

## Post-Cold War Security in and for Europe

### • From Vancouver to Vladivostok

The end of the cold war opened a period of promising but complex and difficult processes. The resultant transformations have entirely changed the landscape of European security. Along with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the bipolar system collapsed. Meanwhile, the Berlin Wall was demolished and Germany unified. The nations that once comprised Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union proclaimed their independence, and many new states appeared on the European scene. Russian troops are leaving Germany and have left a number of other Central and East European (CEE) states. The US military presence in Europe and the foreign deployments of other NATO states have also been significantly reduced.

The arms control agreements that have been achieved were inconceivable even a few years ago. Entire classes of weapons are being removed from the armies, under international supervision, and destroyed. New strategic assumptions are changing military structures and doctrines and effecting a profound transformation in the NATO North Atlantic alliance. Long-sought reductions in military manpower and equipment are being accompanied—although to a lesser degree than might be expected—by reductions in military expenditures.

The 20-year Helsinki process for managing European security and co-operation now covers the Northern Hemisphere—the European continent, North America and most of Asia—the area ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’.

While the achievements of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in human rights are well known, its essential role in arms control and disarmament is not always fully appreciated. The CSCE set the framework and created a unique code of behaviour for states in the process of peaceful change. The summit meetings in Paris (held on 19–21 November 1990) and Helsinki (9–10 July 1992) marked the successive stages of that process. A number of new CSCE institutions were established. In September 1992, the Forum for Security Co-operation opened in Vienna.

### Facts and figures:

#### • From Vancouver to Vladivostok

#### • New states, new conflicts

#### • Military changes

##### Nuclear weaponry

##### Conventional weaponry in Europe

#### • Arms production and exports in Europe

#### • Military expenditure in Europe

#### • Military activities

#### • Soviet/Russian troop withdrawals

#### • Treaty commitments


#### • Arms control commitments

#### • The CSCE: How to manage peaceful change in Europe

The CSCE, like many other institutions, was set up and designed to operate under the conditions of the cold war. These structures and institutions were not prepared to cope with the post-cold war situations, particularly the conflicts wracking Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Now newly urgent hopes and expectations have been pinned on the Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers (14–15 December 1992). Decisions taken there are expected to make CSCE actions and institutions more effective. The time is ripe to move from declarations and institution-building to deeds—to preventing conflicts and peacefully settling crisis situations.

SIPRI has assembled the information and data presented in this fact sheet to facilitate an understanding of the essential changes that have already taken place as well as the new challenges facing Europe and the states participating in the CSCE.

# Vancouver to Vladivostok—a new security zone



**1990:**  
 Germany unifies

**1991:**  
 The Soviet Union breaks up into its constituent republics

**1991/92:**  
 New states emerge from Yugoslavia

**1993:**  
 Czechoslovakia becomes the Czech Republic and Slovakia

## • New states, new conflicts

**The Russian Federation.** The USSR dissolved itself without warfare, from its former 15 constituent republics into new states. However, the Russian Federation is inhabited by over 100 major different nationalities in addition to the ethnic Russian population, grouped together in 20 republics. Historical deprivations and grievances, territorial and border conflicts and economic conditions present a challenge to the Russian Government on a scale that defies easy solution.



**The Caucasus.** By 1992, the Caucasus region had become the most conflict-ridden area in the former USSR. The three independent former Soviet republics in Transcaucasia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, found themselves at war.

**Nagorno-Karabakh.** The war over Karabakh, which wants to be attached to Armenia instead of to Azerbaijan, has since 1988 resulted in several thousand dead and large numbers of refugees in both directions. In February 1992 both Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed with Russia, acting as a mediator, to consider turning to both the United Nations and the CSCE for help. Third parties such as Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkey also became involved as mediators during 1992.


**Nakhichevan.** In 1992, the Azerbaijani area of Nakhichevan, bordering on Turkey, also became involved in armed clashes with Armenian forces.

**Georgia,** also a new multi-national state, in 1992 quelled a rebellion in South Ossetia and later during

the year a rebellion in Abkhazia, which wanted to move out of Georgian jurisdiction and into the Russian Federation. A volunteer force from the Northern Caucasus fought alongside the Abkhazian rebel forces.

**The Northern Caucasus.** This region, made up of small republics belonging to the Russian Federation, saw increasing armed clashes between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, threatening to involve also the rebellious and well-armed mountain republic of Chechnia which 'left' the USSR in November 1991 and declines Russian rule. Inspired by Chechnia, the 'Federation of Mountain Peoples', existing for a short period in the 1920s, was recreated at the end of 1991 and has set up armed volunteer forces. In November 1992 Russia dispatched troops to Northern Caucasus. The issue of the unsettled borders of the Ingush Republic resulted in an outbreak of violence in November 1992, followed by the declaration of a state of emergency in the region and the introduction of Russian troops.

**Moldova.** The former Soviet republic of Moldova has been torn apart by intra-republican armed conflicts ever since the rebellion of the Gagauz minority in 1988. The Trans-Dniester region, inhabited by Ukrainians, Russians and Moldovians (of Romanian origin), declared independence from Moldova, opposing the initially declared intention of the new Moldovan Government to reunite with Romania from which the area, formerly known as Bess-Arabia, was ceded to the USSR in 1940. Armed clashes between Moldovan Government forces and Trans-Dniester forces intensified during the spring of 1992. The withdrawal of the former Soviet 14th Army (now Russian) stationed in the Trans-Dniester region is the subject of negotiation between the Moldovan and Russian governments. The CSCE initiated consultations with all the interested parties with the aim of stopping the war and reaching a peaceful solution.




**Tajikistan.** Civil war erupted in September 1992, due to the ousting of the president, denounced as representing the former communist regime. Former Soviet (now Russian) troops stationed on the Afghani border found themselves trapped between two armed forces. Russia has declared itself strictly neutral and has undertaken a negotiating effort. The war has escalated and led to heavy casualties. In mid-November 1992, Russia achieved a mandate from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to proceed with its mediating effort, possibly also to enable the use of the Russian troops as a peace-keeping force. A delegation from the Supreme Soviet of Russia will visit Tajikistan as a peace-keeping mission to organize aid for refugees and other humanitarian aid. The Russian Supreme Soviet will also have to legislate to specify the status of the Russian troops if they are to play a new role as a peace-keeping force in the CIS territories.

## • Military changes

### *Nuclear weaponry*

With the Joint US–Russian Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms of 17 June 1992 (the so-called De-MIRVing Agreement), Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin have taken steps to drastically reduce strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to no more than 3000–3500 nuclear warheads. This agreement aims to eliminate all multiple-warhead, land-based strategic missiles, long regarded as the most destabilizing systems in the US and Russian arsenals. The agreement constitutes the most ambitious attempt to date to restructure the nuclear balance and should enhance strategic stability. It reduces threats of pre-emptive attack and drastically curtails nuclear war-fighting options. In June 1992 the intention was to have the agreement ready in treaty format within 3 months but delays, especially to do with the future of the former Soviet arsenal, have been encountered.

### Past and projected strategic nuclear forces



Source: *Arms Control Today*, vol. 22, no. 6 (July/Aug. 1992), p. 35.

*Comments:* The De-MIRVing Agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin of 17 June 1992, if translated into treaty language, then signed, ratified and implemented, would reduce by the year 2003 US strategic nuclear forces by 72 per cent (based on 1990 strategic nuclear force holdings) and reduce Russian strategic nuclear forces by some 73 per cent (based on 1990 strategic nuclear force holdings by the Soviet Union). With regard to the 1991 START Treaty, these new reduction proposals would constitute a 59 per cent reduction of forces permitted under START for the United States and a 51 per cent reduction for Russia.

### US and Soviet/Russian strategic forces: warheads by weapon system, 1992 and projected force levels

Weapon system	START Treaty	De-MIRVing Agreement 17 June 1992	Weapon system	START Treaty	De-MIRVing Agreement 17 June 1992
<b>US strategic forces</b>			<b>Soviet/Russian strategic forces</b>		
<i>ICBMs</i>			<i>ICBMs</i>		
MX/Peacekeeper	500	0	SS-18	1 540	0
Minuteman	900 <sup>a</sup>	500	SS-24 silo	560	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 400</b>	<b>500</b>	SS-24 rail	360	0
<i>SLBMs</i>			<i>SLBMs</i>		
Trident I (C-4)	1 536	768	SS-25	693	504
Trident II (D-5)	1 920	960	<b>Total</b>	<b>3 153</b>	<b>504</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 456</b>	<b>1 728</b>	<i>SLBMs</i>		
<i>Bombers</i>			<i>Bombers</i>		
B-1B	1 520	0	SS-N-18	576	576
B-2	320	272	SS-N-20	720	720
B-52H	1 860	1 000	SS-N-23	448	448
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 700</b>	<b>1 272</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>1 744</b>	<b>1 744</b>
<b>Totals</b>			<i>Bombers</i>		
			Bear-H (6)	162	0
			Bear-H (16)	912	752
			Blackjack	192	0
			<b>Total</b>	<b>1 266</b>	<b>752</b>
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>6 163</b>	<b>3 000</b>

<sup>a</sup> This table assumes that under the START Treaty, 300 Minuteman III ICBMs will be 'downloaded' to one warhead each.

Source: Adapted from *Arms Control Today*, vol. 22, no. 6 (July/Aug. 1992), p. 36.

Comment: The table assumes certain force structure and deployment decisions which are outstanding. The figures represent one possible option.

### Strategic nuclear forces in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, 1992

State	ICBMs	Warheads	Bombers
Belarus	72	72	—
Kazakhstan	104	1 040	40
Russia	1 064	4 278	101
	SLBMs: 940	2 804	
	SSBNs: 69		
Ukraine	176	1240	20

Sources: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992), figure 14.1, p. 535; IISS, *The Military Balance 1992–1993* (Brassey's: London, 1992).

### **French and British nuclear weapon buildups**

French and British nuclear weapon modernization programmes are proceeding apace. As a result, the total number of West European nuclear weapons will increase by nearly 50% over the next five years. The main source of these increases is the MIRVing of the submarine forces, a step being completed at precisely the historic moment that the superpowers have agreed to de-MIRV their strategic missiles.

#### **Current and planned French and British nuclear weapon stockpiles**

	Current stockpile, 1992		Planned stockpile, 1998	
	Launchers	Warheads	Launchers	Warheads
<b>France</b>				
Land-based aircraft	63	63	63	63
Sea-based aircraft	20	20	20	20
Land-based missiles <sup>a</sup>	77	118	33	48
Sea-based missiles	80	400	80	480
<b>Total</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>601</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>611</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>				
Aircraft <sup>b</sup>	148	175	148	175
Sea-based missiles	64	100	64	512
<b>Total</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>687</b>
<b>Total French and British</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>876</b>	<b>408</b>	<b>1 298</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes 15 Hadès short-range missile launchers and 30 missiles, produced since 1991 and put in storage.

<sup>b</sup> Does not include an estimated 25 WE-177C naval depth-strike bombs, consigned to storage in 1991.

#### **Trends in French and British strategic nuclear warhead deployments**

	1955	-60	-65	-70	-75	-80	-85	-86	-87	-88	-89	-90	-91	-92
France	..	..	32	36	102	130	222	218	298	292	372	452	436	488
UK	..	105	199	144	144	144	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 1991 and SIPRI Yearbook 1992.

**Conventional weaponry in Europe****National weapon holdings of countries party to the CFE Treaty:  
Before the CFE Treaty and after Treaty implementation**

Country	Tanks		ACVs		Artillery		Aircraft		Helicopters	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
<b>The 16 NATO countries</b>										
Belgium	359	334	1 381	1 099	376	320	191	232	0	46
Canada	77	77	277	277	38	38	45	90	12	13
Denmark	419	353	316	316	553	553	106	106	3	12
France	1 343	1 306	4 177	3 820	1 360	1 292	699	800	418	352
Germany	4 726	4 166	3 103	3 446	2 462	2 705	626	900	206	306
Greece	1 879	1 735	1 641	2 534	1 908	1 878	469	650	0	18
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	1 246	1 348	3 958	3 339	2 144	1 955	577	650	168	142
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	913	743	1 467	1 080	837	607	196	230	91	69
Norway	205	170	146	225	531	527	90	100	0	0
Portugal	146	300	244	430	343	450	96	160	0	26
Spain	854	794	1 256	1 588	1 373	1 310	242	310	28	71
Turkey	2 823	2 795	1 502	3 120	3 442	3 523	449	750	0	43
UK	1 198	1 015	3 193	3 176	636	636	842	900	368	384
USA	5 904	4 006	5 747	5 372	2 601	2 492	704	784	279	518
<b>7 new states of the former Soviet Union</b>										
Armenia	258	220	641	220	357	285	0	100	7	50
Azerbaijan	391	220	1 285	220	463	285	124	100	24	50
Belarus	2263	1 800	2 776	2 600	1 384	1 615	650	260	82	80
Georgia	850	220	1 054	220	363	285	245	100	48	50
Moldova	155	210	402	210	248	250	0	50	0	50
Russia	10 604	6 400	17 338	11 480	8 107	6 415	4 161	3 450	1 035	890
Ukraine	6 204	4 080	6 394	5 050	3 052	4 040	1 431	1 090	285	330
<b>5 former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization countries</b>										
Bulgaria	2 145	1 475	2 204	2 000	2 116	1 750	243	235	44	67
Czechoslovakia	1 797	1 435	2 538	2 050	1 566	1 150	348	345	56	75
Hungary	1 345	835	1 720	1 700	1 047	840	110	180	39	108
Poland	2 850	1 730	2 377	2 150	2 300	1 610	551	460	29	130
Romania	2 851	1 375	3 102	2 100	3 789	1 475	505	430	13	120

**ACV** = armoured combat vehicle.

For **Germany**, current force numbers do not include the forces inherited from the former GDR, which include 2274 tanks, 5817 ACVs, 2140 artillery pieces, 392 aircraft and 52 helicopters.

For the **new states of the former Soviet Union**, the data do not include 3738 ground weapons in 'coastal defence' divisions and naval infantry regiments of the former Soviet Union which will be reduced according to a separate agreement to be implemented in conjunction with the CFE Treaty. Kazakhstan, whose territory falls largely outside the geographical boundaries of the CFE Treaty, is not allocated any of the former USSR's weapons deployed or stored west of the Ural Mountains.

Source used by SIPRI for data in this table: *Arms Control Today*, FACTFILE, June 1992.



**The CFE-1A Agreement on personnel strength of  
conventional armed forces in Europe**




<i>Country</i>	<i>Troop Limits</i>	<i>Current holdings 1992</i>
Armenia	na	na
Azerbaijan	na	na
Belarus	100 000	125 000
Belgium	70 000	71 300
Bulgaria	104 000	97 000
Canada	10 660	5 100
Czechoslovakia	140 000	145 000
Denmark	39 000	24 300
France	325 000	330 400
Georgia	40 000	na
Germany	345 000	411 800
Greece	158 621	139 800
Hungary	100 000	80 800
Iceland	0	0
Italy	315 000	306 000
Kazakhstan	0	0
Luxembourg	900	800
Moldova	na	na
Netherlands	80 000	76 000
Norway	32 000	25 400
Poland	234 000	281 400
Portugal	75 000	45 500
Romania	230 248	187 000
Russia	1 450 000	1 536 000
Spain	300 000	173 200
Turkey	530 000	512 000
Ukraine	450 000	230 000
UK	260 000	222 500
USA	250 000	182 100

'na': 'not announced'. Country has yet to declare its personnel limit or it has not been deemed possible to assess its full-time manpower accurately.

*Sources used by SIPRI for data in this table: IISS, Military Balance 1992-1993, pp. 51, 133, 244; Arms Control Today, July/Aug. 1992, p. 29; Focus on Vienna, no. 28, Nov. 1992.*


## Weapon holdings before and after implementation of the CFE Treaty

*NATO, former Soviet, and non-Soviet former WTO holdings*



Sources used by SIPRI for data in these graphs: *Arms Control Today*, June 1992, p. 32; *Vienna Fax*, vol. 2, nos 10 and 11, 20 Dec. 1991, p. 2.

**CFE Treaty limits on aircraft: 6,800**




**Changes: + 1,330 aircraft**

**- 1,461 aircraft**

**- 107 aircraft**

**CFE Treaty limits on helicopters: 2,000**




**Changes: + 427 helicopters**

**+ 19 helicopters**

**+ 319 helicopters**

**CFE Treaty limits on all holdings: 78,800**



**Changes: - 97**

**- 19,706**

**- 9,860**

## • Arms production in Europe

Of the 34 leading arms-producing companies in Western Europe in 1990, 17 had a dependence on arms sales of 50% or more. Ten of the 34 companies increased their arms sales percentage within total sales between 1988 and 1990, 12 decreased this percentage and 12 remained the same. Twenty of these companies announced significant lay-offs of personnel engaged in arms production in 1991. Employment in the arms industry in European NATO countries is likely to decline by 485 000–650 000 by 1995, a reduction of one-third to one-half.

### The leading arms-producing companies in Western Europe, 1990<sup>a</sup>

Company (parent company)	Country	(US\$ m., at constant 1990 prices)	Arms sales as % of total sales	Employ- ment <sup>b</sup>
British Aerospace	UK	7 520	40	127 900
Thomson-CSF (Thomson S.A.)	France	5 250	77	46 900
GEC	UK	4 280	25	118 529
DCN	France	3 830	100	30 500
DASA (Daimler Benz)	FRG	3 720	48	61 276
Aérospatiale	France	2 860	44	37 691
Dassault Aviation	France	2 260	65	14 900
Alenia (IRI)	Italy	1 840	60	21 981
Rolls Royce	UK	1 830	28	65 900
CEA Industrie	France	1 810	33	37 800
GIAT Industries	France	1 430	97	15 000
MBB (DASA)	FRG	1 420	50	23 229
FIAT	Italy	1 180	17	303 238
MTU (DASA)	FRG	1 110	50	17 524
Oerlikon-Bührle	Switzerland	1 080	32	26 437
Bremer Vulkan	FRG	1 050	44	10 922
Siemens	FRG	990	3	373 000
VSEL Consortium	UK	930	100	15 464
Matra Défense (Matra Groupe)	France	920	99	..
Diehl	FRG	860	48	15 108
CASA (INI)	Spain	780	81	10 050
Oto Melara (EFIM)	Italy	780	100	2 245
Rheinmetall	FRG	750	41	14 062
Eidgenössische Rüstungsbetriebe	Switzerland	700	95	4 672
TST (DASA)	FRG	680	65	9 372
SNECMA (SNECMA Groupe)	France	650	25	14 083
Lucas Industries	UK	630	15	54 942
Bofors (Nobel Industries)	Sweden	620	94	4 549
SAGEM Groupe	France	570	28	16 162
Agusta (EFIM)	Italy	560	60	8 117
Dassault Electronique	France	530	72	4 331
Dornier (DASA)	FRG	500	28	10 931
Westland Group	UK	510	69	9 800
FFV	Sweden	500	47	9 709


<sup>a</sup> Companies with 1990 arms sales of ≥ US\$ 500 m.

<sup>b</sup> Figures refer to total employment, i.e. in both arms production and civilian production.


## • European arms exports

While the estimated value of deliveries of major conventional weapons by the United States has been stable, the figure recorded for Europe and the former Soviet Union has declined dramatically since 1989. The steep decline in the value of arms delivered from the former Soviet Union reflects the collapse of trade with former allies and clients in the developing world. Sharp declines are recorded for the two countries historically regarded as the most important European arms exporters (after the former Soviet Union)—France and the United Kingdom. Arms exports from other countries with significant arms industries—such as Czechoslovakia, Italy and Sweden—have fallen to the point where these countries are no longer among the five largest European arms-exporting countries. After 1989 Germany not only increased its share of declining European arms exports but also increased the value of major conventional weapons delivered in absolute terms. In 1991 the value of arms exported by the former Yugoslavia was boosted by the delivery of a large volume of armoured vehicles to Kuwait. This level of exports from the arms industry of the former Yugoslavia was not continued through 1992.

Exports of major conventional weapons by Europe, the USA and the former USSR, 1989–91




Exports of conventional weapons by European countries other than the former USSR, 1989–91



Graphs show deliveries at SIPRI trend-indicator values.

## • Military expenditure in Europe



### Definition of the data:

**Western Europe** includes: Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK.

**Central and Eastern Europe (CEE):** Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR (up to 1989 only; afterwards it is included in German military expenditure), Hungary, Poland, Romania.

**Other Europe:** Albania, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia.

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1992: *World Armaments and Disarmament*, pp. 259–60.

**Analysis of the graph:** Military spending rose throughout Europe until 1987 before beginning a downward course. Even though a decline has occurred in Central and Eastern Europe and Other Europe, it is remarkable how slow it has been in Western Europe, as the graph clearly shows.

### Growth rate for military expenditure for Europe, excluding the USSR 1990–91

	1990	1991
Western Europe	+ 0.27%	- 1.26%
Central and Eastern Europe	- 11.76%	- 19.54%
Other Europe	- 0.27%	- 4.8%

### Western Europe

In May 1990 the Defence Planning Committee of NATO finally abandoned the so-called 3 per cent 'rule', whereby an annual target of 3% real increase in military expenditure had been established. The policy had been instituted in 1977. No country had consistently followed such a target, because defence spending rise is not simply related to strategic and geo-political threats but is also a function of economic and aggregate budgetary growth. To expect otherwise, and believe that defence ministries can convince the government in general that a continuous and sustained rise of such a high magnitude is possible after the end of the cold war, is unrealistic.

However, aggregate European NATO military expenditure did rise almost continuously from 1980 to 1987—although the rate was lower than the postulated 3%. Starting from a level of almost \$140 billion in

1980, defence spending reached over \$157 billion in 1987. (All figures are in US\$ m., at 1988 prices and exchange-rates.) This constitutes an annual growth rate of 1.8% per annum. Since 1987 the level has stabilized.

Rapid reductions in assets, and substantial cuts in defence spending, will take considerable time to appear. Approximately \$511 billion was spent in military expenditures *on Europe* in 1989.

Of more current interest is the question as to how fast defence spending will decline, now that the political condition has altered totally.

As the graph shows, there was no decline whatsoever until 1991. In 1991 the decline in the growth rate of military expenditure of Western Europe was -1.26%.

### **Central and Eastern Europe**

The problems for these countries are economic and political, rather than military security. According to the data available to SIPRI, military expenditure declined rapidly after 1990. However, it must be stressed that all the newly democratized countries of Eastern Europe need more transparency in their military expenditure.

### **Other Europe**

The countries of Other Europe are reducing their military expenditure, but at a slower rate than the Central and East European countries. However, the situation varies here: given the general tendency to decrease military spending, there have also been cases of increased military expenditures in this group.

## • **Military activities**

Due to the profound political and security changes, socio-economic problems and associated budgetary constraints in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, military activities in Europe have been significantly affected. Manœuvres notifiable under the provisions of the Stockholm and Vienna CSBM Documents were progressively scaled down both in numbers and magnitude. With the poor relevance of the 1986 Stockholm Document on CSBMs to the new circumstances, a 'transparency gap' has been felt. The Vienna CSBM Documents of 1990 and 1992 provided greater insight into military activities with a set of new quantitative and qualitative measures. They ensure a measure of continuity and a pattern of behaviour for CSCE participants in this time of transition, thereby enhancing the sense of security and trust among them. However, those measures—with their state-to-state application and status-quo-preserving functions—are still more pertinent to the cold war requirements than to the present security environment, where violations of commitments stem from national and ethnic roots. Hence, the newly established Forum for Security Cooperation faces the task of working out new confidence-strengthening and stabilizing measures, regionally and sub-regionally applicable and internationally monitored for preventing and defusing crises and conflicts and, at the same time, managing change in various parts of the CSCE area.

### **Annual numbers of military exercises conducted by NATO, the WTO/former WTO, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries in 1989–92**

Figures in brackets are numbers of manœuvres originally notified in the calendars.

	1989	1990	1991	1992
NATO	10 (11)	4 (10)	4 (5)	5
WTO/former WTO	13 (17)	5 (7)	0 (4)	0
NNA	3 (3)	3 (4)	1 (1)	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26 (31)</b>	<b>12 (21)</b>	<b>5 (10)</b>	<b>5</b>

**Soviet/Russian foreign troops and troop withdrawals from Europe****From Central Europe**

Deployed forces <sup>a</sup>	1989	1990	1991	1992
Czechoslovakia	70 000	50 000	0 <sup>b</sup>	0
Hungary	65 000	40 000	0 <sup>b</sup>	0
Poland	40 000	56 000	35 000	6 000 <sup>c</sup>
GDR/Germany	380 000	364 000	338 000	177 000 <sup>d</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>555 000</b>	<b>510 000</b>	<b>373 000</b>	<b>183 000</b>

<sup>a</sup> As of 1 June for each year given. Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1989-1990, 1990-1991, 1991-1992 and 1992-1993*.

<sup>b</sup> Withdrawal completed on 25 June 1991.

<sup>c</sup> Withdrawal completed on 28 October 1992. 6000 troops will remain up to the end of 1993 to co-ordinate the transit of troops from Germany.

<sup>d</sup> Withdrawal to be completed by the end of 1994.

**From the Baltic states**

**At the beginning of 1992, 114 000 Russian troops were deployed in the three Baltic states; at the end of 1992, 57 000 Russian troops remained in the Baltic states.**

- Jan. 1992* The former Soviet armed forces deployed in the Baltic states are transferred to the jurisdiction of Russia.
- 31 Jan. 1992* Beginning of negotiations on withdrawal.
- 3 Mar. 1992* Departure of the first unit.
- 8 Sep. 1992* The agreement between Russia and Lithuania reached; withdrawal to be completed before 31 August 1993.
- 29 Oct. 1992* Russia suspends withdrawal from Baltic states, referring to urgent needs of social protection for the military and to housing problems for withdrawing troops.

**From the other former Soviet republics**

- Belarus, Ukraine** Both states have taken over the armed forces of the former USSR deployed on their territories.<sup>a</sup>
- Moldova** In May 1992 the decision to withdraw the 14th Army (less than 10 000 troops) deployed in the Trans-Dniester region was announced. Talks on the terms of the eventual withdrawal and status of the troops began on 12 August 1992.
- Transcaucasus** In May 1992 it was agreed to transfer partially the military equipment of the Transcaucasian MD to the three states 'on the basis of parity'. Russia started to withdraw its 7th Army from Armenia and 4th Army from Azerbaijan. The Transcaucasian MD (over 100 000 troops) will be dissolved by 1 January 1993; Russia will keep 1 air-borne division and 1 air-defence unit in Azerbaijan (until 1994) and 3 divisions in Georgia and Armenia.

<sup>a</sup> However, in Belarus the CIS units of the strategic forces are transferred to the jurisdiction of Russia; they will withdraw within 7 years or, most probably, much earlier. Ukraine insists on 'administrative control' over the CIS units of the strategic forces. Russia and Ukraine agreed to have the Black Sea Fleet under joint command until 1995.



## • Treaty commitments

### *From the Atlantic to the Urals*

**NATO transformed.** NATO's new orientation focuses on maintaining effective defence capabilities for the defence of members' territory in case of attack, offers co-operation to NATO's erstwhile Eastern adversaries, and emphasizes the utility of established alliance relationships and procedures for managing a highly uncertain security environment.

#### **Political and military changes in NATO developed as follows:**

- 6 July 1990* NATO summit meeting in London: Commitment to enhance the political role of the alliance; officially recognizes the end of the cold war; states that 'the Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the cold war, and extend to them the hand of friendship'. Recognition that a comprehensive reform of NATO strategy is imperative.
- July 1990* Establishment of the Strategic Review Group to prepare NATO's new military strategy.
- 6–7 June 1991* North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen: statement on Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and expanded contacts in security questions.
- 7–8 November 1991* Adoption of a 'New Strategic Concept' based on the London NATO summit meeting commitment, the Strategy Review Group proposals and NATO's obligations under the CFE Treaty.
- creation of rapid reaction forces, main defence forces and augmentation forces
  - emphasis on flexible, mobile forces
  - emphasis on effective surveillance and intelligence
  - emphasis on logistics and transport facilities
  - abandonment of the 'Flexible Response' strategy
  - emphasis on multi-national as opposed to national defence forces
  - de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons: nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles will be eliminated; the remaining nuclear weapons will be based on dual-capable aircraft.
- Proposal for a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to include NATO members, former WTO members and the Baltic Republics.
- 4 June 1992* North Atlantic Council Meeting in Oslo: Expression of support for CSCE peace-keeping activities with regard to planning, preparing and disposition of troops.

**North Atlantic Cooperation Council.** Proposed by the NATO Rome summit meeting on 7–8 November 1991, NACC was called into being on 20 December 1991 to establish 'liaison' between the Alliance and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Its declared goal is consultation and co-operation (but not guarantees) on security and related issues such as: defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian–military relations, civilian–military co-ordination of air traffic management and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Apart from the institutional structure (meetings at foreign minister, ambassadorial and other levels), an informal High-Level Working Group was established to redistribute among the CIS republics the TLE ceilings in relation to the CFE Treaty, which contributed to the successful conclusion of the Treaty. On 1 April 1992 the first meeting of defence ministers within NACC took place; it agreed on a further co-operation programme in such defence-related matters as: military strategies, defence management, the legal framework for military forces,

harmonization of defence planning and arms control, exercises and training, defence education, reserve forces, environmental protection, air traffic control, search and rescue, military contribution to humanitarian aid and military medicine. The membership of NACC is at present 37 states (16 NATO, 5 CEE, 15 former Soviet republics plus Albania). Finland attended the Oslo NACC meeting on 5 June 1992 as an observer.

**Western European Union (WEU).** The end of the cold war and a continuing debate about the future of NATO and Western Europe's role within that organization have given the WEU a new lease on life. Major issues related to a revival of the WEU have to do with questions of the future US role in European defence, French attitudes to NATO, Franco-German relations and the European Union (EU). *The state of the debate:* The Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 identifies the WEU as the body that should develop into the security arm of the European Union. At the WEU Council of Ministers Meeting, held on 19 June 1992 in Petersberg, Germany, decisions were taken to empower the WEU, with military forces drawn from its members, to engage in activities ranging from rescue missions to actual combat missions. The Petersberg Declaration structures the WEU—Central European states' dialogue, consultations and co-operation with regard to the European security architecture and stability. In July 1992, the WEU co-ordinated the deployment of naval forces to supervise United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. At the WEU meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, held in Rome on 20 November 1992, Greece became a member; Iceland, Norway and Turkey became associate members; and Ireland and Denmark received official observer status. With these measures, all 12 European Community members and all the European NATO members are affiliated with the WEU, although with different degrees of involvement.

**Commonwealth of Independent States.** This structure emerged in December 1991 as a result of the break-up of the former Soviet Union and initially comprised 11 of its republics (all but the three Baltic states and Georgia). Its future functions and role (the CIS Charter is expected to be adopted at the summit meeting on 18 December 1992) as well as its composition (Azerbaijan and Moldova will most probably not participate) still remain unclear. However, the CIS has contributed to keeping the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR under central command and control and to ensuring the adherence of eight post-Soviet states to the CFE Treaty. The CIS elaborated a number of decisions both for minimizing conflicts in the process of sharing the military assets of the former Soviet Union and for establishing a certain military co-operation between the participants; so far, over 100 agreements on military and defence issues have been adopted or prepared for signature. On 15 May 1992, the Tashkent Treaty on collective security was signed by 6 CIS member states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Furthermore, the CIS states signed a number of bilateral treaties; some of them provide for mutual assistance (such as that between Russia and Kazakhstan).

*Peace-keeping activities on former Soviet territory:*

*Setting up a mechanism.* On 20 March 1992 the CIS summit meeting in Kiev adopted an agreement on 'groups of military observers and collective peace-keeping forces in the CIS' (10 CIS states—all except Turkmenistan—with the qualified participation of Azerbaijan and Ukraine). On 16 July 1992 the CIS foreign and defence ministers' meeting in Tashkent approved a protocol on the formation and functioning of 'collective peace-keeping forces'.

*South Ossetia.* On 14 July 1992 the first multilateral peace-keeping forces are deployed on the former Soviet territory: 1500 troops—Russian, Georgian and Ossetian—are introduced into the Tskhinvali zone (South Ossetia).

*The Trans-Dniester region.* On 29 July 1992 trilateral peace-keeping forces (1200 Moldovan, 3800 Russian and 1200 members of the Trans-Dniester national guard) start to operate in Moldova (in the Trans-Dniester region).

*Tajikistan.* In the autumn of 1992, after the beginning of civil war, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan started intensive discussions on peace-making efforts, including deliberations on the peace-making mandate for Russian troops deployed in the area.

*Nagorno-Karabakh.* So far, the belligerent and mediating parties have failed to agree on the eventual invitation of peace-keeping forces.

**Membership of the CSCE states in the main European organizations**

CSCE (CFE Party)	NATO	CIS	EC	WEU
Albania				
Armenia (CFE)		x		
Austria				
Azerbaijan (CFE)		(x)		
Belarus (CFE)		x		
Belgium (CFE)	x		x	x
Bosnia and Herzegovina				
Bulgaria (CFE)				
Canada (CFE)	x			
Croatia				
Cyprus				
Czechoslovakia (CFE)				
Denmark (CFE)	x		x	
Estonia				
Finland				
France (CFE)	x		x	x
Georgia (CFE)				
Germany (CFE)	x		x	x
Greece (CFE)	x		x	x
Holy See				
Hungary (CFE)				
Iceland (CFE)	x			
Ireland			x	
Italy (CFE)	x		x	x
Kazakhstan (CFE)		x		
Kyrgyzstan		x		
Latvia				
Liechtenstein				
Lithuania				
Luxembourg (CFE)	x		x	x
Malta				
Moldova (CFE)		(x)		
Monaco				
Netherlands (CFE)	x		x	x
Norway (CFE)	x			
Poland (CFE)				
Portugal (CFE)	x		x	x
Romania (CFE)				
Russia (CFE)		x		
San Marino				
Slovenia				
Spain (CFE)	x		x	x
Sweden				
Switzerland				
Tajikistan		x		
Turkey (CFE)	x			
Turkmenistan		x		
UK (CFE)	x		x	x
Ukraine (CFE)		x		
USA (CFE)	x			
Uzbekistan		x		
(Yugoslavia) <i>suspended</i>				

Azerbaijan and Moldova joined the CIS in December 1991, but neither parliament had as of 1 December 1992 ratified the CIS Agreement.

## • Arms control commitments

### *Conventional*

**Vienna CSBM Documents 1990 and 1992.** The Vienna Document 1990 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) was negotiated in Vienna by all the CSCE member states and signed on 17 November 1990. It incorporated measures contained in the 1986 Stockholm Document (which had built on the relevant sections of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1983 Madrid Concluding Document), with a number of new categories: risk reduction, transparency of military organization, contacts and communications. The Vienna Document 1992, adopted on 4 March 1992, introduced a further set of new measures in an effort to get them closer to present security requirements—for example, information on planned personnel increases, data on and demonstration of major weapon and equipment systems, host visits to dispel concerns about military activities, etc. The Vienna Documents are political commitments and not legally binding agreements.

**CFE Treaty.** The negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE, part of the CSCE process) was held 1989–90 in Vienna between the member states of NATO and the WTO on conventional force reductions in Europe. The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. It sets ceilings on treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the ATTU (Atlantic-to-the-Urals) zone. On 15 May 1992, at a meeting in Tashkent, all former Soviet republics with territory in the ATTU zone agreed on the principles and procedures of implementation of the CFE Treaty (the *Tashkent Document*). At the NACC meeting in Oslo on 5 June 1992 the 16 NATO states, the 5 former non-Soviet members of the WTO and the former Soviet republics in the ATTU zone signed the 'Final document of the extraordinary conference of the states parties to the CFE Treaty' (a 'revised' CFE Treaty, the *Oslo Document*). The CFE Treaty entered into force on 9 November 1992. Negotiations on conventional arms limitation in Europe are now conducted by the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, in which all member states participate.

**CFE-1A Agreement.** The CFE-1A negotiation, concerning limits on military manpower in the ATTU zone, was held in Vienna, November 1990–March 1992. The CFE-1A Agreement (the Concluding Act of the negotiation on personnel strength of conventional armed forces in Europe) was signed in Helsinki on 10 July 1992 by the above CFE states. The Agreement entered into force on 17 July 1992. It entails political commitments and is not a legally binding agreement.

### *Nuclear*

**INF Treaty.** The intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles were conducted between the USA and the USSR, 1985–87. The Treaty entered into force on 1 June 1988. It obliges the USA and the USSR to destroy all land-based missiles with a range of 500–5500 km (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km, and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. This was completed in early May 1991.

**Non-Proliferation Treaty.** The NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Under the Treaty the nuclear weapon states have undertaken not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear weapon states, on their part, have pledged not to receive nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, as well as not to manufacture them or receive assistance in their manufacture. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty (1995) a conference will be convened to decide whether the Treaty will continue in force indefinitely or will be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. By December 1992, over 150 states had become parties to the Treaty. This number includes all the five recognized nuclear weapon powers—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. Former Soviet republics are expected to accede.

**START Treaty.** The START (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty) negotiations were initiated in 1982 between the USA and the USSR to reduce the strategic (intercontinental) nuclear forces of both sides. The START Treaty was signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991. It reduces US and Soviet offensive strategic nuclear weapons to equal aggregate levels over a seven-year period and sets numerical limits on deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and the nuclear warheads they carry.

**Lisbon Protocol.** This Protocol to the START Treaty was signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine pledge to accede to the START Treaty and agree to eliminate all strategic weapons on their territories within the seven-year START reduction period and to join the NPT as non-nuclear states 'in the shortest possible' time.

The START Treaty has been ratified by the USA and Russia but has not yet (as of 1 December 1992) entered into force.

## **Chemical**

**Chemical Weapons Convention.** The draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was adopted by consensus at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 3 September 1992. It is the result of more than two decades of intense negotiation. On 30 November the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution by consensus, approving the CWC. A signatory conference hosted by France will take place in Paris on 13 January 1993. The CWC will enter into force, at the earliest, two years after it is opened for signature and when 65 states have ratified it. All the member states of the CSCE indicated at the July 1992 Helsinki summit meeting that they will be initial signatories to the CWC.


As a global multilateral disarmament treaty, the CWC must meet two major disarmament challenges: (a) existing chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities must be destroyed under stringent verification procedures within 10 years after the Convention enters into force (if a party has special difficulties to destroy its chemical weapons, the period may be extended to 15 years); and

(b) verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry will be a permanent requirement of the Convention. An international body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located at The Hague, will co-ordinate all activities related to the CWC. Under the Convention, it will be possible for the first time to conduct international on-site inspections of any facility which is suspected of non-compliance by utilizing the 'on-challenge' inspection provisions of the Convention.


**US-Russian Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons.** On 1 June 1990 the USA and the then Soviet Union signed this bilateral agreement, which has not yet entered into force. During the June 1992 summit meeting, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed that the agreement would be updated and implemented as soon as possible. Under the agreement both parties will start bilateral destruction of their chemical weapons, of which the USA has 31 400 agent tons and Russia approximately 40 000 agent tons according to publicly available information.

The Russian Federation assumed all the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union, concerning international treaties and agreements, in a note of 12 January 1992.

# CSCE meetings and institutions, 1972-92



## CSCE meetings and institutions, after the 1992 Helsinki summit meeting



### • The CSCE: How to manage peaceful change in Europe

The selection of data, figures and information presented in this SIPRI fact sheet illustrates the profound transformations that have taken place in Europe. Meaningful in this change were decisions adopted in the CSCE process and their implementation. New challenges and armed conflicts across the CSCE area call on the participating states to take specific actions adequate to the new situation. Many decisions and actions of this kind have already been taken.

The CSCE Chairman-in-Office or his representatives have conducted consultations regarding almost all conflict situations in the areas of Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Moldova. The CSCE agenda has often included proposals designed to stop the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia. Now it seems that CSCE activity in this regard requires not only new organizational structures but also an enhancement of the efficiency of such existing mechanisms as:

- the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the role of its Chairman-in-Office (CIO) as well as the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) in the intervals between the Council's meetings;
- the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna; and
- the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, Vienna, established in September 1992.

The decision adopted in Helsinki 'that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations' will acquire an operational meaning after the establishment of the function of a Secretary-General whose task would be to give CSCE decisions an executive power. Of essential importance will be the signing and the entry into force of the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, the establishment of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and a modification of the existing CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

The evolution of CSCE structures and institutions should contribute to increased efficiency and an improvement of the political ability of the CSCE to defuse crisis situations, strengthen the operational instruments designed to prevent military conflicts and—most important—to manage peaceful change in Europe. Improved co-operation with other international organizations, in particular the United Nations, should make the work of these institutions more interlocking and help avoid inter-blocking actions. This would make it possible to lower costs and enhance the effectiveness of its activities. However, new treaties and multilateral institutions and security structures are of essential importance only when and to such a degree as states, and the great powers in particular, are willing to and do use them.

**sipri**

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