

**Crisis in Russia:
Facts and Figures, People and Data**

Russia is going through a time of what historically was known as *smuta*—turbulence, unrest, volatility and uncertainty. The recent developments in Russia have their intrinsic logic, however—the logic of power struggle. On one side of the front line there are forces for reform and the opening up of Russia; on the other side are the opponents of such a policy. The political crisis which we are witnessing—after the dissolution of the Russian Parliament on 21 September and the use of the Army by the President against his opponents on 3–4 October—is not merely a conflict between legislature and executive, as it is so often presented in the press. It is a conflict between those in favour of Russia setting out on the road towards normalcy and those who want her to take the road back.

There is no simple way of transforming a totalitarian system and command economy into a democratic system based on a market economy. Russian and other East European experience shows that the price of such a transformation is immense. The process of abolishing the totalitarian system gives rise not only to increasing antagonisms of a political and socio-economic nature but also to national and inter-ethnic conflicts. Once long-suppressed frustrations and hostilities break out in a multinational state such as the Russian Federation, they may lead to the disintegration and breakup of the state. Elected representatives and the government offices and institutions of the communist state have lost their authority and power. New democratic institutions have not yet taken shape. In this state of affairs, the scope for compromise has shrunk dramatically to nothing. The power of argument is replaced by the argument of power. The Army then becomes the decisive factor. The danger is that democratic forces that have recourse to the military in order to stave off civil war are liable in their turn to be taken hostage by the Army or, being no longer checked by a democratic opposition, to degenerate into another type of authoritarian regime.

This Fact Sheet provides up-to-date information on the development of the present crisis, the new political institutions and organizations and the people who represent them. It throws into relief the significance and role of the Army in the process of change which is taking place. Finally, it gives systematic data on the role of Russia in the conflicts within the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus and Tajikistan and shows the implications for international security.

Contents:

- **POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS AND EVENTS** 2
 - Chronology of the political crisis in Russia
 - The constitutional power structure
 - Proposed federal institutions for the transitional period
 - Political parties and organizations
 - The territorial sub-divisions of the Russian Federation
 - Challenges to Russian state integrity
 - Possible presidential candidates
- **MILITARY FORCES AND COMMAND STRUCTURE** 13
 - Command of the armed forces
 - Force structure
 - Force levels
 - Nuclear forces
 - CIS military arrangements
 - Collective security forces
 - Withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe
- **RUSSIA AND POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS** 17
 - The Baltic area
 - Ukraine
 - Moldova
 - The Caucasus
 - Tajikistan
- **RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY** 24
 - Chronology
 - Russian participation in peace-keeping activities

It has been prepared by four SIPRI researchers—Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia), Shannon Kile (USA), Zdzislaw Lachowski (Poland) and Signe Landgren (Sweden)—and editors Billie Bielckus and Eve Johansson.

This Fact Sheet reports on the state of affairs as of mid-October 1993.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Director of SIPRI

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS AND EVENTS

CHRONOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN RUSSIA

- 12 June 1991* Boris Yeltsin is elected President of the Russian Federation, with 57.3 per cent of the vote.
- 19–21 Aug. 1991* Failed *coup d'état* in Moscow. Yeltsin, supported by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoy and the Chairman of the Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov, plays a key role in preventing the restoration of totalitarianism.
- 28 Oct. 1991* In order to start economic reform Yeltsin demands special powers, which are given on 1 November by the Congress of People's Deputies.
- 2 Jan. 1992* The Government announces price liberalization as the first step in economic reform. After this the Parliament gradually becomes increasingly reluctant to support radical measures for the transition to a market economy, placing itself in opposition to the President and the Government on the most important issues (privatization, the law on bankruptcy, land ownership, the budget deficit, etc.).
- 28 Oct. 1992* Yeltsin deprives Khasbulatov of control over the armed guard of the Parliament.
- 25 Nov. 1992* Yeltsin is forced by the conservatives to dismiss some of his closest associates (including Gennadiy Burbulis and Mikhail Poltoranin).

1–14 Dec. 1992 **The first open constitutional crisis.**
 The 7th Congress of People's Deputies rejects Yeltsin's nomination of the reformist Yegor Gaidar to the post of Prime Minister. Yeltsin threatens to appeal directly to voters to launch a referendum drive to dissolve the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. The Congress adopts several laws to limit the executive powers of the presidency. Following lengthy negotiations between the President and the conservative opposition leaders, the Congress approves the nomination of a compromise candidate, Viktor Chernomyrdin, as Prime Minister. A referendum to resolve the constitutional dispute over the powers of the presidency and the legislature is scheduled for April 1993.

Mar. 1993 **The second constitutional crisis.**
 The 8th Congress of People's Deputies (10–13 March) refuses to hold the referendum agreed upon the previous December and puts into force the amendments to the constitution limiting the powers of the President. Yeltsin replies by announcing (on 20 March) the establishment of 'special rule' until the referendum, which he arranges for 25 April. The actions of the President are denounced as anti-constitutional by the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. The 9th Congress, having failed to impeach the President, takes it upon itself to set the date of the referendum and to formulate the questions. It stipulates that two of them, concerning the anticipated elections, will require a majority of all registered voters (not simply of those voting).

- 25 Apr. 1993* The referendum gives a vote of confidence (58 per cent) to Yeltsin. Rutskoy and Khasbulatov declare the results as having no significance.
- 30 Apr. 1993* Yeltsin makes public the draft of the new constitution; it is denounced by his opponents as unacceptable.
- 1 May 1993* Demonstrations organized by the most radical opponents of the President in the Parliament result in serious disturbances in Moscow.
- 5 June 1993* In an attempt to ensure broader support for constitutional reform, Yeltsin convenes a consultative Constitutional Assembly (or conference) comprising 762 prominent intellectuals and representatives of different political forces. The parliamentarians are divided on the issue of participation.

- July 1993* Yeltsin refuses to sign the Parliament's budget bill, which would lead to a deficit that would cause hyperinflation and thus block reforms. The Parliament passes a law placing the Central Bank under the Parliament's control.
- 13 Aug. 1993* Yeltsin suggests the establishment of a Council of the Federation, comprising representatives of the Regions, to operate as a 'legitimate organ of power' and to be empowered to adopt a new constitution. The debates which follow show the reluctance of the constituent territories to bypass the existing constitution.
- 1 Sep. 1993* The offices of Vice-President Rutskoy and First Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko are 'temporarily suspended' by Yeltsin following a succession of accusations of corruption and counter-accusations against them and others.
- 18 Sep. 1993* Insisting on the anticipated elections, Yeltsin suggests holding them for the presidency as well as the legislature. This is not supported by the Parliament.


21 Sep. 1993 **The third constitutional crisis.**
Yeltsin signs decree no. 1400 disbanding the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies and calls for elections on 11–12 December to the lower house of the Federal Assembly, which will be the new legislative body of the Russian Federation. Any action to prevent the elections is declared illegal and liable to prosecution. The legislature reacts by impeaching Yeltsin under the charge of attempting a state coup, proclaiming Rutskoy acting President and nominating alternative 'force' ministers (the ministers of defence, security and the interior). The Deputies adopt a law introducing the death penalty for any attempt to change the constitutional order by force.

- 23 Sep. 1993* Yeltsin issues a decree on the presidential elections, now set for 12 June 1994. An armed group of the opposition attacks the headquarters of the CIS joint armed forces, killing two people.
- 28 Sep. 1993* Tension is initiated by the Parliament, with calls for massive civil disobedience, the support of the armed forces, the mobilization of hard-liners, the building of barricades around the Parliament office, the distribution of weapons and the organization of sporadic clashes in Moscow, and escalates over a period of a week. The Parliament building is finally surrounded by 5000 Interior Ministry troops and all communications, water supply and electricity are cut off.
- 29 Sep.–1 Oct. 1993* The Parliament is urgently requested to surrender all weapons and to evacuate the building by 4 October. An agreement between the conflicting parties aimed at reducing tension is successfully mediated by the Russian Orthodox Church (Patriarch Alexey II) but denounced a few hours later by the Parliament.

2–3 Oct. 1993 **Mass riots in Moscow.**
The opposition organizes mass riots and numerous attacks against the militia and security forces in the centre of Moscow. Demonstrators collect around the Parliament building and seize the neighbouring hotel housing the *ad hoc* militia command centre. Rutskoy and Khasbulatov appeal to the crowd to capture the television station, the Kremlin and other government facilities. Armed supporters of the Parliament accompanied by several thousand demonstrators seize the office of the Mayor of Moscow, taking the Deputy Mayor hostage, and later attack the Ostankino television transmitting centre. The use of rifles, sub-machine guns and grenade dischargers results in numerous casualties (27 killed, over 180 wounded). Yeltsin declares a state of emergency in Moscow and orders units of the regular army into the city.

- 4 Oct. 1993* 1300 regular troops, with several tanks and armoured combat vehicles, surround the Parliament building. A final demand to give up their weapons and leave the building is addressed to its defenders, who respond with gun-fire. Shelling and assault of the Parliament building follow.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER STRUCTURE



^a Elected in June 1991 (57.3 per cent of vote). Won the referendum in Apr. 1993 (58 per cent of vote). Confronted with the paralysis of power, he insisted on earlier elections to both Parliament and the presidency. He dissolved the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies on 21 Sep. 1993.

^b Elected in June 1991 as Yeltsin's running mate in the presidential elections. He stood in increasing opposition to the President after Nov. 1992 and openly challenged him after Mar. 1993. He was proclaimed President by the dissolved Parliament on 21 Sep. 1993 and played a key role in taking the confrontation to bloodshed. Formally removed from the vice-presidency by Yeltsin's decree on 3 Oct. 1993, he was arrested after suppression of the revolt on 4 Oct. 1993.

^c Nominated in Dec. 1992. He was supported by the Parliament as an alternative to the reformist acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, but basically preserved most of his economic policy.

^d A rotating permanent Parliament. Formed by the Congress of People's Deputies in 1990, it consisted of 240 members of the latter, with a predominantly anti-reformist orientation. It slowed down, undermined or blocked the most important actions of the President and the Government, at the same time trying persistently to increase its own role at the expense of the other branches of power. It was dissolved by Yeltsin's decree on 21 Sep. 1993.

^e Elected in Oct. 1991. In open opposition to the President from spring 1992 and played a key role in the development of conflict between the Parliament and the President and in organizing mass mobilization against Yeltsin's 'anti-constitutional actions'. He was arrested on 4 Oct. 1993.


^f Elected in 1990 and has been convened 9 times since then. It consisted of over 1000 members, divided between democrats, centrists and neo-communists/nationalists roughly in the proportion 1 : 2 : 2. Having introduced over 300 amendments to the existing constitution, it was extremely reluctant to prepare a new fundamental law; at the same time it insisted that it was the only legitimate body with the constitutional authority to adopt it. It strongly resisted earlier elections. It was preparing the impeachment of Boris Yeltsin at its forthcoming session, in Nov. 1993. Dissolved by President's decree on 21 Sep. 1993, it held a '10th extraordinary session' (although failing to secure a quorum).

^g Set up in Oct. 1991, it consisted of 13 members (plus two vacancies) and its function was to protect the existing constitution. It was suspended by Yeltsin's decree on 7 Oct. 1993 for having taken sides in the political struggle.


^h Attempted to mediate between the President and the legislature. He refused to support the actions of Boris Yeltsin in Sep. 1993, considering them to be unconstitutional and resigned after suppression of the revolt on 6 Oct. 1993.

PROPOSED FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Initial proposal



Revised proposal




* As Chechnia has proclaimed its independence, the overall number of Council of the Federation members will most probably go down to 176.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

The traditional 'left-right categorization of the political spectrum is misleading in the case of Russia. In the chart below, the main actors on the Russian political scene are grouped (very approximately) according to their attitude towards the government policy of economic and political reforms in Russia.

Overview of the political spectrum



The dramatic political events in Moscow in October 1993 have seriously affected the party spectrum in Russia. Several organizations (in some cases their Moscow branches) have been suspended, and a number of personalities have been accused of directly participating in revolt. These are marked in the above chart and table overleaf by an asterisk (*).

FACTS ABOUT PARTIES AND BLOCS

The party system is in the making and can be categorized only in a very approximate way. It is characterized by:

- (a) the existence of hundreds of political groups most of which lack a broad social base, have very few members and fail to articulate definite political goals;
- (b) the key role of individual politicians and public figures in ensuring the 'image' of their parties rather than vice versa;
- (c) the absence of regional networks, developed local structures and grass roots involvement, with most of the 'central' parties operating mainly in Moscow, St Petersburg and in some cases only in a few other cities;
- (d) the development of regional (local) political groupings in many areas;
- (e) the emergence of numerous quasi-parties—that is, politically oriented associations on the basis of interest groups;
- (f) constant party-splitting and alliance-building.


Polls indicate that only a few political organizations have been easily 'recognizable' by the voters: Democratic Russia (DR), the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), People's Party of Free Russia (NPSR), the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RDDR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the National Salvation Front (FNS). After the suppression of the opposition, a newly formed pro-government 'Choice of Russia' bloc seems to be the most influential and could get up to 60 per cent of places in the State Duma reserved for the party lists.

Many parties have participated in different broader movements and blocs simultaneously; they are now in the process of defining their alliance strategy. The forthcoming elections have accelerated the realignment of the parties, introducing new changes on the current political scene. In quite a number of cases party alliances in the Regions differ from the federal level. By mid-October, 92 organizations (including 35 political parties and movements) were registered as having the right to participate in elections. Activists of the parties which were suspended in October will most probably run at the local levels.

Organization (Russian abbreviations in brackets)	Major participating parties	Participation in broader movements or blocs	Allies	Membership (various estimates, if available)	Key figures (leaders and/or candidates for the parliament)
Democratic/liberal orientation					
'Choice of Russia' (VR) Bloc	DR PES (?) KPR DI		RPRF		Yegor Gaidar Vladimir Shumeiko Ella Pamfilova Andrey Kozyrev Alexander Yakovlev Gennadiy Burbulis Anatoliy Chubais Sergey Filatov Sergey Yushenkov Pyotr Filippov
Party for Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)			PNR (?)		Sergey Shakhrai Alexander Shokhin Sergey Stankevich
Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RDDR)			RPST	4 000	Gavriil Popov Anatoliy Sobchak
'New Russia' (NR) Bloc	NPR SDPR (?) RSLP KhDSR	DR		20 000	Telman Gdlyan Anatoliy Golov Vladimir Boldyrev
'Democratic Russia' (DR) Movement	NR (?) SDPR KPR RSLP KhDSR NPR	VR		50 000– 70 000 200 000– 250 000 (initially 350 000)	Galina Starovoitova Lev Ponomarev Gleb Yakunin Ilya Zaslavskiy
EPI Centre (basic organization for G. Yavlinskiy's bloc)			RPRF KhDSR SDPR		Grigoriy Yavlinskiy Vladimir Lukin Yuriy Boldyrev

Organization (Russian abbreviations in brackets)	Major participating parties	Participation in broader movements or blocs	Allies	Membership (various estimates, if available)	Key figures (leaders and/or candidates for the parliament)
Republican Party of the Russian Federation (RPRF)		DR (withdrew 15 Oct.)	PNR EPI Centre	5 000– 7 000 3 000	Vladimir Lysenko Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy Igor Yakovenko Pyotr Filippov (VR)
Social Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR)		DR		6 000 5 600	Oleg Rumyantsev Leonid Volkov Anatoliy Golov Vladimir Boldyrev
Peasant's Party of Russia (KPR)		DR VR		14 000 (self- estimates)	Yuriy Chernichenko
Russian Social-Liberal Party (RSLP)		DR NR			Vladimir Filin
Christian Democratic Union of Russia (KhDSR)		DR NR			Alexander Ogorodnikov
Union '25 April'		VR			Gennadiy Burbulis
People's Party of Russia (NPR)		DR NR		10 000 (self- estimates)	Telman Gdlyan Nikolay Ivanov
Party of Economic Freedom (PES)		VR		5 000– 10 000	Konstantin Borovoy
Democratic Initiative		VR			Pavel Bunich
Russian Party of Free Labour (RPST)			RDDR	1 000 1 500 (1992)	Ivan Kivelidi
Centrists					
Civic Union (GS)	'Renewal' RSPP DPR (initially) NPSR*			170 000	Arkadiy Volskiy Alexander Vladislavlev
Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)		GS (withdrew 24 Aug.)		50 000 40 000	Nikolay Travkin Oleg Bogomolov Stanislav Govorukhin
People's Party of Free Russia (NPSR)*		GS		70 000	Alexander Rutskey* Vasiliy Lipitskiy
All-Russian Union 'Renewal'	PP (?) PNR (?)	GS		1 000	Alexander Vladislavlev
Industrial Party (PP)					Arkadiy Volskiy
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP)		GS			Arkadiy Volskiy
Movement 'Entrepreneurs for New Russia' (PNR)			PRES (?)		Konstantin Zatulin
Bloc 'New Centre' (?) (NTs)	RSDTs 'Smena'				Oleg Rumyantsev Pavel Voshchanov Alexander Politkovskiy
Russian Social-Democratic Centre (RSDTs)		GS SDPR NTs(?)			Oleg Rumyantsev
'New Generation (Smena)—New Policy' (former parliamentary faction)		GS NTs(?)			Andrey Golovin Igor Muravyev Sergey Polozkov
Party of Labour (PT)		GS, VST			Boris Kagarlitskiy
Committee 'Union for Fatherland'					Yuriy Skokov Nikolay Fedorov
International Movement of Democratic Reforms (MDDR)					I. Smirnov

Organization (Russian abbreviations in brackets)	Major participating parties	Participation in broader movements or blocs	Allies	Membership (various estimates, if available)	Key figures (leaders and/or candidates for the parliament)
Neo-communist and 'national-patriotic' opposition					
National Salvation Front (FNS)*	Most of the 'right-left' opposition (40+ parties and movements)				Ilya Konstantinov* Mikhail Astafyev*? Gennadiy Zyuganov Vladimir Isakov Sazhi Umalatoeva
'All-Russian Union of Labour' (VST)	SPT PT SVR				
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)*		FNS*		100 000 registered Estimates up to 500 000–600 000	Gennadiy Zyuganov Vladimir Kuptsov
Socialist Party of Working People (SPT)		FNS* VST		10 000	Roy Medvedev Anatoliy Denisov Lyudmila Vartazanova
Russian Communist Workers' Party (RKRK)*		FNS*		60 000–100 000 (own ests)	Viktor Anpilov*
Russian Party of Communists*		FNS*		5 000	Anatoliy Kryuchkov
Union of Communists		FNS*		5 000	A. Prigarin
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks				Up to 1 000	Nina Andreeva
United Front of Working People (OFT)*				Several dozens	
'Working Russia' Movement ('Working Moscow')*		FNS*		3 000	Viktor Anpilov* Albert Makashov*
Russian People's Assembly		FNS*			Nikolay Pavlov Ilya Konstantinov* Viktor Aksyuchits
Russian All-People's Union		FNS* (initially)		1 000	Sergey Baburin
Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RKhDD)		FNS*		1 500–15 000	Viktor Aksyuchits Yuriy Vlasov Valeriy Zorkin
Constitutional Democ. Party (KD)		FNS*		2 000	Mikhail Astafyev
Russian National Council ('Sobor') (RNS)*				Several hundreds	Alexander Sterligov Valentin Rasputin
Agrarian Party					Mikhail Lapshin
Party of Renaissance (PV)		FNS*		Several dozens	V. Skurlatov
Union of Russia's Renaissance (SVR)		FNS* VST			Dmitriy Rogozin
Right-wing extremists					
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)					Vladimir Zhirinovskiy
National Republican Party (NRP)					Nikolay Lysenko
Russian National Unity (RNE)*				Several hundreds	Alexander Barkashov
'Pamyat' Movement					Dmitriy Vasilyev
Russian Party				Several dozens	V. Korchagin Vladimir Miloserdov



The 89 'subjects' of the Russian Federation

TERRITORIAL SUB-DIVISIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Russia has an extremely cumbersome territorial composition. According to the constitution, it consists of 89 'subjects of the federation' including

- 32 ethno-national territories—21 Republics, 1 Autonomous Region and 10 Autonomous Districts—and
- 57 'pure' administrative entities—49 Regions or 'oblasti', 6 Territories or 'kraya' and 2 Federal Cities.

Ethno-national entities

Figures in brackets show percentage of the total population in 1989 represented by the ethnic group from which each territory derives its name.

Republics

(a) *North of the European part of Russia*

- | Autonomous Region | Autonomous Districts |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Karelia (10.0) | 23. Nenets (11.9) |
| 2. Komi (23.3) | 24. Komi-Permyak (60.2) |

(b) *Povolzhye (the Central Volga area)*

3. Mordovia (32.5)
4. Chuvashia (67.8)
5. Mariy El (43.3)
6. Tatarstan (48.5)
7. Udmurtia (30.9)
8. Bashkortostan (21.9)

(c) *North Caucasus and adjacent area*

9. Adygueya (22.1) ← ***
10. Karachaevo-Cherkessia (40.9) ← ***
11. Kabardino-Balkaria (57.6)
12. Northern Ossetia (53.0)
13. Ingushetia* (n.a.)
14. Chechnia** (70.7)
15. Dagestan (79.9)
16. Kalmykia (45.4)

(d) *South of the Asian part of Russia*

17. Gorniy Altay (31.0) ← ***
18. Khakassia (11.1) ← ***
19. Tuva (64.3)
20. Buryatia (24.0)
22. Yevreysk [Jewish] (4.2)

(e) *North of the Asian part of Russia*

21. Yakut-Sakha (33.4)
27. Yamalo-Nenets (4.2)
28. Khanty-Mansi (1.4)
29. Taymyr (13.2)
30. Evenki (14.0)
31. Chukotka (7.3)
32. Koryaki (16.5)

Administrative entities

Territories ('kraya') and Regions ('oblasti') are named after the capital city; in a few exceptional cases the capital city is mentioned in brackets.

(a) *Federal Cities*

33. Moscow
34. St Petersburg

(b) *Territories ('kraya') (numbers underlined on map)*

35. Krasnodar
36. Stavropol
37. Altay (Barnaul)
38. Krasnoyarsk
39. Khabarovsk
40. Primorskiy (Vladivostok)

(c) *Regions ('oblasti')*

41. Kaliningrad
42. Murmansk
43. Archangelsk
44. Leningrad (St Petersburg)
45. Pskov
46. Novgorod
47. Vologda
48. Smolensk
49. Kalinin
50. Yaroslavl
51. Bryansk
52. Kaluga
53. Moscow
54. Vladimir
55. Ivanovo
56. Kostroma
57. Kursk
58. Orel
59. Tula
60. Ryazan
61. Nizhniy Novgorod
62. Kirov
63. Belgorod
64. Voronezh
65. Lipetsk
66. Tambov
67. Penza
68. Rostov
69. Volgograd
70. Saratov
71. Ulyanovsk
72. Samara
73. Astrakhan
74. Orenburg
75. Perm
76. Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg)
77. Chelyabinsk
78. Kurgan
79. Tyumen
80. Omsk
81. Tomsk
82. Novosibirsk
83. Kemerovo
84. Irkutsk
85. Chita
86. Amur (Blagoveshchensk)
87. Magadan
88. Kamchatka (Petropavlovsk)
89. Sakhalin (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk)

Notes:

* The Ingush Republic was restored in 1992 and its territory delimited from that of North Ossetia and Chechnia.

** Chechnia declared full independence from Russia in 1991. Moscow appears to hope this position will change after the peaceful or forceful removal of Chechnian President Dznokhar Dudayev.

*** In 1991–92 these four former autonomous regions upgraded themselves to the status of republics.

CHALLENGES TO RUSSIAN STATE INTEGRITY

Control over resources

The constituent territories blame the central Government for preserving overwhelming control over material and financial assets. Having failed to convince Moscow of the urgent need for decentralization, the Regions and Republics are adopting regulations contradictory to federal law: in 1992 more than 200 000 formal protests were filed against illegal actions by local authorities. Territories are establishing property rights over natural resources (such as gold in Bashkortostan) and attempting to carry out independent foreign, economic and customs policies (Yakut-Sakha, Karelia and some Republics of the Volga area). The Regions with a developed industrial base are insisting that a much higher share of taxes should remain in their possession, and in 1993 a budget 'war' started: following the examples of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakut-Sakha and Chechnia, over 30 Regions have either refused to transfer tax revenues to Moscow or reduced what they do send to 35–40 per cent of the taxes the federal Government has budgeted for.

Sovereignty of the Republics

All the Republics of the Russian Federation have proclaimed sovereignty. Nine republican constitutions stipulate the primacy of local laws over all-Russian ones, one (Chechnia's) proclaims independence, one (Tatarstan's) claims the status of a state in association with Russia, and two (those of Bashkortostan and Tuva) claim the right to free secession. Tatarstan and Chechnia have refused to sign the Federal Treaty. The concept of the sovereignty of the constituent parts of the Federation could still represent a time-bomb threatening the integrity of the country and its ability to operate as a single entity.

Status of the Regions

The Federal Treaty defining the status of the constituent territories was signed on 31 March 1992 but remains a dead letter, and the issue is increasingly becoming a source of conflict.

The administrative entities ('oblasti' and 'kraya'), which do not have the status of states, but which do account for more than 75 per cent of the country's economic potential, are expressing increasing dissatisfaction with their inferior status compared to that of the Republics. Their demands for equal status are meeting strong resistance from the Republics, which are using the Federal Treaty in their defence and threatening to renounce it should they lose their sovereignty and national identity and be broken up among almost 100 administrative entities. The unequal status of the constituent territories has become one of the most difficult issues in the process of constitution-building in Russia.

The power struggle in Moscow has itself become a strong additional incentive for the constituent territories to seek greater autonomy and reduce dependence on Moscow. Some Regions are insisting that heads of administration be elected through direct local elections rather than appointed by the President; some (Vologda, Sverdlovsk/Yekaterinburg,

Chelyabinsk and the Primorskiy 'kray'/Vladivostok) have adopted their own 'constitutions' or intend to do so. The Chelyabinsk regional Soviet has voted for the unilateral proclamation of a South Ural Republic; the Soviet of the Primorskiy 'kray' is considering establishing a 'Primorskiy Republic'; and citizens of St Petersburg have voted in a referendum to give the city republican status. The issue is under discussion in the Archangelsk Region ('Pomorje Republic'), the Irkutsk Region ('South Siberian Republic'), the Rostov Region ('Don Republic') and a number of other Regions.

After disbanding the central Parliament, Yeltsin announced a number of steps to reduce the role of the regional Soviets and increase central control over local administrations. In many regions local elections will be held simultaneously with elections to the Parliament.

Regional alliances

In a number of areas the increasing desire of the Administrative Regions for closer economic links and dissatisfaction with Moscow's performance are taking on political forms actually or potentially opposed to the centre. Various multi-regional associations and alliances are being created, discussed and negotiated by local élites. The largest of these is the 'Siberian Accord', covering 14 Regions and 4 Autonomous Districts in the Asian part of Russia. Other potential multi-regional configurations include the 'East Siberian' or 'Angara-Yenisey' Republic consisting of two or three Regions, the 'Siberian Republic' (three to five Regions), the 'Ural Republic' (five Regions), and even the 'Central Russian Republic' (11 Regions). Though secession so far has not been raised as a possibility, those structures might present a strong challenge to the integrity of Russia.

Territorial and ethnic conflicts

From the Soviet past with its numerous changes of administrative borders and mass deportations, Russia has inherited a number of domestic territorial disputes and potential ethnic conflicts.

The most alarming developments have been in the northern Caucasus and the adjacent area, where over 30 potential conflicts can be identified. The war in and around Ingushetia (which created over 100 000 refugees who are still not able to return home) has been the most tragic manifestation of the problem. Inflammatory debates on territorial redistribution envisage the division or amalgamation of existing Republics or the establishment of new ones. Secessionism is stimulated by the existence of 'independent' Chechnia and by pan-Caucasian irredentism. The Russian-speaking populations are being quickly radicalized by the sense of threat and are pressuring the federal Government to take strong protective measures. Cossack movements, in some cases not only populist but also oriented to violence, are challenging local power institutions and insisting on establishing their own administrative entities.

Though less explosive, the potential for conflict exists in a number of other areas as well, especially in Povolzhye (the Central Volga area).

POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

The presidential elections are scheduled for 12 June 1994.

Boris Yeltsin, 62, President of the Russian Federation since June 1991.

Viktor Chernomyrdin, 55, Prime Minister since December 1992.

Yegor Gaidar, 37, First Deputy Prime Minister since September 1993. He held the position of acting Prime Minister in 1992.

Mikhail Gorbachev, 62, former President of the USSR, President of the International Foundation for Socio-economic and Political Studies (Gorbachev Foundation).

Boris Nemtsov, [36], Governor of Nizhniy Novgorod Region.

Sergey Shakhrai, 37, leader of the Party for Russian Unity, a close associate of Yeltsin in 1990–93. He has held a number of high governmental posts, including that of Deputy Prime Minister.

Yuriy Skokov, 55, former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, President of the Center of Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Studies and President of the Federation of Goods Producers.

Anatoliy Sobchak, 56, Mayor of St Petersburg.

Nikolay Travkin, 47, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) and Co-Chairman of Civic Union.

Arkadiy Volskiy, 61, President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) and Co-Chairman of Civic Union.

Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, 41, Head of the EPI Centre (Centre for Political and Economic Studies). He was Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union in 1990.

MILITARY FORCES AND COMMAND STRUCTURE OF RUSSIA

Command of the armed forces

- On 16 March 1992 the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation was created by a decree issued by President Yeltsin. The Ministry of Defence is the principal body responsible for the formulation and implementation of defence policy. It also provides direct centralized command and control over the armed forces.
- On 6 May 1992 Yeltsin issued a further presidential decree establishing national armed forces and installing himself as Commander-in-Chief. The new armed forces comprised all former Soviet troops and military installations on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as troops and naval forces under Russian jurisdiction stationed outside the republic. The strategic nuclear forces based in Russia remained under the 'unified' control of the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Russian President, in consultation with the heads of states of the three other CIS republics with strategic nuclear weapons based on their territories.
- The Russian armed forces include 630 000 officers, including 2085 generals.*


Force structure

There are five armed services under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation: Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defence Forces, Air Forces and Naval Forces. The first four services are often collectively referred to as the 'Army'. In addition, there are paramilitary units under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Security that are considered to be part of the armed forces.

A key challenge confronting Russian defence planners is to restore military cohesion and overcome the loss of important elements of the former Soviet armed forces. The breakup of the USSR has particularly disrupted integrated early-warning, air defence, and logistical-support systems. Russia has inherited a relatively high percentage of less combat-capable units: a large proportion of the high-readiness units equipped with the most advanced weapons remains outside the Russian Federation, although this situation is changing somewhat with the return of Russian units from Germany and other parts of Europe.

* Figures are for July 1993 and are given by Sergey Stepashin, then Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee of the Supreme Soviet. (*N.zavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 July 1993,

p. 3.) According to alternative estimates, the number of generals is currently 13 000, including 8100 within the Ministry of Defence (as compared with 6200 during the Soviet period). (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 13 Oct. 1993, p. 2.)



Military Forces and Command Structure

Forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Security are not shown.

Source: *RFE/RL Research Report*, 18 June 1993, p. 105.

Furthermore, Russian military planners have inherited a residual force structure oriented to the defence of the periphery of the whole territory of the former USSR. Some Russian forces are stationed on the territory of what are now independent states. They are also badly deployed with respect to the country's new geopolitical position and new regions of conflict. Few combat formations are stationed, for example, along the volatile southern rim of the Federation.

Current Defence Ministry plans call for far-reaching changes in the command structure of the Russian armed forces. Most fundamentally, the basis of the Soviet mobilization and military command structure, the Military District, is being discarded, since many of these districts now fall outside the territory of the Russian Federation or are no longer relevant to the country's post-Soviet security situation. The intention is to replace the old district system with one of geographically designated regional commands by the end of the 1990s. The process of forming such regional groupings, which are likely to integrate combined arms combat units, logistics troops, military transport aviation and air mobile forces, is already under way in the Russian Far East and the North Caucasus, the latter region having been assigned the

highest priority for deployments of new personnel and equipment.

In addition, in line with its new emphasis on mobile forces designed for fighting smaller conflicts in or near Russia's borders, the Ministry of Defence has announced plans to reorganize the present force structure by creating a Mobile Forces Command that will eventually consist of about 100 000 troops. This command will have two components—a Mobile Force and a Rapid Deployment Force. The remaining Ground Forces are to be converted from the present division/army force structure into a brigade/corps structure in order to increase the number of combat-ready units.

Force levels

The Russian armed forces' holdings of major conventional weapon systems (combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery) are limited to ceilings specified in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) signed by the Soviet Union in 1990. The reallocation of the Soviet allotment of CFE treaty-limited equipment (TLE) agreed between the successor states at Tashkent in May 1992 leaves Russia with the most powerful but not the dominant military forces among these states. The Russian

Major conventional weapon holdings of the Russian armed forces before and after CFE Treaty implementation in the ATTU^a zone of application

	Dec. 1992 ^b	Aug. 1995 ^c	% change
Tanks	7 993	6 400	- 19.9
Armoured combat vehicles	16 469	11 480	- 30.3
Artillery	7 003	6 415	- 8.4
Combat Aircraft	4 387	3 450	- 21.4
Helicopters	989	890	- 10.0
Totals	36 841	28 635	- 22.3

^a Atlantic to the Urals.

^b Reflects the declaration made by the Russian Federation on 15 Dec. 1992.

^c Represents the post-CFE national ceilings agreed to by the Russian Federation in the Joint Declaration signed at the CIS Tashkent summit meeting on 15 May 1992.

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1993.

Government has officially raised the issue of revising certain geographic sub-limits specified in the CFE Treaty to enable Russia to relocate forces to the southern regions of the Federation (e.g., the North Caucasus).

Under the terms of the CFE-1A Agreement on personnel strength signed by Russia in July 1992, the ceiling on manpower deployed by the Russian armed forces (excluding Naval Forces and Strategic Rocket Forces) west of the Urals is 1 450 000. The Defence Ministry plans to reduce the total size of the Russian armed forces to not more than 1 500 000 troops by 1 January 1995 in accordance with the 1992 Law on Defence, which states that no more than 1 per cent of the population may be serving in the armed forces by this date.

In part, the rapid reduction of military manpower levels reflects the serious personnel problems

Former Soviet/ Russian armed forces total active-duty personnel strength

Dec. 1988	4 258 000
Dec. 1989	3 993 500
Dec. 1990	3 758 500
May 1992	2 720 000
May 1993	1 751 000
Jan. 1995 (planned)	1 500 000

All personnel numbers are approximate. The 1988-90 numbers are for the total active armed forces of the former USSR. Paramilitary forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of the Interior and Security are not included.

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 1991; IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-93*; Mehuron, T. A., et al, 'Russian Military Almanac', *Air Force Magazine*, July 1993.

afflicting the Russian armed forces. Many skilled junior officers and NCOs have left the ranks because of poor pay and living conditions.

In addition, a considerable expansion of draft deferral eligibility and a striking increase in draft evasion have resulted in severe recruiting shortfalls. To compensate, the Russian Defence Ministry has begun a drive to recruit increasing numbers of contract or 'professional' servicemen: it envisages up to 30 per cent of the force being made up of contract soldiers 1994-95 and up to 50 per cent by the end of the decade.

Nuclear forces

Strategic nuclear forces on the territory of the Russian Federation: delivery systems by warhead, January 1993

Delivery system	Number of launchers	Number of warheads
<i>Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)</i>		
SS-18	204	2 040
SS-19	170	1 020
SS-24 silo-based	10	100
SS-24 rail mobile	36	360
SS-25	297	297
Sub-total	717	3 817
<i>Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)</i>		
SS-N-8	280	280
SS-N-18	224	672
SS-N-20	120	1 200
SS-N-23	112	448
Sub-total	736	2 600
<i>Bombers</i>		
Tu-95 Bear-H (16 weapons)	23	368
Tu-160 Blackjack	5	60
Sub-total	28	428
Totals	1 481	6 845

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 1993; Arms Control Association, *Arms Control Today*, May 1993, p. 29.

The nuclear stockpile of the Soviet Union at the time of its collapse in 1991 consisted of approximately 30 000 weapons, of which roughly two-thirds were tactical nuclear weapons. The transfer of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Eastern Europe and the non-Russian republics of the former USSR to central storage sites in Russia was completed during the first half of 1992. The Russian authorities intend to dismantle many, though not all, of these weapons.

There are approximately 6800 former Soviet strategic nuclear warheads deployed on various delivery systems based on the territory of the Russian Federation. The implementation of the 1991 START Treaty and the follow-up 1993

START II Treaty signed by Russia will reduce this number to no more than 3500 warheads by the year 2003.

CIS military arrangements

One of the principal motivations for establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was to provide a common security system on the territory of the former Soviet Union that would both preserve the Soviet armed forces intact and ensure continued central command over the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. In practice the CIS Joint Forces remained largely a paper organization.

Its effective functioning was hampered from the outset by lack of definition of operational and administrative lines of authority and by political disputes within the CIS over financing arrangements and the ownership of former Soviet military assets. Russia's desire to maintain the integrity of the former Soviet armed forces conflicted with the desire of several CIS member states, notably Ukraine, to escape what they perceived as Moscow's domination of the CIS military structure. Beginning with Ukraine in January 1992, all the CIS member states eventually subordinated the former Soviet 'non-strategic' forces remaining on their territory to the command of national defence authorities. Russia also came into conflict with the CIS High Command and other

CIS member states over its insistence that all strategic nuclear forces based outside Russian Federation territory be placed under the command of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Moscow also insisted on a broader definition of the strategic forces.

These disputes undermined the CIS Joint Forces as the focus of an integrated security system on the territory of the former USSR. The CIS High Command was formally abolished at a meeting of CIS defence ministers in Moscow in June 1993 and replaced by a 'Headquarters for the Co-ordination of Military Co-operation'. This body is to co-ordinate military planning with the defence ministries of the CIS member states.

Collective security forces

At a CIS summit meeting on 24 September 1993 in Moscow, the heads of state agreed to establish Collective Peace-keeping Forces, whose immediate task is to deploy 25 000 volunteer ground troops for peace-keeping duties in Tajikistan by mid-October 1993. The new joint forces will be made up of national formations, which will retain the military insignia and uniforms of their respective states. A joint supply and logistical support system is to be organized, and the forces will be financed according to quotas agreed at the summit meeting.

Withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe

State	Date of completion	No. of troops remaining
Czechoslovakia	25 June 1991	0
Hungary	17 June 1991	0
Poland	17 Sep. 1993	0
Germany	end of 1994	190 000 ^a
Estonia	no date set	4 000 ^b
Latvia	no date set	16 000 ^c
Lithuania	31 Aug. 1993	0

^a as of July 1993.

^b as of Oct. 1993.

^c as of Sep. 1993.

RUSSIA AND POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS

THE BALTIC AREA



By October 1993, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the only former Soviet republics determined not to join the CIS. Militarily, the 'loss' of the three Baltic states means that Russia's Baltic Sea Fleet is confined to the Kaliningrad area, in Baltiysk, and to Kronstadt just outside St Petersburg.

There are three areas of concern:

- **Withdrawal of Russian troops.** At the time of independence after the 1991 abortive coup attempt, Russia had an estimated 150 000 troops in the three Baltic states. The subsequent withdrawal of these troops from Estonia and Latvia has caused considerable controversy. The international community (the UN, the CSCE and the Nordic countries) has unequivocally supported complete withdrawal and the USA linked its aid package to Russia for 1994 to its continuing. Moscow also insists on social protection for the remaining military and points to the housing problems of the troops being withdrawn.

About 4000 Russian troops remain in Estonia as of October 1993: the number has been more than halved during 1993. Estonia wants complete withdrawal by the end of the year. In Latvia, about 16 000 Russian troops now remain. In Lithuania, troop withdrawal was completed by 31 August 1993, despite occasional suspensions initiated by Russia.

Russia is interested in keeping an option to use the naval base of Liepaya, the Skrunda ABM radar station and the Ventspils space monitoring station in Latvia.

- **Civil rights of the Russian-speaking populations.** Moscow is seriously concerned with the issue of 'civil rights' for Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia (respectively 40% and 48% of the population) since new legislation on citizenship in the two countries is consider-

ed to have discriminated against them. Russia is increasingly active in highlighting the issue of human rights violations in the Baltic states in the CSCE, the Council of Europe and the Baltic Co-operation Council. In Lithuania, citizenship was extended to all the Russian-speaking population in the country (20%), and the issue of its rights is much less sensitive for Moscow.

- **Territorial issues.** Estonia has a claim under the 1920 Yuryev (Tartu) Treaty to 2449 km² of Russian borderland territory. Latvia claims the Pytalovskiy district of Russia's Pskov region, an area of 1293.5 km². Both these areas are populated predominantly by Russians. Another potential source of conflict is the north-eastern area of Estonia (Narva and Sillamae) with a predominantly Russian population. A referendum held in 1993 on the suggestion of autonomous status for the area was condemned by the Estonian Government as illegal and threatening to the stability of the country.

The Kaliningrad Region, now an exclave of Russia, has acquired special strategic importance for Moscow because of its loss of military ports and facilities in the Baltic states; communications links and the concerns of neighbouring states over the concentration of military might there are also serious problems for Russia. The overall population in the Region being about 900 000, the strength of the armed forces, estimated at about 200 000 (Russian sources give half of this number), with some 600 tanks, 900 armoured combat vehicles and 700 artillery pieces, is considered definitely excessive. However, this is to a great extent related to the pullout of troops from Germany and Poland; numbers may in due course be reduced to about 60 000.

UKRAINE



The complex Russian-Ukrainian relationship continues to be overwhelmed by a common history, strong economic interdependence and the existence of a large Russian population in Ukraine.

Ukraine has 52 million inhabitants, including 11.4 million Russians (22%) mostly living in the eastern and southern parts of the country.

Among Russian-Ukrainian disagreements the following military and territorial issues have particular impact on the political and security relations between the two states:

Military issues

• *Control over nuclear weapons.* Russia's paramount concern is the status of the former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons based on the territory of Ukraine. Ukraine initially promised to dismantle these nuclear weapons and transfer them to Russia. However, they have come to be seen by Kiev as a 'security guarantee' against Russia's alleged coercion or blackmail. In turn, Russia is trying to use economic and trade leverage, including Ukrainian indebtedness and financial compensation issues as well as Russian supplies of oil and natural gas, to prompt Ukrainian compliance with its earlier nuclear-weapon commitments.

At independence Ukraine acquired 176 intercontinental missiles (ICBMs), armed with 1240 warheads, and 41 strategic bombers, with approximately 600 nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs. These remain under Russia's operational control. Developments concerning the nuclear issue:

- Russia and Ukraine agreed to allow Ukrainian monitoring of Russian dismantlement of withdrawn tactical nuclear weapons. Transfer to Russia of former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil was complete on 7 May 1992;
- In the Lisbon Protocol signed on 23 May 1992, Ukraine undertook to ratify START I and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in the 'shortest possible time';
- On 15 July 1993, Ukraine began dismantlement of 10 SS-19 missiles to be transported to Russia for destruction, with the 60 associated warheads stored in Ukraine under Russian control pending the Ukrainian Parliament's approval of their transfer to Russia;
- Ukraine's reluctance to return modern SS-24 missiles resulted in Russia annulling on 21 September 1993 the Russian-Ukrainian protocol of 3 September 1993;
- An accident in September 1993 in the Pervomaysk nuclear ammunition storage site in Ukraine increased Russian concerns over the safety of nuclear weapons under Ukrainian administrative control;
- On 19 October President Kravchuk asserted that all solid-fuel nuclear weapons (i.e., SS-24s) on Ukrainian soil are to be retained as the property of Ukraine.

• *The Black Sea Navy.* The long and sometimes sharp dispute over the Black Sea Fleet (70 000–100 000 men and over 350 ships) was settled by the Yeltsin–Kravchuk agreement in June 1993 to the effect that the fleet would remain under joint Russian–Ukrainian command for a three-year period and later be halved between Russia and Ukraine. On 3 September 1993, Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk were reported to have examined the possibility of selling the Ukrainian share of the Navy and leasing Sevastopol to Russia to help pay Ukraine's debts to Russia. The deal, however, caused great confusion and mutual recriminations as a result of divergent interpretations of the outcome of the summit.

Territorial issues

• *Crimea.* The Crimean peninsula is heavily populated by Russians (78%). Its territorial status constitutes a source of Russian–Ukrainian wrangling. It was also used by Yeltsin's opponents as an element in the domestic political campaign against the president. The Russian authorities have repeatedly claimed that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine is in-


valid and have suggested that the problem be jointly solved.

The Crimea was turned over to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev's decree of 5 February 1954 to mark the 300th anniversary of *Pereyaslav Rada's* approval of the incorporation of the Trans-Dnepr Ukraine into Russia in 1654.

The Russian Parliament's numerous decisions and votes on the Crimean question culminated in its support in May 1992 for the referendum on independence of the peninsula proposed by the Crimean authorities and a July 1993 resolution declaring Sevastopol to be an integral part of Russia. They were denounced by Yeltsin and the Russian Government

• Apart from the Crimea, other potential crises are liable to flare up in the predominantly Russian-populated areas of the Donbass and southern Ukraine.

MOLDOVA



• *Population.* The population of the former Soviet Republic of Moldova is 4 359 000. 65 per cent are Moldovans (ethnic Romanians), while over one-third of the population comprises not less than 96 minority groups, including 14 per cent Ukrainians and 13 per cent Russians. The country is mostly Romanian-speaking, though this has been substantially reduced by Russian influence over the past 50 years.

Armed conflict began in 1988 with the demand of the Gagauz minority (a Christian people of Turkish origin) to be attached to the Russian Federation to ensure national survival.

• *The Trans-Dniester region* had the status of Moldavian Autonomous Republic within Ukraine until 1940, when it was reunited with Bessarabia, ceded to the USSR by Romania. The region declared independence from Moldova opposing the initially declared intention of the new Kishinev Government to reunite with Romania. In the Trans-Dniester region over 53 per cent of the population of some 780 000 are Ukrainians (28.3%) and Russians (25.4%); the ethnic Moldovans represent 40 per cent. The political activism of the separatist movement is based on fears of Moldovan unification with Romania, however, rather than on nationalist feelings. Armed clashes between Moldovan Government forces and Trans-Dniester forces intensified during the spring and summer of 1992.

• *Russian troops.* From the 30 000 Soviet troops originally stationed in Moldova, the present strength of the 14th Army is about 6000 (less than a standard mechanized division). Five Russian battalions each of 1800 soldiers joined the Trilateral Peace Enforcement Forces (made up of Moldovans, Russians and Trans-Dniestrians), designed to act as a peace-keeping force in the region.

Troop withdrawal is the most controversial aspect of Russian–Moldovan relations and is under negotiation between the two governments. Moscow's reluctance to withdraw stems partly from domestic pressures in Russia to retain an instrument of political pressure and the possibility for military intervention to protect the Russian-speaking population. It is also unclear how an army composed mainly of local inhabitants can be withdrawn.

• *CSCE efforts.* The personal representative of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office and the CSCE long-duration mission to Moldova initiated consultations with all the interested parties with the aim of stopping the war and reaching a peaceful solution.

THE CAUCASUS

The Caucasus is an ethnically diverse area populated by some 70 distinct nations and ethnic groups. It has emerged as a volatile and conflict-prone area and the scene of some of the heaviest fighting on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Armenia and Azerbaijan are locked in a war over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh; armed clashes have also extended to the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan along the border with Turkey. Georgia is torn by civil strife as the government of President Eduard Shevardnadze confronts both a serious military challenge from separatists in the western Georgian republic of Abkhazia and an armed rebellion staged by supporters of the deposed Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

The fierce fighting taking place between and within these three newly independent republics along the southern border of the Russian Federation has directly involved the formally neutral Russian military forces stationed there. Russian involvement in the region has been motivated by many factors, including concerns about the implications for the Russian Federation of the disintegration of neighbouring states, geostrategic considerations (eg, preservation of access to the Black Sea), and broader considerations of Russia's future role on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Major international armed conflicts

- **Georgia: South Ossetia.** There are about 65 000 Ossetians residing in their titular autonomous territory in Georgia. They comprise about 11 per cent of the territory's population.

The autonomous status of South Ossetia was abolished by Gamsakhurdia in the autumn of 1991. Ossetian separatists, demanding that South Ossetia be allowed to unite with North Ossetia, and thus leave Georgia to join the Russian Federation, sparked an armed revolt against the Georgian Government in the spring of 1992; tens of thousands of refugees were forced to flee across the border to North Ossetia in the Russian Federation.

As fighting intensified, direct negotiations between Presidents Yeltsin and Shevardnadze led to a military cease-fire agreement being reached on 24 June 1992. A peace-keeping force comprised of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian troops was deployed successfully the following month under the supervision of a tripartite commission.

- **Georgia: Abkhazia.** About 100 000 ethnic Abkhazians reside in the Georgian autonomous territory of Abkhazia, making up some 17 per cent of the territory's population.

Abkhaz separatists issued a declaration of autonomy on 23 July 1992, prompting the Georgian Government to introduce troops into Abkhazia the following month. The situation in the region deteriorated markedly in early July 1993 when combined Abkhaz and North Caucasian forces launched a new offensive—reportedly with logistical assistance from conservatives in the Russian

army—to capture the Georgian-held Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi. Intensive Russian mediation efforts resulted in the signing of a cease-fire accord on 27 July 1993, under the terms of which a cease-fire monitored by a tripartite Russian–Georgian–Abkhaz commission would be followed by the withdrawal of opposing troops from the combat zone.

The resumption of the Abkhaz offensive against Sukhumi on 16 September 1993 culminated in the badly organized Georgian defenders being pushed out of the city. Shevardnadze criticized Russia fiercely for its lack of neutrality and unwillingness to guarantee a cease-fire agreement to end the fighting. The Russian Government officially condemned the attack and imposed broad economic sanctions against Abkhazia, including a cut-off of electricity supplies from Russian power plants.

Under the pressure of his Government's battlefield defeat in Abkhazia, coupled with the renewal of the armed rebellion staged by Gamsakhurdia loyalists, Shevardnadze has attempted to enlist decisive Russian support. On 9 October 1993 Russia signed a military co-operation agreement with Georgia, which the previous day had opted to join the CIS.

Responding to an urgent appeal for assistance issued by Shevardnadze on 18 October 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev both ruled out direct Russian intervention in the intensifying civil war in Georgia. They did promise to consider joint Russian action with other states in the region to protect Georgia's principal supply routes.

- **Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh.** Separatist grievances in the largely Armenian-populated enclave, transferred in the 1920s to the administrative control of the surrounding the Azerbaijan SSR, erupted into violence in 1988. The collapse of the former Soviet Union at the end of 1991 transformed the bitter domestic dispute into a large-scale war between Armenian and Azeri forces.

Against the background of mounting battlefield defeats at the hands of Armenian Karabakh militiamen, a coup staged in Baku on 4 June 1993 returned former Azerbaijani KGB head and Communist Party leader Geidar Aliyev to the top post in the republic; the coup toppled the year-old anti-Russian Azerbaijani Popular Front government, led by Ebulfaz Elchibey.

Russian-mediated talks held in Moscow in mid-September 1993 between representatives of Azerbaijan and the Karabakh authorities resulted in an agreement to extend a temporary cease-fire in southwestern Azerbaijan. On 8 October 1993, the new Azerbaijani regime signalled its intention to rejoin the CIS, from which the Azerbaijani National Assembly had voted to withdraw in October 1992. On the same day the growing role of Russia was highlighted by a meeting of the heads of state of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with President Yeltsin in Moscow to discuss the worsening strife in the Caucasus.



In June 1992 the Russian Parliament approved legislation making Ingushetia, formerly part of the Chechno-Ingushetian Autonomous Republic, a new republic within the Russian Federation.

• Russian armed forces in the Caucasus

In May 1992 Russia agreed to transfer partially the military equipment of the now-dissolved Transcaucasian Military District to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 'on the basis of parity', and commenced the withdrawal of the 7th Army from Armenia and the 4th Army from Azerbaijan. Under the terms of Russia's 9 October 1993 military co-operation agreement with Georgia, Russian garrisons will remain in Tbilisi, Batumi and Alkhalaki; Russia will rent the naval base at Poti and several airfields.

Transcaucasus Group of Forces:

Deployment of Russian ground forces personnel, by republic

Deployment	June 1992	June 1993
Armenia	23 000	5 000
Azerbaijan	62 000	0
Georgia	20 000	20 000

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1992-93; 1993-94.

Russia and the North Caucasus

The North Caucasus of the Russian Federation consists of a complex patchwork of seven autonomous republics with titular non-Russian nationalities: Adygei; Chechnia; Dagestan; Ingushetia; Kabardino-Balkaria; Karachai-Circassia; and North Ossetia. Ethnic Russians remain the largest single group in the North Caucasus as a whole, although the proportion of Russians in the national republics of the region has been declining since the 1960s.

During the years of Soviet rule, the political-administrative boundaries in the North Caucasus were repeatedly revised. In these changes, little attention was paid to the existing distribution of linguistic and cultural communities in the region. The result has been an accumulated legacy of border disputes and territorial grievances and deprivations that poses a challenge to the integrity of the Russian Federation of a complexity that defies easy solution.

The most serious of these conflicts fall into two broad categories:

- Local demands for greater autonomy from the centre;
- Unsettled borders and conflicting territorial claims between constituent ethnic groups.

In addition, there are numerous other ethnic and territorial disputes in the North Caucasus related to wider developments in the Caucasus, thereby affecting interstate relations between Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Caucasus

Current or potential scenarios of conflict

North Caucasus and adjacent areas:

- Creation (restoration) of the Kabardinian Republic
- Creation of a Kabardino-Circassian Republic
- Creation of a Karachai-Balkarian Republic
- Creation (restoration) of a Cossack republic on the territory of the former Kuban *oblast*
- Creation (restoration) of the autonomous Circassian Republic
- Creation (restoration) of the autonomous Karachai Republic
- Creation of an Abazin Republic and its secession from Karachai-Circassia
- Creation of a Zelenchukso-Urupsky territorial Cossack district and its transfer from Karachai-Circassia to the Stavropol or Krasnodar region
- Transfer of coastal areas of Krasnodar *kray* to Adygei
- Transfer of part of North Ossetia with the town of Mozdok to Kabardino-Balkaria
- Transfer of the Prigorodniy district from North Ossetia to Ingushetia
- Repatriation of Ingushes in the suburban district of North Ossetia
- Creation of a Cossack autonomous area in the Sunzhensky district in Chechnia
- Deportation and flight of Cossacks from Sunzhensky district of Chechnia
- Creation of a united Cherkessia to include Circassia, Kabarda, Adygei and coastal districts of the Krasnodar region
- Creation (restoration) of a Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic to include Chechnia Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabarda and Circassia
- Creation of a Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of Caucasia, embracing popular groups throughout the Caucasus, and its secession from Russia and Georgia
- Creation (restoration) of a Cossack republic on the territory of the former Terek *oblast*
- Creation of a Nogaisko-Terskaya Cossack autonomous *oblast*
- Creation of a Nogay Republic in eastern districts of the Stavropol *kray* and northern Dagestan
- Creation of a Kumyk Republic (within Russia) in the central part of the Dagestan lowlands
- Creation of an Avar Republic in the central and western parts of mountainous Dagestan
- Creation of a Darghin Republic in the eastern part of mountainous Dagestan

- Changing the status of Dagestan to that of a federative republic
- Creation of a republic of Lezghistan in the borderlands of Dagestan and Azerbaijan as part of the Russian Federation or as an independent state
- Return of Chechen-Akkins to western Dagestan
- Transfer of the western part of the Volga delta to Kalmykia

Armenia and Azerbaijan:

- Secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, its transfer to Armenia or its direct control by the Russian Federation or its inclusion in the Russian Federation as a Republic
- Creation of an autonomous (independent) Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to include the former Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous *oblast* and the abolished Shaumyanovsky district of Azerbaijan
- Deportation and flight of Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh and north-eastern border districts of Armenia
- Restoration of the Shaumyanovsky district of Azerbaijan
- Creation of a Talysh autonomous territory in Azerbaijan
- Creation (restoration) of a Kurdish autonomous area in Azerbaijan
- Deportation and flight of Armenians from western border districts of Azerbaijan

Georgia and adjacent republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia):

- Secession of Abkhazia from Georgia
- Deportation and flight of Ossetians from Georgia
- Secession of South Ossetia from Georgia, re-unification of South Ossetia and North Ossetia, inclusion of a united Ossetia in Russia or its establishment as an independent state
- Abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Republic
- Abolition of the Adzhar Autonomous Republic
- Transfer of the southern part of Greater Sochi to Georgia
- Transfer of a Dzhavakhetia from Georgia to Armenia
- Return of deported Avars to Georgia
- Return of Meskhetian Turks to their historical homeland in Georgia

Source: Kolossov, V. A., *Ethno-Territorial Conflicts and Boundaries in the Former Soviet Union*, Territory Briefing 2, International Boundaries Research Unit (University of Durham Durham: 1992)

TAJIKISTAN



Russia is deeply involved in Tajikistan's civil war. Moscow's concerns focus on four major issues.

- **Islamic fundamentalism.** After initial hesitation, Moscow came to perceive the 'democratic-Islamic' coalition in power in Tajikistan (May–November 1992) as both undermining domestic stability and pushing the country towards fundamentalism—a perception to which the 'old *nomenklatura* regimes' of the other Central Asian states substantially contributed. Numerous reports indicate that Russia indirectly and directly participated in bringing to power the current neo-communist and anti-democratic Tajik regime. The latter is under pressure from Moscow (although without visible results) to refrain from repression and to enter into contact with the opposition. In the event of a large-scale guerrilla war against the current political leadership of the country, Russia risks increasing involvement and a scenario resembling that in Afghanistan.
- **The Russian population** totals 300 000 and feels increasingly insecure. The 201st motor-rifle division of the Russian armed forces deployed in Tajikistan is regarded as a symbolic guarantee of their safety.
- **Protection of the borders.** The Tajik national army and border troops are practically non-existent, and all control over the frontier with Afghanistan is carried out by Russian military personnel. As the number of refugees fleeing to Afghanistan because

of the atrocities under the new regime in Dushanbe is extremely high—over 100 000 according to some estimates—illegal transfers at the frontier will continue to threaten the Russian border guards: about 70 have been killed or wounded in 1993. Since an attack against the Russian frontier post in June 1993, which resulted in several fatalities, retaliatory and preventive shelling of the Mujahideen positions in adjacent Afghani areas has become common, complicating relations with Kabul. Moscow argues that the 'external' CIS border has to be defended by all available means; otherwise, because of the transparency of the 'internal' CIS frontiers, Russia would have to close its southern border (with Kazakhstan) and organize border control in the southern Urals and Siberia. Russia has succeeded in having this approach endorsed by the other CIS states: though they seem reluctant to share costs or to send their own troops, a decision to set up 'collective peace-keeping forces' of 25 000 troops was reached on 24 September 1993, the 201st division being a Russian contribution.

- **Strategic considerations.** Russia's concerns may also arise from possible longer-term changes in the geopolitical balance in the area. A continuing Russian presence is considered an important factor in counterbalancing the growing role of other international actors in Central Asia.

RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

CHRONOLOGY

- 12 Jan. 1992* Russia declares officially that it continues to exercise the former Soviet Union's rights and discharge its obligations under international treaties. Russia also takes over the Soviet Union's membership of the UN, the CSCE and NACC.
- 4 Mar. 1992* Russia signs the Vienna CSBM Document 1992.
- 6 Mar. 1992* In response to the UN Secretary-General's request, Russia agrees to send a 900-man airborne peace-keeping force to former Yugoslavia.
- 24 Mar. 1992* Russia signs the Open Skies Treaty in Helsinki.
- 15 May 1992* An Agreement on principles and procedures of 1990 CFE Treaty implementation is signed in Tashkent by Russia and seven other CIS states. Similarly an agreement on chemical weapons is signed by Russia and eight other CIS states reaffirming the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
- 18–28 May 1992* Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev goes on a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia to broker a peace settlement for the region.
- 23 May 1992* Russia, the other nuclear weapon successor states of the Soviet Union and the USA sign the Lisbon Protocol to facilitate implementation of START I.
- 26 May 1992* President Boris Yeltsin and President Lech Walesa of Poland sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Polish territory by the end of 1993.
- 30 May 1992* In a shift in its policy towards Yugoslavia, Russia votes in the UN Security Council to support sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.
- 5 June 1992* The Oslo Final Document of the Extraordinary Committee of the Parties to the CFE Treaty is signed by Russia and other CFE signatory states, making the former Soviet republics with territories within the area from the Atlantic to the Urals (the ATTU zone) parties to the CFE Treaty.
- 16–17 June 1992* In Washington President Yeltsin and President George Bush sign
- the Joint Understanding on further reductions in strategic offensive arms (the DeMIRVing Agreement),
 - the Weapons Destruction and Non-proliferation Agreement, and
 - the Joint US–Russian Statement on co-operation in a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) against ballistic missiles and on the prohibition of chemical weapons.
- 8 July 1992* The Russian Parliament ratifies the CFE Treaty.
- 9–10 July 1992* Russia and the other CSCE states sign the Helsinki Document 1992. On 10 July, the Concluding Act of the negotiation on personnel strength of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement) is signed by Russia and the other states with territories within the ATTU zone.
- 10 July 1992* Russia joins CSCE states in condemning Serbia for the 'bloody conflict' in former Yugoslavia and votes in support of the latter's suspension from the CSCE.
- 14 July 1992* Russia and the USA agree to explore the potential for a joint early-warning centre and co-operation in developing ballistic missile defence capabilities.
- 30 July 1992* The Russian–US agreement concerning the destruction of chemical weapons is signed. Under its terms, the USA undertakes to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons at no cost.
- 8 Sep. 1992* Russia and Lithuania reach agreement on withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian soil by 31 August 1993.

- 19 Oct. 1992 Russia extends its moratorium on nuclear tests until 1 July 1993.
- 28 Oct. 1992 The last Russian combat unit leaves Polish territory.
- 29 Oct. 1992 President Yeltsin signs a directive suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from all three Baltic states, linking the decision to the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in the region. (On 29 March 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev reaffirms this decision.) The pullout nevertheless continues at a slow rate.
- 4 Nov. 1992 The Russian Parliament ratifies START I, stipulating however that the exchange of the instruments of ratification will be postponed until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and agreed on how to implement the Treaty.
- 3 Jan. 1993 Russia signs START II.
- 13–15 Jan. 1993 Russia signs the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris.
- 23 Feb. 1993 Russia makes an 8-point proposal to solve the Balkan crisis, calling for a halt to all fighting, the adoption of the Vance-Owen plan, the lifting of sanctions against Serbia and support for the establishment of multinational UN-sponsored forces. Moscow suggests that it would consider sending a contingent to support the forces and agree to the use of NATO to support the operation.
- 28 Feb. 1993 Yeltsin suggests that the UN grant Russia special powers for keeping the peace in the territory of the former Soviet Union.
- 2 Mar. 1993 Russia declares its willingness to assist in airdrops of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided the safety of flights is guaranteed.
- 19 Apr. 1993 At the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) meeting Russia raises an idea, floated in early March, of changing the terms of the CFE Treaty and relocating weapons in the Caucasus region in order to maintain stability and contain conflicts on its southern borders. The concept is strongly opposed by all other CFE parties.
- 10 June 1993 In talks with US Defence Secretary Les Aspin, Defence Minister Grachev reiterates Russia's desire to change the CFE flanks limits. This meets with resistance from the US and NATO.
- 18 Aug. 1993 Russia suspends the withdrawal of its troops from Lithuania.
- 23 Aug. 1993 Kozyrev warns East Central European states against a drive for NATO membership and the creation of a 'little entente', which could 'result in the potential danger of isolating Russia'.
- 24 Aug. 1993 A Joint Polish-Russian declaration, signed by Yeltsin and Walesa, states that 'Poland's intention to join NATO . . . does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia'. However on 31 August the Russian Foreign Ministry states that Russia would prefer the creation of a pan-European space to 'increasing isolated blocs'. On 30 September, amid crisis in Moscow, Yeltsin sends a letter to major NATO countries warning against an expansion of NATO and proposing other joint arrangements for safeguarding the security of Eastern Europe.
- 31 Aug. 1993 Russian troops leave Lithuania.
- 17 Sep. 1993 The last Russian troops are withdrawn from Poland.
- mid- to end Sep. 1993 Both in Yeltsin's letters to some NATO states and at a JCG meeting, Russia officially raises the issue of changing CFE limits in order to reinforce its borders in the Caucasus region.
- 12 Oct. 1993 During his first visit to Japan, Yeltsin acknowledges that the problem of the Kurile Islands 'exists and must be solved in a definite manner', promising to honour all bilateral agreements signed by Japan and the Soviet Union.

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES

On the territory of the former Soviet Union

Location	Force composition	Russian presence
Georgia/ South Ossetia	Russia; Georgia; South Ossetia	1 infantry battalion
Moldova/Dniester	Russia; Moldova; 'Trans-Dniestria'	6 airborne battalion ^a
Tajikistan	Russia ^b	1 Motorized Rifle Division

^a Five and one reserve battalion.

^b Russia has assigned the reinforced 201st Motorized Rifle Division already in Tajikistan and other units to participate in the 25 000-strong Collective Peace-keeping Forces scheduled to be deployed there beginning in mid-October; the other participating CIS member states are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

UN Missions

Location	Force	Russian presence
Cambodia	UNTAC	54 observers
Croatia	UNPROFOR	1 airborne battalion, 12 observers
Middle East	UNTSO	33 observers
Western Sahara	MINURSO	26 observers
Iraq/Kuwait	UNIKOM	14 observers
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	20 observers

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 1993; IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1993-94.

sipri

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Pipers väg 28
170 73 SOLNA

Telephone: (08) 655 97 00
Telefax: (08) 655 97 33