸⁸ Arms export and import reports giving information only on export licences issued are not referred to in this section.⁸⁹

Only the arms export reports published by Norway (for 2005 and 2006), Spain (for 2003–2006) and Ukraine (for 2004–2006) disaggregate the type and number of SALW units exported for each destination. Therefore only these reports can be used to achieve exact matches for SALW transfers, as follows.⁹⁰ Norway’s arms export report provides an exact match for the only entry in which it is reported as

⁸⁸ The national reports referred to in this section are available on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project website (note 26).

⁸⁹ Germany did not report SALW transfers to UNROCA for 2003, but its arms export report covering 2003 reported the issuing of a licence for the export of 212 sub-machine guns to Latvia. Latvia submitted background information to UNROCA for 2003 in which it filed entries detailing the transfer of 162 sub-machine guns from Germany.

⁹⁰ Serbia reports on imports and exports for 2005 and 2006 in its arms export report published in 2007. Although it lists destinations, types of small arms and types of end-user (military and civilian), it was not possible to distinguish units for SALW from major conventional weapons or military equipment exported to the same destination.

Table 5.9. Internal verification of background information on reported transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2003–2006

Figures in parentheses after matching transfers are the number of matching pairs.

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006
Exact match	10(5)	2(1)	0(–)	12(5)
Partial match (no units)	0(–)	0(–)	0(–)	0(–)
Partial match (differences in units)	0(–)	2(1)	7(3)	47(19)
No match	4	7	42	143
Match not possible	206	788	1 091	636
Total	220	795	1 140	838

Source: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>.

an exporter;⁹¹ Spain's arms export report provides no matches for the four entries in which it is reported as an exporter in reports to UNROCA;⁹² and Ukraine's arms export report provides partial matches (differences in units reported) for three entries.⁹³

Two states—Finland and the USA—reported the type and number of SALW units disaggregated for each destination according to export licence data and provided other information to help corroborate the export of SALW. Finland's arms export reports (for 2003–2006) publish the number of units to be transferred according to the export licence issued but only give the financial value of the actual transfer.⁹⁴ Therefore, only partial matches (no units reported) can be

⁹¹ For 2006 the Netherlands reported to UNROCA that it imported 1050 sub-machine guns from Norway.

⁹² For 2006 Canada reported to UNROCA that it imported 1 pistol/revolver from Spain. For 2006 Greece reported to UNROCA that it imported 1 pistol/revolver and 1652 rifles and carbines from Spain. For 2006 Portugal reported to UNROCA that it imported 242 pistols/revolvers from Spain.

⁹³ For 2006 Georgia reported to UNROCA that it imported 21 700 assault rifles, an undisclosed number of sub-machine guns and 64 under-barrel hand-held and mounted grenade launchers from Ukraine. For 2006 Ukraine reported exporting 900 pistols and revolvers, 970 rifles and carbines, 17 940 automatic rifles, 129 light machine guns and 145 under-barrel hand-held and mounted grenade launchers to Georgia. For 2005 Ukraine reported exporting 620 pistols and revolvers, 310 rifles and carbines, 12 610 assault rifles, 620 light machine guns, 16 heavy machine guns and 64 under-barrel hand-held and mounted grenade launchers to Georgia.

⁹⁴ Bulgaria, Switzerland and the Belgian regions of Brussels (2003), Flanders (2003–2006) and Wallonia (2003–2005) give financial values for export licences and actual exports of items belonging to category 1 of their military lists. Nineteen states reported the financial values of export licences issued in 2006 for items covered by category 1 of the EU Common Military List to the EU Annual Report: Austria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK. Fourteen EU member states reported the financial value of actual exports of items covered by category 1 of the EU Common Military List: Austria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain.

identified using the Finnish report. For 2005 and 2006 Finland's arms export reports provide partial matches (no units reported) for three transfers and no match for one transfer.⁹⁵ The US Department of State reports information gathered from export licences issued on the type and number of SALW units, as well as the value of the units, broken down by destination, in what is known as the 'Section 655 report'. This report does not give information on actual transfers of SALW, but information on actual transfers of surplus SALW can be found via the US Department of Defence's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) database.⁹⁶ This resource yielded no matches for the 44 entries in which the USA was named as the exporting state.

The arms export reports published by the Czech Republic (for 2006) and Sweden (for 2003) give partial matches (no units reported) that were not possible using the Czech and Swedish background information submissions to UNROCA. In its arms export report for 2003, Sweden reported on the export of equipment for 'one rifle company' to Latvia from Swedish army surplus, providing a partial match (no units reported) for three entries for 2003. The Czech Republic's arms export and import report for 2006 provides information on the states that the Czech Republic exported SALW to and imported from—information that was not contained in its submission to UNROCA. The Czech Republic's 2006 arms export and import report provides partial matches (no units reported) for 9 entries, with no matches for a further 26 entries.

The national arms export reports of the Czech Republic (for 2006), Finland (for 2005 and 2006), Norway (2006), Sweden (2003) and Ukraine (2004–2006) thus externally verified 19 entries, giving either an exact or a partial match. These arms export reports also detail transfers of SALW units or ammunition and components that are not reported to UNROCA. They therefore demonstrate that UNROCA only captures a fraction of actual SALW transfers carried out in the period 2003–2006.

A sample of publicly reported SALW transfers missing from UNROCA

Despite the significant increase in submissions of background information on SALW transfers provided for 2006, UNROCA fails to give a realistic picture of the

⁹⁵ For 2006 Germany reported to UNROCA that it imported 1 rifle from Finland. For 2006 Hungary reported to UNROCA that it imported 424 rifles from Finland. For 2005 Poland reported to UNROCA that it imported 20 rifles and for 2006 that it imported 20 rifles from Finland. Finland did not report exporting rifles to Poland in 2006.

⁹⁶ US Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Excess Defense Articles (EDA) database, <<http://www.dscamilitary.com/programs/eda/search.asp>>. For a more detailed discussion of US reporting on SALW transfers see Gabelnick, T., Haug, M. and Lumpe, L., *A Guide to the US Small Arms Market, Industry and Exports, 1998–2004*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 19 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Sep. 2006), pp. 62–76.

scale of international SALW transfers. Three examples given below demonstrate the following.

1. UNROCA has only captured a fraction of the actual SALW imported to states reported on.
2. Some SALW exporting states already provide information to the public on destinations and numbers of SALW units transferred, broken down by sub-category, but have not reported to UNROCA.
3. Significant accumulations of SALW that are being discussed as sources of concern for regional and international stability in national and international media are missing from UNROCA.
4. Unless UNROCA's coverage is expanded to include licensed production, SALW submissions to UNROCA will miss one of the most significant types of SALW transfer.

The first case considered is Afghanistan. As shown in table 5.8, submissions to UNROCA detail the transfer of 45 329 SALW units to the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP) for 2003–2006. For the period 2003–2007, the press office of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the media have provided information on the transfer of at least another 90 000 surplus SALW units by several European states and Pakistan.⁹⁷ Clearly, submissions to UNROCA reveal only a fraction of the SALW units transferred to Afghanistan during 2003–2006.⁹⁸ Yet small arms proliferation in Afghanistan continues to pose security challenges to international forces in Afghanistan and the broader region. In theory, greater transparency in SALW transfers to Afghanistan's army and police—preferably via UNROCA—could help inform decisions on supplying SALW to Afghanistan as part of its security sector reform process.

The second case is Ukraine. While Ukraine has reported light weapon transfers to UNROCA categories III and IV for 2003, 2005 and 2006, it has never reported background information on SALW. However, the Ukrainian export control ser-

⁹⁷ Chivers, C. J., 'Russia's trademark gun, but others grab profits', *New York Times*, 15 July 2007; Iqbal, N., 'Arms gift signals Pakistan's Afghan aims', *Asia Times*, 22 Feb. 2003; and NATO, 'NATO in Afghanistan: NATO support to Afghan National Army (ANA)', versions of June 2007 and Oct. 2007, <<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/ana-support.html>>.

⁹⁸ In 2006 the USA announced plans to send 'tens of thousands' of surplus US military M-16 rifles to the ANA and ANP. Shipments of M-4 assault rifles, M-20 recoilless rifles and M-249 squad automatic weapons were reportedly delivered in mid-2007. Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, 'New gear for Afghan commandos', Press release, 25 July 2007, <<http://oneteam.centcom.mil/>>; and Tran, T., 'Afghanistan to get \$2 billion in U.S. gear', Associated Press, 4 July 2006, <<http://www.afghannews.net/index.php?action=show&type=news&id=844.com>>.

vice has published reports on its SALW exports for 2004–2006.⁹⁹ Published in Ukrainian, the reports give destinations and units exported broken down by sub-categories of SALW that are comparable to those used in the UN's standard reporting form for background information on SALW. Ukraine's SALW export reports for 2004–2006 give information on the transfer of 510 095 SALW units (excluding MANPADS) that were not reported by Ukraine to UNROCA. According to the Ukrainian SALW export reports for 2004–2006, SALW were exported to four of the five most significant importers given in table 5.8: the USA (199 391 units or 39 per cent of reported Ukrainian SALW exports), Georgia (41 088 assorted SALW units), Iraq (35 287 assorted SALW units) and Afghanistan (413 assorted SALW units).¹⁰⁰ Ukraine also reported significant SALW exports to three states that were not included in any of the background information submissions to UNROCA for 2003–2006: Azerbaijan (57 103 assorted SALW units), Chad (10 000 assault rifles) and Libya (100 000 assault rifles).

The fact that Ukraine makes this information publicly available for Ukrainian citizens is a positive development in public transparency on SALW transfers. It is less clear, however, why Ukraine has not submitted this data as background information to UNROCA.¹⁰¹ Ukraine participates in the OSCE and the WA, and it can be assumed that it makes information on SALW transfers available via these intergovernmental reporting mechanisms. It could be argued that several of the destinations given above are in areas of tension, and there is a high risk that the SALW will be diverted to rebel groups and conflict zones due to either poor controls or covert re-exports. In their present format, and given that they are published only in Ukrainian, it can be questioned whether Ukraine's SALW export reports can be used for confidence-building purposes. A Ukrainian submission to UNROCA would help remedy this shortcoming.

The final case considered relates to the export of 100 000 AK-103 rifles from Russia to Venezuela in 2006, and the conclusion of a licensed production agreement for the annual production of 25 000 AK-103 rifles and ammunition in Venezuela.¹⁰² Latin American media reported the dates for the three shipments of AK-103 rifles exported from Russia in 2006.¹⁰³ Since late 2004 Russian and inter-

⁹⁹ The Ukrainian State Export Control Service publishes Ukraine's arms export reports on its website, <<http://www.dsecu.gov.ua/control/uk/>>. The Ukrainian arms export reports for 2004–2006 are also available on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project website (note 26).

¹⁰⁰ For 2006 Georgia reported to UNROCA the import of at least 21 764 SALW units from Ukraine.

¹⁰¹ The fact that the report for 2004 was published at the beginning of 2006 and the report for 2005 at the end of 2006 is perhaps one explanation, in that the reports were made available well after the deadline for submissions to UNROCA.

¹⁰² For a more detailed overview of this case see Holtom, P., *Small Arms Production in Russia* (Saferworld: London, Mar. 2007), pp. 32–33.

¹⁰³ The first shipment of 30 000 AK-103 rifles did not arrive until June 2006. The second shipment of 32 000 rifles was delivered in Aug. 2006, with the remaining 48 000 rifles reportedly shipped from Russia on 5 Nov. 2006. 'Last batch of Russian rifles arrives in Venezuela in two weeks', *El Universal*, 7 Nov. 2006.

national media have reported extensively on Russia's licensed production agreement with Venezuela. While details only began to emerge in 2006, it is still unclear whether the AK-103 rifles produced in Venezuela would be solely for use by the Venezuelan armed forces or could be exported. The production agreement has raised concerns due to its potential impact on regional peace and stability. According to Venezuelan officials, AK-103 rifles will replace the military's stock of ageing Belgian FAL rifles, which will be made available to a growing force of army reservists.¹⁰⁴ However, others warn that the transfer and the creation of domestic production facilities could result in new or surplus arms being transferred to criminal groups or guerrilla forces in Colombia.¹⁰⁵ In December 2004 the USA sent a letter of protest to the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC, criticizing Russia's sale of AK-103 rifles to Venezuela, while the issue of Russian arms transfers to Venezuela was among the key issues discussed on the recent visit to Moscow of Colombian Vice-President Francisco Santos.¹⁰⁶ Neither Russia nor Venezuela has reported the transfer of AK-103 rifles as background information to UNROCA. They have thus missed an opportunity to demonstrate how information on SALW transfers submitted to UNROCA could be a basis for confidence building on a transfer regarded as potentially destabilizing for the recipient's region.

By demonstrating that information on SALW transfers is being collected by states and reported by government officials to media outlets and the public but not to UNROCA, these cases confirm that background submissions to UNROCA only capture a fraction of the actual volume and types of transfers of SALW.

¹⁰⁴ Webb-Vidal, A., 'Chávez in deal with Russia to build gun factory', *Financial Times*, 7 June 2006.

¹⁰⁵ McDermott, J., 'Colombia struggles to counter arms smuggling', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Dec. 2004, p 36.

¹⁰⁶ Scarborough, R., 'Russian arms sale to Chávez irks U.S.', *Washington Times*, 10 Feb. 2005, p. 1; and 'Russian leaders divide up Latin America', *Kommersant*, 4 June 2008.

6. Conclusions

Without a shadow of doubt there has been a significant increase in the volume of information on international SALW transfers made available via inter-governmental and public reporting mechanisms since 2001. The United Nations now offers its good offices as a means of increasing intergovernmental and public transparency on international transfers of small arms and light weapons via the UN Register of Conventional Arms. However, the UN relies on the willingness and ability of its member states to participate in such measures to make them successful. With regard to increased transparency in international transfers of SALW, there are significant regional differences both in the commitments—rhetorical and actual—and efforts of UN member states on this issue. Of the 50 UN member states that responded to the request to report international transfers of light weapons to UNROCA categories III and VII or the invitation to report SALW transfers as background information for 2003–2006, 28 are European (including 18 members of the European Union), 9 are from the Americas, 5 African, 4 Asian, 2 from the Middle East and 2 from Oceania (see appendix B).

Key findings

The international transfer of almost 1 million SALW units was reported to UNROCA for 2003–2006, citing 40 exporters and 128 importers. While the number of states reporting light weapon transfers to UNROCA categories III and VII remained fairly steady, there was a significant increase in the number of states submitting background information on SALW following the introduction of the standardized reporting form in 2006.¹⁰⁷ The key findings of this study with regard to participation and information on SALW transfers reported to UNROCA categories III and VII or as background information include the following.

1. The background information on SALW reported by 28 states represents the first time that these states had made information publicly available on SALW transfers.

2. The background information for 2006 supplied by two states—Mali and Swaziland—represents the first time that these states had reported to UNROCA.

3. Three states—Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti and Senegal—which have consistently submitted nil reports to UNROCA reported actual imports for the first time in their background information for 2006.

4. Four states returned nil reports for both imports and exports for 2006. They therefore took the opportunity to report on the ‘virtual eighth category’ of SALW.

¹⁰⁷ UN General Assembly Resolution 61/77 (note 8); and United Nations (note 8).

The nil reports in particular should be seen as support for the opportunity to report on SALW transfers to UNROCA.

5. More than half of the light weapon units reported to UNROCA categories III and VII either fell below the 75-mm calibre reporting threshold for category III or were anti-tank RPGs that states have not been requested to report to category VII.

6. In their reports on light weapon transfers to categories III and VII, 25 states gave descriptions of items transferred. Of the 31 states that reported background information on SALW to UNROCA, 24 provided a description of items transferred in their reports.

7. Five of the 25 states that reported light weapon transfers to categories III and VII provided comments on the transfer in their reports. Of the 31 states that reported SALW transfers in their background information, 12 provided comments on the transfer in their reports, giving information on the type of transfer (i.e. re-export, donation, transit or temporary export), the quality of the items (i.e. whether second-hand, inactivated or surplus), the end-user or -use (i.e. whether civilians, UN missions, return to manufacturer or for industrial use), the actual delivery date and the method of delivery.

8. Only one state commented that its background information on SALW included transfers to civilians, yet the SIPRI questionnaire revealed that at least eight other states included transfers to civilians in their reports.

9. Only one state commented that the exports reported in its background information on SALW was based on data derived from export licences only. The SIPRI questionnaire revealed that at least five other states relied solely on export licences for reporting exports of SALW as background information.

The reports submitted as background information to UNROCA presented the same verification challenges as the reports to UNROCA on transfers of major conventional weapons. The number of entries for which no match is possible because only one party reported the SALW transfer was particularly high due to the fact that less than 20 per cent of UN member states submitted information to UNROCA on SALW transfers. The identification of partial matches and cases where there was no report from one end of a transfer rather than an exact match could have been the result of a range of factors such as: states recording different years for the delivery of items for the same transfer; states aggregating data differently, often without clearly identifying recipients or providing a description of the items being transferred; states inconsistently reporting the same types of transfers (e.g. to civilians); and states classifying the same models differently. This last issue can be alleviated to some extent by states providing the model of the SALW unit in the 'description of item' column of their reports.

One of the most positive aspects of reporting SALW to UNROCA is that the 'remarks' section, in particular the 'description of item' column, has been widely used. As with reporting on transfers to the seven categories of UNROCA, extra information on the item being transferred and its end-user or -use improves understanding of the data, avoids misinterpretation of reports and is crucial for enhancing UNROCA's confidence-building role.¹⁰⁸

The example of licensed production of Russian rifles in Venezuela given above raises a crucial issue with regard to the types of transfers to be reported to UNROCA. At present, information on the transfer of technology or on units produced under a licence granted by another state are not requested by UNROCA. Yet these types of transfer have helped in the creation of indigenous SALW production capabilities in many of the 67 UN member states that have facilities for producing SALW units.¹⁰⁹ In the debates leading to the establishment of UNROCA it was stated that destabilizing accumulations are not only the result of actual transfers of weapons, and the same is true of SALW. Submitting information to UNROCA on SALW procured through domestic production and SALW holdings would also strengthen the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.¹¹⁰ Thus far, only Japan has submitted information on some SALW procured through domestic production and Togo on SALW holdings. Responses to SIPRI questionnaires revealed a wide variety of opinions on states' willingness and ability to report to UNROCA on SALW production and holdings.

Recommendations: challenges for an eighth UNROCA category

The inclusion of small arms and light weapons in a separate category of the UN Register of Conventional Arms remains a high priority for the Netherlands. Such a broadening of the scope of the register would stimulate UN Member States even more to report on their SALW transfers.¹¹¹

Although the actions of Japan and Togo show that there is support for the inclusion of domestic SALW production and holdings in UNROCA, the expansion of the Register in this way is perhaps a challenge too far at present. A more immediate step to expand the coverage of UNROCA would be to introduce a new,

¹⁰⁸ United Nations (note 69), p. 12.

¹⁰⁹ Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), 'World small arms producing firms', <<http://www.nisat.org/production/WorldProducersIntro.html>>.

¹¹⁰ Greene with Batchelor (note 15).

¹¹¹ Comments given on the Netherlands' completed SIPRI questionnaire. Although not in a position to report on international transfers of SALW as background information, Switzerland also expressed its support for 'mandatory' reporting on an eighth category of SALW to UNROCA.

eighth category for reporting on SALW transfers. In practical terms, this would simply involve the transformation of the ‘virtual eighth category’ created by the introduction of the standardized reporting form in 2006 into a full category.

For those in favour of expanding the scope of UNROCA in this way, this study identifies key technical and political challenges. One of the main technical obstacles in reporting SALW transfers to UNROCA is that the collection of data on units actually transferred, as subcategorized by UNROCA, challenges existing data collection and reporting processes for several states (e.g. Germany and Switzerland). It has been reported that the USA intended to submit background information on SALW transfers, but ‘the complexity of compiling records from various sources has slowed US participation in this portion of the register’.¹¹² Yet responses to the SIPRI questionnaire show that several states that do not have the resources of the USA have managed to put in place the necessary administrative policies and procedures to collect, collate and report information on actual SALW transfers.

In the past, regional workshops have been undertaken as a means of helping to enable participation in UNROCA. Such workshops could be used to provide a better understanding of the potential data sources and methods of collection that could be used for filing reports on SALW transfers. Exponents of ‘best practice’ on reporting SALW could support and participate in such efforts, explaining how their systems have evolved to move beyond using data derived from export licences. If actual transfers of SALW are to be reported to an eighth category of UNROCA, a group of governmental experts on the continuing operation and further development of UNROCA should express its opinion on the use of data derived from export licences.

The main political challenge for the creation of an eighth category is achieving a consensus in a GGE that such a change is both feasible and would contribute to the goals of UNROCA. It can be argued that the response to Resolution 61/77 of 2006 has shown that a considerable minority of UN member states are willing and able to provide background information on international transfers of SALW to a ‘virtual eighth category’ of UNROCA. However, it is unlikely that the next GGE will recommend the creation of an eighth category for reporting SALW to UNROCA based on the response for 2003–2006. It seems that, before this can happen, more states from two groups of UN members would need to demonstrate a willingness to submit information on SALW transfers to UNROCA.

First, more major SALW exporters—in particular China, Russia and the USA—would need to demonstrate a willingness and ability to report SALW transfers to UNROCA. Second, there needs to be more participation by UN member states from regions where SALW transfers are considered to be a threat to regional

¹¹² Abramson, J., ‘UN Register reveals small arms trade’, *Arms Control Today*, Nov. 2007.

stability and to foster misunderstandings and misperceptions that spark, fuel and prolong conflict. Overall, the fact that many states do not participate in UNROCA already undermines its confidence-building potential for several regions of tension. Europe, the region with the most developed exchange of information on SALW (e.g. the OSCE Document on SALW), has provided the most submissions of background information on SALW. The participation of seven states from the Americas is promising. It is disappointing that the only African states to report on SALW transfers to UNROCA for 2003–2006 are Mali, Togo, Senegal and Swaziland, particularly since African states have repeatedly called for SALW to be included in UNROCA. This situation is made more disconcerting by the fact that 37 African states have raised the need to increase transparency on SALW in regional commitments related to countering SALW proliferation.¹¹³ More responses from African countries to the invitation to submit background information on SALW transfers would certainly send a strong signal to future GGEs that there is a willingness and ability to participate in an eighth category for SALW in UNROCA.

It is, of course, possible that the invitation to submit background information on SALW transfers (the ‘virtual eighth category’) could become a substitute for an eighth category in UNROCA. This has happened with the invitation to submit information on procurement of major conventional weapons through domestic production and military holdings. It remains to be seen what states will do with the information submitted—the charge that UNROCA as a whole is for ‘submitting data for the sake of submitting data and getting bonus points for good international behavior’ has yet to be answered.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials was signed on 14 June 2006 by Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo but has not yet entered into force. The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was signed on 21 Apr. 2004 by Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda and entered into force on 5 May 2006. The Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region was signed on 14 Aug. 2001 by Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and entered into force on 8 Nov. 2004.

¹¹⁴ Laurance, E. J., *The United Nations Conventional Arms Register: Present Challenges, New Directions* (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Ottawa, Feb. 2001), p. 16.

Appendix A. Definitions

International definitions of small arms and light weapons

This Policy Paper uses the United Nations definition of small arms and light weapons (see below). The subcategories given for SALW by the UN, the OSCE and the WA are almost identical. The main exception is the inclusion of a subcategory for portable anti-aircraft guns in the OSCE's definition. The European Union (EU) Common Military List category ML.1 captures more or less the same items as covered by the small arms categories of the UN, the OSCE and the WA, although not broken down into comparable subcategories for different types of small arms and includes silencers, special gun-mountings, clips, weapons sights and flash suppressers. The fact that the EU Common Military List category ML.2 does not break down light weapons and large-calibre artillery makes this category more problematic for assessing light weapon transfers using the EU Military List.

The United Nations

According to the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on small arms (1997): 'small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew'.¹¹⁵ The Panel of Governmental Experts also offered the following subcategories: for small arms '(a) Revolvers and self-loading pistols; (b) Rifles and carbines; (c) Sub-machine-guns; (d) Assault rifles; and (e) Light machine-guns' and for light weapons '(a) Heavy machine-guns; (b) Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; (c) Portable anti-aircraft guns; (d) Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles; (e) Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; (f) Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and (g) Mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm'.¹¹⁶

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The OSCE Document on SALW defines small arms and light weapons as

man-portable weapons made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. Small arms are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by individual members of armed or security forces. They include revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns. Light weapons are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by several members of armed or secur-

¹¹⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms', Note by the Secretary-General, A/52/298, 27 Aug. 1997, para. 25.

¹¹⁶ United Nations (note 115), para. 26.

ity forces serving as a crew. They include heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100 mm.¹¹⁷

The Wassenaar Arrangement

According to the WA, small arms are ‘those weapons intended for use by individual members of armed forces or security forces, including revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns’. Light weapons are ‘those weapons intended for use by individual or several members of armed or security forces serving as a crew and delivering primarily direct fire. They include heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; and mortars of calibre less than 75 mm’. MANPADS are ‘surface-to-air missile systems intended for use by an individual or several members of armed forces serving as a crew’.¹¹⁸

The European Union

The first category (ML.1) of the EU Common Military List is generally considered to cover small arms as it is defined as including ‘Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor’: (a) rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, machine pistols and machine guns’ (except for vintage guns), (b) smooth-bore weapons specially designed for military use, fully automatic type weapons, semi-automatic or pump-action type weapons, (c) weapons using caseless ammunition and (d) silencers, special gun-mountings, clips, weapons sights and flash suppressers for specified arms.¹¹⁹

The EU’s Common Military List makes no distinction in its second category (ML.2) between light weapons as classified by the UN (see above) and large-calibre artillery as defined by category III of UNROCA. Category ML.2 covers ‘Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches), projectors and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor’: (a) guns, howitzers, cannon, mortars, anti-tank weapons, projectile launchers, military

¹¹⁷ OSCE (note 19).

¹¹⁸ Wassenaar Arrangement, ‘Guidelines & procedures, including the Initial Elements’, Dec. 2007, <<http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/>>. Category 8, on SALW, was added by the Dec. 2003 Plenary.

¹¹⁹ The most recent version of the EU Common Military List (which was originally adopted on 13 June 2000) is Common Military List of the European Union, adopted by the Council on 10 Mar. 2008 (2008/C 98/01), *Official Journal of the European Union*, C98 (18 Mar. 2008).

flame throwers, rifles, recoilless rifles, smooth-bore weapons and signature reduction devices therefore, (b) military smoke, gas and pyrotechnic projectors or generators and (c) weapons sights.

The UNROCA categories

The seven categories of major conventional weapons on which states are requested to submit information to UNROCA were first defined in an annex to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991. These categories were refined by the first Group of Technical Experts (1992) and subsequent Groups of Governmental Experts (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006). The definitions below are taken from the annex to the UNROCA reporting form.¹²⁰

I. Battle tanks

Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armoured fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high-level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tons unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.

II. Armoured combat vehicles

Tracked, semi-tracked or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either: (a) designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or (b) armed with an integral or organic weapon of at least 12.5 millimetres calibre or a missile launcher.

III. Large-calibre artillery systems

Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces, combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a calibre of 75 millimetres and above.

IV. Combat aircraft

Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defence or

¹²⁰ United Nations (note 8).

reconnaissance missions. The term 'combat aircraft' does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped or modified as described above.

V. Attack helicopters

Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.

VI. Warships

Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 500 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 500 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range.

VII. Missiles and missile launchers

(a) Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres, and means designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by categories I through VI. For the purpose of the Register, this sub-category includes remotely piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined above but does not include ground-to-air missiles.

(b) Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS).

Appendix B. Intergovernmental transparency mechanisms for international transfers of SALW

In addition to UNROCA there are three other intergovernmental reporting mechanisms for international transfers of small arms and light weapons: (a) the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons,¹²¹ (b) Wassenaar Arrangement,¹²² and (c) the European Union Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.¹²³ The information exchange conducted under the OSCE Document on SALW is the only SALW-specific intergovernmental transparency reporting mechanism. The Wassenaar Arrangement is an export control regime for arms-producing countries which includes the exchange of information on SALW transfers. EU member states are invited to submit information on the financial value of export licences issued and used; this is then published in the EU Annual Report.

Table B.1 gives a brief summary of the above three intergovernmental mechanisms. Table B.2 lists the countries that were members of these mechanisms or participated in the SALW reporting mechanisms of UNROCA for 2003–2006.

¹²¹ OSCE (note 19).

¹²² Wassenaar Arrangement (note 118).

¹²³ Council of the European Union, European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, document 8675/2/98 Rev 2, Brussels, 5 June 1998, <http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=408>. See also Bauer and Bromley (note 33); and Bromley, M., *The Impact on Domestic Policy of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: The Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Spain*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 21 (SIPRI: Stockholm, May 2008).

Table B.1. Intergovernmental transparency mechanisms for international transfers of small arms and light weapons

	OSCE Document on SALW	Wassenaar Arrangement	EU Annual Report
Number of participants	56	40	27
First year reporting on SALW	2002	2004	2004
Purpose	To identify destabilizing accumulations; early warning; confidence building	To prevent destabilizing accumulations; promote responsible transfers; prevent diversions; international stability	To inform on implementation of the EU Code of Conduct; promote convergence of arms export policies
Form of transparency	Intergovernmental	Intergovernmental	Intergovernmental and public
Sources of data	Unknown	Unknown	Export licences issued, company data, customs data
Definition of SALW	Yes	Yes	Yes
Information exchanged	Actual SALW exports and imports between OSCE states	Actual SALW exports to non-participating states	Licences issued and used for SALW exports to all states

EU Annual Report = European Union Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports;
 OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SALW = small arms and light weapons.

Table B.2. States participating in intergovernmental reporting mechanisms and publishing national reports on international transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2003–2006

State	UNROCA		SALW in national report	WA	OSCE Document on SALW	EU Annual Report
	Light weapons	Background information on SALW				
Albania		x			x	
Andorra					x	
Antigua and Barbuda		x				
Argentina	x			x		
Armenia					x	
Australia	x			x		
Austria				x	x	x
Azerbaijan	x				x	
Bangladesh		x				
Belarus	x				x	
Belgium				x	x	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		x	x		x	
Bulgaria	x		x	x	x	
Canada		x	x	x	x	
Croatia				x		
Cyprus		x			x	x
Czech Republic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Denmark		x	x	x	x	x
Estonia			x	x	x	x
Finland	x	x	x	x	x	x
France		x	x	x	x	x
Georgia		x			x	
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece		x		x	x	x
Haiti		x				
Holy See					x	
Hungary	x	x		x	x	x
Iceland					x	
India ^a						
Ireland				x	x	x
Israel	x					
Italy			x	x	x	
Jamaica		x				
Japan ^b				x		

State	UNROCA					
	Light weapons	Background information on SALW	SALW in national report	WA	OSCE Document on SALW	EU Annual Report
Jordan	x					
South Korea		x		x		
Kazakhstan					x	
Kyrgyzstan					x	
Latvia	x	x		x	x	
Liechtenstein		x			x	
Lithuania		x		x	x	x
Luxembourg				x	x	x
FYROM			x		x	
Mali		x				
Malta				x	x	
Mexico	x	x				
Moldova		x			x	
Monaco					x	
Montenegro			x		x	
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x
New Zealand		x		x		
Norway	x		x	x	x	
Panama ^c						
Philippines		x				
Poland	x	x		x	x	x
Portugal	x	x		x	x	x
Romania				x	x	
Russia	x			x	x	
Saint Lucia		x				
San Marino					x	
Serbia			x		x	
Senegal		x				
Slovakia		x		x	x	x
Slovenia	x		x	x	x	x
South Africa	x			x		
Spain			x	x	x	x
Swaziland		x				
Sweden	x	x	x	x	x	x
Switzerland ^d			x	x	x	
Tajikistan					x	
Togo		x				
Trinidad and Tobago		x				
Turkey	x	x		x	x	
Turkmenistan					x	

State	UNROCA					
	Light weapons	Background information on SALW	SALW in national report	WA	OSCE Document on SALW	EU Annual Report
UK	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ukraine	x		x	x	x	
USA	x		x	x	x	
Uzbekistan					x	
77 states	25	37	22	40	56	21

EU Annual Report = European Union Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; FYROM = Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SALW = small arms and light weapons; WA = Wassenaar Arrangement.

^a India submitted a nil report to UNROCA for MANPADS for 2003.

^b Japan submitted background information to UNROCA on the procurement of some SALW units for 2004–2006.

^c Panama submitted background information to UNROCA on seizures of illicit SALW for 2006.

^d Switzerland submitted a *note verbale* as background information to UNROCA for 2006 in support of an eighth category.

Sources: UNROCA: UNROCA online database, <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf>; SALW in national report: SIPRI Arms Transfers Project website, <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/atlinks_gov.html>; WA: Wassenaar Arrangement, 'Introduction', <<http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/>>; OSCE Document on SALW: OSCE, 'Participating states', <<http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html>>; EU Annual Report: Council of the European Union, 'Security-related export controls II—military equipment', 29 Apr. 2008, <http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1484&lang=EN>.

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The UN General Assembly's decision in 2003 to invite member states to provide information on transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) has led to a notable increase in the level of transparency in transfers of SALW. This Policy Paper is the first study to document and analyse information on SALW transfers reported to UNROCA for 2003–2006. It finds that, while the level of reporting on light weapons to UNROCA was fairly steady for the years 2003–2006, a significant increase in submissions of background information followed the introduction of a standardized reporting form for 2006.

Despite this noteworthy increase, UNROCA still only captures a fraction of international SALW transfers and transparency in transfers of SALW continues to lag behind that of other conventional weapons. The findings and recommendations of this Policy Paper throw light on the continuing debate over how the coverage of UNROCA can be expanded.

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