


TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CLIMATE SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA

EMILIE BROEK AND CHRISTOPHE M. HODDER



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
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June 2022

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Preface

The impact of climate change on the overall security, peace and stability of countries and societies is increasing. Extreme weather events such as floods and droughts are more frequent and severe around the globe, and their links with insecurity must be urgently addressed. Somalia is a particular and critical case in point. The vulnerability of its people is the result of a number of factors interacting: the impact of climate change builds on decades of conflict and political instability, destabilizing an already fragile state, and undermining the foundations of human security.

Somalia is currently experiencing its worst drought in over four decades, which comes in the wake of three major droughts in the past 10 years. In years when there is no drought, there is often severe flooding that devastates infrastructure, crops and lives. The impact of Somalia's climate crisis is compounded by decades of civil conflict and the activities of armed groups. Amid these challenges, the Federal Government of Somalia has little capacity to manage the combined challenge of climate and security risks effectively.

An integrated approach to managing these risks in Somalia starts with understanding how they are linked in order to develop foresight about how they may play out. Such an integrated approach would make it possible to enhance security, protect local ecosystems and conserve natural resources simultaneously, rather than having to make trade-offs between different priorities.

This report sets out a new three-pronged approach to this end with environmental peacebuilding at its core. The approach bridges humanitarian, development, peace and environmental priorities, thus offering long-term benefits for human security. The authors also delve into the potential contributions of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture—particularly the Peacebuilding Commission—in supporting this new approach. This report should be of fundamental interest to peacebuilding actors, policymakers and researchers alike.

Dan Smith
Director, SIPRI
Stockholm, June 2022

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Summary

Climate change and its security implications are placing considerable pressures on peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. The country is experiencing its worst drought in over four decades, with an unprecedented fourth consecutive failed rainy season. As of May 2022, around 6.1 million Somalis had been affected by drought conditions, and around 6 million face acute food insecurity at crisis levels or worse. When combined with other social, political and economic factors, climate change has affected livelihoods, migration and mobility patterns, armed group tactics, and elite exploitation in Somalia. Rapid-onset disasters (i.e. floods and droughts) and slow-onset climate change have challenged traditional coping strategies and altered the physical surroundings upon which lives depend—sometimes leading people to adopt maladaptive practices that end up increasing their vulnerability to climate change. Climate change can also cause people to become internally displaced and to relocate to camp sites or urban centres where they have limited access to services and resources and where they come into competition with host communities. Armed groups like al-Shabab can take advantage of these climate vulnerabilities and, in the absence of strong state service and security provision, can position themselves as alternative relief providers, thus amassing more influence. Political and clan elites can also exploit their power and wealth to gain access to land and resources at the expense of local populations.

The impacts of climate change are worsening livelihoods and environments in Somalia and they will only continue to do so if not properly addressed. It is therefore important that both local and international stakeholders involved in peacebuilding in Somalia fully incorporate climate security considerations into their analysis, planning and programming. This includes measures to strengthen humanitarian–development–peace triple-nexus responses to climate change; mainstreaming environmental peacebuilding and risk-management strategies; promoting the role of women and youth as agents of peace in Somalia; including climate considerations and ecosystem restoration into state policies, service provision, the security sector and the rule of law; and reinforcing local adaptive capacity by introducing new sustainable practices and supporting civil society.

Analysing the leading climate-related security risks in Somalia and identifying gaps in existing responses leads to a new approach to integrate climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia. The three components of this approach are environmental peacebuilding, national governance and international support. The first component—environmental peacebuilding—is the overarching goal of the approach, the second component refers to the national constituencies and institutions that will apply it, and the third to the international actors that must provide support throughout. Together, these components can help to integrate responses to climate, peace and security in Somalia and strengthen the capacity to implement them.

In addition to local and international actors already working in Somalia, the UN peacebuilding architecture—and in particular the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)—has the potential to contribute. Should the Federal Government of Somalia request the PBC's support in mainstreaming climate security into its peacebuilding responses, the PBC, guided by its principles of national ownership and partnership, could provide a platform to convene stakeholders and meetings in support of this integrated approach in Somalia.

Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
DRP	Defection Rehabilitation Programme
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRF	National Reconciliation Framework
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PCVE	Preventing and countering violent extremism
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WPS	Women and Peace and Security Agenda

1. Introduction

Somalia is heavily affected by climate change and its consequences for human security, which have been compounded by decades of civil conflict and political strife.¹ People's livelihoods are facing new hardships as their physical surroundings alter and traditional coping mechanisms become obsolete. Clan competition over scarce resources, which partly fuelled the outbreak of civil war in 1991, continue to raise tensions and threaten stability.² Over the past three decades, militias, armed groups and eventually al-Shabab have exploited climate vulnerabilities to their advantage and have contested the successive governments of Somalia.³ The political volatility surrounding the heavily contested 2022 federal election—which was concluded on 15 May after over a year of delay—and increasing attacks by al-Shabab as part of its continued campaign to undermine the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), could challenge peacebuilding efforts and the capacity of the newly elected government to provide for local communities in the face of climate change.⁴ It is within this context that the FGS could choose to bring the topic of climate security up for discussion with international partners and other relevant stakeholders.

The United Nations has recognized the importance of climate security in Somalia. The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), established in 2013, is an integrated mission that coordinates political and developmental efforts.⁵ UNSOM has increasingly incorporated climate-related security risks into its peacebuilding efforts, including by appointing the first-ever full-time climate security and environmental mission adviser to a UN peace operation. In 2018 the UN Security Council formally acknowledged the 'adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia [and] the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors'.⁶ In 2021 it strengthened this call in Somalia with one of the first Security Council resolutions to officially recognize the link between climate change and security.⁷

Climate change and other sources of environmental stress in Somalia require that a greater emphasis be placed on peacebuilding approaches that strengthen existing coping mechanisms and traditional dispute-resolution methods and that devise new ways to manage increased resource scarcity. The effects of climate change are becoming more severe: as of May 2022 approximately 6.1 million people had been affected by the drought emergency resulting from four consecutive failed rainy seasons, 80 per cent of them women and children.⁸ The FGS and the UN would thus benefit from more time, resources and coordination to address climate security. While climate change is not the sole reason for intervention in any given situation, it is an underlying issue that, alongside other factors, can exacerbate insecurity and vulnerability in Somalia.

This report sheds light on the climate-related security risks in Somalia and identifies entry points that both national and international actors can consider in their

¹ Ogallo, L. A. et al., 'Climate change projections and the associated potential impacts for Somalia', *American Journal of Climate Change*, vol. 7, no. 2 (June 2018).

² Krieger, T., Panke, D. and Pregernig, M. (eds), *Environmental Conflicts, Migration and Governance* (Bristol University Press: Bristol, 2020).

³ Eklöv, K. and Krampe, D. F., *Climate-related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 53 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Oct. 2019), p. 6.

⁴ Lwanga-Ntale, C. and Owino, B. O., 'Understanding vulnerability and resilience in Somalia', *Jambá—Journal of Disaster Risk Studies*, vol. 12 (2020).

⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 2102, 1 May 2013; and Middleton, R. et al., *Somalia: Climate-related Security Risk Assessment* (Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks: Stockholm, Dec. 2018).

⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 2408, 27 Mar. 2018.

⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 2592, 30 Aug. 2021.

⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Somalia: Drought', Situation Report no. 7, 20 May 2022.

future engagement on climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia. This report also explores the potential contribution of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). In September 2021 the Security Council explicitly welcomed the FGS's continued engagement with the PBC and the latter's unique ability to mobilize international support behind Somalia's peacebuilding objectives.⁹ The PBC through its bridging and advisory roles can support peacebuilding approaches together with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The report thus examines how the UN peacebuilding architecture, in particular the PBC, can help local and international actors integrate their approaches on climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia.

This report is based on desk research and a literature review of secondary sources, as well as interviews with relevant stakeholders. The report continues (in chapter 2) by outlining the negative impacts of climate change on peace and security in Somalia through four interrelated pathways: livelihood deterioration, migration and mobility, armed groups, and elite exploitation.¹⁰ These pathways help to visualize how human actions and local contexts influence climate-related security risks. Each pathway also maps out existing FGS and UN programming, discourses and responses aimed at mitigating these risks. Although the report does not extensively touch on ongoing efforts by civil society or the private sector, it does suggest ways to further engage them. The report then evaluates and assesses these existing responses and identifies gaps for future interventions. These are then used to recommend (in chapter 3) a new approach to integrate climate security and peacebuilding responses in Somalia with three main components: environmental peacebuilding, national governance and international support. The report closes with brief conclusions (in chapter 4).

⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 2592 (note 7).

¹⁰ These four pathways have been identified by earlier research on East and West Africa and South and South East Asia by van Baalen, S. and Mobjörk, M., 'Climate change and violent conflict in East Africa: Integrating qualitative and quantitative research to probe the mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2018); Tarif, K., 'Climate change and violent conflict in West Africa: Assessing the evidence', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2022/3, Feb. 2022; and Nordqvist, P. and Krampe, F., 'Climate change and violent conflict: Sparse evidence from South Asia and South East Asia', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2018/4, Sep. 2018.

2. Climate-related security pathways and responses in Somalia

Before analysing the climate-related security pathways in Somalia, it is helpful to first situate them within a context of changing climatic conditions. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the current climate trends in Somalia and the associated socio-economic vulnerabilities. It then introduces four climate-related security pathways that are having an impact on human security and peace outcomes in Somalia. Within each pathway, current responses to alleviate the challenges are analysed to identify gaps and potential intervention points.

Climate trends and projections and socio-economic vulnerabilities

In Somalia, the mean annual temperature is 30°C, with the hottest periods occurring between April and June.¹¹ This mean temperature has been increasing since 1991. By the end of the 21st century, these temperatures are expected to have increased by around 3°C across the country.

Somalia is characterized by arid and semi-arid climates with two annual rainy seasons—*gu* from March to June and *deyr* from October to December—but with variability between years and seasons. This climate variability is influenced by natural factors, such as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, which causes more rainfall and flooding during El Niño years and more droughts in La Niña years.¹² It is also caused by periodic non-human ‘forcing’ events such as volcanic eruptions.¹³ The average annual rainfall in Somalia is 200 millimetres, with the north receiving as little as 50 mm, the south 400 mm and the south-west as much as 600 mm.¹⁴

These climate trends are projected to be accompanied by a rise in the frequency of rapid-onset disasters (i.e. sudden natural events such as floods and droughts).¹⁵ Somalia has the longest continental coastline in Africa, extending 3025 kilometres along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (see figure 2.1), meaning that it is also vulnerable to intense cyclones from the east.¹⁶

These climate-related changes are intensifying local conflicts over diminishing resources and increasing vulnerabilities in Somalia. In 2021 the failed *deyr* rainy season exacerbated drought conditions, and the poor *gu* rains in 2022 have led to an unprecedented fourth consecutive failed rainy season, the worst drought in over four decades.¹⁷ These drought conditions are set to worsen in the months to come. The climate crisis has diminished crop and livestock production, increased the spread of disease among livestock, reduced local household purchasing power, and created a risk of localized famine in six areas of the country linked to rising food prices.¹⁸ In 2022, around 1.4 million children under the age of five face acute malnutrition, including 329 500 of whom are expected to be severely malnourished.¹⁹ The crisis has also reduced access to education of around 60 000 students, with at least 158 schools

¹¹ World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal, ‘Somalia’, accessed 30 May 2022.

¹² World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 11).

¹³ World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 11).

¹⁴ World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 11).

¹⁵ World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 11).

¹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘Somalia’, World Factbook, 21 Jan. 2022.

¹⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 8).

¹⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Somalia: Drought’, Situation Report no. 3, 20 Jan. 2022; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 8).

¹⁹ United Nations, Security Council, ‘Situation in Somalia’, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/392, 13 May 2022, para. 42.



Figure 2.1. Map of Somalia

Source: UN Geospatial, 'Somalia', 1 July 2020.

closed across Puntland, Galmudug, South West and Jubaland states.²⁰ The poor rainfalls are decreasing water availability in Somalia, with up to 80 per cent of water sources currently drying up, including in the Juba and Shabelle rivers.²¹ Reduced access to water points and grazing lands has increased local resource competition and food insecurity.²²

Although the Indian Ocean coastline provides Somalia with critical marine ecology and fisheries, rising sea surface temperatures, ocean acidification and de-oxygenation are expected to deteriorate the health of marine ecosystems. This will decrease fish catches and have an impact on important climate regulators from the inner ocean, such as carbon sequestration (a process that captures and stores atmospheric carbon dioxide and reduces the effects of climate change).²³

²⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 8).

²¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Somalia 2022 drought impact snapshot', 5 Apr. 2022.

²² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 18).

²³ Jacobs, Z. L. et al., 'Key climate change stressors of marine ecosystems along the path of the East African coastal current', *Ocean & Coastal Management*, vol. 208 (1 July 2021); and US Geological Survey (USGS), 'What is carbon sequestration?', [n.d.].




Figure 2.2. Climate-related security pathways

Presentation of the four climate-related security pathways that cause climate change to increase people's vulnerability and result in incidents of human insecurity.

Climate-related security pathways

The above climate trends and projections increase socio-economic vulnerabilities and interact with existing social, political and economic dynamics in Somalia to affect human security and peace. Earlier research on East and West Africa and South and South East Asia has identified four pathways through which climate change can interact with and lead to violent conflict: livelihood deterioration, migration and mobility, armed groups, and elite exploitation.²⁴ The pathways approach avoids making direct links between environmental changes and conflict, and emphasizes the contexts and processes (e.g. economics, political structures and human agency) that can intervene to reduce the effects of climate change on human vulnerability and community resilience (see figure 2.2). The pathways can provide policymakers with tools through which to respond to these risks.

Livelihood deterioration

In Somalia climate change can interact with other factors to upend livelihoods and intensify the risk of violent conflict erupting.²⁵ Because 72 per cent of the Somali

²⁴ van Baalen and Mobjörk (note 10); Tarif (note 10); and Nordqvist and Krampe (note 10).

²⁵ Eklöv and Krampe (note 3), p. 1.

population is employed in the agricultural sector, livelihoods are heavily affected by increases in rapid-onset disasters.²⁶ These changes can contribute to a loss of income and jobs in the agricultural and pastoralist sectors.²⁷ For women, who are the main breadwinners in Somali households, the effects of climate change can increase their domestic workloads and elevate their risks of gender-based violence.²⁸ In response to these grievances, people may adopt unsustainable coping mechanisms that end up deepening their insecurity.

Since 71 per cent of the Somali population already lives in poverty, these climate-related changes can destabilize already precarious livelihoods.²⁹ Unpredicted changes in rainfall patterns can affect the movements and livelihood cycles of farmers and herders as traditional grazing routes become unusable and resources grow scarcer.³⁰ Many communities and nomadic pastoralists depend on regular rainfall for food production, and fluctuations in precipitation can severely hamper their ability to meet dietary needs.³¹ As of May 2022, over 6 million people faced food insecurity at crisis levels or worse due to prolonged drought conditions.³² Growing numbers of floods and cyclones in Somalia have led to surges in desert locust populations, which can cause severe crop failures for farmers and a further loss of income.³³ A desert locust outbreak in 2019 and 2020—the worst in almost 25 years—heavily affected crop production and food security in the country.³⁴ While Somalia’s marine sector and fisheries could provide additional food security and job creation for local populations, these coastal resources are increasingly threatened by overfishing and illicit fishing, climate change, mangrove destruction, and toxic waste.³⁵

Climate change can also have gendered impacts and, in combination with other factors, can lead to increases in domestic workload and gender-based violence.³⁶ The number of female-headed households in Somalia has risen significantly. Women assume a greater domestic workload and responsibility when men move away to cities for work, join the military or escape clan violence at home.³⁷ These changes can be difficult to cope with when combined with the impacts of climate change. As the main providers of their families, women are the first to know when rapid-onset disasters such as droughts are going to happen, and they are also the most affected.³⁸ Due to their close proximity to climate risks, women have crucial skills when it comes to managing natural resources and are often at the front line of climate-adaptation efforts, especially when men migrate away.³⁹ It is almost always the women who are tasked with the collection of firewood for household cooking and energy security. Increases in droughts have accelerated environmental degradation, causing women to walk

²⁶ United Nations Somalia, *Common Country Analysis: Somalia 2020* (United Nations: New York, Sep. 2020), p. 22.

²⁷ Eklöv and Krampe (note 3), pp. 15, 28.

²⁸ Somali Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MWHRD), *Somali Women Forging Alliances to Safeguard Equal Rights for All* (MWHRD: Mogadishu, Oct. 2020).

²⁹ World Bank, ‘The World Bank in Somalia: Overview’, 30 Aug. 2020.

³⁰ Eklöv and Krampe (note 3), p. 18.

³¹ Nicolle, H., *Identifying Climate Adaptive Solutions to Displacement in Somalia: Assessment Report* (Samuel Hall: Berlin, Feb. 2021).

³² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 8).

³³ De Coning, C. et al., ‘Climate, peace and security fact sheet: Somalia’, SIPRI and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Feb. 2021.

³⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), *Somalia: Agricultural Livelihoods and Food Security in the Context of COVID-19*, Monitoring report (FAO: Rome, Sep. 2021).

³⁵ UN Environment Programme (UNEP), *The State of the Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study* (UNEP: Geneva, Dec. 2005).

³⁶ Croome, A. and Hussein, M., ‘Climate crisis, gender inequalities and local response in Somalia/Somaliland’, *Forced Migration Review*, no. 64 (June 2020).

³⁷ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

³⁸ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

³⁹ Nellemann, C., Verma, R. and Hislop, L. (eds), *Women at the Frontline of Climate Change: Gender Risks and Hopes—A Rapid Response Assessment* (UN Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal: Arendal, 2011).

longer distances to fetch water and firewood and exposing them to direct security risks such as sexual violence and human rights violations.⁴⁰ At water points, livestock grazing areas and firewood-collection zones, women are also at high risk of violence, including rapes, partly due to insufficient shelter or lighting.⁴¹ For men, the loss of livestock and income due to droughts and their increasing use of narcotics (notably, khat dependence) have been found to increase their domestic violence against women and children at home.⁴² During clan conflicts over land and resources, men have also become victims of revenge killings and armed clashes.⁴³

When people are faced with a decline in livelihood options and access to vital resources, it can lead them to adopt maladaptive coping strategies—these are methods of adaptation that have the opposite of their intended effects and can end up increasing vulnerabilities instead of reversing them.⁴⁴ Access to energy in Somalia, for example, is extremely limited, with almost 11 million people lacking access to electricity. They therefore turn to traditional biomass sources, which provide for 80–90 per cent of total energy needs in Somalia, or to illicit practices, such as charcoal production, which have detrimental effects on land degradation and Acacia forests in the country.⁴⁵ In 2012 the United Nations Security Council banned exports of charcoal from Somalia and in 2019 strengthened this ban by issuing additional recommendations to UN member states on the prohibition of all import and export of charcoal to or from Somalia.⁴⁶ The scarcity of water can also lead people to overextract groundwater resources, as more wells and boreholes are created to meet water demands in unsustainable ways that harm the environment.⁴⁷ Decreases in agricultural productivity can also lead young men to partake in violent activities, including membership of armed groups, to provide income for their families.⁴⁸

Government and UN responses. Both the Federal Government of Somalia and the UN have responded in several ways to address the risks of livelihood deterioration in Somalia.

The Recovery and Resilience Framework was established in 2018 based on a Drought Impact and Needs Assessment.⁴⁹ That assessment was conducted by the FGS together with the UN, the World Bank and the European Union (EU) following the previous major drought in Somalia, in 2016–17, to support the FGS in estimating the costs of damage and the amount needed for recovery.⁵⁰ The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia presents the coordinated, strategic response devised by humanitarian agencies in order to meet the acute needs of people affected by crisis.⁵¹

⁴⁰ Thulstrup, A. W. et al., ‘Uncovering the challenges of domestic energy access in the context of weather and climate extremes in Somalia’, *Weather and Climate Extremes*, vol. 27 (Sep. 2018).

⁴¹ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

⁴² Croome and Hussein (note 36).

⁴³ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

⁴⁴ Schipper, L. et al., ‘Guest post: Why avoiding climate change “maladaptation” is vital’, Carbon Brief, 10 Feb. 2021.

⁴⁵ UN Development Programme, ‘Climate finance is the lifeline Somalia needs to build a resilient future’, 28 Feb. 2022; and UN Environment Programme, ‘How Somalia’s charcoal trade is fuelling the Acacia’s demise’, 21 Mar. 2018.

⁴⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 2036, 22 Feb. 2012; and United Nations, Security Council, 751 Committee, ‘Recommendations on interdiction of charcoal from Somalia by member states pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012), 2111 (2013) and 2182 (2014)’, Implementation Assistance Notice no. 1, 12 Feb. 2019.

⁴⁷ Nicolle (note 31), p. 14.

⁴⁸ El-Bushra, J. and Gardner, J., ‘The impact of war on Somali men: Feminist analysis of masculinities and gender relations in a fragile context’, *Gender & Development*, vol. 24, no. 3 (2016).

⁴⁹ Somali Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MPIED), *Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework* (MPIED: Mogadishu, June 2018).

⁵⁰ Somali Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MPIED), *Somalia Drought Impact and Needs Assessment*, vol. 1, *Synthesis Report* (MPIED: Mogadishu, Jan. 2018).

⁵¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Humanitarian Response Plan 2022: Somalia* (OCHA: New York, Dec. 2021).

The 2022 Drought Response Plan outlines the responses necessitated by the ongoing drought in Somalia and the resulting famine and humanitarian crisis.⁵² The focus of the response plan is to scale up delivery of humanitarian assistance to hotspot crisis locations, including through provision of water, food, cash and voucher assistance, nutrition, and health services.⁵³ It also prioritizes early action and mitigation of the impact of drought on vulnerable communities.⁵⁴ All the interventions in the plan are integrated into the Humanitarian Response Plan.⁵⁵ In the light of the worsening drought emergency, around 2.8 million drought-affected people received life-saving assistance between January and May 2022, and a Drought Response and Famine Prevention Plan is being developed for May–December 2022, with a focus on famine prevention.⁵⁶ In May 2022, newly elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appointed a special envoy for drought as part of his prioritization of responding to climate-related challenges and their impacts on Somali livelihoods.⁵⁷ The envoy will work closely with local and international partners to find sustainable solutions and overcome the most pressing impacts of the drought in Somalia.

At the regional and local levels, several initiatives have been launched to provide livelihood relief and support. The Joint Programme for Sustainable Charcoal Reduction and Alternative Livelihoods, which started implementation in 2016 and ran until March 2022, is an initiative by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to provide Somalis with alternative options for clean energy and sustainable livelihoods.⁵⁸ To reduce local demand for charcoal, the project created and distributed fuel-efficient stoves and promoted the use of liquid petroleum gas and a biogas project in Mogadishu. The FAO also put in place initiatives to educate locals on alternative livelihood options such as livestock raising, horticulture and beekeeping.⁵⁹

Several projects have also focused on building local resilience to and capacity to deal with rapid-onset disasters. One project—the Support for Integrated Water Resources Management to Ensure Water Access and Disaster Reduction for Somalia’s Pastoralists project—is implemented by the Directorate of Environment and Climate Change in the Office of the Prime Minister, the Somali Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the UNDP, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). It addresses growing water scarcity and increasing floods and droughts, aiming to integrate water resource management for agricultural and nomadic pastoralists.⁶⁰ The project, which covers the period 2019–23, invests in infrastructure, automatic weather stations and early-warning data that can support contingency planning for local farmers and pastoralists. Other international actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have also helped to strengthen local capacity by developing maize and sorghum seeds that are more resilient to droughts and pests. The seeds are used by almost 60 cooperative farming schemes across the country.⁶¹ In south central and

⁵² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Drought Response Plan: Somalia 2022* (OCHA: New York, 17 Dec. 2021).

⁵³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 52), p. 12.

⁵⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 52), p. 12.

⁵⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 52), p. 4.

⁵⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 8).

⁵⁷ UN Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, ‘On field visit with Somalia’s drought envoy, humanitarian coordinator warns of “dire and grim” situation’, 31 May 2022.

⁵⁸ UN Development Programme (UNDP), ‘The joint programme for sustainable charcoal reduction and alternative livelihoods’, [n.d.].

⁵⁹ UN Development Programme (note 58).

⁶⁰ UN Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Support for integrated water resources management to ensure water access and disaster reduction for Somalia’s pastoralists’, [n.d.].

⁶¹ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘“If your animals die, you die with them”—Somali herders defenceless against the climate crisis’, 13 Sep. 2021.

northern Somalia, the ICRC supported herders by introducing Napier grass that can grow in many different soil types and provides sustainable fodder for livestock.

In March 2022 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the EU launched a project that will work with local communities in Galmudug state in central Somalia to build long-term resilience to climate change and address violent conflict arising from resource competition.⁶² Throughout the 18-month project cycle, the IOM will support community-driven solutions to ensure water access and management, provide capacity development on environmentally sustainable practices, and construct water-harvesting and groundwater infrastructure that can help to build local capacity in the long-term.⁶³

Gaps in current responses. Overall, these responses have focused on rapid-onset disasters and addressing the impacts of resulting conflict and displacement. They could benefit further from longer-term cross-sectoral integration and funding support. The responses tend to lack the large-scale development funding needed to support a humanitarian–development–peace triple-nexus approach that can alleviate the impacts and rapid increase of humanitarian needs in Somalia.⁶⁴ They are also often siloed and sector-focused. Climate responses in Somalia should transition towards area-based approaches—these are geographically defined and can bring together different disciplines to address short-term humanitarian needs and longer-term development planning.⁶⁵ Area-based approaches are largely bottom-up and incentivize triple-nexus coordination between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors.⁶⁶

In addition to emergency relief, donors should also continue to focus on supporting local adaptive practices that are resistant to climate change and localized in approach. In addition to existing initiatives and projects, local resilience can also be built using the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, which was established in 2013 under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to promote integrated approaches to the losses incurred by climate change.⁶⁷ This mechanism can initiate stakeholder synergies, enhance local knowledge on responses to loss and damage, and strengthen capacity-building and funding possibilities.

As explained above, climate change has affected women and men differently, which highlights the need for localized and tailored solutions. It is important to provide flexible and long-term funding directly to Somali actors and organizations.⁶⁸ A significant portion of donor funding is directed towards UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), even though it is often Somali actors and civil society that deliver the responses, especially in conflict zones that are not easily accessible to non-Somalis.⁶⁹ Empowering Somali actors can help to strengthen responses to livelihood deterioration, since they have pre-existing relationships with

⁶² International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘New IOM and EU project targets Somali communities affected by conflict and climate change’, 1 Feb. 2022.

⁶³ International Organization for Migration (note 62).

⁶⁴ Medinilla, A., Shiferaw, L. T. and Veron, P., *Think Local: Governance, Humanitarian Aid, Development and Peacebuilding in Somalia*, Discussion Paper no. 246 (European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM): Maastricht, Mar. 2019).

⁶⁵ Medinilla et al. (note 64).

⁶⁶ Medinilla et al. (note 64).

⁶⁷ UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries’, [n.d.]; and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, entered into force 21 Mar. 1994.

⁶⁸ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

⁶⁹ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

affected communities and have a better grasp on the contexts and gendered impacts of climate change.⁷⁰

Finally, strengthening the maritime sector in Somalia could be another important strategy to mitigate livelihood deterioration. The growing problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing has increasingly threatened Somalia's maritime sector and the FGS's ability to benefit from the full potential of its coastline and diverse marine species.⁷¹ International fishing fleets, originating mainly from Yemen, Iran and South East Asia, have engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing with the support of local Somali enablers (both state and non-state) and reduced the need to purchase formal fishing licences.⁷² This has environmental consequences for Somalia's marine resources and undermines the FGS's ability to fully develop the economic potential of its fisheries.⁷³ Promoting the conservation of threatened marine species, introducing sustainable uses of fisheries, and addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing could create additional livelihood diversification and food supplies in the face of climate change.⁷⁴ The lack of accurate and complete data on Somalia's fisheries—almost 86 per cent of the fisheries are currently unreported—makes it difficult to predict the extent to which Somalia is socially and economically dependent on its fisheries.⁷⁵ Filling this information gap could be an important first step.

Migration and mobility

Climate change in Somalia has interacted with other factors to displace populations and increase pressure on natural resources and exacerbate local conflicts.⁷⁶ When climate change influences people's livelihood options or the ecosystem on which they depend, they may respond to these changes in several ways—one of these is moving away from their homes to try to make a better living elsewhere.

Because many traditional livelihood practices depend on rainfall for crops and livestock, rapid-onset disasters, slow-onset climate change and irregular rainfall have rendered many coping mechanisms obsolete, leading many people to leave their places of origin in search of more habitable areas elsewhere.⁷⁷ Internal displacement, a form of forced displacement that does not cross an internationally recognized state border, can upend lives and increase insecurity.⁷⁸ Somalia has a high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Between 2005 and 2018, internal displacement in Somalia increased more than threefold, partly due to droughts in 2011 and 2017.⁷⁹ By late 2021 there was an estimated total of 3 million IDPs around the country—a number that is rapidly rising with the prolonged drought conditions.⁸⁰ Between January and May 2022, 771 400 new displacements were reported as a result of four consecutive failed rainy seasons, worsening drought conditions and conflict.⁸¹

⁷⁰ Croome and Hussein (note 36).

⁷¹ Bahadur, J., *Fishy Business: Illegal Fishing in Somalia and the Capture of State Institutions* (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime: Geneva, June 2021).

⁷² Bahadur (note 71).

⁷³ Bahadur (note 71).

⁷⁴ UN Environment Programme (note 35).

⁷⁵ Taylor, S. F. W. et al., 'Measurement and implications of marine food security in the Western Indian Ocean: An impending crisis?', *Food Security*, vol. 11, no. 6 (Dec. 2019).

⁷⁶ De Coning et al. (note 33).

⁷⁷ Nicolle (note 31).

⁷⁸ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'IDP definition', *Emergency Handbook*, 4th edn (UNHCR: Geneva, 2015).

⁷⁹ United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2018/800, 30 Aug. 2018.

⁸⁰ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Regional Bureau for East, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes, 'Refugees, asylum-seekers, refugee returnees and IDPs as of 31 Dec. 2021', 31 Jan. 2022.

⁸¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 8); and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Somalia: Drought displacement monitoring dashboard (April 2022)', 16 May 2022.

When people are internally displaced, it can cause friction with host communities and can alter clan and power compositions of cities as new groups arrive and challenge the old.⁸² In 2021, 3400 IDP sites were recorded in Somalia, 90 per cent of which were in urban centres, often on the outskirts of cities, where IDPs lack basic services and are caught in poverty traps.⁸³ This problem is exacerbated by the gaps in urban planning policies, which place additional burdens on host communities and their already scarce resources.⁸⁴ In response, some IDPs adopt maladaptive coping strategies. For example, firewood and charcoal collection can deteriorate the surrounding natural environments through increased deforestation and land degradation.⁸⁵

In IDP camps, people can also become targets for recruitment by armed groups such as al-Shabab.⁸⁶ The frequent conflicts between clans and landowners and the lack of social cohesion in the camps make it easier for armed groups to gain the trust of IDPs and target potential recruits, especially younger men.⁸⁷ Because IDPs often depend on their clan affiliations for protection and access to vital services, when they relocate to areas outside the reach of their own clans, it can increase their insecurity.⁸⁸ Children in IDP camps are also targets for armed groups, since parents are less able to provide for their families and ensure the safety of their children.⁸⁹ In these camps, children receive less education and have fewer employment possibilities, thereby increasing their likelihood of being recruited.⁹⁰ A 2019 report by the UN secretary-general found that Somalia had the highest number of children recruited by armed groups globally.⁹¹

Government and UN responses. The FGS and the UN have led several responses to increase community resilience to displacement.

The Midnimo project was launched as a pilot project in 2016, supported by the Peacebuilding Fund, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the IOM. It strengthened local governance, created durable solutions for displaced communities and refugee returnees, and improved social cohesion in Jubaland and South West states.⁹² It was succeeded by Midnimo II in 2018, expanded to Hirshabelle and Galmudug states with the UNDP as a new partner and with gender as an overarching focus.⁹³

The Midnimo pilot projects paved the way for the National Durable Solutions Strategy for 2020–24.⁹⁴ This was developed by the FGS and helps to address the root factors of displacement, including by supporting displaced communities and IDPs to integrate with local communities and to access public services, housing and social safety nets. It also addresses migration caused by the flooding of the Juba and Shabelle rivers.

⁸² Eklöw and Krampe (note 3), p. 27.

⁸³ World Bank, *Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2021); and Camp Coordination Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster Somalia, 'CCCM Cluster Somalia strategy', International Organization for Migration and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Jan. 2022.

⁸⁴ Nicolle (note 31), p. 7.

⁸⁵ Nicolle (note 31), p. 86.

⁸⁶ Eklöw and Krampe (note 3), p. 21.

⁸⁷ United Nations, *UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017–2020* (United Nations: New York, Dec. 2017).

⁸⁸ International Organization for Migration (IOM), 'Climate change drives displacement of thousands of vulnerable people in Somalia', Medium, 4 Jan. 2021.

⁸⁹ Regilme, S. S. F. and Spoldi, E., 'Children in armed conflict: A human rights crisis in Somalia', *Global Jurist*, vol. 21, no. 2 (July 2021).

⁹⁰ Regilme and Spoldi (note 89).

⁹¹ United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, 'Children and armed conflict', Report of the Secretary-General, A/73/907–S/2019/509, 20 June 2019.

⁹² Global Protection Cluster, 'Somalia: The Midnimo project's experiment in integrated humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programming on durable solutions', [n.d.].

⁹³ Global Protection Cluster (note 92).

⁹⁴ Somali Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED), Durable Solutions Unit, *The National Durable Solutions Strategy (2020–2024)* (MOPIED: Mogadishu, [2020]).

The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) has also taken measures to tackle the impacts of droughts on essential services and women's access to basic hygiene necessities such as soap, underwear and menstrual pads. UNFPA has distributed dignity kits with hygiene and sanitary necessities.⁹⁵ It has also deployed eight mobile teams to provide women with information on how to protect themselves from gender-based violence, especially in IDP camps and host communities.⁹⁶

Gaps in current responses. There is a need to further incorporate ecosystem restoration and nature-based solutions into responses to displacement.⁹⁷ Climate change can have an impact on local ecosystems and biodiversity, which in turn accelerates internal displacement in Somalia and causes more people to adopt maladaptive coping strategies that damage local environments.⁹⁸ It is therefore important to integrate ecosystem restoration into resettlement plans for communities at risk of being displaced.⁹⁹ These nature-based considerations can ameliorate living conditions for displaced people while 're-greening' local nature.¹⁰⁰ They can also help by removing the need for maladaptive strategies.

The new IDP site in Luglow, Jubaland, has already integrated this type of thinking into its planning. In early 2021 the Jubaland Ministry of Environment and Tourism with the technical support of the UNEP, the FAO and the IOM conducted an assessment of the environmental impact of relocating communities to Luglow.¹⁰¹ The UN supported by planting new trees and ensuring access to charcoal and water for displaced communities in the site.¹⁰² New IDP camps in Somalia could benefit from similar ecosystem approaches in their planning to address problems in a preventative manner from the start.

Armed groups

Rapid-onset disasters and resource scarcity caused by climate change can affect the tactical considerations of armed groups and contribute to worsening insecurity.¹⁰³ The famine of 1991–92 was the combined result of one of Africa's worst droughts and the ousting of President Mohamed Siad Barre and subsequent clan-based militia fighting over power and resources, which tore the country apart.¹⁰⁴ During the early years after its establishment in 2006, al-Shabab capitalized on recurring droughts in the late 2000s to extort local farmers in the south and generate income.¹⁰⁵ The strains caused by climate change can be used by armed groups to boost recruitment and increase their share of land and resources.¹⁰⁶ These impacts are contingent on the lack of capacity and presence of state and other actors to act as service and relief providers and to counter the influence of armed groups.

Ecological constraints can exacerbate the suffering of the most vulnerable segments of society, limiting their coping capacity to defend their own interests (along clan lines)

⁹⁵ UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 'Drought in Somalia forces displacement, posing particular challenges for women and girls', 22 Apr. 2021.

⁹⁶ UN Population Fund (note 95).

⁹⁷ Nicolle (note 31), p. 15.

⁹⁸ Schipper (note 44); and Nicolle (note 31), p. 114.

⁹⁹ Nicolle (note 31), p. 114.

¹⁰⁰ Ecosystem Restoration Camps, 'Refugees & restoration', 16 July 2021.

¹⁰¹ Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), *Amplifying the Voices of Displacement Affected Communities: Perception Survey on the Relocation of Displaced Populations from Kismayo to Luglow* (NRC: Oslo, Oct. 2021).

¹⁰² Hodder, C., 'Climate change and security in the United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia', Adelphi Research, July 2021.

¹⁰³ Mobjörk, M., Krampe, F. and Tarif, K., 'Pathways of climate insecurity: Guidance for policymakers', SIPRI Policy Brief, Nov. 2020.

¹⁰⁴ Bradbury, M. and Healy, S., 'Endless war: A brief history of the Somali conflict', *Accord*, no. 21 (2010).

¹⁰⁵ Heaton, L., 'The making of a climate outlaw', *Foreign Policy*, 6 June 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Mobjörk et al. (note 103).

against armed groups. During droughts, farmers tend to sell more of their livestock, which floods the market for animals. This causes prices in local markets to plummet and elevates the risk of people participating in livestock raiding or joining armed groups.¹⁰⁷ Between 2012 and 2017 al-Shabab benefited from water shortages by capturing important water points on the Juba and Shabelle rivers, poisoning water wells and destroying critical water infrastructure.¹⁰⁸ When people adopt unsustainable practices such as charcoal collection to cope with the challenges caused by rapid-onset disasters, al-Shabab has taken advantage by taxing traders who possess charcoal and using the income to finance its own insurgency.¹⁰⁹ Gains of territory since 2017 have enabled al-Shabab to control almost all of the main supply routes in southern and central Somalia, leading it to collect more taxes than the FGS.¹¹⁰

Armed groups can also take advantage of a lack of state service provision during rapid-onset disasters to position themselves as alternative providers of relief. Insecurity along major supply routes, especially in southern and central Somalia, makes it difficult for humanitarian agencies to provide basic services and lifesaving relief.¹¹¹ More than 500 000 people in Somalia currently live in territory that is controlled by al-Shabab and beyond the reach of external humanitarian assistance.¹¹² Al-Shabab has positioned itself as a relief provider, including by creating drought committees in six administrative regions in 2017 to coordinate relief operations and distribute food in case of famine.¹¹³ Most recently, the ongoing drought crisis and food shortages have been aggravated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine: Somalia relies almost entirely on imported wheat, which is used in most food staples; yet almost all of its wheat imports come from Russia or Ukraine, trade with which has now been suspended.¹¹⁴ Al-Shabab has capitalized on the opportunity to provide cooking oil, rice and sugar to affected communities.¹¹⁵

Al-Shabab also provides alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms when local populations deem formal state courts to be untrustworthy or corrupt.¹¹⁶ Local farmer-herder disputes and competition over land have traditionally been resolved through *xeer*, a customary legal mechanism that applies ad hoc between two parties with a third-party judge determining the outcome and any compensation.¹¹⁷ However, the combination of civil war and climate-induced migration of traditional mediators has led to a decline in the use of *xeer*, while formal state courts are often found to be too slow or corrupt.¹¹⁸ Many Somalis thus seek alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, for example by turning to al-Shabab. They even do this in territories beyond its control, such as Mogadishu.¹¹⁹ Al-Shabab's legal courts have sometimes been found to provide faster and more efficient results when resolving land disputes.¹²⁰ Al-Shabab has also advertised its legal courts as being more accessible and fairer to marginalized populations, such as minority clan groups, who are often unable to afford access to formal

¹⁰⁷ Maystadt, J.-F. and Ecker, O., 'Extreme weather and civil war: Does drought fuel conflict in Somalia through livestock price shocks?', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 96, no. 4 (July 2014).

¹⁰⁸ Strategic Foresight Group, 'Water and violence: Somalia', *Blue Peace Bulletin*, vol. 5 (2019).

¹⁰⁹ Hiraal Institute, *The AS Finance System* (Hiraal Institute: Mogadishu, July 2018).

¹¹⁰ Mohamud, H. S., 'Somalia's dangerous authoritarian turn', *Foreign Affairs*, 26 Jan. 2022.

¹¹¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 51), p. 39.

¹¹² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 51), p. 39.

¹¹³ De Coning et al. (note 33).

¹¹⁴ Buchholz, K., 'This is how wheat shortages are creating a food security risk', World Economic Forum, 12 Apr. 2022.

¹¹⁵ Sguazzin, A., 'Next Africa: Drought, Russia's war open a window for al-Shabaab', Bloomberg, 29 Apr. 2022.

¹¹⁶ Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia (EAJ), *Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu* (Pact and American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative: Nairobi, Jan. 2020).

¹¹⁷ Brown, O. and Keating, M., *Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts: Working towards More Effective Resolution of National and Sub-national Resource Disputes* (Chatham House: London, June 2015).

¹¹⁸ Eklöw and Krampe (note 3), p. 19.

¹¹⁹ Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia (note 116), p. 17.

¹²⁰ Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia (note 116), p. 17.

justice systems.¹²¹ State justice officials have even used al-Shabab's courts when their legal cases cannot be concluded in formal state courts and they require an al-Shabab judge to deliver the final verdict.¹²² These dynamics undermine government-led justice systems and regulation.

Government and UN responses. The FGS and the UN have implemented several actions to respond to armed groups and their manipulation of climate-related vulnerabilities.

In 2016 the FGS adopted a national strategy and action plan on preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) as part of its approach to security in Somalia.¹²³ In 2017 UNSOM became the first UN mission with a dedicated PCVE mandate and an adviser to support the FGS in implementing its PCVE plan and strategy.¹²⁴ These steps were strengthened in 2017 when the FGS and the UN endorsed the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), which integrated PCVE within military and state security efforts in Somalia.¹²⁵ This approach targets interventions around gender equality and climate change, and has partnered with youth and religious groups, women, and former members of al-Shabab.¹²⁶

The Defection Rehabilitation Programme (DRP) is another FGS effort to counter violent extremism by providing a path for disengaged former al-Shabab fighters.¹²⁷ Initiated in 2015, the DRP was eventually incorporated into the national PCVE strategy. The DRP, with the support of UNSOM, the IOM, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the PBF, has adopted and evolved a gender-sensitive approach through dedicated programmes for children and women formerly associated with al-Shabab.¹²⁸

The African Union (AU) has also helped the FGS to counter armed groups like al-Shabab through the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its replacement, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). In April 2022, AMISOM transitioned its authority to ATMIS, which will operate until 31 December 2024.¹²⁹ ATMIS will follow-up on the progress made by AMISOM since 2007 in line with the Somalia Transition Plan established in 2018 and will gradually transition security responsibilities, including efforts to combat al-Shabab, from the AU mission to the Somali security forces.¹³⁰

Gaps in current responses. Although the PCVE strategy and action plan have provided capacity support to curtail the effects of armed groups, they could be strengthened by placing more focus on the root causes of armed recruitments. The plan has been criticized for framing armed groups such as al-Shabab as the sole problem, and overlooking other grievances such as the lack of state security apparatuses, clan conflict and unemployment.¹³¹ In the absence of state security provision, the proliferation of weapons in civilian hands has increased incidents of violence.¹³² These conflicts can

¹²¹ Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia (note 116), p. 18.

¹²² Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia (note 116), p. 17.

¹²³ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), 'Prevention and countering of violent extremism', [n.d.].

¹²⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2358, 14 June 2017; and UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 123).

¹²⁵ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 123).

¹²⁶ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 123).

¹²⁷ AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 'AMISOM trains Somali officials in rehabilitation of ex-combatants', 11 Dec. 2019.

¹²⁸ AU Mission in Somalia (note 127).

¹²⁹ African Union (AU), 'African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) transitions to African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)', 5 Apr. 2022.

¹³⁰ AU Transition Mission in Somalia, 'About ATMIS'; and UN Security Council Resolution 2628, 31 Mar. 2022.

¹³¹ Saferworld, 'Thinking beyond "countering violent extremism" in Somalia: Local views on an international "project"', [n.d.].

¹³² Peace and Development Research Center, 'Achieving local reconciliation in Somalia', eds M. Keating and M. Waldman, *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019), p. 84.

cause revenge killings and cycles of violence in home communities. Climate-related security risks have also been exploited by armed groups, which capitalize on human vulnerabilities to place themselves as service providers and gain more following. Climate security must therefore be fully included in the training and capacity building of the Somali military, police and maritime forces so that they can secure communities in the face of climate change and curtail the influence of armed groups.

The rule of law and justice provision in Somalia must also be strengthened so that these services can be used by local communities to adjudicate their land and resource disputes. This could reduce the need for people to seek alternative resolution mechanisms elsewhere, such as with armed groups like al-Shabab. In order to address the root causes of armed group recruitments, livelihood creation and relief must also be integrated into PCVE approaches and must be gender sensitive.

In the long term, building trust in the Somali authorities and their ability to provide legitimate and trusted services, justice and security is important to mitigating the authority of armed groups.¹³³ This is consistent with research showing that a fair allocation and delivery of the right services—that is, the services that are asked for and in the form that is wanted—increases the government’s legitimacy and people’s trust in the state.¹³⁴ If the FGS is perceived as a legitimate and trusted provider of the required services, then people will be less inclined to search for alternative relief sources such as armed groups when they are faced with climate-related security risks.

Elite exploitation

Local struggles brought on by environmental degradation and resource scarcity can be manipulated by elites—people with relative wealth or power—and escalated into broader conflict.¹³⁵ In Somalia elites have exploited the effects of climate change such as droughts, floods and locust infestations to their advantage, and so deepened insecurity.¹³⁶ They have manipulated clan relations and grievances, which can intensify local conflicts and at times interact with national political dynamics. Conflicts between political factions in the FGS and the federal states—as was the case during the 2021–22 federal elections—undermine institutional capacity to address climate risks, thereby deepening insecurity.

Power and access to resources are largely clan-based in Somalia—almost all public and political positions are linked to clan affiliation.¹³⁷ An increase in the spread of arms and weapons in Somalia has exacerbated the impacts of inter- and intra-clan armed competition over natural resources.¹³⁸ Political contestations at the national level over the formation of federal states and border disputes between the states have restricted population movements between government jurisdictions and contributed to violent border disputes.¹³⁹ These struggles have been affected by the political aims of clan elites, whose groups tend to be distributed across political borders.¹⁴⁰ Clan-based power-sharing deals have also been found to marginalize ethnic minorities and create openings for manipulation by armed groups like al-Shabab, especially after periods of floods and droughts.¹⁴¹

¹³³ Krampe, F., Hegazi, F. and VanDeveer, S. D., ‘Sustaining peace through better resource governance: Three potential mechanisms for environmental peacebuilding’, *World Development*, vol. 144 (Aug. 2021).

¹³⁴ Krampe et al. (note 133).

¹³⁵ Mobjörk et al. (note 103).

¹³⁶ Eklöv and Krampe (note 3), pp. 21, 26.

¹³⁷ Keating, M. and Waldman, M., ‘Overview’, eds Keating and Waldman (note 132), p. 11.

¹³⁸ Thalheimer, L. and Webersik, C., ‘Climate change, conflicts and migration’, eds Krieger et al. (note 2), p. 65.

¹³⁹ Thalheimer and Webersik (note 138), p. 66.

¹⁴⁰ Thalheimer and Webersik (note 138), p. 66.

¹⁴¹ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), *Countering Al-Shabaab Propaganda and Recruitment Mechanisms in South Central Somalia* (UNSOM: Mogadishu, [2017]).

Elites and powerful clans have also exploited their positions of power to capture land and territory in Somalia at the expense of local communities. Climate change is one of the factors that has reduced the amount of cultivable land and increased local competition for tenure rights.¹⁴² In Jubaland the absence of clear land-governance systems and regulation has caused illegal occupation and land grabbing to become leading triggers of violent conflict.¹⁴³ The 2011 flood in the Shabelle River Basin, displaced weaker minority clans from their lands, which, when the water retreated, were seized by more powerful clan elites.¹⁴⁴ These actions amplified mismanagement in land usage and uncontrolled land degradation.¹⁴⁵

Government and UN responses. The FGS and the UN have addressed the security risks of elite exploitation through preventative approaches that strengthen local management of resources and land, thereby mitigating the risk of violent conflicts erupting and reducing the spaces for elites to manipulate.

The above-mentioned Support for Integrated Water Resources Management to Ensure Water Access and Disaster Reduction for Somalia's Pastoralists project aims to strengthen Somalia's water-management practices and resilience.¹⁴⁶ Included in the project is an early-warning telephone system to mitigate the effects of rapid-onset disasters.¹⁴⁷ Once people receive a text message, the telephone app directs them to the closest water resource as droughts become more intense. This enables pastoralists to move their herds in time, before suffering any losses. The \$10 million project also includes the creation of Somalia's first National Hydro-Meteorological Service and the provision of education for pastoralists on how to better manage their resources, as well as construction of automatic weather stations and water-storage dams.¹⁴⁸

In response to land grabbing, the UN together with the Somaliland and Puntland ministries of interior and finance and associations of local government authorities introduced a Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery.¹⁴⁹ This programme included the drafting of land legislation in Puntland, where the 2020 Urban Land Management Law now provides a legislative framework to mediate land conflicts.¹⁵⁰

Gaps in current responses. Although several responses are already ongoing, it is important to focus on the root grievances currently enabling elite exploitation in Somalia, and then build the capacity of the local and federal government actors and institutions that can address them. To achieve this, an important step at the national level is to collect and share climate risk analyses across ministries of the FGS and with the federal states—this will allow the analyses to be fully included in Somalia's security sector and enable the FGS to prevent climate risks from turning violent and being manipulated by elites. Enhancing coordination between the FGS and the federal

¹⁴² Eklöv and Krampe (note 3), p. 22.

¹⁴³ UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), *Land and Conflict in Jubaland: Root Cause Analysis and Recommendations* (UN-Habitat: Nairobi, 2020).

¹⁴⁴ Eklöv and Krampe (note 3), p. 22.

¹⁴⁵ Thalheimer and Webersik (note 138), p. 66.

¹⁴⁶ UN Development Programme, 'Somalia and UNDP launch new US\$10 million project for pastoralist communities to access scarce water resources and adapt to climate-related droughts and floods', 12 Nov. 2019. See also UN Development Programme (note 60).

¹⁴⁷ UN Development Programme (note 146).

¹⁴⁸ UN Development Programme (note 146).

¹⁴⁹ UN Human Settlements Programme, 'Joint program on local governance and decentralized service delivery in Somalia', [n.d.].

¹⁵⁰ UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), 'New Urban Land Management Law to guide land issues in Puntland, Somalia', July 2020.

states is key to enabling such mainstreaming of climate security across ministries and should be a priority for the newly elected FGS.

Early-warning systems are also important preventive tools that can help the FGS to anticipate and minimize the effects of rapid-onset disasters on local communities and take stronger action against elite exploitation of climate vulnerabilities.¹⁵¹ The FGS can strengthen these preventive capacities by working together with other regional partners, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which has the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), and the AU, with its Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).¹⁵²

Another important issue that has emboldened elite exploitation in Somalia is the lack of clear land tenure rights and applicable law. To address the root causes of exploitation, it is important for the FGS to bridge the gaps between customary tenure systems and the application of statutory law.¹⁵³ These disparities have enabled the capture of land by the more powerful elites and have amplified clan divisions. At both the national and local levels, there are no clear land tenure laws or institutions.¹⁵⁴ There is also no central government authority clearly responsible for managing these land tenure issues. A priority should be to focus on developing land-reform laws that integrate traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms such as *xeer* and strengthen the FGS's capacity to adjudicate land-related disputes.

¹⁵¹ De Coning et al. (note 33).

¹⁵² De Coning et al. (note 33).

¹⁵³ Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, 'Somalia', Gender and Land Rights Database, accessed 25 Nov. 2021.

¹⁵⁴ Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (note 153).

3. Climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia

Climate change has an important influence on livelihoods, mobility patterns, armed group tactics and elite exploitation in Somalia. When combined with other pre-existing factors, such as the social, political and economic contexts, climate change can create human security risks. Chapter 2 maps out these climate-related security risks and identifies gaps for future interventions.

This chapter begins by introducing existing climate security and peacebuilding approaches in Somalia and describing the potential contribution of the Peacebuilding Commission based on its convening role. It then uses the gaps identified in chapter 2 to recommend a new, integrated approach to climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia consisting of three components: environmental peacebuilding, national governance and international support. The overarching goal of this approach is environmental peacebuilding, which can be achieved through a focus on national governance, with international support. Together, these have the potential to strengthen climate, security and peace in Somalia.

Addressing climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia

The Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations and other external actors have introduced projects and programmes in Somalia to address the needs of local populations and the climate-related security risks identified in chapter 2. Yet, peacebuilding efforts continue to be affected by climate change. This can undermine coordinated and effective responses, especially during rapid-onset disasters that require immediate action. It is important that multilateral partners in Somalia continue to reinforce one another in an integrated way and to incorporate climate security into their peacebuilding processes. The PBC can support these objectives of coherence and partnership.

Existing approaches

Efforts and progress have already been made by both local and international actors in Somalia to address the interlinkages between climate security and peacebuilding. In 2019 Somalia adopted a National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) to consolidate regional and national leadership in a participatory way, and to provide a coordinating platform for peacebuilding efforts in the country.¹⁵⁵ In 2019 Somalia also launched its ninth National Development Plan, for 2020–24, which includes three cross-cutting priorities: the environment, durable solutions to long-term displacement, and the nexus between humanitarian and development work.¹⁵⁶ The plan informed the 2021–25 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Somalia, which fully incorporates climate security, climate change and environmental protection into its outputs.¹⁵⁷ The framework emphasizes the importance of integrated and triple-nexus responses to peace and development. The climate security and environmental adviser deployed to UNSOM has also trained government officials and UN staff on how to analyse and incorporate the links between climate change and security into their development and mediation work.¹⁵⁸ During the 26th UN Climate Change Conference

¹⁵⁵ United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, Press statement on peacebuilding in Somalia, 4 Dec. 2020.

¹⁵⁶ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), 'UN Peacebuilding Commission holds first meeting on Somalia since 2015', 2 Dec. 2020.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations Somalia, *Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2021–2025* (United Nations: New York, Oct. 2020); and Hodder (note 102).

¹⁵⁸ Romita, P., 'The UN Security Council and climate change', Research Report no. 2, Security Council Report, June 2021.

(COP26) in 2021, Somalia revised its nationally determined contribution under the 2015 Paris Agreement, reaffirming its investment in mitigation and adaptation efforts, committing itself to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30 per cent below ‘business as usual’ levels by 2030, and strengthening disaster preparedness and management in vulnerable sectors and groups.¹⁵⁹

The PBC has engaged with Somalia to support its peacebuilding priorities. In December 2020, at the request of the FGS following Somalia’s renewal of eligibility for the Peacebuilding Fund, a PBC meeting was convened to discuss Somalia’s peacebuilding priorities and challenges.¹⁶⁰ This was the first PBC meeting on Somalia since 2015. During the meeting, the PBC recognized progress made through Somalia’s ninth National Development Plan and the NRF.¹⁶¹ The PBC committed itself to help mobilize international support for Somalia’s peacebuilding priorities and find solutions to intractable challenges to peace. This included support to the NRF and promoting the vital role of women in peacebuilding.¹⁶²

Should the FGS request support from the PBC in integrating climate security into its peacebuilding responses, the PBC could consider convening meetings and other initiatives on the issues, in close collaboration with UNSOM. The PBC’s support to Somalia’s efforts would be based on its mandate (see box 3.1) and guided by the principles of national ownership and partnership.

The Peacebuilding Commission and climate security

Since 2020 the PBC has been increasingly involved in issues related to climate change and peacebuilding.¹⁶³ In July 2020 the PBC held its first meeting on peacebuilding challenges in the Pacific Islands. It expressed concerns over the Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts on peacebuilding efforts in a region that faced profound socio-economic challenges and climate risks.¹⁶⁴ In September 2020, following a PBC meeting on the Lake Chad Basin, the commission submitted a written statement to the UN Security Council’s open debate on the humanitarian impacts of environmental degradation on peace and security.¹⁶⁵ The written statement stressed the importance of mitigating tensions and addressing farmer–herder disputes exacerbated by environmental degradation in the Lake Chad Basin. In 2021 the PBC called for more structural investments in response to climate change in the context of the commission’s discussion on the Sahel region. This engagement continued during the PBC’s March 2022 ambassadorial-level meeting on climate-related peace and development challenges in the Sahel.¹⁶⁶ The PBC has actively supported the efforts of the G5 Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—to address climate degradation issues from a peacebuilding angle, guided by the implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and its support plan.¹⁶⁷ The PBC’s most recent engagement on the topic occurred in May 2022, when an ambassadorial-level meeting was convened

¹⁵⁹ Federal Republic of Somalia, ‘Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)’, July 2021; and Paris Agreement, opened for signature 22 Apr. 2016, entered into force 4 Nov. 2016.

¹⁶⁰ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 156).

¹⁶¹ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 156).

¹⁶² UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 156).

¹⁶³ Sherman, J. and Krampe, F., ‘The Peacebuilding Commission and climate-related security risks: A more favourable political environment?’, SIPRI–IPI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2020/9, Sep. 2020.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, Ambassadorial-level Meeting on the Impact of COVID-19 on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Pacific Islands, Chair’s summary, 28 July 2020.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, Chair’s statement to Security Council open debate on ‘Humanitarian effects of environmental degradation and peace and security’, 17 Sep. 2020. See also Romita (note 158).

¹⁶⁶ United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, ‘Ambassadorial-level meeting on the Sahel’, 16th session, 22 Mar. 2022.

¹⁶⁷ United Nations (note 166); and United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, annex.

Box 3.1. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was created in December 2005 through twin resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. These resolutions conferred on the PBC the following mandate:

- (a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- (b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- (c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.^a

Following a 2015 review of the peacebuilding architecture, in 2016 the General Assembly and the Security Council further called upon the PBC:

- (a) To bring sustained international attention to sustaining peace, and to provide political accompaniment and advocacy to countries affected by conflict, with their consent;
- (b) To promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding, noting that security, development and human rights are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing;
- (c) To serve a bridging role among the principal organs and relevant entities of the United Nations by sharing advice on peacebuilding needs and priorities, in line with the respective competencies and responsibilities of these bodies;
- (d) To serve as a platform to convene all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, including from Member States, national authorities, United Nations missions and country teams, international, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society, women's groups, youth organizations and, where relevant, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to provide recommendations and information to improve their coordination, to develop and share good practices in peacebuilding, including on institution-building, and to ensure predictable financing to peacebuilding.^b

^a UN General Assembly Resolution 60/180, 30 Dec. 2005, para. 2; and UN Security Council Resolution 1645, 20 Dec. 2005, para. 2.

^b UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, 12 May 2016, para. 4; and UN Security Council Resolution 2282, 27 Apr. 2016, para. 4.

on the impact of climate change on peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands.¹⁶⁸ The Pacific Island representatives called for support from the PBC in unlocking climate finance in the region, and members of the commission further encouraged the PBC to continue using its advisory, bridging and convening roles in considering the impact of climate change on peacebuilding processes.¹⁶⁹

The PBC can help mobilize international partners around the issues of climate change and peacebuilding, building on the initial investments made by the PBF and other partners in Somalia. The PBC can also provide a platform for sharing approaches on integrating climate security into peacebuilding processes among countries and regions, including Somalia.

Integrating approaches to climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia

The inherent interconnection of the climate-related security pathways in Somalia requires the FGS, the UN and other external actors to integrate their approaches to climate security and peacebuilding based on three components: environmental peacebuilding, national governance and international support. These components were established based on the gaps in responses identified in chapter 2 (see figure 3.1).

¹⁶⁸ United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, 'Ambassadorial-level meeting on the impact of climate change on peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands', 31 May 2022.

¹⁶⁹ UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, 'This week in DPPA: 28 May–3 June 2022', 3 June 2022.

Each component of the proposed approach encompasses a set of recommendations—programmes, projects and activities—to be implemented and the actors who can accomplish them (see figure 3.2). The first component, on environmental peacebuilding, contains the goal and content of the proposed approach. The second component, on national governance, recommends ways to strengthen national capacity and institutions in support of environmental peacebuilding. The final component, on international support, outlines the coordination and assistance needed from the UN and other external actors to support the FGS and other local stakeholders in implementing environmental peacebuilding approaches. In short, environmental peacebuilding is the goal of the approach, national governance focuses on the responsible implementing actors, while international players can provide support throughout. Together, these three components can contribute to enhancing Somalia’s climate resilience, peace and security. The approach can also help the PBC to discuss priority areas in which it can engage and help mobilize international support.

Environmental peacebuilding

Strengthen environmental mediation and climate risk analysis

Since climate change can alter national capacities and institutions for building peace, exacerbate local grievances, and increase the likelihood of violence erupting, it must be factored into peacebuilding strategies.¹⁷⁰ Environmental peacebuilding addresses climate change as a problem requiring collective action and highlights the importance of building trust and long-term interactions around resource cooperation.¹⁷¹

As illustrated in the elite exploitation pathway (discussed in chapter 2), it is critical that climate risk assessments be shared across government ministries. These assessments must be grounded in community-led processes to integrate the local perspectives on climate change and resource scarcity, and they must better target peacebuilding efforts. The livelihood deterioration pathway highlights the need to strengthen individual and localized approaches to climate change and the actors that can effectively deliver them. To ensure these efforts are effective, they must be accompanied by strong institution building and rule of law in Somalia in order to enable national accountability and sustainable resource governance.¹⁷²

Include climate-sensitive advice in peacebuilding mandates

To strengthen environmental peacebuilding, it is important to integrate resource risk and climate perspectives within peacebuilding mandates. Because the mismanagement of resources has been found to cause conflict relapses, a focus on environmental peacebuilding could help to ensure that peace efforts address and incorporate resource-management strategies.¹⁷³ During the UN Security Council review of peace operations and mandates—including UNSOM in Somalia—it could be important to focus on how to better integrate resource and climate change considerations into peacebuilding processes.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Matthew, R. A., ‘Climate change adaptation and peacebuilding’, eds A. Swain and J. Öjendal, *Routledge Handbook of Environmental Conflict and Peacebuilding* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2018).

¹⁷¹ Ide, T., ‘The dark side of environmental peacebuilding’, *World Development*, vol. 127 (Mar. 2020); and Conca, K. and Dabelko, G. D. (eds), *Environmental Peacemaking* (Woodrow Wilson Center: Washington, DC, 13 Nov. 2002).

¹⁷² United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Letter dated 2 July 2020 from the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the president of the General Assembly and the president of the Security Council, A/74/935-S/2020/645, 7 July 2020.

¹⁷³ Krampe et al. (note 133).

¹⁷⁴ Abdelkhalek, O., Written statement at the UN Security Council ministerial open debate on transitions under agenda item ‘United Nations peacekeeping operations’, 8 Sep. 2021.




Figure 3.1. Linking the gaps to recommendations

The UN in Somalia has already made efforts to strengthen the link between these issues. UNSOM has a youth, peace and security adviser, a climate security and environmental adviser, and a peacebuilding and conflict adviser, all of whom have a focus on coordinating with and supporting the PBF and the peacebuilding agenda at large.¹⁷⁵ The UN presence in Somalia was also the first to establish a youth strategy to mainstream youth into peacebuilding activities.¹⁷⁶ However, the UN has yet to develop a dedicated peacebuilding strategy in Somalia—something that the UN Security Council explicitly mandated in the case of Sudan—or an expert to coordinate peacebuilding efforts at the operation level.¹⁷⁷

Climate change and its security impacts must be included in the conflict and context analyses developed by peacebuilding missions. It is important that, when these studies are conducted, they are followed up by the training and capacity building of UN staff to ensure that they translate into system-wide programming and interventions.¹⁷⁸ This can be supported by climate security and environmental advisers deployed to UN missions, such as the one in Somalia.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ Westin, K., 'Meet the first youth, peace and security adviser on deployment from FBA', Folke Bernadotte Academy, 9 Dec. 2020.

¹⁷⁶ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), *Operationalising the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Somalia: Progress towards a Federalisation Agenda as a Foundation for Peace* (GPPAC: The Hague, Mar 2022), p. 22.

¹⁷⁷ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (note 176), p. 19.

¹⁷⁸ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (note 176), p. 4.

¹⁷⁹ Romita (note 158).




Figure 3.2. Integrated approach to climate security and peacebuilding in Somalia

ATMIS = African Union Transition Mission in Somalia; CSO = civil society organization; DPO = United Nations Department of Peace Operations; DPPA = UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; EUCAP = European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia; FAO = Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN; FGS = Federal Government of Somalia; FMS = federal member states; GCF = Green Climate Fund; IOM = International Organization for Migration; IUCN = International Union for Conservation of Nature; NGO = non-governmental organization; PAMG = UNSOM Political Affairs and Mediation Group; PBC = UN Peacebuilding Commission; PBF = UN Peacebuilding Fund; ROLSIG = UNSOM Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group; UNDP = UN Development Programme; UNEP = UN Environment Programme; UNICEF = UN Children's Fund; UNSOM = UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, WFP = World Food Programme.

Promote inclusive peacebuilding, including through support to women leadership

Equally important to environmental peacebuilding is the need to recognize women as agents for peace in Somalia. As the main breadwinners of households in the country, women play specific roles in facilitating long-term conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding.¹⁸⁰ As noted in chapter 2, it is important that climate security approaches integrate gender-sensitive advice and the roles and experiences of women. Involving women in decision-making and capturing their unique perspectives on natural resource management can help to increase the impact of peacebuilding and make it more inclusive.¹⁸¹ Women are often at the front line of climate disasters, and therefore have unique leadership abilities during crises situations.¹⁸² Women are important

¹⁸⁰ Keating, M. and Waldman, M., 'Introduction', eds Keating and Waldman (note 132), p. 5.

¹⁸¹ UN Environment Programme (UNEP) et al., *Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change* (UNEP et al.: New York, 2020).

¹⁸² Nihad, N. and Abdenur A. E., 'At the forefront of climate action: Local approaches to climate-sensitive conflict and violence protection', Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), 27 Sep. 2021.

Box 3.2. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

The United Nations Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 by the secretary-general at the request of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The PBF is the UN's financial instrument to sustain peace in countries at risk of or affected by violent conflict. It invests together with governments, UN agencies, regional organizations, multilateral banks, national multi-donor trust funds and civil society organizations. Between 2006 and 2021 the PBF allocated almost US\$1.67 billion to 65 countries.^a

The PBF supports UN responses to fill critical gaps, to respond quickly to peacebuilding opportunities, and to catalyse processes and resources in a risk-sensitive way.^b The PBF Advisory Group provides advice and oversight on the allocations, programming and policies of the PBF. It also gives input on how financing can support UN efforts towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace.^c

^a United Nations, Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund, 'The Fund', [n.d].

^b United Nations (note a).

^c United Nations, Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund, 'Sixth Advisory Group of the Peacebuilding Fund', [n.d].

drivers of change when it comes to climate security and must be included in decision-making processes.¹⁸³

The PBC has similarly stressed the importance of paying attention to inclusive and gender-sensitive peacebuilding.¹⁸⁴ In 2016 it created a gender strategy to raise attention about the gendered dimension of peacebuilding (and the distinct roles of men and women in peace processes) as well as to enhance its gender-sensitive advice to the Security Council.¹⁸⁵ In February 2021 the PBC adopted a Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding, acknowledging the important roles of young women and men in peacebuilding processes and committing itself to mainstreaming them into its work.¹⁸⁶ The PBC can help to convene actors working on climate and peacebuilding and discuss ways forward to strengthen the roles of women and young people as agents for peace.¹⁸⁷ Because the PBC operates around the principles of national ownership and partnerships, it is important that PBC member states raise these issues themselves in meetings and initiate country-led PBC discussions on how to advance women-led climate action.¹⁸⁸

The PBF could also be an important actor in unifying gender, climate and peace approaches (see box 3.2). Although multilateral climate funds are increasingly mainstreaming gender considerations into their governance and operational structures, more could be done to improve gender-responsive budgeting, including by adopting clear gender-climate indicators in budget allocations to keep track of and be accountable for progress.¹⁸⁹ Because there is currently no dedicated fund for climate and security with a specific marker on gender, more funding must be made available to support women working at the frontlines of climate and peace.¹⁹⁰ The PBF could help to amplify the unique contributions of women in environmental peacebuilding. Within the PBF's 2020–25 eligibility period, 50 per cent of PBF resources in Somalia will be dedicated to implementing the Women and Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda and promoting gender equality.¹⁹¹

¹⁸³ Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 'At the crossroads of climate, gender and sustaining peace: What is the role of the UN peacebuilding architecture?', Virtual roundtable, Summary note, 27 Oct. 2021, p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ Abdelkhalek (note 174).

¹⁸⁵ United Nations, A/74/935-S/2020/645 (note 172).

¹⁸⁶ United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, 'Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding', 23 Feb. 2021.

¹⁸⁷ UN Environment Programme et al. (note 181).

¹⁸⁸ Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation et al. (note 183), p. 3.

¹⁸⁹ Schalatek, L., 'Core steps to increase quality and quantity of gender-responsive climate finance', UN Women, Expert Group Meeting, EGM/ENV/EP.7, Sep. 2021.

¹⁹⁰ Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation et al. (note 183), p. 5.

¹⁹¹ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 156).

Somalia already recognizes the importance of women in peacebuilding. The 2019 NRF is gender sensitive and emphasizes the key role of women in building peace.¹⁹² This is in line with the WPS Agenda, and provides a participatory approach to reconciliation in Somalia, including through the involvement of women in leadership and political processes. The 2019 Somali Women's Charter similarly emphasizes the role of women in building long-term peace in Somalia.¹⁹³

With the conclusion of the 2021–22 Somali federal parliamentary and presidential elections, it will be important to ensure that the FGS continues to support gender-inclusive responses to climate security, especially in the light of the humanitarian disaster from the prolonged drought and famine. During the elections, a 30 per cent female quota in the parliament was set as a political aspiration.¹⁹⁴ Although the House of the People elected its first woman deputy speaker, the 30 per cent quota was not attained, and the number of women in parliament is now lower than in 2016.¹⁹⁵ Recognizing the important roles of women, they must be included and represented in the new government administration at all levels.¹⁹⁶ This will help to enhance inclusive and gender-sensitive leadership and approaches to climate change and peace in Somalia.

National governance

Reinforce national capacity to respond to climate change and security

At the national level, it is important to strengthen the FGS's capacity to address climate security, especially considering the forecasted increase in the number and severity of rapid-onset disasters.¹⁹⁷ As outlined in chapter 2, this includes by building capacity in military, police and maritime authorities around climate-related security risks. Given the security dimensions of climate change across the board in Somalia, security sector actors must factor it into their responses through operational planning, training and military measures. Integrating these climate dimensions into the security sector can strengthen preventative approaches to climate change in Somalia.

It is equally important to support the government's capacity to provide critical services and justice to local populations in the face of rapid-onset disasters. Because Somalia is heavily dependent on its agriculture and the available cultivable land has significantly decreased, one priority should be to create, for example, a coherent agricultural policy.¹⁹⁸ These national policies must incorporate ecosystem and conservation thinking. Strengthening the rule of law and ensuring efficient dispute-resolution mechanisms to adjudicate land and resource disputes can also help to increase local confidence in state courts and curtail the influences of armed groups such as al-Shabab.

Moving forward, it will also be important to strengthen government oversight of the Somali maritime sector and its rich marine ecology. As mentioned in the discussion of the livelihood deterioration pathway (in chapter 2), coastal fisheries could provide critical food supplies and create jobs for local communities and serve as an additional measure to counteract the effects of climate change. In Somalia's 2021 nationally determined contribution on climate change, the FGS notes the importance

¹⁹² United Nations (note 155).

¹⁹³ Somali Women's Charter, Somali Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, 2019.

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, Security Council, 'Crucial election plans in Somalia now advancing following "period of uncertainty", special representative tells Security Council, spotlighting women's quota', SC/14601, 12 Aug. 2021.

¹⁹⁵ United Nations, Security Council, 'Peaceful transfer of power in Somalia offers long-awaited opportunity to advance urgent national priorities, special representative tells Security Council', SC/14900, 23 May 2022.

¹⁹⁶ United Nations (note 195).

¹⁹⁷ Ogallo et al. (note 1).

¹⁹⁸ Warsame, A. A. et al., 'Climate change and crop production nexus in Somalia: An empirical evidence from ARDL technique', *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, vol. 28, no. 16 (Apr. 2021).

of strengthening fisheries value chains by developing climate-smart practices.¹⁹⁹ It also calls for the improvement of monitoring and early-warning systems to measure sea-level rises and their impacts and to strengthen adaptive capacities to respond to rapid-onset disasters. Finally, it notes the need to continue supporting mangrove- and shoreline-restoration programmes. Developing the maritime sector and protecting it from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and environmental degradation can help to provide additional adaptive capacity to respond to climate change in Somalia.

Promote ecosystem-centred approaches that build local resilience

To support environmental peacebuilding approaches, it is important to strengthen local resilience. As outlined in the discussion of livelihood deterioration (in chapter 2), this can be done by promoting local nature-based solutions and early-warning systems that build capacity to respond to climate change. This can include methods to increase water availability and improve water-management strategies in periods of irregular rainfall.²⁰⁰ To support local farmers, weather-resistant agricultural techniques and crops can be introduced. Investing in weather-forecasting technology and drought-monitoring systems can also help people plan for rapid-onset disasters and potentially reduce their impacts.²⁰¹ Integrating local observations and community knowledge into these early-warning forecasting systems can enable more effective responses to rapid-onset disasters.

Nature-based solutions, which use ecosystem services to build resilience to climate change, can help Somalia adapt to climate risks such as flooding.²⁰² One project—Sustainable Flood Management and Risk Reduction Action—which ran from August 2021 to March 2022, was conducted by the Somali Ministry of Energy and Water Resources and the UNEP–DHI Centre on Water and Environment in the Shabelle River Basin. It targeted flash floods (sudden increases in river flow due to heavy rains followed by quick recessions), which affect wadis (dried-up river beds) and their springs, which are critical resources for desert dwellers.²⁰³ The study concluded that building a combination of different types of weir can be helpful in reducing peak flows of flash floods and mitigating the impacts on downstream lives and property.²⁰⁴ This project is an example of building resilience to climate change by ‘tapping into nature’.²⁰⁵

Support public–private partnerships around climate change

Public–private partnerships and their contributions to climate security in Somalia can also help the FGS respond to climate change.²⁰⁶ The business sector in Somalia is both a backbone of the economy and a main source of employment, services and goods, especially in the absence of state service provision.²⁰⁷ For young people, the private sector has provided an important source of employment, skills and education and has also provided role models that are separate from illicit activities such as armed groups.²⁰⁸

¹⁹⁹ Federal Republic of Somalia (note 159).

²⁰⁰ Warsame et al. (note 198).

²⁰¹ Warsame et al. (note 198).

²⁰² UN Environment Programme–DHI Centre on Water and Environment, *Sustainable Flood Management and Risk Reduction Action: Applicability of Nature-based Solutions for Flood and Drought Management in Somalia*, Final report (UNEP–DHI Centre: Hørsholm, 28 Mar. 2022), p. i.

²⁰³ UN Environment Programme–DHI Centre on Water and Environment (note 202), p. i; and UN Environment Programme, ‘Reducing the impact of flash floods in Somalia: Study’, 18 May 2022.

²⁰⁴ UN Environment Programme–DHI Centre on Water and Environment (note 202), p. 92.

²⁰⁵ UN Environment Programme (note 203).

²⁰⁶ Kazmi, B. A. and Loyaan, F. A., ‘Business-led peacebuilding in Somalia’, eds Keating and Waldman (note 132), p. 508.

²⁰⁷ Kazmi and Loyaan (note 206), p. 503.

²⁰⁸ Kazmi and Loyaan (note 206), p. 504.

Somali businesses have also delivered health services, water and access to communications during rapid-onset disasters and famine.²⁰⁹ Many large businesses have set aside annual budgets to provide humanitarian and development relief, including during droughts.²¹⁰ In addition, Somali businesses have helped to establish new organizations that are socially and environmentally sustainable.²¹¹ The private sector is an important source of funding and innovation that can help to mainstream climate into finance.

International support

Coordinate triple-nexus responses to climate change and peace

As noted in the discussion on the livelihood deterioration pathway (in chapter 2), current responses in Somalia could benefit further from humanitarian–development–peace triple-nexus coordination. During its meeting on Somalia in December 2020, the PBC highlighted the importance of coordinated peacebuilding efforts in the country across the pillars of the UN’s work.²¹² Building strong national institutions and capacities requires technical expertise from a variety of UN actors and external organizations. Given the complexity of these challenges, it is important to move towards multilateral and cross-sectoral interventions to climate and peace. This can also bridge gaps between short-, medium- and long-term approaches to these issues. Rather than focusing on either short-term humanitarian relief or longer-term development solutions, triple-nexus approaches can make it easier to break the siloes and provide emergency relief to rapid-onset disasters while still supporting longer-term resilience, reconciliation processes and transitional justice.

Triple-nexus responses can help the FGS implement the recommendations put forward in the environmental peacebuilding and national governance components of the proposed approach. These integrated approaches can be realized through a focus on joint programmes and area-based approaches that require cross-sectoral collaborations at their core.²¹³ The climate security and environmental adviser to UNSOM can also continue to promote and streamline integrated climate security responses across the UN triple-nexus actors in Somalia.²¹⁴ Regional organizations such as IGAD and the AU can help the FGS reduce the risk of climate-induced conflict by granting access to their early-warning climate and conflict systems.²¹⁵

Mobilize funding and partnerships in support of climate responses

In order to support environmental peacebuilding processes and the implementing actors and structures in Somalia, it is important to strengthen and target appropriate funding and partnerships. When the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted twin resolutions in 2020 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, it marked a recognition by UN member states of the need for adequate, predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding.²¹⁶ The PBC, which together with the PBF helps to create multi-stakeholder synergies across geographic and thematic scopes, can help to strengthen partnerships between international finance institutions, the UN and

²⁰⁹ Kazmi and Loyaan (note 206), p. 506.

²¹⁰ Kazmi and Loyaan (note 206), p. 507.

²¹¹ Kazmi and Loyaan (note 206), p. 507.

²¹² UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (note 156).

²¹³ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (note 176), p. 5.

²¹⁴ De Coning et al. (note 33).

²¹⁵ De Coning et al. (note 33).

²¹⁶ UN General Assembly Resolution 75/201, 21 Dec. 2020; and UN Security Council Resolution 2558, 21 Dec. 2020. See also Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA), *Financing for Peacebuilding in Peacekeeping and Transition Contexts: Chair’s Summary* (Aswan Forum: Cairo, Apr. 2022).

the private sector when it comes to peacebuilding investments in conflict-affected countries.²¹⁷ During a roundtable held in connection with the General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Financing for Peacebuilding in April 2022, states called on the Security Council to draw on the PBC's bridging and advisory roles to support countries in transition and facilitate their national transition plans and financing objectives.²¹⁸

International financing institutions and actors are already engaged in Somalia to strengthen its peacebuilding and climate objectives. In 2020 Somalia achieved the 'decision point' for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other creditors, which normalized its relations with these institutions.²¹⁹ This qualified Somalia to receive grant financing to address its public finance and development needs, including peacebuilding. A UN–World Bank partnership has already been established in Somalia.²²⁰ In response to the ongoing drought in Somalia, the World Bank has provided \$45 million in reprogrammed and new sources to support existing responses.²²¹ The PBF has also been active in Somalia since 2009 and has provided support to projects implemented by UN organizations, UNSOM, the FGS, federal states and civil society.²²² The PBF is fast, flexible and risk-tolerant, making it a good candidate for climate-related funding. The African Development Bank (ADB), has already funded several climate-adaptation projects in Somalia that respond to water stress and droughts and that strengthen pastoralist livelihoods through resilient infrastructure and capacity building.²²³ The ADB further acts as an instrument of support to multi-donor funds such as the Multi-Partner Infrastructure Fund for Somalia, which was established in 2016 to help Somalia with development and rehabilitation of infrastructure, strengthening of institutions, and economic governance. The ADB works closely with other multi-donor funds including the UN's Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and the World Bank's Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia.²²⁴

Partner with local civil society

It is equally important to strengthen the role of local civil society in climate security responses. Civil society actors and organizations can help to foster resilience to climate change through bottom-up processes. The Somalia NGO Consortium has supported international donors, including by creating 'crisis modifiers' and resilience programmes that provide short-term reactive relief from droughts and their effects on food security.²²⁵ In early 2022 the consortium issued a joint statement to the international donor community calling on donors to urgently fund the response to the humanitarian crisis evolving in Somalia following three consecutive failed rainy seasons.²²⁶ (A fourth rainy season failed later in 2022.) The statement cited the growing number of people to be displaced by drought and the escalating risk of famine.

²¹⁷ Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (note 216).

²¹⁸ High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly on Financing for Peacebuilding, 'Round tables: Informal PBSO outcome summaries', 26 Apr. 2022.

²¹⁹ International Monetary Fund (IMF), 'Somalia to receive debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative', Press Release no. 20/104, 25 Mar. 2020.

²²⁰ Taggart, M. and Kumskova, M., 'Partnerships for sustaining peace', PBC Blog, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), 9 June 2021.

²²¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 21).

²²² Jantzi, T. et al., 'Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Project Portfolio in Somalia: Evaluation Report', UN Peacekeeping and the Konterra Group, 27 Dec. 2019, p. 4.

²²³ African Development Bank (ADB), 'Building resilience to water stress in Somaliland: Preparation of water resources management and investment plan project', Implementation Progress and Results Report, Mar. 2021; and African Development Bank (ADB), 'Rural livelihoods' adaptation to climate change in the Horn of Africa—Phase II (RLACC II)', Implementation Progress and Results Report, July 2021.

²²⁴ Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (note 216).

²²⁵ Medinilla et al. (note 64).

²²⁶ Care International, 'NGOs call upon donors to urgently fund Somalia drought crisis', 1 Feb. 2022.

Dryland Solutions, a Somali organization, has similarly supported climate-adaptation efforts by creating an ecosystem-restoration camp in Garoowe, the capital of Puntland, to restore the Nugaal Valley.²²⁷ The camp will be situated on a semi-desert grassland that was degraded by deforestation, droughts, water shortage and conflict.²²⁸ It will work together with local communities to restore the ecosystem and become a hub for food and resource production, education and healthcare provision. The project intends to train local stakeholders on ecosystem restoration and sustainable land-management practices, with the hope that it will spread to other areas of the country as well.²²⁹

Although civil society actors are actively contributing to climate and peace efforts in Somalia, they are often doing so separately and without joint consultation. At the 2022 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, Hassan Mowlid Yasid, the executive director of the Somali Greenpeace Association, cited a lack of partnership and collaboration between these diverse organizations as an obstacle.²³⁰ There is currently no joint mechanism among civil society organizations working on these topics. An important step forward could be to map out the existing civil society organizations in Somalia and their contributions, and identify areas for synergy, partnership and information sharing.

²²⁷ Ecosystem Restoration Camps, 'Camp Dryland Solutions: Nuvaal [sic] Valley region, Somalia', [n.d.].

²²⁸ Ecosystem Restoration Camps (note 227).

²²⁹ Ecosystem Restoration Camps (note 227).

²³⁰ Yasid, H. M., 'Harnessing climate security opportunities in conflict-affected contexts: Experiences from United Nations field presences', Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, 24 May 2022.

4. Conclusions

Although the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations and other external actors are already addressing climate security in Somalia, efforts to integrate their approaches can be reinforced. Several ongoing responses have attempted to alleviate climate-related security risks across the four different climate-related security pathways. In Somalia, it is important to bring governmental and external actors around a humanitarian–development–peace triple-nexus approach to climate security. The new integrated approach to climate security and peacebuilding proposed here aims to achieve this through three components: environmental peacebuilding, national governance and international support. Should the FGS request it, the Peacebuilding Commission could provide support to this approach through its convening and bridging roles and guided by its principles of national ownership and partnership.

Alongside the proposed integrated approach, it will be equally important to continue exploring the linkages between climate security and peacebuilding processes in Somalia. The following four recommendations could be considered by the FGS. First, the FGS along with international supporting actors should strengthen and mainstream climate security in Somalia across government ministries, security and legal apparatuses, and governance structures. Second, the FGS and UNSOM should focus on environmental peacebuilding and risk-management strategies to strengthen the links between peacebuilding and environmental processes in Somalia. Third, the FGS, UNSOM and other external actors should support government capacity to deliver coordinated and local responses to rapid-onset disasters. To be effective, responses must be localized and build the adaptive capacity of communities to respond to climate change. This includes by engaging Somali civil society, community leaders and peace activists to understand how local communities are already coping with climate change and peacebuilding. Fourth and finally, the FGS should build the institutions needed to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This will be especially important considering the current drought conditions and ensuing humanitarian crisis. Taken together, these engagement processes can lead to mutual commitments for Somalia's future climate responses and resilience.

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