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CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA

KAROLINA EKLÖW AND
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

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Preface

Climate change has landed. Over the past two decades, its impact has swept across the globe, taking human life, undermining livelihoods, destroying infrastructure, shaking national economies and stressing state budgets. As climate change is transforming and redefining the global security landscape, the implications of climate change for peace and security have become increasingly embedded within security discourse, including in the United Nations as a whole and the UN Security Council.

As a result, a handful of UN peacebuilding, peacekeeping and special political missions have been granted mandate renewals that include a call to report on climate-related security risks and deploy appropriate risk management strategies. One of the first UN Security Council resolutions to do so was the extension of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia's mandate (UNSOM) in 2018. It is without doubt that improved preparation for and response to the challenges in complex peacebuilding contexts entails peacebuilding efforts becoming more climate-sensitive. Focused on Somalia, this policy paper is the first in a series that asks how the UN peacebuilding efforts have been affected by climate change and how they have responded.

During three decades of conflict, Somalia has experienced an increase in the frequency of climate-related changes, including severe droughts. The impacts of climate- and weather-related changes are adding pressure to an already overburdened and under-equipped governance and judicial system. This is a serious problem in the state-building process and an obstacle to the successful implementation of UNSOM's mandate to advise on state-building, maritime security and broader security sector reform. The paper shows that, with 94 per cent of the nomadic population in Somalia living in poverty, climate change forces herders to adapt their behaviour because traditional grazing routes have become unusable. A growing number of internally displaced people are exposed to insurgent groups such as al-Shabab. The overall effect is to set back UN efforts to support the building of governance institutions and broader state-building in Somalia.

UNSOM has responded to the growing impact of climate-related change. Innovative initiatives such as the development of the Recovery and Resilience Framework, the establishment of the Drought Operations Coordination Centers, and the appointment of an environmental security adviser all demonstrate an important set of responses that bridge the mission's short-term need for rapid humanitarian response and the long-term vision of a sustainable and resilient society.

This paper offers a unique insight into the changing reality of contemporary peacebuilding efforts and gives a much-needed understanding of the challenges the Somali peacebuilding process faces, as the basis for practical policy recommendations. It should be of considerable interest to policymakers, practitioners and researchers alike.

Dan Smith
Director, SIPRI
Stockholm, October 2019

Acknowledgements

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Karolina Eklöw and Florian Krampe

Summary

Climate-related security risks are increasingly transforming the security landscape in which multilateral peacebuilding efforts are taking place. This report offers a glimpse into the future of peacebuilding in times of climate change by looking at the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). To help future peacebuilding efforts become more climate sensitive, this report shows: (*a*) how climate-related environmental change in Somalia and the Horn of Africa is challenging successful implementation of the UNSOM mandate and (*b*) how UNSOM has integrated the challenges stemming from climate-related environmental change into its ongoing operations.

There are three layers of conflicts on the local, national and international levels, which have characterized Somalia since the early 1990s. Each level has interrelated triggers and drivers of conflict. In addition, the history of decades-long civil war, violence and criminal impunity is closely linked to Somalia's social and economic development, specifically endemic poverty, undernourishment and high population growth. The impacts of climate change have increased the magnitude of Somalia's food and water crises, compounded by land mismanagement and lack of governance.

Impacts of climate-related security risks on the peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

This policy paper shows that climate change affects the work of UNSOM in multiple ways, and that there are several notable responses to the increasing challenges. Climate change has hindered UNSOM in its work to provide peace and security, and also in its efforts to establish functioning governance and judicial systems. The key drivers are the substantial impacts of climate-related change on the livelihood of people, especially through the effects on migration and forced displacement. The absence of livelihood options and the increase in poverty contribute to grievances and fragility that hamper implementation of the UNSOM mandate. A substantial element of this dynamic is the effect on migration and people's mobility. The consequences are societal pressures that fuel grievances and provide opportunities for actors to benefit politically. Moreover, it causes people to choose illicit alternative livelihoods such as human trafficking and charcoal trading. Grievances that are linked to group allegiances are a particularly serious risk factor because they affect conflicts on multiple levels and are likely to inhibit resolution, thus prolonging conflicts. Despite these linkages among climate-related change and the socioeconomic and political dynamics on the ground, there is a general lack of awareness, especially in the donor community, of how environmental problems are directly linked to livelihood, migration and displacement.

Responses of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia to climate-related security risks

UNSOM has responded to the increasing impact of climate-related change. Lessons learned from previous failed responses—notably the 2011 drought—have created innovative initiatives that have worked (e.g. the Drought Operations Coordination Centers). While there is still room to improve, UNSOM's initiatives such as drought coordination, the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Framework for Somalia and the appointment of an environmental security adviser, may help to deliver a set of responses that meet the short-term need for a rapid humanitarian response and the long-term objective of achieving a sustainable and resilient society. This seems essential for peacebuilding in Somalia, given the increasing stress of climate impacts in this conflict-affected country. It could be concluded that the harsh climatic conditions have dictated the need for greater integration and interdependence in UN peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.

Implications and ways forward

The lessons learned from current challenges to and responses by UNSOM suggest the need for synergetic policy responses that can turn the responses to climate-related security risks into opportunities for UN efforts to sustain peace. There are implications for the UN in Somalia, similar missions in climate-vulnerable areas and the wider UN system.

The United Nations in Somalia

The UN in Somalia must adapt to the extreme manifestations that a changing climate brings. In the short term, UNSOM and the UN Country Team must establish mechanisms for ad hoc cooperation. In the long term, UNSOM must form a common vision with room for adaptive tactics. Transboundary collaboration can help to address the spatial dimensions of climate-related security risks. The UN in Somalia should:

1. Promote flexibility in short-term humanitarian–security cooperation
2. Create an adaptive long-term strategy and vision
3. Increase regional response mechanisms in the Horn of Africa

Similar United Nations missions in climate-vulnerable areas

Missions in other areas with similar challenges have a window of opportunity to prepare for known looming changes and to assume that unknown changes will occur due to warmer temperatures. Missions can prepare by actively learning from other missions in a climate-fragile context. By challenging themselves and innovatively responding to changes, even if there is no instruction manual, UN missions should:

4. Prepare now for climate impacts
5. Learn what works and what does not
6. Dare to try new responses

The United Nations system

The wider UN system can prepare for climate-related changes by synthesizing information across domains and using the established Climate Security Mechanism. The system can be strengthened by equipping staff with skills through training. Training of the trainers is an important addition. Funding and donor communities must adapt to a climate-changing world. By financing activities that strengthen resilience to climate-related security risks, investments will contribute to sustaining peace. The UN system should:

7. Synthesize the climate risk assessment capacity
8. Improve training of peacebuilding actors
9. Adjust funding streams to support integrated responses

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CSM	Climate Security Mechanism
DOCC	Drought Operations Coordination Center
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
ENSO	El Niño–Southern Oscillation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change
RC	Resident Coordinator
RMU	Risk Management Unit
RRF	Recovery and Resilience Framework
SNA	Somali National Army
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WFP	World Food Programme

1. Introduction

The primary objectives for United Nations peacebuilding are to stop violence, prevent the rekindling of conflict and help societies and governments to reset their internal relations on a path for sustaining peace. These objectives become exponentially more difficult in countries affected by the adverse effects of climate change because such impacts compound many social, economic and political pressures.[1] The consequences of climate change and violent conflict exaggerate the human costs of war, inhibit building peace and affect people's livelihoods long after active combat has ceased. Therefore, climate change not only is an issue of human security but also is increasingly transforming the broader security landscape in which peacebuilding activities are taking place.[2]

International efforts to maintain peace and security have not yet specifically taken these challenges into account. This is concerning because the basic priorities of international peace efforts are inevitably affected by climate-related environmental change (i.e. 'a change in biophysical conditions that are or will be affected by a change in the state of the climate or by variations in the mean state of the climate').[3] Research increasingly indicates that the impacts of climate-related environmental change are interfering with the objectives of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities, which are to reduce the risk of conflict relapse and facilitate sustainable peace and development.[4]

This policy paper offers a glimpse into the future of peacebuilding in times of climate change by looking at the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). Torn apart by multiple conflicts over the last three decades, Somalia is among the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world. This paper is one of the first detailed studies into the effects of climate change on UN peacebuilding efforts and their associated responses. It is guided by the following two overarching questions:

(*a*) How is climate-related environmental change in Somalia and the Horn of Africa hindering the successful implementation of the UNSOM mandate?

(*b*) How has UNSOM integrated the challenges stemming from climate-related environmental change into its ongoing operations?

This policy paper shows that climate change affects the work of UNSOM in multiple ways, and that there are several notable responses to the increasing challenges. Based on an understanding of these risks and challenges, the paper

[1] USAID, *The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks* (USAID: Washington, DC, 2018); and Peters, K. et al., *Double Vulnerability: The Humanitarian Implications of Intersecting Climate and Conflict Risk*, Working Paper 550, International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre and Overseas Development Institute: London, 2019.

[2] Krampe, F., 'Climate change, peacebuilding and sustaining peace', SIPRI Policy Brief, June 2019.

[3] Mobjörk, M. et al., *Climate-related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach* (SIPRI and Stockholm University: Stockholm, Oct. 2016).

[4] Mobjörk et al. (note 3); Matthew, R., 'Integrating climate change into peacebuilding', *Climatic Change*, vol. 123, no. 1 (Mar. 2014), pp. 83–93; and Scott, S. V. and Ku, C., *Climate Change and the UN Security Council* (Edward Elgar Publishing: 2018).

Box 1.1. Key concepts and definitions

Climate-related security risks

For the purpose of this study, climate-related security risks are defined using a comprehensive security approach that includes human, community, state and international security. Such a comprehensive security approach is needed because climate-related security risks are multifaceted (i.e. involve different consequences, such as drought, flooding and sea-level rise), and can simultaneously undermine the security of different reference objects (e.g. humans, communities, states, the international system, the environment and ecology). Moreover, climate-related security risks span different policy areas, such as foreign, military, development, economy and environment policy. This multifaceted and multidimensional character of climate-related security risks calls for scrutinization of the framing of security (i.e. analyses of how organizations are responding to climate-related security risks should also investigate how these risks are understood in the organization because this is likely to explain different policy outcomes).[a]

Climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) definition)

'Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods". The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributable to natural causes.'[b]

Peacebuilding (United Nations definition)

'Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace.'[c]

Peace operation (SIPRI definition)

'The SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database contains information on operations that are conducted under the authority of the UN and operations conducted by regional organizations or by ad hoc coalitions of states that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, with the stated intention to: (*a*) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (*b*) support a peace process, or (*c*) assist conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts.'[d]

Somalia

In this paper 'Somalia' refers to the internationally recognized territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The paper focuses on those parts of Somalia that accept the 2012 provisional constitution. While Somaliland faces similar ecological challenges, the political situation is sufficiently different to require separate analysis.

[a] Krampe, F. and Mobjörk, M., 'Responding to climate-related security risks: reviewing regional organizations in Asia and Africa', *Current Climate Change Reports*, vol. 4, no. 4 (2018), pp. 330–37.

[b] IPCC, *Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty* (IPCC: Geneva, 2018), Annex I, Glossary.

[c] UN Peacekeeping, 'Terminology', <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>.

[d] SIPRI, 'Definitions and methodology', <https://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/methods>.

Box 1.2. Methodology

This study looks at the implications of climate change on United Nations peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. As a single case study, the report is limited in regard to generalizability beyond the scope of the case of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).[a] Even though a generalization of how climate-related security risks affect peacebuilding efforts cannot be provided, it is possible to deductively ascertain the importance of climate change in the context of peacebuilding by providing a plausibility probe—that is, an 'illustrative' case study to 'demonstrate the empirical relevance'.[b] The study serves as an 'eye opener' to policy actors and researchers, and guides future inquiries into the research question of how climate change affects peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.

A qualitative process-tracing methodology is followed to identify the observable implications.[c] This allows a deeper understanding to be gained of the economic, social and political tensions and the environmental dynamics. A combination of primary and secondary data has been collected and analysed, including existing academic literature on peace efforts in Somalia and first-hand reports from UNSOM. In addition, the study builds on a unique set of 27 interviews with peacebuilding officials that have previously worked or are currently working within the various UN offices in Somalia, complemented by interviews and consultations with regional experts in Nairobi (Kenya) and Stockholm (Sweden). The viewpoints of these serve as a lens through which events, as well as actors and their decisions, are interpreted. Moreover, the interviews provide information that is otherwise unattainable and unrecorded.[d] Interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, allowing the use of received information without disclosing the identity or affiliation of the interviewee (unless with consent). In addition to primary interviews, existing research on climate-related security risks in the Horn of Africa and relevant peacebuilding literature further qualify this study.

[a] Brady, H. E. and Collier, D. (eds), *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, 2nd edn (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); and George, A. L. and Bennett, A., *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

[b] Levy, J. S., 'Case studies: types, designs, and logics of inference', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Mar. 2008), pp. 1–18.

[c] George and Bennett (note a); and Bennett, A. and Checkel, J. T., *Process Tracing* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2014).

[d] Richards, D., 'Elite interviewing: approaches and pitfalls', *Politics*, vol. 16, no. 3 (Sep. 1996), pp. 199–204.

outlines ways to improve policy responses and transform climate risks into opportunities for UN peacebuilding in the context of the sustaining peace agenda, as outlined by the UN Secretary-General. It is suitable for readers familiar with the Somali conflict and also those new to the topic.

While this chapter provides some key concepts and definitions (box 1.1) and a brief description of the approach used (box 1.2), chapter 2 provides a comprehensive background to the conflict and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, including a look at UNSOM and the UN Country Team (UNCT). This is followed by a comprehensive study of climate and environmental change in Somalia (chapter 3). Readers with knowledge of the conflict and the climatic conditions may choose to proceed directly to chapter 4, which describes the empirical findings of this study: how climate-related environmental change is hindering successful implementation of the UNSOM mandate. Thereafter, insights are provided into the responses by UNSOM and the UNCT (chapter 5), followed by a look at the implications and ways forward (chapter 6).

2. Conflicts and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia

Located at the eastern shore of the Horn of Africa (figure 2.1), Somalia has experienced armed conflict and violence since the late 1980s, which has resulted in a long, drawn-out and comprehensive state collapse.[5] While international peacebuilding efforts are ongoing, including attempts to consolidate a new federal government structure following the 2012 provisional constitution, three decades of civil war and established societal tensions are complicating Somalia's peace progress. There are three interrelated layers of conflicts on the local, national and international levels, which have characterized Somalia since the early 1990s. Each level has interrelated triggers and drivers of conflict.

Locally, conflicts in Somalia are often manifested through low-level communal violence, and are intimately linked to resources and clan affiliation. Communal violence has frequently spilled over to the national level and was part of the outbreak of the civil war in the 1990s. After a peak of fatalities in the civil war of the early 1990s, violent conflict among different clans continued on the communal level. These conflicts were—and still are—closely linked to access and control over natural resources, especially land, livestock, fisheries and water.[6] The ownership of resources is linked to livelihood styles, which often signifies clan association, for example in conflicts between powerful clan-based nomadic herder groups and often marginalized settled communities. Access to natural resources often defines power relations in and among communities on the local level. The implications of communal tensions frequently spill over to the national level, as clan identities increasingly become politicized.[7]

Nationally, Somalia's conflicts are linked to territorial claims, clans and contestations of government, especially following the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. The northern area of Somaliland claims independence and operates as de facto independent but has not been internationally recognized as an independent state. Puntland is committed to unity with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) but operates with a high degree of autonomy. Jubaland, Southwestern State, Hirshabelle and Galmadug (see figure 2.1) also operate under the 2012 provisional constitution and are considered Federal Member States. The national-level conflict is thus a mélange of politicized clan identities and a legacy of Somalia's colonial history.[8] On the one hand, the national conflicts are compounded by communal conflicts and related communal identities that are linked to narratives

[5] Menkhaus, K., 'State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 97 (2003), pp. 405–22.

[6] Elmi, A. and Barise, A., 'The Somali conflict: root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies', *African Security Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Jan. 2006), pp. 32–54.

[7] Elmi and Barise (note 6).

[8] Lewis, I. M., *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (Hurst & Co: London, 2008).



Figure 2.1. Map of Somalia and contested territories

Credit: Christian G. Dietrich.

of clan-based grievances.[9] On the other hand, competition by elites for national power has exacerbated local-level fault lines. The various armed factions and conflicts in Somalia are sustained by the lack of functioning judiciary and police.

[9] Elmi and Barise (note 6); and Menkhaus, K., 'Somalia: "They created a desert and called it peace(building)"', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 36, no. 120 (July 2009), pp. 223–33.

Formal police and military forces are often still operating as clan militia and lack proper integration as national forces.[10] Access to small arms and light weapons, as well as social and demographic pressures such as large quantities of unemployed youth, amplify local and national conflicts.[11] After 2007 the Islamist extremist group al-Shabab became the most significant contestant for government power on the national level.[12] The absence of functioning state governance and the high level of corruption provided an entry point for the network, which maintains ties to al-Qaeda.[13] This facilitated an internationalization of the conflict, by linking it to the 'global war on terrorism'.

Internationally, Somalia—as well as the entire Horn of Africa—is undergoing substantial changes in its security landscape because of increasing foreign military presence, especially since 2001. A wide variety of international actors are currently operating in Somalia, including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.[14] Multilateral international organizations, including the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the UN, also have missions in Somalia. With about 20 000 troops, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has the biggest multilateral peace operation in the country.[15] With the increasing significance of al-Shabab, Somalia's conflicts are linked to broader international military efforts. Regional power relations, especially with Ethiopia, also affect Somalia on multiple levels.[16]

A brief chronology of the major developments in the Somali conflict and peacebuilding efforts between 1960 and 2019 is now provided.

Decolonization, Somali civil war and first United Nations peace efforts: 1960–2000

The Somali state emerged following independence of two separate territories from British and Italian colonial rule in July 1960. The first years of independence saw the emergence of a multiparty, democratic government, but were marked by several incidents of repeated fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia.[17] In 1969 a military coup brought the socialist regime of President Siad Barre. The regime's authoritarian rule became dominated by certain clans and sub-clans, and progressively eroded the state and its institutions. Growing societal grievances, especially of marginalized clans, led to public protests and clan-based armed

[10] Somalia expert, Personal communication with the authors, Oct. 2018–Aug. 2019.

[11] Elmi and Barise (note 6).

[12] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Uppsala University), <https://ucdp.uu.se/?id=1&id=1>.

[13] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (note 12).

[14] Melvin, N., 'The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa region', SIPRI Background Paper, Apr. 2019.

[15] SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>.

[16] Quaranto, P. J., *Building States While Fighting Terror: Contradictions in United States Strategy in Somalia from 2001 to 2007*, ISS Monograph Series no. 143 (Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, May 2008).

[17] Kendie, D., 'Toward Northeast African cooperation: resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia disputes', *Northeast African Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2003), pp. 67–109.

conflict, which led to the death of thousands of people in the early 1990s.[18] The ouster of the Barre regime in January 1991 led to the outbreak of a civil war among clan-based militias, pushing Somalia increasingly towards state collapse. Somaliland declared its independence in the wake of this conflict.

The humanitarian impact of the fighting was severe, with an estimate of over 15 000 casualties in fighting between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 1992.[19] In addition, the UN assessed 4.5 million people to be on the brink of starvation, and 2 million people fled their homes due to the effects of the war. As humanitarian relief was severely delayed, food became a resource that civilians and warlords sought for, making the delivery of food aid a dangerous operation.[20] To provide protection for humanitarian aid personnel, the UN established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in April 1991. UNOSOM I was followed by the UN Task Force in December 1992, which was replaced by UNOSOM II, which operated in Somalia from March 1993 until March 1995. The deployment of UNOSOM II was overshadowed by the killing of 24 UN peacekeepers in June 1993.[21] Shortly after, 18 US soldiers died in intense fighting in Mogadishu after a US helicopter was shot down. Photographs of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu led to a withdrawal of US troops and a subsequent dissolution of the mission by March 1995. Low-scale conflict in the absence of a functioning state continued until the early 2000s.[22]

Emergence of al-Shabab and renewed peace efforts: 2001–19

During the early 2000s international mediation efforts led to the formation of several transitional governments, notably the Transitional National Government (2000–2004) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2004–12), which operated from Kenya in the first five years.[23] Part of these state formation attempts included suggestions for power-sharing to mitigate the clan conflicts through the '4.5 formula', which guaranteed balance of representation for the four major clans in parliament and assumed the 0.5 to accommodate representation of the remaining clan and ethnic minorities.[24] However, opposition within Somalia against the new government arrangements led to increasingly violent opposition that peaked with a military standoff between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006. The combined effects of protracted conflict and severe drought and flood events caused a massive humanitarian crisis and displacement

[18] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (note 12).

[19] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (note 12).

[20] Human Rights Watch, *World Report 1993—Somalia* (Human Rights Watch: 1 Jan. 1993).

[21] Autesserre, S., 'The crisis of peacekeeping: why the UN can't end wars', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 98, no. 1 (2019), pp. 101–16.

[22] *New York Times*, 'UN report describes Somalia's swift descent into anarchy', 19 Aug. 1999.

[23] Quaranto (note 16); and International Crisis Group, *Somalia's Islamists*, Africa Report no. 100 (International Crisis Group: Brussels, 2005).

[24] Nasteha Mohamud, A., 'Somalia's struggle to integrate traditional and modern governance systems: the 4.5 formula and the 2012 provisional constitution', *Journal of Somali Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4 (June 2019), pp. 41–69.

Box 2.1. Mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

In Resolution 2158 (2014) the UN Security Council:

'1. Decides to extend UNSOM's mandate for a period of 12 months as follows:

(a) To provide United Nations "good offices" functions, supporting the Federal Government of Somalia's peace and reconciliation process;

(b) To support the Federal Government of Somalia, and AMISOM as appropriate, by providing strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building, including on:

(i) Governance, including public financial management;

(ii) Security sector reform, rule of law (including police, justice and corrections within the framework of the United Nations Global Focal Point), disengagement of combatants, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, maritime security and mine action;

(iii) The development of a federal system; the constitutional review process and subsequent referendum on the constitution; and preparations for elections in 2016;

(c) To assist the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international donor support, working with bilateral and multilateral partners, in full respect of the sovereignty of Somalia, in particular on:

(i) Security sector assistance including with the Government's requirements under the terms of the partial suspension of the arms embargo; and

(ii) Maritime security;

(d) To help build the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia to:

(i) Promote and protect human rights and women's empowerment, including through the provision of Gender Advisers and Human Rights Advisers;

(ii) Promote child protection and to implement the relevant Somali Government action plans on children and armed conflict, including through the provision of Child Protection Advisers;

(iii) Prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, including through the provision of Women's Protection Advisers;

(iv) Strengthen Somalia's justice institutions and to help ensure accountability in particular with respect to crimes against women and children;

(e) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on, and help prevent:

(i) Any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed in Somalia, including through the deployment of human rights observers;

(ii) Any violations or abuses committed against children in Somalia;

(iii) Any violations or abuses committed against women, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.'[a]

UN Security Council resolutions 2221 (2015), 2232 (2015), 2275 (2016), 2358 (2017), 2408 (2018) and 2461 (2019) have successively renewed the UNSOM mandate. The current mandate is valid until 31 March 2020.

[a] UN Security Council Resolution 2158, 29 May 2014.

with '160,000 Somali refugees in northern Kenya alone and 400,000 internally displaced in Somalia'.[25] To stabilize the situation and aid the humanitarian relief, AMISOM was authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007 and subsequently authorized by the UN Security Council.[26]

[25] Security Council Report, 'December 2006 monthly forecast' (Security Council Reports: New York, 2006).

[26] UN Security Council Resolution 1772, 20 Aug. 2007.

Despite the deployment of AMISOM, the Islamist extremist group al-Shabab has emerged, since 2008, as the main insurgent group in Somalia. By 2011 it controlled substantial parts of southern and central Somalia, including the important port of Kismayo and parts of Mogadishu.[27] After a massive increase in AMISOM troop size from around 9000 troops in 2011 to 16 970 in 2012, al-Shabab lost ground but still maintains substantial control in southern Somalia.[28] In June 2013 the UN Security Council established UNSOM with the mandate (box 2.1) to support establishment of the FGS following the agreement on a new constitution in 2012. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed has held the presidential post since 2017 through selection by a group of clan elders.[29]

[27] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (note 12).

[28] SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 15); and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (note 12). See also Williams, P. D., 'Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2018), pp. 172–192.

[29] Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2018—Somalia* (Human Rights Watch: 18 Jan. 2018).

3. Climate and environmental change in Somalia

Somalia is located in the most eastern part of the Horn of Africa, with the equator crossing through it in the south. The country possesses the longest coastline of all African states and has a warm desert climate in the north and a semi-arid climate in the south. The Juba and Shabelle rivers flow into southern Somalia, with headwaters emerging from the Ethiopian highlands. Somalia is characterized by four seasons: between the two monsoons, there are irregular rain and hot and humid periods. From April to June, there is the main rainy season, Gu. This is followed by the dry Xagaa season before the Dayr provides further rainfalls from October to December. The annual cycle is completed as the dry Jilaal season stretches from December to March. The climate in the Horn of Africa is affected by the Indian Ocean's variable sea-surface temperatures and the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle.[30] Different ENSO phases have diverse impacts during seasons and across different parts of the Horn.[31]

Somalia is highly susceptible to the effects of climate change and extreme weather conditions, such as periods of extended drought, flash floods, erratic rainfall, disruption to the monsoon seasons, strong winds, cyclones, sandstorms and dust storms.[32] Many extreme weather events have occurred in Somalia in the past 25 years.[33]

Hydrology

Somalia's two main rivers, the Juba and the Shabelle, generate fertile floodplains, sustain essential agriculture and crop production, and supply Mogadishu with water. Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia share the Juba–Shabelle river basin, with Somalia being the lower riparian (see figure 3.1).[34] Both rivers emerge in the Ethiopian highlands and are Somalia's only perennial rivers. Given the lack of rainfall in the downstream areas, these two rivers are highly dependent on precipitation in the Ethiopian highlands. The low rainfall downstream and also high evaporation and water withdrawal are reasons why both rivers lose runoff on their descent to the Indian Ocean (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). Increased dam-building activities in Ethiopia affect the river system further.[35]

[30] Williams, A. P. and Funk, C., 'A westward extension of the warm pool leads to a westward extension of the Walker circulation, drying eastern Africa', *Climate Dynamics*, vol. 37, no. 11–12 (Dec. 2011), pp. 2417–35.

[31] Anyah, R. O. and Semazzi, F. H. M., 'Climate variability over the Greater Horn of Africa based on NCAR AGCM ensemble', *Theoretical and Applied Climatology*, vol. 86, no. 1–4 (Sep. 2006), pp. 39–62.

[32] Ministry of National Resources, *National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change (NAPA)* (Federal Republic of Somalia: Mogadishu, Apr. 2013), p. 14.

[33] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 'Somalia floods update', 7 May 2018.

[34] UN Environment Programme (UNEP), *Africa Water Atlas* (UNEP: Nairobi, 2010).

[35] Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 'The Juba and Shabelle rivers and their importance to Somalia', 2016.



Figure 3.1. Juba–Shabelle river basin average annual rainfall

Note: Rainfall levels are graded on a colour spectrum with yellow representing areas with low amounts of rainfall and blue representing areas with high amounts of rainfall.

Source: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Africa Water Atlas* (UNEP: Nairobi, 2010).



Figure 3.2. Juba–Shabelle river basin modelled available runoff

Note: Runoff levels are graded on a colour spectrum with red representing areas with low amounts of runoff and blue representing areas with high amounts of runoff.

Source: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Africa Water Atlas* (UNEP: Nairobi, 2010).

Water scarcity is a persistent phenomenon in Somalia. Regional experts and UNSOM officers have expressed concern about the rivers, which face overall decreasing volumes and have tended to temporarily dry up completely on several occasions.[36] Dry soil is less capable of absorbing water, and arid and semi-arid lands stretch across 80 per cent of the Somali landmass. In the central semi-arid parts (i.e. dry areas that still receive some rain), the rainfall is as low as 50–100 millimetres (mm)/year.[37] Dry soil and environmental degradation cripple the environment's ability to absorb or withstand extreme weather and natural hazards. This exacerbates the impact of effects associated with climate change such as intensified droughts, flash floods and sandstorms, creating a 'catch 22' situation.[38] Over the past two decades, land degradation, deforestation and desertification have rapidly accelerated; the Lower Juba area was estimated to have lost 50 per cent of its forest cover during the years between 1993 and 2014.[39] Even with current temperatures, the flora in Somalia is strained to such an extent that it is often unable to rehabilitate itself.[40]

[36] SWALIM/FAO Officers, Group interview via Skype, Feb. 2019; and UNCT Officer 2, Interview via Skype, June 2019.

[37] Ministry of National Resources (note 32).

[38] FAO, *Resilient Livelihoods—Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security* (FAO: Rome, 2013).

[39] Ogallo, L. A. et al., 'Land cover changes in Lower Jubba Somalia', *American Journal of Climate Change*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 2018), pp. 367–87.

[40] Thulstrupa, A. W. et al., 'Uncovering the challenges of domestic energy access in the context of weather and climate extremes in Somalia', *Weather and Climate Extremes* (Sep. 2018).



Figure 3.3. Temperature anomaly in Somalia in degrees Celsius (°C) relative to the 1901–2015 average

Data source: The World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/>.

Temperature

Somalia has some of the world's highest mean annual temperatures. Given the country's location near the equator, its temperature remains high throughout the year.[41] Yet, the long coastline contributes to some variation in the temperatures between the north and south. The arid and semi-arid landmass is typically prone to high temperatures and extreme weather conditions.[42] Somalia's mean daily maximum temperatures ranged from 30 degrees Celsius (°C) to 40°C, with Berbera in the north experiencing afternoon high averages of more than 38°C (June–September) and Mogadishu reporting up to 32°C in April.

Stark variation has characterized Somalia's climate over the last century. However, the country has experienced a gradual and continuous increase in mean annual temperatures since 1991, especially since the 1960s relative to the 1901–2015 average (figure 3.3). Future projections have modelled a temperature increase of between 3.2°C and 4.3°C by the end of the 21st century.[43]

Precipitation

Rainfall in Somalia is generally erratic. The country has an average annual rainfall of around 250 mm, which varies across the country. In the northern area, the

[41] Hadden, R. L., *The Geology of Somalia: A Selected Bibliography of Somalian Geology, Geography and Earth Science, revised edn* (Topographic Engineering Center, US Army Corps of Engineers: Feb. 2007).

[42] Ministry of National Resources (note 32).

[43] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *AR4 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R. K. and Reisinger, A. (eds)] (IPCC: Geneva, 2007); and Ministry of National Resources (note 32), p. 28.



Figure 3.4. Precipitation anomaly in Somalia in millimetres (mm) relative to the 1901–2015 average

Data source: The World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/>.

conditions are hot and arid, and there is less rainfall (<250 mm). The precipitation in the south is around 400 mm of rainfall. The south-west part receives the most rain of around 700 mm.[44]

The rainfall in Somalia is also characterized by its interannual and intra-seasonal variability. Precipitation anomalies from 1901 to 2015 (figure 3.4) show a high interannual variability, with three periods identified: from 1901 to 1929 the sequence is wet, from 1930 to 1961 there are more dry years, and from 1962 to 2005 the sequence presents a high variability of rainfall with more extreme events occurring, causing droughts and flash floods. However, from 2002 a return to wetter years is observed, but with lower intensity.

The impact of ENSO events—which occur some 12 000 kilometres away from Somalia on the Pacific coast of South America—is closely linked to precipitation in East Africa. During the El Niño period, which is characterized by warm ocean temperatures along the central and east-central equatorial Pacific, East Africa generally experiences more rain and flooding.[45] In contrast, during La Niña events (i.e. periods of colder ocean temperatures in the eastern Pacific), East Africa experiences strong winds and rainfall deficiency, leading to more droughts during that period.[46] Looking at the long-term trend over the last century, Somalia is currently in a period where it is receiving more precipitation (figure 3.4). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Somalia

[44] Ministry of National Resources (note 32).

[45] Nicholson, S. E., 'A review of climate dynamics and climate variability in eastern Africa', *Liminology, Climatology and Paleoclimatology of the East African Lakes* (CRC Press: 1996), pp. 25–56; Wolff, C. et al., 'Reduced interannual rainfall variability in East Africa during the last ice age', *Science*, vol. 333, no. 6043 (Aug. 2011), pp. 743–47; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 'El Niño and La Niña', [n.d.].

[46] Wolff et al. (note 45).



Figure 3.5. Key livelihood and labour cycles in Somalia's seasonal calendar

Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network, <http://fews.net/file/113530>.

is expected to receive more rainfall in the future. However, the rainfall events are anomalous and heavier, which can be more detrimental than helpful to the environment.[47] This is because incidences of extreme rainfall can cause flooding and soil erosion in areas with minimal or degraded forests. Additionally, dry soil becomes less capable of absorbing water, limiting the recharge of groundwater and aquifers. This rainfall therefore does not add more 'green water' (water naturally infiltrated by rain and retained in the soil that plants and roots can access).[48] Instead, the water from this rainfall facilitates soil erosion and is discharged into the sea.

According to the IPCC models, increased precipitation and overall wetter conditions, especially during the rainy season, are expected for East Africa because the increase in temperature will intensify the hydrological cycle.[49] The IPCC models suggest 'less severe droughts in October–November–December and March–April–May, a reversal of recent historical trends'.[50] Rainfall is expected to increase in Somalia by about 3 per cent by 2050 in relation to the 1981–2000 reference period.[51]

[47] IPCC, *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report*, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R. K. Pachauri and L. A. Meyer (eds)] (IPCC: Geneva, 2014).

[48] Rockström, J. et al., 'Future water availability for global food production: the potential of green water for increasing resilience to global change', *Water Resources Research*, vol. 45, no. 7 (July 2009).

[49] IPCC (note 47).

[50] FAO, 'Forest management and climate change in Eastern Africa', FAO, 14–16 Dec. 2016. See also IPCC (note 47).

[51] Ministry of National Resources (note 32).

Socioecological dimensions

Due to the increasing impacts of climate-related environmental change, seasons and weather phenomena are becoming more difficult to predict. This has tremendous impacts for everyday life for the Somali population, which is highly dependent on agriculture as a livelihood. Employment in the agricultural sector, which consists of activities in agriculture (farmers and herders), hunting, forestry and fishing, was 72.4 per cent in Somalia in 2018.[52] Surveyed for the 2013 Somalia National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change (NAPA), elder, pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities expressed that predicting seasons was becoming harder. This has been coupled with an increasing number of dust storms and droughts, stronger winds, new species and notably hotter temperatures over the past four decades. The communities also pointed out that dust storms have become more frequent and tend to occur immediately before severe flash floods.[53]

The livelihood and labour cycles for nomad herders and settled farmers are closely linked to the seasons in Somalia (figure 3.5). Expected labour demands peak twice a year, tied with the timing of the Gu off-season harvest and the Deyr off-season harvest. Land preparation and planting is intended to occur in symbiosis with the Deyr and Gu seasons for harvest for agro-farmers. For herders, camel calving and cattle calving are also tied to certain months. Nomads and livestock migrate to lush grazing areas during wet seasons. Therefore, any seasonal variability and unpredicted shifts have cascading effects on herders, farmers, markets, families and entire communities.

Rainfall in the Gu season has been below normal in Somalia since 2015, and the country has faced the third-driest rainy season in 2019 since the mid-1980s.[54] The combined effects of failed rainy seasons have already caused widespread crop failure and a reduction in the profitability of domesticated animals in 2019. This has made communities in the most severely affected areas face food instability or displacement, with 53 000 individuals displaced by drought, adding to the estimated 2.6 million displaced Somalis.[55] The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia estimates a 50 per cent decrease in anticipated harvest in 2019, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) estimated in May that 5.4 million individuals would face food emergency in the coming months.[56]

In Somalia's NAPA, the FGS concluded that weather events such as drought, strong winds, extreme flooding and high temperatures are associated with loss of livelihood, loss of livestock and increased poverty.[57] Community leaders told the authors of the NAPA (2013) report that drought tends to induce herder–farmer

[52] International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT Database (International Labour Organization: Sep. 2019), <https://ilostat.ilo.org/>.

[53] Ministry of National Resources (note 32).

[54] UN OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, Somalia, 1–30 June 2019.

[55] UN OCHA (note 54).

[56] UN OCHA (note 54).

[57] Ministry of National Resources (note 32).

conflicts, where settled communities and livestock herders compete over the same resources. They further conveyed how nomadic communities engage in intergroup conflict in the search for diminishing pasturelands. Strong winds typically disrupt telecommunication and electrical infrastructure. Flooding tends to damage sewage systems, increases the prevalence of human diseases, and causes physical damage to houses, roads and canals. High temperatures cause the rate of evaporation to increase, wells to dry up and crops to dry out, which further exacerbate failed harvests. Flash floods and droughts have similar social outcomes, and the authors of the NAPA (2013) report particularly sought responses to these two phenomena. In the longer term, droughts tend to incite increased local food prices, more salinity along the coastal groundwater and generally graver water conflicts. Flooding harms fruit trees, pushes contaminated water into the ocean and provokes migration of species on land and in water.[58]

Beyond the Juba–Shabelle basin, Somalia depends on groundwater access through boreholes, wells and springs to facilitate small-scale irrigation.[59] However, with irregular availability of water and climate-affected recharge of groundwater, wells dry up quickly. During certain times of the year, this significantly affects irrigation patterns and cultivation prospects.

In the long term, warming temperatures make conditions for agricultural livelihoods and cultivation of land harder in Somalia. In addition, some environmental effects that are exacerbated by humans undercut the quality of cultivable land. Land degradation—the subtle environmental process enhanced by human activity that gradually lowers the health of productive land—is widespread in Somalia. While remaining undetected for long periods of time, land degradation exhausts soils, erodes gullies and can propel the resettlement of species.[60] The most common reason for land degradation is the illegal charcoal exploitation of Acacia trees, which is an industry with an estimated annual revenue of 1.9 billion US dollars in Africa.[61] But it has been pointed out that this one-dimensional explanation of land degradation and deforestation allows for an insufficient basis for policymaking because it does not account for other factors.[62] Wind erosion, overgrazing, mismanagement and poor agricultural practices further contribute to land deprivation.[63]

As Somalia lacks the enforcement of a basic legal framework and also lacks an applied environmental policy, the execution of activities that stress vegetation is allowed. Additionally, longer and more intense droughts enhance human-made deforestation and are leading to failed crops and dying livestock.[64] An incomplete

[58] Ministry of National Resources (note 32), pp. 34–37.

[59] SWALIM, 'Ground water', 2014.

[60] SWALIM, 'Land degradation in Somalia', 2016.

[61] Nellemann, C. et al. (eds), *The Environmental Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources* (UNEP and INTERPOL: 2016).

[62] Hussein, S., *Understanding the Drivers of Drought in Somalia: Environmental Degradation as a Drought Determinant* (SIDRA Institute: 2017).

[63] McKinney, M., Robert, S. and Logan, Y., *Environmental Science: Systems and Solutions* (Jones & Bartlett Publishers: 2007).

[64] Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), *Somalia's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions* (FGS: Nov. 2015).

understanding of the breadth of the problem of land degradation skews responses by decision makers and herders. With most of the Somali population depending on agriculture, forestry and fisheries, climate-related changes affect life profoundly. There is a strong connection between seasonal patterns and livelihood and income-generating activities, as shown in figure 3.5, because of the dependence on farming and herding.

4. Climate impacts on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

Climate change affects peacebuilding in several ways. Its compound character is a strong exogenous factor that reshapes the local social, political and economic context thereby potentially amplifying local grievances and marginalization. As mentioned above, climate change inhibits economic development in countries where most of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood. Extreme weather events weaken already fragile institutions by having to direct resources and attention to respond to the impacts of slow- or rapid-onset disasters. In cumulation, the impacts of climate change actively erode the capacity of states, weaken their institutions and thus reduce their ability to prevent conflict.

To illustrate how climate-related environmental change in Somalia and the Horn of Africa is hindering the successful implementation of the UNSOM mandate, the 2014 mandate is used as the conceptual starting point. The mandate from Resolution 2158 is assessed along its two major themes: (*a*) peace and security and (*b*) governance and justice. It is worth noting that dynamics presented in one section, such as displacement and livelihood deterioration, reappear again in other sections as they are relevant explanations for other facets of the mandate.

Peace and security

The first of the two main themes of the UNSOM mandate is to support peace and security in Somalia. For instance, the mandate outlines UNSOM aims to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state-building to the FGS. It aims to include the disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants. Three dynamics in particular are interfering with the UNSOM mandate towards peace and security: (*a*) increased herder–farmer conflicts, (*b*) insurgent group recruitment and (*c*) competition over land. Climate change exacerbates the effects of each challenge.

Tensions between herders and farmers are increasing

Irregular precipitation and variations in temperature have severe effects on agriculture in East Africa, leading to an increase in conflicts between herders and farmers. Herders have had to adapt their behaviour due to the impacts of climate change because traditional grazing routes have become unusable and nomadic mobility patterns more erratic due to shifts in seasonal weather patterns. The change of herder routes and schedules has subsequently caused increased conflicts with farmers over land, access and resources.[65] Studies also show that herders are more inclined to sell their livestock during periods of extreme weather—such

[65] Workshop with regional experts, Nairobi, May 2019; and van Baalen, S. and Mobjörk, M., 'Climate change and violent conflict in East Africa: integrating qualitative and quantitative research to probe the mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, vol. 20, no. 4 (10 Nov. 2017).

as drought and high temperatures—than during normal conditions. The sudden increase in supply due to the surplus of animals reduces prices in local markets.[66] With around 94 per cent of the nomadic population in Somalia living in poverty, this upsets an already weak market.[67] The economic volatility is stressful, and also makes people more prone to pursue illegal livelihoods and even join or be recruited for armed factions.[68] The increase in livestock raids and related violence has been another implication of diminishing livelihood options for herders.[69]

Although herder and farmer clashes have always occurred, they are now harder to solve. The traditional approach to dispute resolution in Somalia, xeer, has survived colonization and state collapse, but it has no single authority and is applied ad hoc between two disputing parties, with a third party deciding the outcome and compensation.[70] This customary legal mechanism to resolve and prevent these conflicts has been weakened or replaced. This is partly because of the civil war, but also because of conflict and weather-related migration of traditional mediators, such as elders and local experts of customary law.[71] In territories controlled by al-Shabab, Somalia's traditional xeer law is typically replaced by Sharia law.[72] As such, there are few lasting measures for conflict resolution and reconciliation for communal conflicts over territory, livestock or natural resources. This limits the prospects for local trust and reconciliation and instead contributes to existing intergroup grievances that link to domestic political, clan and ethnic tensions.

These local-level conflicts have direct implications for the UNSOM mission to support peace. As a senior UNSOM staff member stressed: 'When it comes to resource sharing, and there is scarcity, it is a trigger of conflict. But if it gets worse, it can be taken up to regional and even national level.'[73] The complex linkages that contribute to polarization of intergroup identities and relations also affect the UNSOM mandate and the prospect to successfully support the peace and reconciliation process. UNSOM staff and the strategic framework of the UNCT recognize that these protracted disagreements, relating to natural resources and land, are linked to Somalia's larger political dynamics and have resulted in some

[66] Maystadt, J. and Olivier, E., 'Extreme weather and civil war: does drought fuel conflict in Somalia through livestock price shocks?', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 96, no. 4 (July 2014), pp. 1157–82; and Maystadt, J., Calderone, M. and You, L., 'Local warming and violent conflict in North and South Sudan', *Journal of Economic Geography*, vol. 15, no. 3 (May 2015), pp. 649–71.

[67] Ogallo, L. M. et al., 'Land cover changes in Lower Jubba Somalia', *American Journal of Climate Change*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 2018), pp. 367–87.

[68] Maystadt, Calderone and You (note 66).

[69] Workshop with regional experts, Nairobi, May 2019; Markakis, J., 'Anatomy of a conflict: Afar & Ise Ethiopia', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 97 (2003), pp. 445–53; and Butler, C. K. and Gates, S., 'African range wars: climate, conflict, and property rights', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 49, no. 1 (2012), pp. 23–34.

[70] Brown, O. and Keating, M., *Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts: Working Towards More Effective Resolution of National and Sub-national Resource Disputes* (Chatham House: London, 2015).

[71] United Nations, UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017–2020, 2018; and UNSOM Officer 5, Interview via Skype, Apr. 2019.

[72] Life & Peace Institute, *Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia. A Snapshot and Analysis of Key Political Actors' Views and Strategies* (Life & Peace Institute: Uppsala, 2014).

[73] UNSOM Officer 4, Interview via Skype, Apr. 2019.

of Somalia's deadliest violent clashes.[74] As stated in the UN strategic framework, this perpetuates a vicious circle: 'In the absence of local reconciliation, disputes among political entities over borders and territory, natural resources, as well as clan tensions over control of nascent administrations persist.'[75]

Conflicts between herders and farmers are historically common to the area, as well as to large parts of the Sahel and West Africa. The influx of small arms—facilitated by the continuous lack of rule of law—has increased these conflicts, thus providing a constant increase in the number of casualties.[76] However, there is growing evidence that climate-related environmental change has contributed to the rise in conflicts between herders and farmers. Climate change affects the local economy, especially local livestock markets. On an aggregated level the resultant livelihood challenges are seen as lowering the threshold for people facing economic hardship to engage in violence.[77] The growing impact of climate-related challenges affects the prospect of UNSOM achieving its mandate on peace and security because it indirectly contributes to low-level communal violence. It moreover demonstrates how closely linked climate-related risks are to issues of governance, justice and rule of law, which are discussed in detail below.

Insurgent groups gain recruitment opportunities and political narratives gain support

The double exposure of Somali society to climate-related change and decades of violence has caused approximately 2.6 million Somalis to become internally displaced as of August 2019. Flash floods in southern and central areas displaced 215 000 people over a period of only a few months in 2018.[78] The loss of livelihoods has led many of the displaced to migrate towards urban centres, such as Mogadishu as well as smaller cities like Baidoa in south-western Somalia, where more than 320 000 people currently live in improvised internally displaced person (IDP) camps. Many live on private land without access to social services and without secure rights of tenure, meaning that they risk eviction. In such circumstances, micro conflicts are not unusual.[79]

UN OCHA reports that because al-Shabab has invigorated its efforts to recruit children, families choose to leave their homes to seek shelter in IDP camps.[80] Yet, experts emphasize that, even within these camps, children are exposed to

[74] United Nations (note 71).

[75] United Nations (note 71).

[76] Krampe, F., Scassa, R. and Mitrotta, G., 'Responses to climate-related security risks: Regional organizations in Asia and Africa', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2018/2, Aug. 2018; and Workshop with regional experts, Nairobi, May 2019.

[77] Maystadt and Olivier (note 77); and Webersik, C., 'Wars over resources? Evidence from Somalia', *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 50, no. 3 (2008), pp. 46–58.

[78] World Health Organization, 'More than half a million Somalis affected by floods and heavy rainfall', 8 May 2018.

[79] International Organization for Migration, 'IOM to relocate internally displaced persons at risk of eviction in Baidoa', Press release, 4 June 2019.

[80] UN OCHA, 'Somalia—Renewed displacement in South Central Somalia', European Commission ECHO Daily Flash, 7 Aug. 2019.

recruitment efforts by insurgent groups.[81] In 2018 Somalia had the highest level globally of children recruited and used in armed conflict (2300).[82] IDP camps are hotspots for conflict among and between clans and land owners and have also become recruitment grounds for insurgent groups like al-Shabab that actively recruit young and unemployed men from campsites.[83] One expert noted a tendency of violent groups, such as al-Shabab, to strengthen their recruitment tactics by utilizing the fact that IDP campsites are inhabited by thousands of strangers and therefore lack social cohesion and security. Peacebuilding experts working in the area explain that insurgents are able to capitalize on this state of disarray and assimilate into the camp environment, gaining trust among inhabitants and thus being able to better identify potential recruits.[84]

In other cases, armed groups and political factions exploit grievances of the population that stem from weather-related losses and experiences of conflict. Resource scarcity due to extreme weather events and the loss of homes or family members are seen by development experts as playing a central role in generating grievances that make individuals more susceptible to certain political agendas.[85] Local political elites take advantage of the aforementioned grievances and strengthen their own agenda. This has sensitive historical relevance as clan relations and the role of grieving marginalized groups and clans was and remains linked to conflict dynamics among dominant groups on a national scale.

The exposure to conflict and the consequences of climate and environmental change provide a fertile ground for armed groups to mobilize for their cause, thereby undermining UNSOM peace efforts. The recruitment is especially subverting UNSOM support for the 'disengagement of combatants, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration' by the Somali Government and AMISOM. Two of the main purposes of AMISOM are to protect the central government and defeat al-Shabab. As established in Resolution 2093 (2013), UNSOM is working in a coordinated manner with AMISOM and providing logistical support delivered through the UN Support Office in Somalia.[86]

With over 20 000 troops, AMISOM operates in southern Somalia and has functioned as the FGS de facto army since 2007. It will continue to do so until the Somali National Army (SNA) builds up enough capacity to function alone.[87] The UN Security Council decided to retract a thousand AMISOM troops as the initial stage in a gradual drawdown in 2017, which was later delayed as the SNA was not ready to take over responsibilities.[88] The SNA and by extension the FGS

[81] Swedish MFA Officer 3, Interview via Skype, Jan. 2019; and Somalia expert (note 10).

[82] UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, 'Children and armed conflict', Report of the Secretary-General, A/73/907–S/2019/509, 20 June 2019.

[83] UN (note 71).

[84] Swedish MFA Officer 3, Interview via Skype, Jan. 2019.

[85] Swedish MFA Officer 3 (note 84); and UNDP (note 68).

[86] UN (note 71).

[87] SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 15); and Sperber, A., 'Somalia is a country without an army', *Foreign Policy*, 7 Aug. 2018.

[88] 'Unanimously adopting Resolution 2431 (2018), Security Council extends mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, authorizes troop reduction', Meetings coverage, SC/13439, 30 July 2018.

could face collapse if the AU lets the troops depart at this stage.[89] An additional risk factor is the possibility of losing control of the harbour in Kismayo, halfway between Mogadishu and the Kenyan border, which is of strategic significance for the FGS and al-Shabab.[90]A regional expert stated that the major obstacles are the lack of integration of different clan militias to the SNA, which often still operate as clan militia. Additional reasons include corruption and insufficient command and control mechanisms, coupled with the absence of a long-term plan for the security structure of a national federal system.[91]

There are multiple other factors behind the successful recruitment by and influence of insurgent groups. Insurgent groups successfully recruit as people seeking a sense of belonging and identity are drawn to the promise of immediate protection and an income. The widespread access to weapons and a culture of impunity in Somalia have also long contributed to the trend.[92] However, the increasing frequency and severe impacts of extreme weather-related displacements and losses of livelihood are fuelling grievances. The FGS and UN agencies are struggling to adequately respond under complex and challenging conditions.

In conclusion, climate change and ongoing conflict are enabling violent groups, especially al-Shabab, to exploit poverty and grievances of the population. Political and clan elites are also able to capitalize on grievances to gain support for their political agenda, fuelling stronger resentment among groups as well as against the FGS and its allies. This is undermining the prospects for UNSOM work on security sector reform.

More frequent droughts and floods raise intergroup competition and exploitation of weaker segments because of decreasing cultivable land

Land tenure rights—or the lack of them—is a sensitive issue in Somalia. Climate change impacts are accelerating these dynamics. Increasingly severe flooding has affected the Shabelle area, which is inhabited by settled groups and nomads. The same pattern has led to recurring violence, marginalization and permanent displacement of minority groups who cultivated land in the larger Shabelle river basin area.[93] Most displaced people during the 2011 drought had livelihoods and lifestyles that were dependent on agriculture. The affected people predominantly belonged to the Bantu/Jareerweyne group and the agro-pastoral Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle) clan. UNSOM officers recalled how flooding affected the area and weaker minority clans in particular were displaced. Once the water retreated, their land was quickly seized by local elites and more powerful clans.[94] The consequences are increasing competition over scarce land and water resources and forced displacement. Similar patterns of elites and more powerful actors

[89] Felbab-Brown, V., 'Developments in Somalia', Testimony, Brookings Institution, 14 Nov. 2018; and Menkhaus, K., 'Elite bargains and political deals project: Somalia case study', Stabilisation Unit, National Security Council of the United Kingdom, Feb. 2018.

[90] Regional expert 1, Personal communication with authors via conversation in Europe, Oct. 2019.

[91] Somalia expert (note 10).

[92] UNDP (note 68).

[93] FAO (note 33).

[94] UNSOM Officer 5, Interview via Skype, Apr. 2019.

exploiting weaker segments of societies after incidences of flooding or droughts leading to increased violence have been observed across the Horn of Africa.[95]

Broader political/ideological conflict dynamics, rather than communal clan and ethnic group division, also increase marginalization and grievances. For instance, in the wake of the drought of the early 2000s, al-Shabab seized areas in the southern part of the country. The group swiftly occupied the few remaining green areas of land, exploiting farmers and the lush land as a way to generate income for the insurgency.[96] By securing access to food, water and land resources for itself, al-Shabab has successfully held its stronghold in southern and central Somalia.

Due to their vulnerability to disaster impacts and dependence on more powerful groups, minority groups are especially systematically discriminated against by more dominant groups and are often affected by forced displacement.[97] These marginalized groups and clans accumulate in IDP camps, where they are over-represented and exposed to increased crime, recruitment efforts and socioeconomic hardship. UNSOM notes the disproportionally large recruitment of insurgent groups from the weaker clans and sub-clans.[98]

One UNSOM officer stressed how there were recurrent comments that the ethnic minorities felt marginalized from clan-based power-sharing deals. 'This marginalisation provides an opening for Al-Shabaab to exploit.'[99] Similar patterns of elites and more powerful actors exploiting weaker segments of societies after incidences of flooding or droughts leading to increased violence have been observed across the Horn of Africa.[100]

The amount of cultivable land that is safely available to civilians is decreasing due to environmental change, land degradation and conflict. The resulting displacement and marginalization contribute to grievances and violence among different groups and clans over land access, thereby complicating UNSOM peacebuilding efforts. This creates long-term challenges for UNSOM, as contested land weakens the potential for the land to be used and adapted for agriculture use and made resilient to climate change. One UNSOM officer stressed: 'Unless land disputes can be handled in a legally secure manner, you will never be willing to make the investments required to rebuild agriculture in Somalia.'[101] Land pressures are therefore increasingly in need of conflict resolution and mediation efforts to reduce tensions and limit marginalization. But the problem is, because of the difficult security situation—not just in al-Shabab areas—UNSOM is unable

[95] Van Baalen and Mobjörk (note 65); Nordqvist, P. and Krampe, F., 'Climate change and violent conflict: sparse evidence from South Asia and South East Asia', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2018/4, Sep. 2018; and Workshop with regional experts, Nairobi, May 2019.

[96] Heaton, L., 'The making of a climate outlaw', *Foreign Policy*, 6 June 2017; and UNSOM Officer 9, Interview via Skype, Aug. 2019.

[97] Danish Immigration Service, *Report on Minority Groups in Somalia* (Danish Immigration Service: Copenhagen, Sep. 2000).

[98] UNSOM, *Countering Al-Shabaab Propaganda and Recruitment Mechanisms in South Central Somalia* (UNSOM: Mogadishu, 2017).

[99] UNSOM (note 98), p. 10.

[100] Van Baalen and Mobjörk (note 65); Nordqvist and Krampe; and Workshop with regional experts (note 95).

[101] UNSOM Officer 9, Interview via Skype, Aug. 2019.

to provide adequate livelihood support, as UNSOM and other UN officials can move only among and from some safe compounds and towns, and are unable to stay for longer periods in areas of need.[102]

The competition over areas of land is often a trigger of violence, even though economic, social and political factors remain key explanations for the outbreak of violence. Weather-related changes and fast-onset natural disasters are increasingly reducing the availability of resources and provide windows of opportunity for powerful elites to take advantage. Unfavourable conditions such as drought facilitate communal tensions, which undermine the ability of UNSOM to support peacebuilding.

Governance and justice

The second main theme in the UNSOM mandate is to improve the governance system and the institutional framework for justice and rule of law through strategic advice. Many of the governance and justice challenges relate to internal displacement, which has been increasingly linked to climate-related environmental changes.[103] The subsections below analyse how climate change contributes to the following dynamics: criminality, governance arrangements, urbanization, and health and violence risks.

Criminality can thrive in conditions induced by climate change

Piracy along the Somali coast is a widely covered phenomenon that has received global attention and is considered to be 'feeding local wars'.[104] Pirates, who are typically deprived fishers, are directed by criminal elites to hijack ships and kidnap the crew for a ransom. Piracy activity reached a peak in 2008 and further escalated in 2011–13.[105] Some reports picked up on the increased pirate activities in the midst of the 2017 drought and looming famine.[106] There is some indication of a link between piracy and extreme weather events in some cases in Southeast Asia.[107] However, evidence for Somalia remains scarce. Other factors, such as illegal fishing activities by foreign fleets and the activities of international security actors (including those from the UN and the EU) are primary explanations for pirate activities in this area.[108]

[102] UNSOM Officer 8, Interview in person in Europe, Apr. 2019.

[103] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Somalia', Fact sheet, 30 June 2018.

[104] Middleton, R., *Piracy in Somalia—Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars* (Chatham House: London, 2008).

[105] Oxfam International, *Oxfam's Remote Partnerships, Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms in Somalia* (Oxfam International: London, 2009); and Oxfam and Save the Children, *A Dangerous Delay: The Cost of Late Response to Early Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa*, Joint Agency Briefing Paper (Oxfam/Save the Children: Oxford/London, Jan. 2012).

[106] Campbell, J., 'Return of Somali pirates alerts Pentagon', *Africa in Transition*, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2017.

[107] Nordvist and Krampe (note 105).

[108] Middleton (note 104).

Organized crime is thriving throughout Somalia.[109] The number of criminal gangs has increased significantly in recent years, especially in Somaliland and Puntland.[110] Organized crime is facilitated by weak governance and corruption. Other enabling factors include diminished livelihood options due to warming temperatures and extreme weather events.[111] As previously indicated, rising temperatures and greater frequency of droughts and floods are driving displacement. For instance, the 2018 flash floods in Somalia displaced nearly 215 000 people.[112] Similarly, a prolonged drought affected 6.7 million people and displaced 926 000 people between November 2016 and September 2017.[113] Climate impacts have contributed to an increase in the number of IDPs that moved to urban areas, such as Mogadishu, and who are living in improvised camps. These camps have become hotspots for criminal activities such as human trafficking and child exploitation, and a recruitment ground for al-Shabab. In addition, sexual and gender-based violence is particularly prevalent in IDP camps.[114]

Moreover, some people whose livelihoods have been affected and who have remained on their land have been pushed into illegal, unconventional economic activities that are often linked to larger illicit networks. Illegal trade and a thriving shadow economy are a logical coping strategy for people after three decades of civil war. Nevertheless, these activities are weakening the FGS and strengthening alternative, de facto governance systems such as that of al-Shabab. The Sharia courts run by the insurgent group are considered effective, as judgements are enforced.[115] Al-Shabab is exercising government-like control in the south and central parts, and also works as an underground network that collects illicit taxes and extortions of business elites in Mogadishu.[116]

Charcoal production and trade via Somalia, banned by the UN in 2012, are examples of alternative livelihoods.[117] The exploitation of Acacia trees for charcoal has exceptionally negative effects for the environment as it decreases the coping capacity for extreme weather and destroys Acacia forests that are vital for herders.[118] Al-Shabab is benefiting from these criminalized activities because

[109] Felbab-Brown (note 89); and Chesson, G. et al., 'Somalia's organized crime networks: a new framework to degrade al-Shabaab', *International Affairs Review*, vol 25, no. 1 (2017).

[110] Menkhaus (note 89).

[111] Gjelsvik, I. M. and Bjørgo, T., 'Ex-pirates in Somalia: processes of engagement, disengagement, and reintegration', *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention*, vol. 13, no. 2 (Oct. 2012), pp. 94–114; and Thulstrupa et al. (note 40).

[112] World Health Organization, 'More than half a million Somalis affected by floods and heavy rainfall', 8 May 2018.

[113] Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), World Bank, UN and EU, *Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment*, Vol. 1, Synthesis Report (FGS, World Bank, UN and EU: 2018).

[114] British Government, *Country Policy and Information Note Somalia: Women Fearing Gender-based Violence*, Version 4.0, Apr. 2018; and Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2019—Somalia* (Human Rights Watch: 2019).

[115] Maruf, H., Joseph, D. and Anzalone, C., *Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally* (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, IN, 2018).

[116] Maruf et al. (note 115).

[117] UN Security Council Resolution 2036, 22 Feb. 2012.

[118] UNEP, 'How Somalia's charcoal trade is fuelling the Acacia's demise', 21 Mar. 2018.

it taxes traders for the possession of charcoal.[119] This revenue helps finance al-Shabab's insurgency and strengthens the group's position as authority of a de facto state.

UNSOM is mandated to 'Strengthen Somalia's justice institutions and to help ensure accountability'. Illegal activities are feasible due to the weak security sector and rule of law. But the additional pressures—including through climate change—are worsening the prospects for the future of rule-based federal governance of Somalia and thus the fulfilment of the UNSOM mandate. Indeed, as further elaborated in the next section, this is something that UN officers frequently experience: 'many people prefer to go to al-Shabab courts because they are less corrupt, and their decisions are enforced because al-Shabab still has the capacity to use force through survival. Of course, this is something that directly undermines the whole state-building process.'[120] The vastness of illicit livelihood options undermines UNSOM's ability to help the Somali Government reduce crime and 'ensure accountability'.[121]

Weak governance and state institutions combined with a complex security situation prepare the ground for organized crime and corruption in Somalia. However, the impacts of climate- and weather-related changes are adding pressure to an already overburdened and capacity-lacking governance and judicial system. Insurgents and criminal elites continue to capitalize on the vulnerabilities that climate change impacts generate and amplify. This is a serious threat to the state-building process and hampers successful implementation of the UNSOM mandate to advise on state-building, maritime security and broader security sector reform.

The legitimacy of the Somali state-building process is undermined

Legitimacy is essential in peacebuilding and state-building processes.[122] In Somalia, climate change impacts facilitate dynamics that indirectly provide opportunities to undermine the state-building process facilitated by UNSOM.

The combination of more frequent droughts, a weak FGS and UN actors that are unable to adequately respond in al-Shabab controlled territories is creating conditions that al-Shabab is strategically using to gain legitimacy among the population. For instance, in areas under its control, the insurgent group functions as a service provider for the population—not least during floods and droughts. Generally, al-Shabab collects the Islamic zakah—a religious tax—at roadblocks, as well as in the form of alms that every person must provide during traditional events such as Ramadan.[123] During humanitarian disasters, al-Shabab collects food and money through its distribution centres to provide disaster relief to those affected, especially the poor. The increasingly cyclical occurrence of drought, flood and famine gives al-Shabab the opportunity to highlight its position as a

[119] Hiraal Institute, *The AS Finance System* (Hiraal Institute: Mogadishu, 2018).

[120] UNSOM Officer 9 (note 101).

[121] UN Security Council Resolution 2158, 29 May 2014, p. 3.

[122] Krampe, F., 'Empowering peace: service provision and state legitimacy in Nepal's peace-building process', *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2016), pp. 53–73.

[123] Hiraal Institute (note 119).

relief provider—a notable change from its previous strategy where al-Shabab would stop people in its territory from seeking aid in government-controlled territory.[124]

Aiding al-Shabab's position as a de facto government in parts of southern Somalia, the group is controlling the influx of humanitarian agencies and aid in two ways: (*a*) it controls which types of foreign aid are allowed in its territory, even in humanitarian emergencies, and (*b*) it taxes humanitarian actors at roadblocks and monitors their actions.[125] Al-Shabab has therefore set up a Humanitarian Coordination Office, which reportedly coordinates the efforts to obtain money from aid actors and monitor their activities on al-Shabab territory.[126] Politicizing humanitarian aid, al-Shabab has criticized some agencies for distributing food produced in the USA. By contrast, in territory controlled by al-Shabab, the World Food Programme is, for instance, allowed only to distribute domestically harvested food.[127] By successfully providing an alternative, the insurgent group demonstrates the weakness of the FGS to provide for the people and thereby strengthens its own rule. Additionally, al-Shabab is able to display power over the UN and other international relief actors by exerting sanctions and control while maintaining an antagonistic narrative towards other actors.

Another instance where climate change impacts indirectly undermine the legitimacy of the Somali state-building process relates to displacement. The sudden influx of large population groups from one area to another amid rapid-onset disaster such as floods is one such example. This is because the movement of displaced people into new areas is changing the demographic composition and ethnic make-up of areas. For instance, the influx of IDPs to the city of Baidoa in south-western Somalia, amid land degradation related to the impacts of climate change, led to an erosion of the UNSOM-facilitated local power-sharing agreement.[128] UNSOM staff explained that the agreement was implementing careful mediation and proportional allocation of political representation along ethnic/clan lines.[129] Yet, the influx of displaced persons changed the demographic and clan/ethnic composition of the city. These demographic changes called the legitimacy of the power-sharing agreement into question and set back UN efforts to support the building of governance institutions and broader state-building in Somalia.

UNSOM officials stress that clan maps for Somalia quickly become outdated, as climate change and conflict impacts are rapidly altering the demographic geography of the country.[130] This has direct implications for peace efforts as the case

[124] Somalia expert (note 10).

[125] Harnisch, C., 'The terror threat from Somalia: the internationalization of Al Shabaab', American Enterprise Institute (Feb. 2010), p. 15.

[126] Jackson, A. and Abdi Aynte, A., *Talking to the Other Side: Humanitarian Negotiations with Al-Shabaab in Somalia* (Humanitarian Policy Group: London, Dec. 2013).

[127] Mwangi, O. G., 'State collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and legitimacy in Somalia', *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, vol. 13, no. 4 (Dec. 2012), pp. 513–27.

[128] UNSOM Officer 5 (note 94).

[129] UNSOM Officer 5 (note 94); and UNSOM Officer 9 (note 101).

[130] UNSOM Officer 9 (note 101).

of power-sharing in Baidoa illustrates. UNSOM has been engaged in facilitating the local power-sharing agreement, including mediation and political representation along clan and ethnicity lines. Implicitly, this challenges the perceived legitimacy of the UN as a local mediator because demographic shifts resulting from migration undermine the mission's effectiveness in this area. This means that local conflicts and conflict resolution efforts become quickly entangled with broader governance structures.[131]

Power-sharing agreements along the main clan lines are common in all levels of Somali governance. These agreements are generally good tools for peacebuilding to manage local grievances. However, according to senior UNSOM officials, in the context of increasing climate impacts that make fluctuating demographics more common, these agreements are quickly perceived as being unrepresentative by the population and political factions. By extension, they undermine UNSOM in state-building and the development of a federal system.[132] This creates tensions in local communities, and also disrupts efforts by the UN to establish agreement among the clans—a task that becomes more difficult as the perceived legitimacy of Somali governance structures deteriorates.

Moreover, in the context of drought and famine, al-Shabab is able to gain a positive impact as a service provider because it is more flexible and therefore resilient to the impacts. It has succeeded in making the larger international aid community and UNSOM seem weak, while at the same time it has gained legitimacy among the population through exerting control over international actors. This dynamic presents a significant obstacle for UNSOM and the FGS to successfully support the Somali state-building process.

Urbanization is increasing, leaving the Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations unprepared

Natural resources are becoming increasingly stressed and scarce, making farmer and herder livelihoods more difficult to sustain.[133] The lack of viable options in rural settings has pushed people to urban centres like Mogadishu, which is now Africa's most densely populated city.[134] As few individuals return to their areas of origin, urban areas grapple with challenging socioeconomic conditions and high unemployment rates. Migrants arrive in Mogadishu because of several push and pull factors. Those that flee their homes due to conflict or fast-onset natural disasters often arrive at cities without any material belongings and means to support their families. Consequently, temporary, inadequate and often illegal shelters and settlements at the fringes of cities are common. The Norwegian Refugee Council described how tensions among clans and land disputes are adding to the tense socioeconomic situation in these settlements. Legal quarrels

[131] Menkhaus (note 89).

[132] UNSOM Officer 9 (note 101).

[133] Markakis (note 69).

[134] Haydarov, R. et al., 'Evidence-based engagement of the Somali pastoralists of the Horn of Africa in polio immunization: overview of tracking, cross-border, operations, and communication strategies', *Global Health Communication*, vol. 2, no. 1 (July 2016).

have made forced evictions common causing secondary displacement.[135] The severe strain on the UN and the absence of an effective government mean that there is a shortage of sustainable housing options.

Mogadishu is far from resilient to the transformative impacts of climate change, and urban flooding is common.[136] Yet, regardless of access to safe housing and services, the formerly rural population of all ages is unprepared for life in an urban economy. Even though urbanization is not explicitly part of the UNSOM mandate, senior UNSOM officials identify it as a key challenge for Somalia's social and economic development.[137] The inclusion of urbanized youth in the country's political processes—thus keeping them from criminal activities, clan tensions and insurgent recruitment—is a particular challenge for the UN. Poverty reduction is key to UN global efforts for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and is inherent to the UNCT. It is in the interest of the FGS and the UN to avoid widespread unemployment. The UN strategic framework is aiming to support socioeconomic opportunities through work by agencies such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), but the challenge of stimulating non-rural jobs for a growing urban population without official qualifications is immense.[138]

When considering the UNCT as an extension of actors implementing the UNSOM mandate, there are even examples of widespread local unemployment directly impeding UN efforts to provide water services. A senior UNSOM official shared the following experience: '. . . there were two to three instances where there were certain groups who [did] a bit of vandalism [when] we were setting up for example water pumps. But then through the local communities, those things were brought back and put in place. It was not really [connected to] a clan conflict; it was more the young people not having employment, so they tried to steal.'[139] Yet, receiving adequate funding to deal with these challenges remains difficult, as a senior UN official expressed: 'We are struggling very hard for these issues to gain greater understanding and to receive funding and to address them.'[140]

This example demonstrates that the communal absence of purposeful occupation—jobs or education—may have direct implications for UN activities. But the lack of employment is also an indirect and systematic risk for realization of the UNSOM mandate, as poverty and lack of employment opportunities provide fertile ground for illegal or violent activities.[141]

Nevertheless, the decline in farming, new economic trends and urbanization are global phenomena that are neither unique to Somalia nor driven solely by climate change. Yet, increasingly unpredictable seasons and warmer temperatures fundamentally affect the prospects for an economy based on natural resources.

[135] Norwegian Refugee Council, 'Troubling trend sees evictions in Somalia double', 28 Aug. 2018.

[136] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Unsettlement: Urban Displacement in the 21st Century* (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: Geneva, 2018).

[137] UNSOM Officer 3, Interview via Skype, Nov. 2018; and UNSOM Officer 9 (note 101).

[138] UNSOM Officer 2, Interview via Skype, Dec. 2018; and UNSOM Officer 3 (note 137).

[139] UNSOM Officer 4 (note 73).

[140] UNSOM Officer 9 (note 101).

[141] UNDP (note 68).

Economic stimulation in urban economies is necessary to avoid a compounding wave of urban poverty when rural livelihoods are no longer an option, which is especially relevant in Somalia and for UNSOM.

Risks relating to health and to sexual and gender-based violence are increasing

Climate-induced change compounds existing social and cultural vulnerabilities. One of the dynamics is linked to the increasingly warmer temperatures. Daily maximum average temperatures range from 30°C to 40°C and are expected to increase due to climate change.[142] This makes daily activities for women, such as the fetching of water or collection of firewood, more demanding or even riskier for their health and well-being. The limited access and availability of adequate water sources—according to UNICEF, only 45 per cent of Somalis have access to improved water sources—is exposing Somalis, especially in rural areas, to high risks of contracting waterborne diseases. But the need to walk long distances also exposes Somalis to direct risks, including gender-based violence and human rights violations.[143] Moreover, UNDP stresses the need for men to find water during droughts for livestock, while 'women and children are expected to stay at home and care for the other livestock'.[144] Again, this increases the vulnerability of women and children to abuse while adding another set of demanding daily tasks to an already heavy workload.

A second dynamic relates to climate-induced displacement. The level of internal displacement more than tripled in Somalia from 2005 to 2018. Causes for this increase included the droughts in 2011 and 2017.[145] According to the Secretary-General's reports in May and August 2019, increased activity by al-Shabab in the first few months of 2019, accompanied by the absence of rain due to the delayed Gu season, meant that there were 2.6 million individuals displaced within Somalia by the middle of 2019.[146] Given the difficult conditions in IDP camps, as discussed previously, women in particular are exposed to sexual violence. According to Human Rights Watch, this has increased in recent years.[147] The weak physical shelters in IDP camps—often constructed from plastic, cloth or cardboard—make it difficult to provide security and guarantee the protection of IDPs, demonstrating the breadth of women's vulnerability in these circumstances.[148] In addition, the traditional clan mechanisms to protect against harassment and violence can become disrupted when groups are displaced. Women from ethnic minority groups are especially vulnerable in this situation.[149]

[142] Hadden (note 41).

[143] Thulstrupa et al. (note 40).

[144] UNDP, Gender in Somalia, [n.d.].

[145] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2018/800, 30 Aug. 2018.

[146] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2019/393, 15 May 2019; and UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2019/661, 15 Aug. 2019.

[147] Human Rights Watch (note 29).

[148] UNSOM and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR), *Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia* (UNSOM and OHCR: Dec. 2017).

[149] Human Rights Watch, *'Here, Rape is Normal': A Five-Point Plan to Curtail Sexual Violence in Somalia* (Human Rights Watch: New York, 2014).

The UNSOM mandate aims to help build the capacity of the FGS to prevent any violation of human rights or international humanitarian law, specifically stressing the need for protection of women and children. UNSOM is mandated to help build the capacity of the FGS in preventing conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence by strengthening justice institutions and accountability.Because climate change is exposing women to insecure circumstances, there is a growing need to improve the protection of women in many parts of Somalia. One method for UNSOM to reach this goal is the provision of gender advisers and women's protection advisers.[150] The prolonged droughts and growing incidences of gender-based violence mean that the tasks of such advisers are becoming harder and more complex.

It is important to stress that 'women' are not a homogeneous group facing identical challenges and opportunities across Somalia. Additionally, it is necessary to recognize that 'women' should not be conflated with gender; conflict affects women and men in different ways, and can change male and female gender norms and relations.[151] For example in urban areas, women are now engaging in trade activities that were traditionally dominated by men, such as currency exchange and in trading livestock, the drug qaad and fuel.[152] Despite living in poverty and insecurity, in some circumstances, women have taken on the role of primary breadwinner in their households. Women have also been actively involved in the conflict—as combatants and peacemakers.[153] However, this change in roles has not significantly altered underlying patriarchal cultural values, even though the conflict has also widened inequalities between Somali men and affected male societal roles.[154]

To summarize, the impacts of climate-related change indirectly increase the vulnerability of women and men. They provide an opening for some actors to expose individuals to abuse and increase the overall risk of gender-based violence. While sexual and gender-based violence affects women on a larger scale, the exposure of men to this type of violence should not be ignored. Preventive measures through UNSOM and other actors become increasingly difficult to realize given the growing scale of the problem. Comprehensive analysis of root causes to lack of resilience to weather extremes and a culture of gender discrimination would benefit from advice provided by UNSOM to the FGS.

[150] UN (note 71).

[151] Puechguirbal, N., 'Discourses on gender, patriarchy and resolution 1325: a textual analysis of UN documents', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 17, no. 2 (2010), pp. 172–87.

[152] Musse, F. and Gardner, J., *A Gender Profile of Somalia* (EU Somalia Mission: 2013).

[153] Ingiriis, M. H. and Hoehne, M. V., 'The impact of civil war and state collapse on the roles of Somali women: a blessing in disguise', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2013), pp. 314–33.

[154] Gardner, J. and El-Bushra, J., 'Somalia: The impact of war on Somali men and its effects on the family, women and children', Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, Rift Valley Institute, Feb. 2016.

5. Institutional responses to climate-related security risk

Throughout the past three decades UN missions in Somalia have had to adapt to tough climatic conditions and their knock-on effects. UN agencies are generally well equipped to respond to natural hazards such as flooding and droughts and to provide adequate humanitarian assistance. For conflict-affected states, these responses become ever more complex and inhibited by conflict dynamics and complicated politics. This has created new demands on peace efforts. UNSOM has found pathways to adapt to the complicated situation on the ground, in the face of increasing frequency and strength of extreme weather events and the human impacts. UN actors in Somalia are jointly referred to as an integrated mission or office. According to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), an integrated mission is 'a strategic partnership [... with ...] a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at country-level'.[155]

Most of the responses are reactions to current or emerging weather-related emergencies and rarely anticipate or adapt to climate-related risks. As pointed out by senior UNSOM leadership, the problem is exacerbated by the inadequate funding streams for UNSOM. Only through creative fundraising was UNSOM able to implement some of the drought responses.

This chapter provides insight into the institutional response—how UNSOM has responded and integrated the security challenges stemming from climate-related environmental change into its ongoing operations. Three institutional responses are specifically discussed: (*a*) a coordinated drought response, (*b*) a Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) and (*c*) an environmental security adviser. These are conspicuous examples of how UNSOM has responded to the compounding climate-related security risks.

Coordinated drought response

Famine has hit Somalia on several occasions. They were often of heightened severity because of the dual effects of drought and conflict, as in 1991–92 and 2010–12. In particular, the impact of the 2011 drought led to strong self-reflection within the UN as a Food and Agriculture Organization and Famine Early Warning Systems Network study estimated in 2013 'that famine and severe food insecurity in Somalia claimed the lives of about 258,000 people between October 2010 and April 2012, including 133,000 children under 5'.[156]

During the emerging drought and famine in parts of Somalia in 2016, the Somali Government and UNSOM leadership were strongly committed to

[155] UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (UN: New York, 2008).

[156] FAO, 'Study suggests 258,000 Somalis died due to severe food insecurity and famine', 3 June 2013.

preventing another famine from happening (see box 5.1 for drought response).[157] In 2016 international actors such as the UN and Oxfam sounded the alarm and warned of potential drought-related famine in 2016 and 2017. In early 2017 UN OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team in Somalia released an operational plan that outlined the needs, gaps and plans for famine prevention response by humanitarian partners in the first half of 2017.[158]

There were a few unique features that made the response more successful. According to interviewees, one of them was the determined attitude and recognition of the risks within the Somali Government. As a senior UNSOM officer stressed:

> . . . the request to address the underlying causes didn't come from us. . . . just before the drought in late 2016 the authority [the FGS] was saying: we know the drought is coming, we have to fight it, we are asking the international community that this should be the last time we were going to be on the brink of starvation. That makes it easier because you have a federal level and a sub-federal level you have authorities that [care], and this hadn't happened in the country for three decades.[159]

A second positive change was a new institutional feature with the creation of a Drought Operations Coordination Center (DOCC), established in Mogadishu, and later also regionally, for example in Baidoa.[160] The aim of this DOCC was 'to seek to harmonise humanitarian relief efforts in order to reach all people in need of assistance'.[161] Within the DOCCs, different UN agencies were able to coordinate their responses and be 'engaged in daily planning for the multi-sectoral response'.[162] This type of coordinated effort had not occurred as a response to previous droughts in the country.[163] As a senior UNSOM official recalled: 'The near-famine in 2016–17 really brought us together and allowed us to put a number of more innovative approaches into place, such as a drought operation coordination centre, on different locations. This is bringing together all the agencies around the table on a real-time basis, we're looking at the situation from a multi-sectoral point of view and therefore our responses are multifocal.'[164]

In conclusion, a severe famine was avoided and the response has been described as a 'success'.[165] After a surprisingly rich Gu rainy season in 2018, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted how food security improved considerably, despite some flooding.[166] The number of acutely food-insecure people had

[157] UNSOM Officer 3, Consultation in Stockholm, May 2019.

[158] UN OCHA, 'Somalia: Operational Plan for Famine Prevention (Jan-Jun 2017)', Feb. 2017.

[159] UNSOM Officer 3, Interview via Skype, Nov. 2018.

[160] World Food Programme (WFP), *Somalia Operation Overview—Drought Response Operation Overview* (WFP: Feb.–July 2017); and UNSOM, 'UN opens regional drought operations coordination centre in Baidoa', 19 Mar. 2017.

[161] UNSOM (note 160).

[162] WFP (note 160).

[163] UNSOM Officer 4 (note 73); and UNSOM Officer 3 (note 157).

[164] UNSOM Officer 3 (note 159).

[165] UNSOM Officer 3 (note 159); and Brady, J., 'The new way of working is not exactly "new" to Somalia', UN OCHA, 27 Feb. 2018.

[166] UNHCR (note 103).

Box 5.1. Previous drought response in Somalia

The droughts in 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2010–11 had devastating impacts on the population in terms of famine, food insecurity, water scarcity and loss of livelihoods in Somalia.[a] In August 2010 predictions by international aid agencies were made about an approaching rain deficiency. Despite early warnings of drought, the crisis unfolded on an enormous scale. In the absence of any state-led response—and a substantial delay in major international response—it became the first time in three decades that the United Nations declared a famine in the area.[b] The famine was triggered by a major production failure and a global spike in the price of food. This severely reduced people's purchasing power at a time when local production had collapsed in the context of an ongoing civil war.[c] The circumstances displaced thousands of Somalis domestically, and more than 1 million Somali refugees fled to neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia.[d] Two areas that were hardest hit by the drought and subsequent famine in 2011 were the Lower Shabelle area and Bakool in the south. At the time, they were also under al-Shabab control.

Meanwhile, the United States—Somalia's biggest donor until 2009—had received reports that insurgents were taxing and raiding food convoys and threatening the work of aid agencies. Consequently, the USA imposed a rule which stated that aid would be stopped if there was a possibility that it would 'materially benefit' terrorist groups.[b] The catastrophe was thus due to the absence of a central government, lack of planning and response to early warnings, circumstances negating the financial support of key donors, ongoing conflict, and the failure of international actors to jointly respond to the crisis. The severely delayed international aid response has received a considerable amount of research attention, which placed it in the context of the 'global war on terrorism' but lacked analysis of other factors such as the limited involvement of the Federal Government.[c]

Despite early warnings, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives during the 2011 drought.[e] Five years later, the trend almost repeated itself. Two successive poor rainy seasons in 2016–17 provoked a creeping drought—the same perilous pattern as in 2011. The number of people affected by drought-related diseases and malnutrition rose. Abnormal migration of cattle in search of grassland, large-scale crop failure and livestock death spread. Competition for diminishing resources increased local tensions and irritated inter-communal relations.[f] Notably, a demographic difference was that, in 2011, fleeing Somalis wandered hundreds of kilometres and crossed borders for shelter, but in 2017 the displacement took place within dozens of kilometres.

[a] Ogallo, L. A. et al., 'Land cover changes in Lower Jubba Somalia', *American Journal of Climate Change*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 2018), pp. 367–87.

[b] Pflanz, M., 'UN declares first famine in Africa for three decades as US withholds aid', *The Daily Telegraph*, 20 July 2011.

[c] Maxwell, D. et al., 'Facing famine: Somali experiences in the famine of 2011', *Food Policy*, vol. 65 (Dec. 2016), pp. 63–73.

[d] Human Rights Watch, *'Here, Rape is Normal': A Five-Point Plan to Curtail Sexual Violence in Somalia* (Human Rights Watch: New York, 2014).

[e] Oxfam and Save the Children, *A Dangerous Delay: The Cost of Late Response to Early Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa*, Joint Agency Briefing Paper (Oxfam/Save the Children: Oxford/London, Jan. 2012).

[f] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Somalia: Operational Plan for Famine Prevention (Jan-Jun 2017)', Feb. 2017.

decreased by over half, from 3.3 million in 2017 to 1.5 million in 2018.[167] Yet as the drought continued, the UN warned in June 2019 that '2.2 million people could face acute food insecurity' by September 2019.[168]

[167] UN OCHA, 'Somalia: 2019 humanitarian response plan aims to address underlying causes to long standing issues', 21 Jan. 2019.

[168] Gladstone, R., 'UN aid chief warns of looming "horror" as Somalia again faces famine', *New York Times*, 5 June 2019.

It is worth noting that while the creation of DOCCs was an ad hoc measure, it was decided that these centres should be kept and turned into permanent resilience centres.[169] An interviewee highlighted how the integrated approach to addressing a potential drought and humanitarian crisis in Somalia was an unintentional manifestation of the so-called 'new way of working'. This new way of working, as introduced by UN Secretary-Genera António Guterres, is the embedding of the nexus of humanitarian and development matters into the heart of UN manoeuvres. As the UNSOM officer reflected: 'So probably implementing the new way of working is to make it relevant for your context. And to have the government involved.'[170]

The Recovery and Resilience Framework

The RRF for Somalia resulted from the coordinated response to the drought event in 2017–18. It aims to address the underlying drivers of drought vulnerability by providing a long-term plan.[171] One UNSOM officer illustrated how the responses to vulnerabilities must have a broad approach to fully encompass the scope of climate-related risks: 'These consequences [of climate-related change] are for the people, the economy and even the political situation that Somalia faces. This is of deep concern not just for the UN, but also the government, national actors and for non-governmental organizations and humanitarian actors here.'[172]

Upon request by the Somali Government, the EU, the UN and the World Bank supported a comprehensive assessment of the drought. As a senior UNSOM official recalled: 'So even in the drought we started to look at what damage the drought did and also we started mapping the measures that it would require for a drought of that magnitude not to have the same impact anymore. The drought impact need assessment was an assessment run under the leadership of the government but we [the UN] brought in almost 200 experts from the World Bank, UN and EU.'[173] The process led to a Somalia drought impact and needs assessment, which was a three-volume assessment that aimed to take stock of the drought-related damages and losses, and also to outline the 'recovery and resilience needs' for the Somali Government to focus on.[174] The latter part specifically resulted in the RRF.

As outlined in the road map towards the RRF from 3 January 2018, 'The RRF will seek complementarity and synergy with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2018 launched in January 2018.' The HRP functions as the official resource mobilization instrument for the UN in Somalia.[175] With one third of

[169] UNSOM Officer 7, Interview via Skype, Apr. 2019; and UNCT Officer 1, Interview via Skype, June 2019.

[170] UNSOM Officer 3, Interview via Skype, Mar. 2019.

[171] UN OCHA (note 167).

[172] UNSOM Officer 4 (note 73).

[173] UNSOM Officer 3 (note 170).

[174] UNDP and World Bank, 'Toward drought recovery and resilience: the Somalia drought impact and needs assessment and Recovery and Resilience Framework', 2018.

[175] Somali Federal Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED), *Guiding Principles and Roadmap Towards the Recovery and Resilience Framework for Somalia* [MOPIED: Jan. 2018].

the population requiring humanitarian assistance and protection, the funding and operations through the HRP and its 352 projects (in 2019) is a matter of life and death in all 18 administrative regions of Somalia.[176] 'While the overarching priority of the HRP is life-saving assistance, the RRF will outline recovery and resilience initiatives that need to be undertaken over the medium- to longer-term to reduce needs, risks and vulnerabilities.'[177] Moreover, cross-sector prioritization of recovery needs, institutional capacity building and monitoring and evaluation systems are mentioned in the RRF.[178] The RRF works as a collective planning mechanism, formulating the programme and priorities to tackle needs in urban and rural areas.

The aim of the RRF, which is fully consistent with the national development plan, is to address the underlying drivers of drought vulnerability.[179] Implementation of the RRF will be supported through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility, which is a coordination framework and a financing architecture for implementing the national development plan. The RRF therefore offers a mechanism to move away from dependence on humanitarian support. The provision of multiple funding sources embodies a broader scope of support and is also key to flexibility and financial resilience, according to a senior official within UNSOM.[180]

Due to consistently low levels of local and federal institutional capacity, moving away from humanitarian support presents a dilemma for the UN and other actors. As the UNCT has pointed out in its strategic framework, the country has long been fully dependent on humanitarian assistance, and thus on regular interventions for immediate relief. This is a cause and an effect of crisis. Resilience to shocks and cyclical emergencies is therefore chronically low.[181] The RRF forms integrated medium- to long-term recovery and resilience initiatives to address needs, and reduce vulnerabilities and risks caused by drought.

A senior UNSOM official noted that the approach taken to address the drought event in Somalia is in line with the UN reform process and the new way of working: '. . . then when we got missions coming in from HQ and it turned out that it made sense according to the theory—and so we had a mission coming in that told us about the "collective outcomes", and as part of the process I just described, the drought impact need assessment, RRF, the working together of the hum-dev nexus looking at the underlying causes—we were doing this stuff, we were simply just doing this stuff.'[182]

[176] UN OCHA, *Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan Summary* (Jan. 2019).

[177] MOPIED (note 175).

[178] Somali Federal Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED), *Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework Summary Report* (MOPIED: June 2018).

[179] UN OCHA (note 167).

[180] UNSOM Officer 3 (note 170).

[181] UN (note 71).

[182] UNSOM Officer 3 (note 170).

An environmental security adviser

The third notable response to the increasing impacts of climate change and the link to peace efforts in Somalia resulted from exchanges between the senior leadership of UNSOM and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The idea of appointing an environmental security adviser emerged in 2017. According to several sources, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Somalia at the time identified the need to connect environmental degradation to societal changes, as this was understood to have implications on security. In consultations with the UNEP Director, the foundations were laid for creating the position of a senior programme management officer, which will be placed in the integrated office of the Deputy SRSG/Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator.[183]

Receiving financial support from the German Foreign Office, the environmental security adviser will work on issues related to the impact of climate change, environmental degradation and conflicts over natural resources. The adviser will also provide analysis of how these issues may affect the dynamics of politics, security and conflicts.[184] The portfolio will include tasks such as enhancing coordination of environment-related programmes and projects in Somalia, and identifying any unintended adverse consequences arising from environment-related projects. The environmental security adviser is expected to provide coordination among different entities, identify gaps and improve responses 'in partnership with the Resident Coordinator members of the UN Country Team, United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM), development partners and civil society'.[185] The person appointed will work closely with political elements in the integration and coordination of a preventive approach to climate-related risks for the UNCT. UN officials expect the adviser to play mostly a coordinating role.[186]

[183] UNEP Officer 1, Interview via Skype, Jan. 2019; German MFA Officer 1, Interview via Skype, Dec. 2018; UNEP Officer 2, Personal communication with authors, Nov. 2018–Aug. 2019; and UNSOM Officer 1, Interview via Skype, Jan. 2019.

[184] German MFA Officer 1, Interview via Skype, Dec. 2018; UNEP Officer 2, Personal communication with authors, Nov. 2018–Aug. 2019; and UN Careers, 'Job openings', 2019.

[185] UN Careers, 'Job openings', 2019.

[186] UNCT Officer 2, Interview via Skype, June 2019.

6. Implications and ways forward

As outlined in the introduction, this report aims to contribute to the understanding of: (*a*) how climate-related environmental change in Somalia and the Horn of Africa is hindering the successful implementation of the UNSOM mandate and (*b*) how UNSOM has integrated the challenges stemming from climate-related environmental change into its ongoing operations.

The analysis has shown that climate change affects the work of UNSOM in multiple ways and that there are several notable responses to the increasing number of challenges. Climate change has affected UNSOM in its attempts to provide peace and security, and also in its efforts to establish functioning governance and judicial systems. The key drivers are the substantial impacts of climate-related change on the livelihood of people, especially through the effects on migration and forced displacement. The absence of livelihood options and the increase in poverty contribute to grievances and fragility that hamper implementation of the UNSOM mandate.

The consequences are societal pressures that fuel grievances and provide opportunities for a range of actors to benefit politically, and for people to choose illicit alternative livelihoods (e.g. human trafficking and charcoal trading). Grievances that are linked to group affiliation are particularly serious risk factors because they affect conflicts on multiple levels and are likely to inhibit resolution and thus prolong the conflicts in Somalia. Despite these clear linkages between climate-related change and the socioeconomic and political dynamics on the ground, there is a general lack of awareness, especially in the donor community, of how environmental problems are directly linked to livelihood, and indirectly linked to to migration and displacement.

It is important to stress that UNSOM has responded to the increasing impact of climate-related change. Effective learning from previous failed responses—notably the 2011 drought response—has brought to bear innovative successful initiatives such as the DOCCs. While there is still room to improve drought coordination, the implementation of the RRF and the appointment of an environmental security adviser may help to deliver a set of responses that meet the short-term need for a rapid humanitarian response and the long-term objective of achieving a sustainable and resilient society. These are essential for peacebuilding in Somalia to be successful, given the increasing stress of climate impacts in this conflict-affected country. The harsh climatic conditions have dictated the need for more integrated approaches to UN peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.

Based on an understanding of these contemporary challenges for UN missions, synergetic policy responses can turn into opportunities for UN efforts to sustain peace. The following proposes implications and ways forward for the UN in Somalia, similar missions in climate-vulnerable areas and the UN system.

For the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations Country Team

While the avoidance of famine in Somalia is a significant achievement, it is key for UNSOM to continuously learn and adapt to the ever-changing climatic, social and political circumstances in Somalia, to realize the common vision for sustainable and resilient peace. Climate-related impacts are evolving and will require further flexibility, adaptation and new mechanisms beyond those that work today. Three ways forward are highlighted for UNSOM.

1. Promote flexibility in short-term humanitarian–security cooperation

The intersection of climate-related humanitarian crises in a fragile context highlights the need for coordination between governments, humanitarian actors and security actors working in Somalia. The idea of positioning UN humanitarian activities under the same control structure as security or military actors is contested for good reasons. However, the reshaping of the security landscape by climate change raises difficult questions about the need for and benefits of short-term humanitarian–security cooperation, and whether this can be achieved without undermining humanitarian neutrality. There needs to be flexibility for humanitarian actors to use expanded resource space and perfunctory tools when climate-related risks arise. But this flexibility requires quick context-dependent decisions to understand in what configuration humanitarian assistance, security responses, development cooperation and peacebuilding can be synergized to provide the best possible outcomes in the short term, without undermining long-term peace and development. The current structure of the UNCT is equipped with units that synthesize analysis and risk. While the Risk Management Unit (RMU) has a comparable purpose, it does not have the capacity to conduct the thematic risk analysis that would be required for assessment of climate-related risks.[187] Nevertheless, the UN in Somalia is still well positioned to work with an integrated approach to assess climate-related security risks. There is potential to use the RMU and its Integrated Analysis Team to conduct sophisticated analysis for decision making on responses to climate-related security risks.

2. Create an adaptive long-term strategy and vision

As demonstrated by UNSOM's successful coordinated response to recent drought events and the implementation of the RRF—which has laid the foundations for effective long-term resilience building and development strategies—it is important to adapt response structures to evolving circumstances. Placing an emphasis on a long-term adaptive strategy could help to shift the common vision among UNSOM, the UNCT and the FGS that emerged around the drought response to encompass other areas. UNSOM should proactively identify climate action as an opportunity to build sustainable peace. Projects that aim for climate action and development could help to bring about short-term adaptation and long-term

[187] UNCT Officer 1, Interview via Skype, June 2019.

resilience. A key aim of such projects should be to recast the role of women as agents of positive change, rather than victims of climate-related impacts. Inclusive community engagement will also contribute to peacebuilding and strengthen the state's ability to provide services and enable climate-sensitive development. As part of that, the inclusion of youth groups in decision-making processes and consideration of a diverse range of perspectives will benefit peace efforts and help to catalyse a long-term approach. Such approaches will aid conflict prevention as they mitigate local grievances and reduce marginalization, which are becoming increasingly prevalent causes of conflict.

3. Increase regional response mechanisms in the Horn of Africa

In addition to developing the response within Somalia, the transnational character of climate change will require broader regional coordinated responses. The creation of a regional climate security adviser for the Horn of Africa could provide advantages for the quality and utility of climate-related security risk assessments and coordination of responses across the area. Regional organizations, such as the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are relevant entry and attachment points for such a regional adviser. For instance, IGAD has existing capacity through its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre, which deal with climate-related security risks.

For similar United Nations missions in vulnerable areas

With mounting manifestations of climate change and coupled responses by the UN Security Council to assign UN missions with the task of reporting on risks, more missions are expected to include analysis and evaluation of climate-related security risks.

4. Prepare now for climate impacts

For peacebuilding efforts in climate-vulnerable areas, it is pivotal to start thinking about how climate change will affect the work. The lesson from Somalia is that missions should increase capacity to assess climate-related security risks by increasing the dialogue among different UN agencies working within the country. The recruitment of an environmental security adviser would probably stimulate such dialogue and increase mission capacity to improve reporting on climate risks to the UN Secretary-General. Moving towards improved integration and coordination is essential to prevent climate-related impacts from negatively affecting the peacebuilding mandate of missions. The UN new way of working provides an opportunity for mission leaders to improve the integration of their missions, while at the same time protecting them from potential climate-related security risks. Seeking regional support through regional peace and development advisers and regional climate security advisers will pre-emptively strengthen knowledge and early warning capacity.

5. Learn what works and what does not

Increased information exchange among mission leaders about responses that worked and about what failed are essential parts of increasing the adaptive learning capacity of peacebuilding missions. Even though all UN missions have context-based features and unique histories, the ability for missions in Somalia to manage climate-related risks and assess the security-related consequences of climate change so far has been dependent on mission leadership. An interviewee at a senior level noted that the success of the integrated mission in Somalia and the coordination itself depend on 'how you set up your relationship with your country team'.[188] There is no recipe for success, but trust is a critical factor.

6. Dare to try new responses

Climate change substantially alters the security landscape that peacebuilding missions operate in. While this demands learning about what worked and what did not, it also demands new untested responses. Yet, finding new innovative solutions for the specific context is a risk that needs to be weighed up by mission leaders; this will require compromises and create dilemmas. The leaders of peacebuilding missions know that there are no easy solutions. Tackling these kinds of complex challenges requires technical and political experts (national and international) that trust each other enough to build the standing capacity to address unforeseen obstacles to delivering a common (and evolving) national vision. In all likelihood, the responses will fail a number of times in one way or another and suffer setbacks. It will be critical for missions and mission leaders to establish an environment where transparency about failures is a learning opportunity to make incremental improvements to future responses.

For the United Nations system

There are a few ways forward that can be drawn from this paper as to how the UN system can adjust to climate-related security risks.

7. Synthesize the climate risk assessment capacity

In 2017 and 2018 the UN Security Council began to assign UN missions the task of reporting assessments on climate-related security risks. There is a need for the UN system to improve its understanding and assessment of the compounding risk factors of climate change. Therefore, more in-depth qualitative analysis is required to develop the UN institutional assessment capacity of these risks. Without this, the reports about climate risks by UNCTs will not provide useful assessments for consideration by the UN Security Council. A key role in this will be played by the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), which is tasked to provide integrated climate risk assessments to UN bodies. The CSM is hosted by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), with staff allocated to it by UNDP

[188] UNSOM Officer 3 (note 159).

and UNEP, as well as by the DPPA.[189] This mechanism can be considered a first step in a more comprehensive response to climate-related security risks. The CSM can facilitate the process of synergizing existing knowledge from different UN agencies and areas and cases, and feed this back into the central UN system.

8. Improve training of peacebuilding actors

Synthesized existing knowledge should be used to inform training of UN staff to improve their capacity to understand and respond to climate-related security risks. This is needed to continuously update the knowledge base of the UN system and to improve reporting to the UN Secretary-General. The UN should therefore invest in joint, cross-agency training to enhance coordination and learning across the system. The synthesized knowledge across cases through the CSM work with peace and development advisers, RCs and other actors will help to drive and develop the training and keep it practical and relevant.

Additional training at senior management level, such as SRSGs and RCs, would support an overall understanding of climate-related security risks and provide many synergies to the points raised above. In light of the ongoing UN reform with the new RC structure, there is a window of opportunity to invest in equipping staff with new skills and expertise. Given that the UN currently does not have the full capacity to make climate-related risk assessments, investment in training by non-UN actors should be considered. Consultation of external expertise will also help to prevent against institutional bias and the inclusion of unfounded internal preconceptions.

9. Adjust funding streams to support integrated responses

As of 2019, donors such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund have acknowledged that Somalia is on a path of positive progress. In light of this positive development, donors and partners have made record-high donations to Somalia in the past year.[190] Even though there is immense potential to rebuild Somalia physically and institutionally, an inherent difficulty in responding to climate-related security risks is the siloed funding structure that attaches funding to specific and isolated responses, thereby inhibiting integrated responses. Although extending the role of the RC with regard to the allocation of multi-year funding might cause some unforeseen problems, it would almost certainly strengthen the sustainability of coordinated responses to climate-related security risks and support the long-term aim of building sustainable and resilient peace. The Peacebuilding Fund could be one possible pathway to establishing broader and more integrated funding to missions.

[189] Smith, D. et al., *Climate Security Making it #Doable* (Clingendael: Feb. 2019), p. 14.

[190] European External Action Service, 'European Union announces its first ever budget support to Somalia', 27 Sep. 2018; and Swedish Government, 'Somalia Partnership Forum supports positive developments in Somalia', 12 July 2018.

CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA

Climate-related security risks are transforming the security landscape in which multilateral peacebuilding efforts take place. This policy paper offers a glimpse into the future of peacebuilding in the time of climate change by providing an in-depth assessment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

Climate-related change in Somalia has reduced livelihood options and caused migration. It has also left significant parts of the population in a vulnerable condition. These climate-related security risks contribute to grievances and increase inequality and fragility, which in turn pose challenges to the implementation of UNSOM's mandate. The impacts of climate change have hindered UNSOM in its work to provide peace and security in Somalia and in its efforts to establish functioning governance and judicial systems.

UNSOM has responded to the growing impact of climate-related change. It has learned lessons from previous failed responses—notably the 2011 drought—and has created innovative initiatives that have been effective. While there is still room for improvement, UNSOM's new initiatives may help to deliver a set of responses that meet the short-term need for a rapid humanitarian response and the long-term objective of achieving a sustainable and resilient society.

The challenges faced by UNSOM and its responses to them have wider implications. They suggest that there is a need for synergetic policy responses that can turn the responses to climate-related security risks into opportunities for UN efforts to sustain peace.

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