

POLICY RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: THE AFRICAN UNION

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I. Introduction

The security challenges arising from climate change often go beyond state boundaries. They pose unique and multidimensional issues for governments and institutions trying to find adequate responses. Such challenges are exponentially more difficult in Africa than in some other parts of the world.

Africa is responsible for a mere 4 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions.¹ Yet, 57 per cent of the countries facing the highest double burden of climate exposure and political fragility risks are located in sub-Saharan Africa.² As the risks are most pronounced in fragile countries and transcend boundaries, responses from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the African Union (AU) are crucial to identify, assess, respond to and prevent climate-related security risks. However, there is currently little knowledge of how the AU understands or responds to climate-related security risks.

Previous research on institutional responses to climate-related security risks suggests that responses require: (a) an integrated approach that combines knowledge on climate risks and the social and political realities in the local context and (b) transnational responses by nations and supranational organizations.³ Building on previous research, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the AU's climate security policy landscape for interested policymakers in Africa and beyond.⁴ Throughout the paper, the term 'climate-related security risks' encompasses a diverse and wide array of impacts and risks emerging from climate change and how they undermine the security of different referent objects—human and state

¹ Ritchie, H., 'Global inequalities in CO2 emissions', Our World in Data, 16 Oct. 2018.

² United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks* (USAID: Washington, DC, Sep. 2018).

³ Dellmuth, L. M. et al., 'Intergovernmental organizations and climate security: Advancing the research agenda', *WIREs Climate Change*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018), e496.

⁴ Dellmuth et al. (note 3); Mobjörk, M. et al., *Climate-related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach* (SIPRI and Stockholm University: Solna, Oct. 2016); Born, C. et al., 'Advancing United Nations responses to climate-related security risks', SIPRI Policy Brief, Sep. 2019; Krampe, F. and Mobjörk, M., 'Responding to climate-related security risks: Reviewing regional organizations in Asia and Africa', *Current Climate Change Reports*, vol. 4, no. 4 (Oct. 2018), pp. 330–37; and Bremberg, N. et al., 'The EU and climate related security risks: A community of practice in the making?', *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 41, no. 5 (2019), pp. 623–39.

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SUMMARY

● Africa is responsible for a mere 4 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions. Yet, 57 per cent of the countries facing the highest double burden of climate exposure and political fragility risks are located in sub-Saharan Africa. As the risks are most pronounced in fragile countries and transcend boundaries, responses from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the African Union (AU) are crucial in developing the relevant solutions.

To offer a better understanding of how the AU discusses and responds to security challenges arising from climate change, this Background Paper provides a comprehensive overview of the AU's climate security policy landscape for interested policymakers in Africa and beyond. The main findings reflect that the AU is increasingly recognizing different security risks, and that its discourse is rapidly developing towards more integrated responses to climate-related security risks.



security. The main policy analysis is structured along the dimensions of: (a) whom the provisions for climate-related security are for, that is, whether the referent object is either human or state security, (b) the exact location of climate-related security matters on the AU architecture, that is, the organ(s) responsible for implementing the work, and (c) the institutional response and policy implementation.

This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview of the AU structures and processes to provide a broad understanding of the overall AU decision-making process. This is followed by a description of the paper's methodological approach in section III. Sections IV–VII continue with an analysis of AU policies on climate-related security risks under the four thematic policy areas of: food security, peace and security, human security, and energy security and natural resource use crises. Finally, section VIII summarizes the AU position on climate-related security risks, with highlights of the main challenges faced. An accompanying Policy Brief provides a broader assessment of the paper's outcomes with relevant policy recommendations.⁵

II. Overview of African Union structures and processes

Establishment of the African Union

The vision of integrating Africa by 'Pan-Africanist leaders' led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 to emancipate African countries from the challenges of colonial suffrage, drive economic development and enhance continental security. The OAU is celebrated for the role it played in liberating African countries from the repression of colonialism and apartheid, with South Africa being the last country to gain independence in 1994.⁶ The establishment of the AU in 2002 was necessitated by the OAU's failure to steer continental development, eradicate poverty, curtail conflict and address human rights violations. The AU headquarters is in Addis Ababa, and it acts as the regional interlocutor for African states in intergovernmental bodies including the UN with regard to social, economic and political policies.⁷ The supranational body consists of all 55-member African countries after the readmission of Morocco in 2017 since its departure in 1984.

⁵ Krampe, F. and Aminga, V., 'Climate-related security risks and the African Union', SIPRI Policy Brief, May 2020.

⁶ Gottschalk, K. and Schmidt, S., 'The African Union and the new partnership for Africa's development: Strong institutions for weak states?', *International Politics and Society*, vol. 4 (2004), pp. 138–58; Sharkdam, W., 'In search of greater unity: African states and the quest for an African Union government', *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, vol. 1, no. 3 (Dec. 2009), pp. 645–71; and Murithi, T., *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development* (Routledge: London, 2005).

⁷ African Union Commission (AUC) and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere, *African Union Handbook 2019*, 6th edn (AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Wellington, New Zealand, 2019), pp. 14–15.



Polymaking organs of the African Union

The main policymaking organs of the AU are the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC). The Assembly is the highest decision-making organ of the AU, led by the AU chair. The chair is a one-year leadership role for African heads of state, and it rotates across the continent's five geographic regions. The Executive Council comprises foreign ministers of AU member states; it coordinates and prepares decisions for the Assembly and monitors the implementation of policies. The PSC is the key pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and is mandated with promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. APSA is 'the umbrella term for the key AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in the African continent'.⁸ It is an operational structure for effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. APSA pillars include the PSC, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and the Peace Fund.⁹ The PSC is meant to function in collaboration with the UN Security Council and other similar international organizations. The protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC empowers it to 'support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters'.¹⁰ The African Union Commission (AUC) is the IGO's secretariat that plays a central role in the management of AU activities and is headed by the AUC chair. The AUC also coordinates implementation of AU policies and related projects for continental development.¹¹ In addition to these main divisions, the AU has several specialized institutions and organs that work together closely to achieve the organization's vision.¹² Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of the AU.

The PSC is meant to function in collaboration with the UN Security Council and other organizations

Reform of African Union institutions

The 2016 institutional reforms of the AU set out a comprehensive agenda for repositioning and realigning AU institutions to focus on fewer priorities and effectively meet the evolving needs of the continent.¹³ For instance, AU leaders recognize that a merger between the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) and the Political Affairs Department 'will contribute to enhancing synergy and cohesion of efforts in the promotion of peace, stability and good governance in Africa'.¹⁴ The reforms also identify endowing the AU with

⁸ AU, 'The Peace & Security Council'.

⁹ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), pp. 75–80.

¹⁰ AU, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (AU: 9 July 2002), p. 10.

¹¹ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), p. 90.

¹² AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), p. 15.

¹³ AU, 'Overview of institutional reforms'.

¹⁴ AU, *Remarks by Ambassador Smail Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security at the Official Launch of the African Union Peace Fund* (AU: 17 Nov. 2018).




Figure 1. African Union organizational structure

predictable and self-autonomous financing streams as core in minimizing the organization’s over-reliance on partner support. In July 2016 the AU Assembly instituted a universal levy of 0.2 per cent on eligible imports to finance the overall AU budget and revitalize the AU Peace Fund. The Peace Fund was established in 1993 as the principal financing instrument for the peace and security activities of the OAU. Following the establishment of the AU in 2002, the Peace Fund became one of the five pillars of the APSA. In the implementation of the 0.2 per cent levy, \$400 million of member state contributions will be endowed to the Peace Fund by 2021 to strengthen institutional capacity, peace support operations, mediation and preventive diplomacy.¹⁵ Since 2017 the Peace Fund has received \$131 million in member

¹⁵ AU, ‘Peace Fund’.



state contributions, which is the highest level of home-grown financing since its establishment in 1993.¹⁶

African Union policy processes

AU policy proposals are prepared and debated by experts appointed by member states, and suggestions are scrutinized by relevant member state ministers. Proposals with budgetary implications are discussed by the PRC, which comprises member state ambassadors based at AU headquarters. Final proposal documents are then forwarded to the Executive Council, and some are adopted at this stage. Those on politically sensitive matters are forwarded to the Assembly for adoption as AU resolutions, declarations or decisions.¹⁷

African Union regional economic communities and the New Partnership for Africa's Development

The AU recognizes eight regional economic communities (RECs) and two regional mechanisms (RMs), which have developed individually and are central to various transformative programmes in their regions and across the continent.¹⁸ Some RECs foster economic cooperation, others are driven by peace and security concerns, and some have combinations of objectives.

Even though the RECs are closely integrated into the AU work, it is still a challenge to harmonize all their processes at continental level as some organs of the AU are yet to be ratified and function.¹⁹

It is still a challenge to harmonize all their processes at continental level

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) became part of the AU framework in 2001 when it was tasked with handling the continent's development strategies. In 2019 the AU adopted NEPAD as the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), with the mandate of coordinating and executing priority regional and continental development projects, strengthening the capacity of member states and regional bodies, and promoting regional integration.²⁰

Agenda 2063

All these institutional developments and reforms are aimed towards the accelerated realization of Africa's vision and flagship action plan, Agenda 2063.²¹ The agenda is the continent's 50-year development blueprint with a shared strategic framework for structural transformation and for repositioning Africa as a dominant player in the global arena by 2063. Based on the AU's description, Agenda 2063 was developed through an

¹⁶ AU, 'Operationalization of AU Peace Fund on track ahead of 2020', 6 Nov. 2019.

¹⁷ Hoste, J. and Anderson, A., 'Dynamics of decision making in Africa', Conference report, Centurion, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 8–9 Nov. 2010, p. 3.

¹⁸ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), pp. 144–58.

¹⁹ AU, 'Judicial, human rights & legal organs'.

²⁰ NEPAD, 'Who we are: About us'; and NEPAD, 'The African Union Development Agency-NEPAD'.

²¹ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), p. 18.



Table 1. Policy documents analysed in this paper, and their year of publication, under the four policy themes identified

Analysed policy documents and material	Year published
<i>Food security</i>	
Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security	2003
Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa	2013
Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods	2016
Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2015–2025	2015
<i>Peace and security</i>	
African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020	2016
Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework	2015
African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016–2020	2015
<i>Human security</i>	
Revised Climate for Development in Africa Programme Framework Programme Document 2012	2012
African Risk Capacity Strategic Framework	2016
Agenda 2063	2015
Africa Adaptation Initiative Framework Document 2017–2020	2016
Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Africa	2017
<i>Energy security and natural resource use crises</i>	
Convention of the African Energy Commission	2001
Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa	2011
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative Framework	2015
Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts between Communities	2019
<i>Complementing documents^a</i>	
The 585th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU: An open session to the theme: Climate change: State fragility, peace and security in Africa	12 Apr. 2016
708th PSC meeting on the theme: The drought situation and its implication on peace and security in Africa	6 Oct. 2017
The 774th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: ‘The link between climate change and conflicts in Africa and addressing the security implications’	29 May 2018
The 828th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: ‘Climate change funding in line with the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) to contribute towards peace and security’	27 Feb. 2019
Press statement of the 864th PSC meeting on natural and other disasters on the continent	12 Aug. 2019

^a Press statements on African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) open sessions themed around climate change and the associated security risks.

extensive consultative process involving various African stakeholders, with special attention to the inclusion of women and youth. It captures ideas from African development experiences, challenges and opportunities, as well as reviews of national plans, regional and continental frameworks.²² The vision

²² AU, ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa we want’.



of Agenda 2063 incorporates milestones that aim to represent transitions in the journey towards the ‘Africa we want’ by 2063.

III. Methodology

The research approach followed the example of previous studies relying on document data and interviews.²³ First, examining the intersection between the literature on climate-related security risks and the AU’s core objectives enabled the author to identify and consider four key policy themes for a comprehensive analysis. The identified themes were food security, peace and security, human security, and energy security and natural resource use crises. These four thematic areas are distinctly embedded in Africa’s vision and flagship action plan, Agenda 2063, which was officially adopted by the AU Assembly in 2015 (more on Agenda 2063 in later sections of this paper).²⁴ The four themes are also closely linked with Africa’s peace and security concerns, which the AU continues to grapple with, and are often interlinked with climate change.

Second, the investigation carefully considered 16 official AU continent-wide policy frameworks that are relevant to the identified four policy themes. Emphasis was put on where and how the security implications of climate change are explicitly or implicitly described within the frameworks, and the policy responses suggested to handle these risks (if any). The policy frameworks selected for analysis also deal with diverse continental human and state security domains such as food supply, employment prospects, infrastructure development, energy resource use and development. Press statements on five PSC open sessions offered complementary information to the selected policy frameworks.²⁵

To gain a better understanding of the institutional and policy context, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 strategically selected experts who were predominantly professionals working for the AU, United Nations bodies, representatives of civil society organizations and think tanks. The interviews were held virtually via Skype, face to face or through informal discussions at seminars where the author was present. The expert selection was based on a snowballing interview process that began with existing contacts. The role of the expert interviews was to systematically verify obtained document and interview data, check for potential biases and increase research validity.²⁶

²³ Krampe and Mobjörk (note 4); and Krampe, F., et al. ‘Responses to climate-related security risks: Regional organizations in Asia and Africa’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2018/2, Aug. 2018.

²⁴ AU, ‘Goals & priority areas of Agenda 2063’.

²⁵ AU, ‘The 585th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU: An open session to the theme: Climate change: State fragility, peace and security in Africa’, 12 Apr. 2016; AU, ‘708th PSC meeting on the theme: “The drought situation and its implication on peace and security in Africa”’, 6 Oct. 2017; AU, ‘The 774th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session to the theme: “The link between climate change and conflicts in Africa and addressing the security implications”’, 29 May 2018; AU, ‘The 828th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: “Climate change funding in line with the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) to contribute towards peace and security”’, 27 Feb. 2019; and AU, ‘Press statement of the 864th PSC meeting on natural and other disasters on the continent’, 12 Aug. 2019.

²⁶ Interviews were conducted under the Chatham House rule.



Lastly in February 2020, an informal round-table workshop was co-organized by SIPRI and the Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa where the AU has its headquarters. The workshop gathered a selected group of about 20 experts based in Addis Ababa from the AU, UN bodies, diplomats, civil society organizations, think tanks and academia. The experts were invited to the workshop based on their expertise relevant to discussions on climate-related security risks in Africa. The strategic objective of the workshop was to challenge this study's findings and receive comments that strengthened the outcomes of this paper.

Table 1 provides an overview of the four policy themes identified. It details the corresponding policy documents analysed in subsequent sections of this paper, including their years of publication. The following sections of the paper thematically provide a comprehensive analysis of the identified policy frameworks.

IV. Food security

Chronic hunger is still widespread in Africa, with an estimated 21.5 per cent prevalence of severe food insecurity in the total population in Africa against 9.2 per cent in the world in 2018; the figure is rising in all subregions according to estimates.²⁷ This is despite the continent's enormous agricultural potential, with over 60 per cent of the arable land remaining unutilized.²⁸ A 2011 World Food Programme (WFP) paper elucidates that conflict and food insecurity have a complex relationship where food insecurity is not a necessary nor sufficient condition for violent conflicts, but when combined with other factors, it can be an 'impact multiplier' in conflict situations.²⁹ In fact, 'In conflict-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa for instance, the number of undernourished people increased by 23.4 million between 2015 and 2018—a significantly sharper increase compared with countries not exposed to conflicts.'³⁰ Resources such as land and equipment essential for food production are destroyed during conflict, which may lead to food shortages and hunger. Similarly, economic, environmental and population pressures are increasingly leading to deadly conflicts between farmers and nomadic pastoralists across the continent. In Nigeria 'transhumance' clashes between farmers and nomadic pastoralists reached alarming levels in 2018, and more than 1800 deaths in the continent were attributed to transhumance-related conflicts.³¹

One interviewed expert stressed that the unprecedented impacts of climate change have reduced the coping capacity of millions of people, driving them

Food insecurity, when combined with other factors, can be an 'impact multiplier' in conflict situations

²⁷ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019: Safeguarding against Economic Slowdowns and Downturns* (FAO: Rome, 2019).

²⁸ AU and FAO, 'African Union, FAO and Lula Institute join efforts to fight hunger in Africa', 21 Nov. 2012, p. 15.

²⁹ Brinkman, H. and Hendrix, C., 'Food insecurity and violent conflict: Causes, consequences, and addressing the challenges', WFP Occasional Paper no. 24, July 2011.

³⁰ FAO et al. (note 27), p. 7.

³¹ AU, 'Statement By HE Ambassador Smail Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security on Conflict Prevention: A mechanism to curb forced displacement in Africa Pan-African Parliament, Midrand, South Africa', 5 Mar. 2019.



into food insecurity and worsening conditions for many who were already food insecure. The consequences are far-reaching as undernourishment bottlenecks the social and economic development of the individual, the local community, the nation and entire economies.³²

Policy frameworks and responses

The food security frameworks with direct or indirect references to the security impacts of climate change analysed in this study are the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security, the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, the AU Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa and the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy.³³

Maputo and Malabo declarations

The AU Assembly endorsed and adopted the Maputo Declaration as an Africa-led and Africa-owned flagship strategy for agriculture development in July 2003.³⁴ The declaration presented the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework for revitalizing Africa's agriculture and for reducing poverty and hunger in the continent. AU member states were to commit a minimum of 10 per cent of national budgets to support the declaration's targets, which would lead to more than 6 per cent growth in agricultural productivity in the continent annually.³⁵ The CAADP is underpinned by AU core principles, which include African ownership, mutual partnerships and collective responsibility in addressing African challenges.³⁶ The 2014 Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change recognized the necessity for the AU to strengthen climate-resilient agriculture within the CAADP framework to buffer food security in the continent.³⁷

The CAADP framework lacked explicit reference to crosscutting issues such as livelihoods sustainability, gender, climate change adaptation and mitigation

The Maputo Declaration's implementation process has enabled countries to address some key transformational issues in agricultural development. However, the framework's guidelines lacked explicit reference to cross-cutting issues such as livelihoods sustainability, gender, climate change adaptation and mitigation.³⁸ The Maputo Declaration also focused on crop production with inadequate attention on other land-using subsectors such as pastoralism, even though pastoral areas occupy about 40 per cent

³² Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Kenya (FES Kenya) official no. 1, Interview with author via Skype, 29 Nov. 2018.

³³ NEPAD, 'AU 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security', July 2003; NEPAD, *Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods* (NEPAD: 2016); AU, *Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities* (Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA): 2013); and AU, *Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2015–2025* (AU: 2015).

³⁴ NEPAD, 'AU 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security' (note 33).

³⁵ AU, 'Statement by HE Dr. Jean Ping Chairperson AU Commission at the Summit on World Food Security, Rome - Italy 03–05 Jun 2008', 9 June 2008.

³⁶ AU, 'Vision and mission'.

³⁷ UN, *Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change* (UN: 2014), p. 39.

³⁸ NEPAD, 'AU 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security' (note 33).



of Africa's land mass, albeit with significant variations among countries.³⁹ Hence, after a decade-long underperformance, AU member states and stakeholders demanded clarity on the framework's targets, assessments of technical efficacies and political feasibilities for success in agricultural transformation.⁴⁰ A World Bank report for instance, shows that only Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe attained or surpassed the 10 per cent target in 2014.⁴¹ There was a push to move from planning to effective implementation for visible impact on people's lives.

This led to the adoption of the Malabo Declaration in 2014 that sets the Africa 2025 Vision for Agriculture.⁴² As the Malabo Declaration is implemented within the framework of the Maputo Declaration, AU member states recommitted to the 2003 process and pledged to develop and implement CAADP-based national agricultural investment plans (NAIPs) to boost investment and productivity in agriculture.⁴³

The Malabo Declaration consists of seven thematic areas that encompass targets in the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063.⁴⁴ The sixth thematic area focuses on the need to enhance livelihood and production system resilience to climatic variability and other related risks. AU leaders have committed to a biennial review process that includes reporting to AU summits on the progress made towards realizing the set goals and targets. The AU implementing bodies are the AUC and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency in collaboration with partner institutions.

Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa

The Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa is the first continent-wide pastoral initiative, anchored within the auspices of the AU Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA). The framework aims to secure, protect and improve the livelihoods and rights of African pastoralists by providing a platform for mobilizing and coordinating political commitment to inclusive pastoral development. The strategy emphasizes the regional nature of many pastoralist ecosystems, thus instigating the need to support and harmonize policies across RECs and member states. Poverty, environmental degradation, marked rainfall variability, conflicts and limited political representation of pastoralists in the decision-making processes are

³⁹ AU, *Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities* (note 33), p. 8.

⁴⁰ NEPAD, *Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods* (note 33).

⁴¹ Goyal, A. and Nash, J., *Reaping Richer Returns: Public Spending Priorities for African Agriculture Productivity Growth*, Africa Development Forum series (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank: Washington, DC, 2017).

⁴² NEPAD, *Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods* (note 33).

⁴³ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, 'CAADP: Policy advice to support agricultural transformation in Africa', period 2017–19.

⁴⁴ AUC, *An Overview of Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (AUC: 2015); and AU, *The 2017 Progress Report to the Assembly: Highlights on Intra-African Trade for Agriculture Commodities and Services: Risks and Opportunities, Inaugural Biennial Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the June 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods* (DREA: 30–31 Jan. 2018).



identified as being some of the multidimensional and complex factors that increase the vulnerability of pastoralists to food and human insecurity.⁴⁵

While emphasizing the root causes of pastoral vulnerability, the framework recognizes climate change as one of the emerging global trends that leads to threats and opportunities for African pastoralists. In this policy, climatic events such as droughts and floods are recognized to reduce access to grazing land and water, thus exacerbating transhumance conflicts with settled farmers over land ownership uncertainties. The policy strives to ensure that technical approaches that go beyond a single sector and embrace indigenous knowledge are prioritized. It also encourages innovations for sustainable natural resource management, effective governance and further integration of pastoral livelihoods with expanding market opportunities.⁴⁶

Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy

The AU Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy has been in place since 2005 to strengthen food and nutrition strategies and to emphasize the essential role that food and nutrition security plays in socio-economic development in Africa. The 2005–15 strategy recognized that addressing Africa’s food and nutrition issues is an important contribution to sustainable peace, as ‘communities are less likely to engage in civil strife when their food insecurity is being addressed in a meaningful and sustainable manner’.⁴⁷

The revised 2015–25 strategy was tailored to reflect Agenda 2063 and global initiatives including the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals of the UN.⁴⁸ It recognizes the great diversity in the African continent in terms of conditions and factors that determine the nutritional status of the people, and advocates to have them addressed through regional, national and subnational plans. The strategy underscores climate change as a risk to Africa’s food production, and recognizes that ‘war and insecurity will always pose threats to food and nutrition security in affected populations’.⁴⁹ The AUC has overall responsibility for overseeing and guiding implementation processes, while AU RECs are mandated with the decisive role of regularly monitoring and evaluating the progress of the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy.

War and insecurity will always pose threats to food and nutrition security in affected populations

Implementation of the policy frameworks

The CAADP framework has been instrumental in raising Africa’s agricultural profile to the centre of the development agenda at national, regional and global levels.⁵⁰ The refined Malabo Declaration facilitated the mobilization and alignment of multi-stakeholder partnerships and investments around

⁴⁵ AU, *Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities* (note 33), p. 10.

⁴⁶ AU, *Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities* (note 33).

⁴⁷ AU, *African Regional Nutritional Strategy 2005–2015* (AU: 2005), p. 25.

⁴⁸ AU, *Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2015–2025* (note 33).

⁴⁹ AU, *Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2015–2025* (note 33), p. 32.

⁵⁰ FES Kenya official no. 1 (note 32).




Figure 2. Armed conflicts globally in 2019

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2020).

NAIPs that have been developed through the CAADP process.⁵¹ According to AUDA-NEPAD, 44 African countries have signed up to the CAADP process since 2003, and 39 of them have begun to implement CAADP-based NAIPs.⁵² In addition to improving the development planning processes, countries are now placing more attention on strengthening and aligning food policy design processes by, for instance, making them transparent and inclusive, as well as by linking them to evidence-based analysis. There is also growing attention and action focused on strengthening and aligning institutional and human capacity for planning and implementation efficiency and effectiveness.⁵³

The evaluation of the progress made in the implementation of the Malabo Declaration has identified areas of success, as well as specific areas that need strengthening at national and regional levels to drive action towards the goals of the Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly in the eradication of hunger. For instance, the 2017 Malabo Declaration inaugural biennial review report, in which 47 out of 55 member states participated, reveals that the continent is not on track with regard to ending hunger indicators, with a score of 3.6 in 2017 compared to a benchmark of 3.94. Most countries had not met the 10 per cent investment

⁵¹ NEPAD, *Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods* (note 33).

⁵² NEPAD, 'Overview CAADP'.

⁵³ AU, *The 2017 Progress Report to the Assembly: Highlights on Intra-African Trade for Agriculture Commodities and Services: Risks and Opportunities, Inaugural Biennial Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods* (DREA: 28–29 Jan. 2018).



target, but 20 countries attained or exceeded the 3.94 benchmark score.⁵⁴ When assessing performance for the declaration's sixth thematic area, only Mauritius is on track with government budget lines for enhanced resilience to climate-related risks through disaster preparedness, early warning response systems and social safety nets.⁵⁵ The review methodology is based on a country-led data collection and reporting approach, which demonstrates increased ownership and collective leadership to the achievement of the goals enshrined in AU policies.

An interviewed expert pointed out that these successes have been far too few and too isolated to improve the lives of the millions of Africans affected by food insecurity.⁵⁶ This is in agreement with the 2019 UN report on the state of food insecurity, which indicates slow progress towards achieving food security and nutrition indicators and that 'hunger is on the rise in almost all subregions of Africa'. The slow progress is closely associated with the increase in conflict in Africa exacerbated by climate-related shocks, drought and other factors that threaten to reduce agricultural and livestock productivity in the continent.⁵⁷ The AU DREA has also increasingly recognized that climate and environmental challenges undermine the region's sustainable development prospects and heavily affect livelihoods. It has stepped up efforts to mainstream disaster risk reduction (DRR) in agricultural development policies, programmes and plans, and in aligning AU DRR work to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.⁵⁸

Resolving protracted conflicts has become more difficult due to the effects of climate change

V. Peace and security

The African continent has a number of long-term, severe and, in some cases, interrelated crises and violent conflicts (see figure 2). These constitute over 60 per cent of the peace and security agenda of the UN Security Council. The continent also hosted 24 out of 60 multilateral peace operations active in 2018, and had the highest number of personnel serving on peace operations globally.⁵⁹ The number of violent conflicts has significantly reduced since the beginning of the 21st century, and important advances have been made thanks to the collective determination and efforts of AU member states and bilateral and multilateral partners. However, far too many African countries remain trapped in cycles of conflict and associated consequences. Resolving protracted conflicts such as those in Darfur, Somalia and now the Sahel—with serious regional and international consequences—still remains

⁵⁴ AU (note 53).

⁵⁵ The 6 countries that have managed to build resilience to climatic shocks but were yet to meet their investment targets for resilience building by the time the inaugural biennial review was carried out are Burundi, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Rwanda and Togo.

⁵⁶ FES Kenya official no. 1 (note 32).

⁵⁷ FAO et al. (note 27).

⁵⁸ International Organization for Migration (IOM) officials nos 1–4, Interviews with author via Skype, 28 May 2019; UN Development Programme (UNDP) official no. 1, Interview with author via Skype, 12 June 2019; UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 3 June 2015, A/RES/69/283, 23 June 2015; and AU, 'AUC holds workshop on mainstreaming disaster risk reduction (DRR)', 28 Aug. 2013.

⁵⁹ SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019), p. 159.

a considerable challenge in the continent, and has become more difficult due to the effects of climate change.⁶⁰

Interviewed experts stressed that the complex instigating factors include ethnic and religious extremism, shortcomings in governance, and the illicit proliferation, accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. Furthermore, new threats to continental peace and security have emerged in recent years, relating to issues such as climate change and environmental degradation.⁶¹ Although Africa contributes least to global warming when compared to other continents, it arguably bears the highest burden from the resulting consequences due to its limited resources and low adaptive capacity.⁶² Major climate-related risks that are negatively affecting the quest for peace relate to, for example, scarce water resources, issues around land governance and displacement associated with extreme climatic events.⁶³ Livelihoods have also been overwhelmed by disasters such as severe droughts, floods and cyclones, which evolve into social tensions that undermine peace, security and stability in most of the affected countries and their neighbours.

Policy frameworks and responses

The peace and security frameworks with direct or indirect references to the security impacts of climate change analysed in this study are the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020, the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) and the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020.⁶⁴

The AU has devoted considerable efforts to conflict prevention and resolution and to peacebuilding through its PSD, which operationalizes the mechanisms of APSA pillars.⁶⁵ The PSD also supports other AUC security-related initiatives such as the CEWS and the AU Border Programme (AUBP) that are within the auspices of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division (CPEWD). The AUBP focuses on strengthening cross-border collaboration, pragmatic border management and resolving disputes on natural resources that transcend boundaries.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ See e.g. Eklöv, K. and Krampe, F., 'Climate-related security risks and peacebuilding in Somalia', SIPRI Policy Paper no. 53, Oct. 2019.

⁶¹ ISS official no. 1, Interview with author via Skype, 12 Dec. 2018; and AU expert no. 3, Interview with author via Skype, 24 May 2019.

⁶² USAID (note 2); and Peters, K. et al., 'Double vulnerability: The humanitarian implications of intersecting climate and conflict risk', Working paper 550, Mar. 2019.

⁶³ Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) official no. 1, Interview with author via Skype, 28 Jan. 2019.

⁶⁴ AU, *African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020* (AU: 2016); AU, *Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework* (AU: 2015); and AUC, *African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016–2020* (AUC: 5 Dec. 2015).

⁶⁵ Albuquerque, A., *The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): Discussing the Remaining Challenges* (Swedish Defence Research Agency: Oct. 2016).

⁶⁶ AU, 'Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division', 15 May 2018; and AU, 'African Union Border Programme (AUBP): Uniting and integrating Africa through peaceful, open and prosperous borders', 9 Nov. 2018.



African Union Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020

The AU Assembly adopted an ambitious disarmament instrument in 2013 (Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020) so as not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans. This ambitious goal recognizes that illicit flows of arms, especially to non-state actors, significantly fuel insecurity, thus undermining social cohesion, economic development and the territorial integrity of states. The month of September of each year until 2020 was declared an amnesty month for surrendering illegally owned weapons and arms in Africa. A master road map that outlines ‘the practical steps’ required to achieve the initiative’s goals was adopted in 2017. The PSC, the AUC, RECs/RMs and other AU organs play a pivotal role in overseeing implementation to help accelerate progress towards realization of this continent-wide goal.⁶⁷

In 2015 the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) developed a report on the proceedings of the Fifth African Union High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. The report, on silencing the guns in Africa, emphasizes the linkage between climate change and conflict by underscoring the ‘potential to exacerbate and multiply many existing conflicts across the continent’ or that ‘climate change could likely have a multiplier effect and impact on existing conflicts, such as those in Darfur’.⁶⁸ Furthermore, while outlining the fundamental factors increasing the demand for, and drivers of, the proliferation of arms and ammunition, the initiative’s master road map underscores the credible threats caused by climate change on security. The road map recognizes that reducing ‘vulnerabilities of livelihoods to climate change through building resilience systems’ as one of the practical steps of solving the environmental challenges to be overcome in pursuit of a conflict-free Africa.⁶⁹ Many recommendations in the road map remain unimplemented. The AU has therefore dedicated 2020 to stocktaking the achievements and challenges in implementing the road map through the annual theme Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development. This is intended to accelerate the achievement of the grand vision underscored in the disarmament instrument beyond 2020.⁷⁰

The disarmament instrument has also received attention from the international community. In 2019 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2457 (2019) on the AU goal of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020, to increase coordinated action between the UN and the AU on ridding Africa of conflicts. The resolution emphasized the need for adequate climate risk

The AU Assembly adopted ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020’ to rid the burden of conflicts from the next generation of Africans

⁶⁷ AU, ‘6th Annual Retreat of Special Envoys and Mediators on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa: Silencing the Guns – Terrorism, Mediation and Armed Groups’, 21–22 Oct. 2015.

⁶⁸ ACCORD, *Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future: Realising a Conflict-free Africa* (ACCORD: 2015), pp. 26–30.

⁶⁹ AU, *African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020* (note 64), p. 23. (AU: 2016), p. 23.

⁷⁰ ISS, ‘Silencing the guns beyond 2020’, 5 Aug. 2019.



assessment and risk management strategies, and pledged support to lay a solid foundation for durable peace and stability in the continent.⁷¹

Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework

The CSCPF was developed in 2015 as a template for facilitating a coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention within the AUC, and with the RECs. It identifies and addresses member state structural vulnerabilities through preventive action. The structural root causes of conflict analysed in the CSCPF include lack of good governance, socio-economic development, environment and climate change, gender and youth, and post-conflict peacebuilding. These structural weaknesses, if not addressed, can ‘evolve overtime, with a potential to cause violent conflicts’. Among other objectives, the CSCPF hastens the process of mainstreaming conflict prevention into AU programmatic interventions and ensuring that the root causes of conflict, including climate change, are addressed systematically. The CSCPF provides technical assistance to member states using its country structural vulnerability and resilience assessments and country structural vulnerability mitigation strategies. Member states can voluntarily access these tools and build their capacities on structural vulnerabilities and set up adequate mitigation strategies. The CSCPF also ensures implementation of the APSA and strengthens coordination between the AU and RECs in their structural conflict prevention efforts.⁷²

African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap

The PSC is the main APSA pillar and is the decision-making organ for AU conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies. The CEWS, another APSA pillar, anticipates and prevents conflicts on the continent by providing timely information on potential, actual and post-conflict threats to continental peace and security, in collaboration with REC early warning systems.⁷³ The CEWS methodology is anchored upon data-driven analysis of indicators, where climate and environment specific pointers are among those monitored for early warning and early response strategies.⁷⁴

The 2016–20 APSA road map highlights climate change as a cross-cutting issue under its strategic priority areas, terming it as a ‘threat multiplier that exacerbates security trends, tensions and stability’.⁷⁵ However, the road map also stresses existing challenges with mainstreaming climate-related security risks, for example, in regional early warning systems and conflict prevention functions within the AU peace and security mandate. The PSC also acknowledges the vulnerability caused by climate change and has held sessions focusing on the linkages between climate change and security. Some PSC documents term climate change as an ‘existential multidimensional and multi-layered threat to local, national, regional and continental peace,

⁷¹ UN Security Council Resolution 2457, ‘Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security - Silencing the guns in Africa’, S/RES/2457, 27 Feb. 2019.

⁷² AU, *Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework* (note 64).

⁷³ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), pp. 75–76; and AUC, *African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016–2020* (note 64), p. 15.

⁷⁴ AU, *African Union Continental Early Warning System: The CEWS Handbook* (AU: 21 Feb. 2008).

⁷⁵ AUC, *African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016–2020* (note 64), p. 20.



security and stability'.⁷⁶ The PSC also pinpoints that the impacts of climate change are arguably a potential trigger of intercommunal violence, particularly in pastoral communities, and it has made recommendations to mainstream climate change, particularly in early warning and conflict prevention efforts. This was also supported by interviewed experts involved in related work.⁷⁷ However, these recommendations have not yet been developed into actionable commitments. This may stem from the limited understanding of what climate-related security risks are and how they affect policy processes. AU officials pointed out that the AUC is yet to study the nexus between climate change and peace and security, which could inform policymaking on climate-related security risks.⁷⁸

Implementation of the policy frameworks

There are rhetorical steps and statements within the AU peace and security arena linking climate change to insecurity in various frameworks. However, interviewed experts stressed that the AU is yet to establish clear leadership for spearheading the implementation of policies responding to climate-related security risks.⁷⁹ Steps to address the effects of climate change are currently aligned in traditionally 'environmentally aligned' departments such as the AU DREA, which administers various programmes on climate change in agriculture.

AU officials identify the CPEWD as the most centralized division to host a climate security discussion. This is based on the division's comparative advantage that stems from its mandate to operationalize aspects of APSA such as the CEWS and AUBP.⁸⁰ AU officials further pinpointed that the PSD and the DREA have increased their collaboration in addressing climate security at the level of the AUC. The two departments previously organized a continental training workshop with a focus on the root causes of the pastoralist–farmer transhumance conflicts that are rampant in parts of the continent. The project tabled a platform for experience sharing and drafted recommendations for addressing transhumance conflicts.⁸¹ Further to this, the CPEWD and DREA have also co-convened the Interdepartmental Taskforce on Conflict Prevention (IDTFCP), inviting representatives from various AUC departments and divisions to establish and institutionalize a 'climate cluster'.

⁷⁶ AU, 'The 585th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU: An open session to the theme: Climate change: State fragility, peace and security in Africa' (note 25); AU, 'The 774th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: "The link between climate change and conflicts in Africa and addressing the security implications"' (note 25); AU, 'The 828th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: "Climate change funding in line with the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) to contribute towards peace and security"' (note 25); and AU, 'Press statement of the 864th PSC meeting on natural and other disasters on the continent' (note 25).

⁷⁷ FES Kenya official no. 1 (note 32); Amani Africa official no. 1, Interview with author via Skype, 23 Jan. 2019; and IOM officials nos 1–4 (note 58).

⁷⁸ AU officials nos 1 and 2, Comments on author's manuscript, 30 Oct. 2019.

⁷⁹ ISS official no. 1 (note 61); AU expert no. 2, Interview with author via Skype, 10 Jan. 2019; AU expert no. 3 (note 61); and IOM officials nos 1–4 (note 58).

⁸⁰ AU, *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division* (AU: Sep. 2018); AU, 'Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division' (note 66); and AU, 'African Union Border Programme (AUBP): Uniting and integrating Africa through peaceful, open and prosperous borders' (note 66).

⁸¹ AU officials nos 1 and 2 (note 78).



The IDTFCP was established in 2014 to synergize interdepartmental efforts in addressing the root causes of instability.⁸² According to AU officials, the AU PSD and DREA have gained from this revitalized coordination mechanism as it provides a platform for the AUC to harmonize its programmatic interventions in efforts to understand and address climate-related security risks in the continent. The officials further illuminated that the climate cluster of the IDTFCP would be undertaking various initiatives including: (a) updating the 2014 Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change to reflect Africa's climate-related security risks, (b) conducting a study on the nexus between climate change and peace and security, and examining the role of the AU and RECs in addressing climate-related security risks and (c) establishing an integrated early warning mechanism to develop a comprehensive approach to the prevention and mitigation of climate-related security risks.⁸³

VI. Human security

Regions in the continent such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa are experiencing a deteriorating humanitarian crisis characterized by a complex interplay of prolonged drought, insecurity, high food and fuel prices, and displacement of persons. Similar dynamics left over 4.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Chad in 2019.⁸⁴ Providing the required assistance in conflict settings after a drought is becoming increasingly complex, as it is inhibited by the fighting or extremist militia groups targeting humanitarian agency personnel.⁸⁵ The worsening human security situation is linked to or aggravated by economic stagnation and chronic poverty, massive violations of human rights, and policies of exclusion and marginalization, among others.⁸⁶

International Organization for Migration (IOM) officials emphasized that women in particular face huge obstacles because of gender inequality, which often thwart their ability to pursue economic opportunities.⁸⁷ More than 2200 migrant deaths were reported in the Mediterranean in 2018—a testimony to the desperation of African youth, who are willing to risk their lives in search of better opportunities.⁸⁸ In 2018 Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo hosted 2.9 million and 1.8 million new conflict displacements, respectively—the highest and second highest number of new conflict displacements in Africa and globally. Ethiopia's figure rose from 725 000 at the end of 2017.⁸⁹ As a matter of urgency, the AU dedicated 2019 to focus on

Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo hosted 2.9 million and 1.8 million new conflict displacements

⁸² Wachira, G. M., *Strengthening the Peace and Governance Nexus within the African Union: Enhancing Synergy between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)*, NUPI Report no. 7 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 2017), p. 30.

⁸³ AU officials nos 1 and 2 (note 78); and UN (note 37).

⁸⁴ UN News, 'Hunger, displacement and disease: 4.3 million people remain in dire need of aid in Chad', 22 Mar. 2019; and AU, *Overview of the Drought Situation in the Horn of Africa* (AU: 25 Aug. 2011).

⁸⁵ AU, 'AU's response to the Sahelian crisis', 9 Mar. 2012.

⁸⁶ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 'Human security'.

⁸⁷ IOM officials nos 1–4 (note 58).

⁸⁸ AU (note 31).

⁸⁹ IOM, *World Migration Report 2020* (IOM: Geneva, 2019), p. 45.



forced displacement under the annual theme of Year of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa: Towards Durable Solutions to Forced Displacement in Africa.

These challenges have created space for religious extremism, resource-related conflicts and the resurgence of intrastate conflicts, which further forcibly displace millions of people. Islamic State and its global affiliates continue to conspire and recruit disgruntled African youth into movements that are responsible for massive violations of human rights.⁹⁰ Boko Haram for example claimed more than 1300 lives in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria in 2018.⁹¹ There remains urgency to address the socio-economic, political and environmental ‘push factors’, including the impacts of climate change, that lead young people to join these violent movements.

The PSC has also recognized that the adverse effects of climate change have increased the resistance and re-emergence of epidemics such as Ebola, yellow fever or cholera, which are causing serious social, economic, political and security threats to many parts of the African continent and are destabilizing livelihoods.⁹²

Policy frameworks and responses

The AU human security frameworks that are analysed in this study are the Revised Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev-Africa) Framework Programme Document 2012, the African Risk Capacity Strategic Framework, Agenda 2063, the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) Framework Document 2017–2020 and the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Africa (POA).⁹³

Revised Climate for Development in Africa Programme Framework Programme Document 2012

ClimDev-Africa is a joint initiative that was launched in 2011 by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the AUC and the African Development Bank.⁹⁴ By drawing its strategic value from the comparative advantage that each of the partners brings on board, ClimDev-Africa aims to generate and disseminate reliable and high-quality climate information and mainstream the information into development programmes.⁹⁵ The 2012 ClimDev-Africa’s revised framework recognizes ‘increased risks of conflicts related to population migrations’ among its priority sectors affected by climate

⁹⁰ ISS official no. 4, Seminar with author present, 9 Oct. 2019.

⁹¹ AU (note 31).

⁹² AU, ‘Press statement of 742nd PSC meeting on public health threats to peace and security in Africa’, 18 Jan. 2018.

⁹³ ClimDev-Africa, *Revised ClimDev-Africa Framework Programme Document 2012* (ClimDev-Africa: Apr. 2012); African Risk Capacity (ARC), *African Risk Capacity Strategic Framework 2016–2020* (ARC: Dec. 2016), p. 6; AUC, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (AUC: Sep. 2015); AAI, *Africa Adaptation Initiative Framework Document 2017–2020: Enhancing Action on Adaptation and Addressing Loss and Damage in Africa* (AAI: 2016); and AU, *Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Africa* (AU: Nov. 2017).

⁹⁴ ClimDev-Africa, ‘Home’.

⁹⁵ African Development Bank Group, ‘Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa) Initiative’.

change. The framework highlights that as can be seen in areas like Darfur and northern Kenya, conflicts over access to and control of key livelihood resources such as land and water may increase.⁹⁶

ClimDev-Africa's climate-related knowledge will address Africa's climate information gaps and integrate the information into food, peace and security, development, and energy and natural resource use policies for a climate-resilient future. The AUC steers the partnership's political leadership.

African Risk Capacity Strategic Framework

International disaster response mechanisms are often inefficient or inequitable, as funding is secured on a largely ad hoc basis after disaster strikes.⁹⁷ As such, lives are lost, development gains and resilience are eroded, and the risk of political instability increases. The AU established the African Risk Capacity (ARC) as a specialized agency in 2012 to provide timely and targeted responses to extreme climate-related risks by providing early warning technology, contingency planning, risk pooling and transfer facilities to participating African governments.⁹⁸ The ARC innovative finance mechanisms transfer risk from governments to international risk markets, enabling countries to strengthen their disaster risk management systems and access rapid and predictable financing when disaster strikes.

One interviewed expert argued that millions of Africans relying on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihood are vulnerable to projected longer and more intense droughts, and greater weather volatility across parts of the continent.⁹⁹ The ARC innovative disaster response model protects these vulnerable populations by significantly reducing the cost of emergency contingency funds, while decreasing reliance on external aid. The ARC strategic framework for 2016–21 recognizes that disrupted livelihood conditions in the aftermath of a disaster due to delayed and insufficient response can lead to 'significant additional humanitarian and economic costs which can exacerbate conflict and displacement'.¹⁰⁰ However, this policy instrument's principles of engagement lack explicit framing or tangible recommendations on climate-related security risks.

Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063 is Africa's shared strategic framework for structural transformation mandated to provide the basis for inclusive people-centred socio-economic development and continental and regional integration.¹⁰¹ The fourth strategic pillar of the agenda particularly focuses on building a peaceful and secure Africa.¹⁰² The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–23) outlines 10-year milestones that form a benchmark against which Agenda 2063 can deliver transformational outcomes for Africa's people.¹⁰³ Although not explicitly mentioned in the framework, the AU Agenda 2063 flagship projects, to a great extent, respond to the complexities and

⁹⁶ ClimDev-Africa (note 93), p. 11.

⁹⁷ ARC, 'About: African Risk Capacity', 2019.

⁹⁸ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), p. 180.

⁹⁹ PACJA official no. 1 (note 63).

¹⁰⁰ ARC (note 93).

¹⁰¹ AUC and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), p. 18.

¹⁰² AUC (note 93), p. 6.

¹⁰³ AUC, *Agenda 2063, First Ten-year Implementation Plan 2014–2023* (AUC: Sep. 2015).



interrelatedness of existing and emerging human security concerns such as chronic poverty, violent conflicts, gender disparity, migration and climate change.

A key flagship project in the implementation plan for accelerating efforts to secure peace in the continent is the Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 initiative discussed earlier.¹⁰⁴ Other Agenda 2063 projects seek to address drivers that erode human security such as shrinking economic prospects and environmental degradation. These include clean energy infrastructure projects such as the Grand Inga Dam (capacity of 40 000 MW) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that will increase access to clean modern electricity and secure employment prospects for many people in the country and beyond.¹⁰⁵

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA), which entered into force in July 2019, seeks to accelerate action towards an integrated Africa through trade and free movement of persons, goods and services for enhanced economic transformation. Additionally, the AFCFTA has provisions to ensure that the operationalization of the continent-wide single market does not compromise human rights, environmental protection, international security and rule of law.¹⁰⁶ Rapid population growth and the ‘corresponding demands for the continuously degraded environment resources, forced migration and natural disasters’ are recognized to intensify ‘resources-based conflicts in Africa’ in the 2014 Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change.¹⁰⁷ As such, the Agenda 2063 African Passport and Free Movement of People will lead to the abolishment of existing border restrictions, thereby fostering free movement of Africans within the continent and, in a way, addressing ‘illegal’ intra-continental migration.¹⁰⁸

Africa Adaptation Initiative Framework Document 2017–2020

The AAI was formally launched by AU heads of state in 2015 to enhance Africa’s adaptative capacity and strengthen its resilience to address the impacts of climate change that are jeopardizing past and future developments in the continent.¹⁰⁹ The AAI was developed by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in response to a mandate from the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). The CAHOSCC and AMCEN provide political leadership to the AAI with support from the AGN.

The AAI advocates for and facilitates implementation of policies and actions to address the adaptation financing gap and enhances measures for implementing DRR and reducing the continent’s vulnerability to climatic impacts. The AAI delivers through a unified approach of synergetic regional and transboundary cooperation on adaptation knowledge management and sharing, resource mobilization, and progress monitoring and evaluation. The framing of security risks in the AAI 2017–2020 framework leans towards strengthening agricultural resilience in Africa for food security,

¹⁰⁴ ACCORD (note 68).

¹⁰⁵ Sanyanga, R., ‘Grand Inga Dam, DR Congo’, International Rivers.

¹⁰⁶ AU, *Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area* (AU: 21 Mar. 2018).

¹⁰⁷ UN (note 37), p. 55.

¹⁰⁸ ISS official no. 2, Seminar with author present, 9 Oct. 2019.

¹⁰⁹ AAI, ‘About: AAI’, 2019.



with different resource mobilization initiatives focusing on strengthening adaptation and resilience in Africa's agricultural sector.¹¹⁰

More recently within the AU, the PSC recognizes the importance of supporting AAI adaptation priority guidelines through climate finance, recognizing that adaptation is crucial in efforts to address the linkage between climate change and violent conflicts. A 2019 PSC open session themed Climate Change Funding in line with the AAI to contribute towards Peace and Security emphasized the need for the AUC to be 'more actively involved in the Continental climate change institutional architecture, play a pivotal role and mainstream climate change in all its activities particularly in early warning and prevention of climate change related violent conflicts and crises'.¹¹¹

Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Africa

The Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ARSDRR) was adopted by AU leaders in 2004 to guide the reduction and management of the risks posed by disasters that are increasingly witnessed in the continent.¹¹² The implementation of the ARSDRR led to positive progress in the continent until its conclusion in 2015. The Sendai Framework then provided a renewed momentum for strengthening efforts to build on ARSDRR progress, increase resilience and drive Africa's sustainable development in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063.¹¹³ AU leaders expressed their strong commitment to the implementation of the Sendai Framework and strategically developed the POA covering the framework's 15-year time frame. The POA complements existing regional and national DRR strategies by identifying priorities for strengthening resilience in Africa. The first phase is a five-year action plan of priority activities that are anchored in the Sendai Framework's guidelines.

The POA recognizes that hazards and vulnerabilities associated with disasters exacerbated by climate change and variability, coupled with risk drivers such as poverty and conflict, 'further aggravate the risks and reduce the coping capacity and resilience of communities'. Progress in the implementation of the POA is assessed biennially for strengthened learning and accountability. The overall implementation responsibility of the POA rests with the member states, relevant AU organs and RECs.¹¹⁴

Implementation of the policy frameworks

African policymakers are increasingly recognizing the importance of enhancing action on strengthening the continent's adaptation levels and implementing approaches to bolster resilience to climatic impacts. With support from initiatives such as the AAI and the ARC strategic framework,

¹¹⁰ AAI (note 93).

¹¹¹ AU, 'The 828th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: "Climate change funding in line with the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) to contribute towards peace and security"' (note 25).

¹¹² AU (note 93).

¹¹³ UN General Assembly (note 58), p. 6.

¹¹⁴ AU (note 93).



African countries are already undertaking action to adapt to the impacts of climate change, although these efforts are yet to be intensified as the impacts of climate change increase.

While building on the successes and challenges faced during ClimDev-Africa's first phase up until 2016, the second phase has realigned itself with continental and global climate change and development initiatives. Phase II therefore integrates the objectives outlined in the Paris Agreement, 2030 Agenda, Agenda 2063 and Sendai Framework, and resource mobilization is holistically integrating climate change in development policy.¹¹⁵

The AAI has successfully delivered its pre-2020 objectives and is currently mobilizing resources for its post-2020 activities, aiming to achieve transformative results through the Decade of Climate Action. In October 2018 African leaders also adopted the Tunis Declaration that, among other objectives, will accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework. The declaration recognizes the continent's progress on advancing the DRR agenda and adopted a monitoring and reporting framework for tracking and reporting progress in implementation of the POA. This demonstrates increased political will to keep DRR on the AU agenda.¹¹⁶

By 2019 all nationally determined contributions submitted by African countries to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change had an adaptation component, clearly indicating that adapting to the impacts of climate change is a priority in the continent's efforts to increase the adaptive capacity of vulnerable populations.¹¹⁷ Thirty-three AU member states have also signed the ARC establishment agreement, and eight had fully ratified it by March 2019. A report reviewing 2018 activities shows that the ARC has provided over \$400 million to member states in drought insurance coverage since its establishment, protecting millions of vulnerable populations from the impacts of extreme climatic events.¹¹⁸

The Agenda 2063 objectives align with global instruments such as the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals, with the overall aim of contributing positively to Africa's development and fostering sustainable peace and human security.¹¹⁹ Ensuring a harmonized and integrated approach to the implementation of the Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda will minimize the duplication of resource use, thus optimizing development outcomes, preventing conflict and upholding human security.¹²⁰

VII. Energy security and natural resource use crises

Access to energy is an essential prerequisite for economic and social development because it is directly linked to human development indicators

¹¹⁵ African Development Bank, *ClimDev Africa Special Fund (CDSF) 2019 Work Plan and Budget* (African Development Bank Group: Mar. 2019).

¹¹⁶ AU and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *Declaration of the Sixth High Level Meeting on Disaster Risk Reduction, Tunis, Tunisia: 13 October 2018* (AU and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction: 13 Oct. 2018).

¹¹⁷ Chaherli, N. et al., 'Africa's commitment to building a climate resilient and low carbon future', World Bank, 18 Sep. 2019.

¹¹⁸ AU, 'Report of the African Risk Capacity Specialized Agency of the African Union (Jan. 2018–Dec. 2018)', 4–6 Mar. 2019, pp. 2–8.

¹¹⁹ AU, 'Linking Agenda 2063 and the SDGs'; and AU, 'Operational phase of the African Continental Free Trade Area is launched at Niger Summit of the African Union', 7 July 2019.

¹²⁰ AU expert no. 3 (note 61); IOM officials nos 1–4 (note 58); and UNDP official no. 1 (note 58).

such as health, education, food security, gender equality and livelihoods.¹²¹ When compared to the global average, Africa's energy consumption per capita is very low, despite accounting for over a fifth of the global population. According to the 2019 Africa Energy Outlook, the average energy consumption in most African countries is 0.4 tonnes of oil equivalent per capital (toe/capita) against the world average of around 2 toe/capita, although figures differ across and within member states.¹²² AU member state energy regimes are dominated by carbon-intensive energy systems, and over half the population use unregulated biomass for cooking. Both practices are harmful to the environment, and indoor air pollution caused by inefficient burning of wood poses severe health challenges.¹²³

However, there is a growing complexity of conflicts related to the exploitation and management of energy and other natural resources such as land, water and forest resources. Access to energy resources such as oil and other extractives has been identified to correlate with social injustices such as authoritarianism, civil wars and regional disruptions, with major oil producers experiencing precarious political landscapes. Oil resources are sometimes controlled by illegitimate groups of people and the funds channelled towards purchasing weapons, igniting or continuing civil wars, or for power and control, as is the case in the Niger Delta and Darfur.¹²⁴ For instance, Nigeria (Africa's largest oil producer and exporter) gets over 80 per cent of its revenue from oil exports, but the benefits barely trickle down to the country's population.¹²⁵ The country has significant poverty levels, with over 93 million people living on under \$1.90 per day in 2019 according to data courtesy of the World Poverty Clock.¹²⁶ The Niger Delta is frequently associated with violence, human rights violations, environmental destruction, widespread corruption, and ethnic and political unrest.¹²⁷ Some minerals (e.g. cobalt, which is a crucial metal in battery production) have been associated with fuel exploitation and exacerbate instances of fragility and conflict. Cobalt mines are hotspots for exploitation by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—a country that is already struggling with fragility and corruption.¹²⁸

Furthermore, the 'stresses imposed by climate change will amplify existing tensions, particularly in areas where measures to facilitate cooperation over shared resources are weak or missing', according to a report by the AU and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).¹²⁹ Mirumachi et al. also

Clean energy projects, if not done right, may have 'undesirable, unintended or perverse effects' that give rise to distinct and serious security concerns

¹²¹ Sida, 'Power Africa', 15 Aug. 2019.

¹²² International Energy Agency, *Africa Energy Outlook 2019* (International Energy Agency: Paris, 8 Nov. 2019), pp. 28–50.

¹²³ Hagen, U. and Pouget, M., 'AREI needs to speed up to secure support for an African energy transition', German Climate Finance, 5 Aug. 2019.

¹²⁴ Beauchamp, Z., 'How the structure of global oil markets fuels authoritarianism and war', Behind Energy, 4 Feb. 2016.

¹²⁵ Pariona, A., 'Top 10 oil producing countries in Africa: Nigeria is Africa's top oil producing nation', World Atlas, 10 Oct. 2017.

¹²⁶ World Poverty Clock, 'Country card: Nigeria'.

¹²⁷ Forbes, 'Amnesty and new violence in the Niger Delta', 20 Mar. 2018.

¹²⁸ Church, C. and Crawford, A., 'Will the world's switch to renewable energy support conflict?', International Institute for Sustainable Development.

¹²⁹ AU and UNEP, *Report of the African Union Panel of the Wise on Improving the Mediation and Resolution of Natural Resource-Related Conflicts Across Africa: The 5th Thematic Report of the African*



argue that clean energy projects, if not done right, may have ‘undesirable, unintended or perverse effects’ that give rise to distinct and serious security concerns.¹³⁰ There is therefore a rising need to identify, develop and standardize best practices and policies that can mitigate the negative effects of these stresses on human and state security. This can include the proper management of entire value chains that depend on natural resources for modern energy and other sustainable development interventions. The AU and UNEP report recommends that the AU, RECs, member states and local actors prioritize and commit efforts to understanding and resolving conflicts related to natural resources and their links to peacebuilding and development processes.¹³¹

Policy frameworks and responses

The AU energy and natural resource use frameworks analysed in this study are the Convention of the African Energy Commission (AFREC), the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) Framework, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and the Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts between Communities.¹³²

Convention of the African Energy Commission

The AFREC was created in 2001 as a technical agency of the AU to map out energy policies, strategies and development plans in tandem with subregional, regional and continental development priorities.¹³³ Three key programmes are among AFREC’s endeavours to promote effective exploitation and utilization of the continent’s energy resources.

First, the AFREC has created the Africa Energy Information System (AEIS), which provides guidelines on issues related to sustainable development, promotion of energy resources and increasing energy access to disadvantaged populations. As provided for in the Convention, the AEIS is to ‘design, create and up date an energy continental data base and facilitate rapid dissemination and exchange of information’ on sustainable energy development.¹³⁴ Second, the Renewable Energy Development programme is to mobilize financial resources and provides technical assistance to member states and other stakeholders in Africa’s energy structure. Third, in 2015 the Clean Energy and Climate Change programme was initiated to address

Union Panel of the Wise (AU and UNEP: Oct. 2019), p. 10.

¹³⁰ Mirumachi, N. et al., ‘Unveiling the security concerns of low carbon development: Climate security analysis of the undesirable and unintended effects of mitigation and adaptation’, *Climate and Development*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2019), pp. 97–109.

¹³¹ AU and UNEP (note 129), pp. 13–15.

¹³² AU, *Convention of the African Energy Commission* (AU: Lusaka, Zambia, July 2001); AREI, *A Framework for Transforming Africa Towards a Renewable Energy Powered Future with Access for all* (AREI: Oct. 2015); AU et al., *Programme for Infrastructure Development for Africa: Interconnecting, Integrating and Transforming a Continent* (AU: 18 Nov. 2011); and AU, *Communique of the 901st PSC Meeting on the Theme Strengthening Governance Systems in the Management of Natural Resources Between and Among Communities in Africa: Briefing on the ‘Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts between Communities’* (AU: Dec. 2019).

¹³³ AU and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere (note 7), pp. 172–73.

¹³⁴ AFREC and AU, ‘About AFREC’, 2020; and AU, *Convention of the African Energy Commission* (note 132), p. 5.



the interconnections among clean energy, climate change and sustainable development through policy promotion and capacity-building strategies. Even though explicit references to climate-related security risks are lacking in AFREC's objectives, the activities constituted in its initiatives have long-term positive human security implications once implemented.¹³⁵

Africa Renewable Energy Initiative Framework

The AREI was launched (in December 2015 at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris) as a transformative, Africa-owned and Africa-led inclusive initiative to accelerate and scale-up harnessing of Africa's huge renewable energy potential. The AREI aims to add at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020, and at least 300 GW by 2030.¹³⁶ At the launch 10 donors pledged \$10 billion to accelerate AREI's objectives.¹³⁷

The AREI framework adopts a human-security-centred approach to the security risks of climate change by recognizing that expanded energy access enables African societies to 'develop social security provisions and other means of improving welfare for their populations over the coming decades'.¹³⁸ Beyond delivering energy security, the framework highlights that renewable energy can deliver other human security indicators by powering agriculture for improved food security, and power industries boosting economic growth.

The PSC has started to recognize that 'supporting access to cleaner and more efficient, as well as more sustainable sources of energy' can contribute towards building community resilience and mitigate competition for access to scarce resources, hence fostering peace.¹³⁹ The AREI and AFREC build on and strengthen other continent-wide initiatives such as the PIDA and Sustainable Energy for All.

Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa

Aware of Africa's weaknesses, the AUC launched the PIDA in January 2012 as a flagship framework for infrastructure development towards the realization of Agenda 2063.¹⁴⁰ The priority of the PIDA is to establish modern transport, energy, transboundary water resources management, and information and communications technology infrastructure to drive the continent's economic agenda, eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth, integrate Africa in the world economy and accelerate the empowerment of sidelined groups such as youth and women.¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ AU, *African Energy Commission (AFREC) Report on AFREC Activities to the STC* (AU: 13–17 Mar. 2017).

¹³⁶ AREI, 'AREI', 2019.

¹³⁷ Hagen and Pouget (note 123). The 10 donors are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the USA and the European Union.

¹³⁸ AREI (note 132), p. 14.

¹³⁹ AU, 'The 828th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, an open session on the theme: "Climate change funding in line with the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) to contribute towards peace and security"' (note 25).

¹⁴⁰ African Development Bank Group, 'Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)'.

¹⁴¹ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, 'Improving the infrastructure in Africa: Support to the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)', period 2018–21.



PIDA energy programmes are anchored in the PIDA energy vision that aims to increase access to ‘modern energy for all’ through efficient and environmentally friendly energy infrastructure, eradicating poverty and invigorating sustainable development in the continent.¹⁴² The AUC ensures that PIDA projects align with regional and continental strategies such as Agenda 2063, while AUDA-NEPAD coordinates the stakeholder engagement efforts for streamlined funding for the projects.

Present PIDA documents do not explicitly outline ‘conflict-sensitive’ mechanisms of harnessing renewable energy and valuable metals, especially when exploiting such resources in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This therefore creates vacuity on safeguarding against creating or exacerbating grievances and inequalities among groups, or displacing poor and marginalized communities from land essential to their livelihoods during project development.¹⁴³

Bamako Declaration

The Bamako Declaration was adopted in November 2019, and it is the first continent-wide policy pushing for a comprehensive plan of action on addressing the negative human and state security impacts stemming from persistent conflicts related to natural resources that are also ‘acerbated by climate change’.¹⁴⁴ Recommendations in the declaration’s proposed plan of action include mechanisms for identifying adequate measures for addressing the impacts of climate change through adaptation and mitigation policies.

Recommendations include mechanisms for identifying adequate measures for addressing the impacts of climate change

The declaration also recognizes that innovatively strengthening the resilience of affected populations and collaborating in early warning and early response initiatives will address the mounting complexity of conflicts related to the inextricable links among climate change, the exploitation and management of natural resources, and peace and security.¹⁴⁵

Implementation of the policy frameworks

Implementing infrastructure projects—especially regional projects with many stakeholders—is always complex. For PIDA project implementation, country governments provide the political leadership, while financial institutions such as the African Development Bank provide financial leadership.¹⁴⁶ The 2018 PIDA progress report highlights efforts by AUDA-NEPAD to strengthen renewable energy development by supporting

¹⁴² African Development Bank Group, ‘The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa: Transforming Africa through modern infrastructure’.

¹⁴³ Mirumachi et al. (note 130).

¹⁴⁴ AU, *Communique of the 901st PSC Meeting on the Theme Strengthening Governance Systems in the Management of Natural Resources Between and Among Communities in Africa: Briefing on the “Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts between Communities”* (note 132), p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ AU, *Communique of the 901st PSC Meeting on the Theme Strengthening Governance Systems in the Management of Natural Resources Between and Among Communities in Africa: Briefing on the “Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts between Communities”* (note 132).

¹⁴⁶ AU et al. (note 132), p. 9.



feasibility studies and design of wind and solar projects in different African countries under the Renewable Energy Access Programme.¹⁴⁷

Throughout 2019 the AFREC held regional workshops with energy experts in member states to capacitate them on reliable energy data collection and synthesis that can inform policymaking for Africa's energy transition process. The AFREC has also initiated the African Energy Transition Programme that will accelerate a transition to lower carbon dioxide emission pathways and meet targets set in Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals. Thirty-seven African countries had ratified the AFREC convention as of May 2019, and others are at different stages of ratification.¹⁴⁸ Progress in the AREI is slowly advancing. The 2015–20 phase of the project was dedicated to setting up governance protocols and concrete action plans. So far, the AREI board has accepted 24 projects aimed at adding new and additional renewable energy generation across Africa. The year 2020 marks the close of the first implementation phase, and evaluations whether the political initiative is on track will be carried out.¹⁴⁹

A February 2020 meeting of the UN–AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, which broadly recognized the multiplier effect of climatic impacts on peace, security and stability, also called for enhanced UN–AU collaboration in implementing policies addressing this complex linkage, including the recommendations in the 2019 Bamako Declaration.¹⁵⁰

Africa's quest for sustainable development has to remain in tandem with the urgency to create targeted response and management of energy and conflicts related to natural resources. This calls for an impetus on mechanisms that ensure efforts to harness clean energy and other natural resources are 'conflict sensitive', especially when exploiting such resources in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. UN Development Programme (UNDP) officials also recommend that the AUC should strongly advocate for climate-smart infrastructure projects that are resilient to damage caused by extreme weather and mainstream conflict sensitivity in project development to avoid any unintended impacts on target communities.¹⁵¹

VIII. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to provide a comprehensive overview of the AU's climate security policy landscape for interested policymakers in Africa and beyond. The policy analysis sought to answer: (a) whom the provisions for climate-related security are for in AU policy frameworks, (b) the exact location of climate-related security matters on the AU architecture and (c) the institutional response and policy implementation within the four thematic policy areas analysed in sections IV–VII.

Overall, the policy document analysis and interview findings reflect that the AU is increasingly recognizing the security risks associated with climate

¹⁴⁷ NEPAD, *2018 PIDA Progress Report: Summary Update* (NEPAD: 2018).

¹⁴⁸ AU, 'Building Africa energy database for the industrial sector', Press release no. 4/2019, 29 Oct. 2019; and Leaders League, 'Rashid Ali Abdallah (African Energy Commission): "Africa needs to develop all available types of renewable energy"', 3 July 2019.

¹⁴⁹ Hagen and Pouget (note 123).

¹⁵⁰ AU, 'Joint communiqué: United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security holds eighteenth consultative meeting in Addis-Ababa on 11 February 2020', Feb. 2020.

¹⁵¹ UNDP official no. 1 (note 58).



change in its food security, peace and security, human security, and energy and natural resource management security work. In fact, the discourse around climate security within the AU is vibrant and rapidly developing. The 16 policy frameworks that were analysed explicitly or implicitly recognize climate change as one of the emerging global trends threatening Africa's human and state security. The framing of and discourse on the climate-related security risks differ across the four policy themes analysed in this report. The analysed food, energy and human security frameworks reference the impacts of climate disasters through a human-centred lens by focusing on the devastating outcomes of extreme climatic events on populations. This is notably different in the peace and security and natural resource work, which has a combination of state and human-centric framings of the climate risks in policy discourse.

Moreover, the mapping has illustrated that for a long time, AU climate matters have been pushed to pillars that are traditionally associated with climate change such as the AU DREA and with limited cross-pillar coordination.¹⁵² This siloed approach has been amplified by inefficient internal coordination mechanisms for streamlining climate concerns across different AU departments, especially those with significant financial and political backing like the AU PSD. However, AU officials emphasized that there is renewed energy and collective responsibility in understanding and addressing climate security risks in the AU. Various AU departments have started to harmonize departmental capacities and hence elevate the understanding and efforts to address climate-related security risks. For instance, AU officials pointed out that the PSD and DREA have increased their collaboration in addressing climate security risks at the level of the AUC. The CPEWD and DREA have also co-convened the IDTFCP, inviting representatives from various AUC departments and divisions to establish and institutionalize a 'climate cluster'. This will potentially tap into the interdepartmental and interdisciplinary knowledge and provide avenues for addressing the emerging challenges associated with climate-related security risks. This revitalized coordination mechanism will also provide a platform for the AUC to harmonize its work across all key departments and ensure a commission-wide participation in scaling up AU attention to climate-related security work.

The mapping also identified specific areas that need strengthening at national and regional levels to drive actions towards the region's sustainable development prospects and that heavily affect livelihoods. For instance, the AU is far from fully concretizing its responses to climate-related security risks. Recommendations in all except one of the analysed policies are yet to be developed into actionable commitments that can address the array of climate-related challenges facing Africa. Notably, much more needs to be done in this regard. Many AU frameworks with explicit recognition of the security risks associated with climatic shocks (such as the APSA road map and the AU Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa) are far from achieving their strategic objectives. This failure can be linked to other multi-faceted continent-wide challenges such as the sluggish economic growth,

The 'climate cluster' will also provide a platform for the AUC to harmonize its work across all key departments

¹⁵² ISS official no. 1 (note 61); and IOM officials nos 1–4 (note 58).



the rising trend of insurgency of extremist groups in some regions and the weak governance capacity of member states, which inhibits the speedy formulation and implementation of policy. Commendably however, the adoption of the Bamako Declaration in November 2019 evidently depicts the growing AU efforts in framing and developing targeted policy responses and implementation mechanisms for climate-related security risks. For instance, the Bamako Declaration has recommendations that, if implemented, can address conflicts associated with climate change, natural resource management and stability.

Finally, the AU is strongly pushing for financial independence and sustainability in order to achieve the strategic mandates set out in the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063. By extension this will also accelerate AU preparedness in understanding and addressing climate-related security risks. For instance, the CAADP-based NAIPs were set out to boost member state investment and productivity in agriculture and ensure food security. The ARC financing mechanisms also enable countries to strengthen their disaster risk management systems and access rapid and predictable financing when disaster strikes (including those stemming from climate change). The AU Peace Fund has also benefited from \$131 million from member state contributions (from the 0.2 per cent levy on eligible imports) to strengthen resilience to structural vulnerabilities and enhance conflict response mechanisms. However, interviewed AU experts highlighted that a large portion of the AU budget is still supported by external donors with supplements from other sources such as through fundraising activities, and there is an impetus for accelerated efforts to reach the \$400 million target by 2021. The donor-supported budgets are not commensurate with the challenges at hand.¹⁵³

Reflections highlighting a broader assessment and discussions of AU strengths and weaknesses from the analysis in this paper are published in an accompanying Policy Brief. The Policy Brief also provides relevant recommendations that will further entrench AU understanding, political engagement and programmatic interventions for climate-related security risks.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ AU expert no. 1, Seminar with author present, 25 Oct. 2018; FES Kenya official no. 1 (note 32); IOM officials nos 1–4 (note 58); and UNDP official no. 1 (note 58).

¹⁵⁴ Krampe and Aminga (note 5).



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SIPRI BACKGROUND PAPER

POLICY RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: THE AFRICAN UNION

VANE AMINGA

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